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The mechanization of British Cavalry regiments took place between the two 
World Wars and on into 1942. This thesis describes the process by which horsed 
cavalrymen were re-trained in armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) and the 
experiences of some of the regiments managing this change.  Extensive use has 
been made of the oral testimonies of many of the soldiers involved, a number of 
whom are still living, as well as regimental and War Office archives.  The reason 
given for the delay in cavalry mechanization, cited in some military histories, 
much influenced by Sir Basil Liddell Hart, was resistance from the cavalry to 
parting from their horses.  This thesis refutes this assertion regarding the cavalry 
as a whole, but details the exceptions of two regiments that lobbied on their 
own behalf. The principal reason for the protracted process of mechanization, 
argued in the thesis, was the lack of suitable and sufficient AFVs.  Examination 
of the Vickers papers have revealed that tank production was taking place during 
the mid-1930s, but for overseas clients.  These tanks could, speculatively, have 
been procured for British units.  Why this did not happen is examined, and the 
following factors considered: the influence of an Army Council member 
regarding the future usefulness of tanks, the pressure of public opinion, in which 
the Britain by Mass Observation archives have been illuminating, and the 
economic priorities of inter-war British Governments.  Following the 
abandonment of the ‘10 Year Rule’ in 1932, a defence policy was formulated 
that gave the army the lowest priority for rearmament of the three services and 
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For the British horsed cavalryman undergoing ‘mechanization’, the move from 
horses to vehicles, there were many changes to which he had to adapt other 
than the form of transportation and weapons platform.1  In tanks, or other 
armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs), the cavalrymen’s individual role changed.  As 
a horseman he had a dual role of being part of a mobile arm, but was equipped 
and trained to fight equally well mounted or on foot.2  In his new role in a 
vehicle it was different; he became part of a crew.  His personal armaments 
were exchanged, swords and rifles for revolvers.3  The weapons platform 
transferred from an individual conveyance, ‘grace laced with muscle and 
strength by gentleness confined’,4  to a clanking, hot, claustrophobic, metal 
capsule that had to be shared with other men.5  George ‘Yorkie’ Husband of the 
16th/5th Lancers6 explained, when interviewed for this thesis in 2010 and having 
undergone mechanization, that ‘the training was better as a horseman than [in] 
a tank.  Tank life [he remembered], takes a bit of getting used to, one horse and 
you together and then you finish up with five of you, it was a different world’.7   
 
Sharing, mutual dependence and teamwork brought a cultural as well as a 
mechanical change to cavalry regiments.  Horsed troopers, unless they were in a 
specialist group, such as machine-gunners or signallers, were all trained for a 
                                                 
1 See Appendix J for definitions and terminology. 
2 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
3 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author.  
4 From a poem by Ronald Duncan collected in Way, The Poetry of Horses, p.59.  
5 Interview with Parnell by Dr Peter Liddle; Tape 623 – The Second World War Experience Centre.  
6 See Appendix A for the Regiment’s full title. 
7 Personal interview with Husband (2010); by the author. 
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similar role, and with their horse were solo performers.  More importantly, 
mounted cavalry officers both lived and worked separately from the men they 
led.8  A tank crew had to form a team, equal in status, except for the 
commander, but nonetheless mutually dependent as a driver, signaller, gunner 
or commander.  The commander of a tank could be any rank from a lance 
corporal to a major, or sometimes the commanding officer of the regiment, who 
would ordinarily be a lieutenant colonel.9  Tank crews fought, cooked, ate and 
slept together, totally reliant on each other, for each other.  As a consequence 
of mechanization and because of this new closeness between officers, NCOs and 
troopers, the style and nature of the leadership changed.10   
 
The management of mechanized training appeared to have been similar in each 
cavalry regiment. Tried and tested, and no doubt honed by experience, it 
followed the principles of the original programme ordered by the War Office in 
1928 for the conversion to armoured cars of the 11th Hussars and the 12th 
Lancers.11  The troopers were organized into cadres of around twenty men.12  
Cavalry regiments had a higher proportion of NCOs to men, about 1 NCO to 6 or 
7 troopers, than did infantry regiments.13   This ratio was ideal for effective 
leadership and would have enhanced the efficiency of the training.  There were 
specialist trainers; the Signals Officer took charge of signals training and the 
‘Technical Adjutant’ commanded the gunnery and maintenance training.  The 
                                                 
8 Personal interviews with Lucas (2007); and Bennett (2007); by the author.  
9 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author.  
10 Personal interviews with ffrench-Blake (2006); and Husband (2010); by the author. 
11 TNA WO 32/2844 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Armoured Car Regiment:  
Organisation 1927-1928 20/Cavalry/619 War Office letter to all Commands, 4 April 1928.  
12 Personal correspondence with Jeffcut (2007); by the author.   
13 French, D., Military Identities, p.148. Infantry regiments were multi-battalions, in the Great 
War era the full strength was around one thousand soldiers. A cavalry regiment is a single 
‘battalion’.  
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majority of regiments took about twelve months to convert from horses to AFVs, 
but much depended on the availability and continuity of the supply of equipment 
with which to train.  Elements of the 8th Hussars regiment achieved an effective 
transition to vehicles in five months in 1936, and in 1942 the Royal Scots Greys 
took just eight months to convert the whole regiment from horses to tanks.  
Interviewed in 2007, Lieutenant Colonel Aiden Sprot of the Royal Scots Greys, 
the last British Regular cavalry regiment to become armoured, contended that 
one of the most singularly exceptional achievements of the British Army was that 
all Regular horsed cavalry regiments had become armoured by 1942: 
 
[It is] really rather remarkable that from that time, August 1941, we [the 
Royal Scots Greys] went from a completely horsed regiment to a 
completely mechanized one.  It is quite a complicated thing, for someone 
who has never driven a motor car before to then suddenly drive a tank.  
And someone who had never played with a wireless before – nobody had 
wirelesses in those days.  Only about fifty men out of 500 could drive a 
motor vehicle in August 1941. And it was rather remarkable that from that 
time, August 1941, we were fit to go into battle with Rommel in the 
desert in June the following year.14  
 
                                                 
14 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author.   
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This was a particularly notable feat given that there was hardly a man who had 
not previously taken his place in the regiment as a horseman.15  The 
mechanization or armouring of horsed cavalry was an exceptional example of 
change management.  A change of this magnitude could not have been 
successfully achieved without appropriate leadership, strong motivation and an 
effective training programme. 
 
The Army Council, following the end of the Great War, had no intention for the 
British Army’s Regular cavalry regiments other than to mechanize them.16  
When, in 1928, the mechanization of two cavalry regiments, the 11th Hussars 
and the 12th Lancers, was decided upon (discussed in Chapter One), the War 
Office set out a programme of how this change should be managed.  So 
successful and robust was this programme that it was, in essence, replicated for 
the other 18 Regular cavalry and the Household Cavalry regiments as they too 
went through the process of change from horses to AFVs from 1928 until 1942.  
However, the Army Council and the War Office throughout most of the inter-war 
period faced two challenges: what mechanical vehicles should replace horses 
and how was the capital cost of the vehicles to be afforded. 
 
In researching and critically examining the change process employed by the 
British cavalry to replace horses with vehicles and train cavalrymen in their 
operation, the question inevitably arose, why did this take so long?  If each 
                                                 
15 Royal Scots Greys historical records G219 Case GB51, p.4. 
16 TNA WO 32/5959 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Scheme for reduction of Cavalry 
Regiments – hand written note p.3, 24 February 1921; the General Staff, in 1921; ‘hoped’ horsed 




regiment took one year to dispose of their horses and learn to use the AFVs and 
the whole process took some 20 years, perhaps the Army Council’s budget could 
afford to equip only one regiment each year.  That was not the case; the 
mechanization of the cavalry regiments was not evenly spaced in this logical 
fashion.  Perhaps the change was poorly managed, the expertise inadequate or 
the men difficult to train, but when ordered to do so the regiments appeared to 
have moved effectively from one operational method to the other.  Perhaps 
there were other, less obvious, reasons for the protracted mechanization of the 
cavalry, perhaps the change from horses to vehicles was resisted by the officers 
and men tasked to bring it about as has been suggested in popular 
historiography.  
 
A cursory, superficial reference to popular Anglophile cavalry historiography17 
soon revealed the ‘Liddell Hart paradigm’:18 that the cause of the delay was the 
resistance to change exerted by the cavalry corps itself.  Lieutenant Colonel R L 
‘Val’ ffrench-Blake of the 17th/21st Lancers, interviewed for this thesis in 2006, 
wrote in 1962 that: 
 
There is a tendency to regard the failure to mechanize the cavalry early 
enough after the First World War, as being due to an influential and 
powerful clique based on the Cavalry Club, which steadily resisted all 
efforts on the part of the progressive elements to deprive the cavalry of 
                                                 
17 Phillips, 'The Obsolescence of the Arme Blanche and Technological Determinism in British 
History’ War in History Volume 9, No. 1, pp. 37-74.  
18 Harrison Place, Military training in the British Army, p.95. 
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their horses, and thwarted all efforts in the War Office and in Parliament. 
In fact, strong resistance was put up by some individual regiments on 
their own behalf, but not generally by the cavalry as a whole.19 
 
The source of this ‘tendency’ can be traced to the mid-1960s and the memoirs of 
Sir Basil Liddell Hart.  Liddell Hart was a journalist from 1924, and a writer of 
many works of popular military history. His publications were influential, as 
were his ‘contacts’, culminating in his becoming, in 1937, an unofficial advisor 
to the Secretary of State for War, Leslie-Hore Belisha (1937-1940), who 
considered Liddell Hart a ‘military expert’.20  In his memoirs, Liddell Hart 
proclaimed, ‘Wellington’s reputed saying that the Battle of Waterloo was won on 
the playing fields of Eton is merely a legend, but it is painfully true that the 
early battles of World War II were lost in the Cavalry Club’.21  An assertion 
justified this claim with the equally sweeping statement that the cavalry had an 
‘inbuilt technophobia’, and a ‘misplaced sentimental attachment to the 
horse’.22   
 
                                                 
19 ffrench-Blake, A History of The 17th/21st Lancers 1922-1959, pp.61/62.  
20 Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, p.40. See Appendix C for brief biography of 
Liddell Hart. 
21 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.77;  Liddell Hart had been critical of the involvement of the 
cavalry units in the Great War, he ‘insisted [the cavalry] caused more trouble to their own sides 
than to the enemy’, see Phillips, ‘Who Shall Say That the Days of Cavalry Are Over? The Revival 
of the Mounted Arm in Europe, 1853-1914’, War in History, URL: 
http://wih.sagepub.com/content/18/1/5, p.7, accessed 01.12.2011.    
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, ‘many of our failures and early difficulties in 
armoured fighting in North Africa’ was caused, according to  Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, by 
the ‘failure to provide adequate spare parts for tanks’; meeting of Churchill’s ‘Tank Parliament’, 
5 May 1941; and on 28 June 1942, Alanbrooke, regarding the war in the Middle East and how it 
would end, wrote ‘the trouble is due to our tanks being under armed as compared to the 
Germans’, Danchev and Todman, War Diaries, pp.155/156 and 274.   
22 Liddell Hart [1959], The Tanks: The History of the Royal Tank Regiment and its Predecessors, 
Heavy Branch MGC, Tank Corps and Royal Tank Corps, 1914-1939, (Cassells, London), p.200, in 
French, D., Military Identities, p.263. 
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Evidence has been found to support Liddell Hart’s assertion.  Individual 
regiments, to which ffrench-Blake correctly referred, did resist mechanization, 
but there were only two of them, The Royal Dragoons (The Royals) and the Royal 
Scots Greys (The Greys).  More specifically, it was two senior officers associated 
with their respective regiments who resisted mechanization; this is explored in 
the last chapter of this thesis. 
 
Liddell Hart’s influence had been considerable, widespread and persistent, and 
most cavalry regimental histories had done little justice to the subject of 
mechanization in terms of specific details.  They had tended to give credence to 
a reluctance to change, the idea of the sentimental attachment to the horse and 
concerns over the destruction of three hundred years of tradition.  Hector 
Bolitho’s comment in his history of The 3rd The Kings Own Hussars was typical:  
 
It would be idle to assume that either the officers or the troopers, who 
loved their horses in a way that Englishmen can never love machines, took 
kindly to their task.23   
 
In similar vein, regarding the 4th Hussars, the author David Scott Daniell 
asserted ‘life without the horse seemed no life at all [because in many cases] 
the horse, his care and ministration, his grace and beauty, was the main spring 
                                                 
23 Bolitho, The Galloping Third, p. 243. 
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of a cavalryman’s life’.24  Other examples are the 8th Queen’s Royal Irish 
Hussars ‘Short History’ in which it is stated: ‘For the Regiment came the change 
over from horses to tanks.  To a Regiment so basically Light Cavalry in deeds and 
spirit this change came as a grievous blow’.25  The 10th Royal Hussars regimental 
history warned: ‘The regiment now [1927] had on its official strength, fourteen 
motor lorries, three motor cycles and three motor cycle combinations, but the 
danger of complete mechanisation still seemed distant’.26  A further example is 
the history of the 15th/19th The King’s Royal Hussars in which Bastin wrote the 
questionable statement that:   
 
While everyone knew in their heart of hearts that mechanization one day 
was inevitable, they hoped to enjoy a few more years with their horses.  
Hitler put paid to those hopes…  The vehicles on which driving instruction 
was to be given began to arrive in the early summer… They were greeted 
with gloomy silence.27 
 
Field Marshal Sir John French’s second son Lieutenant Colonel The Honourable 
Edward Gerald French’s 1951 book, Goodbye To Boot And Saddle or The Tragic 
Passing of British Cavalry, added authenticity to Liddell Hart’s later assertions.  
French clearly implied in the title of his book that the cavalry objected in some 
way to being mechanized.  French commented that the cavalry ‘suffered the 
                                                 
24 Scott Daniell, 4th Hussar, p.290. 
25 Strawson and Rhoderick-Jones, Irish Hussar, p.95. 
26 Brander, The 10th Royal Hussars, p.103 – emphasis added. 
27 Bastin, The History of The 15th/19th The King’s Royal Hussars 1945-1980, p.12. 
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gradual process of mechanization… [and] had there been a plebiscite in the 
cavalry… an overwhelming majority would have cast their votes in favour of 
disbandment [rather than mechanization]’.28   
 
This thesis will examine how much the esprit de corps of the regiments 
supported or hindered the change management programme to mechanization.  
The cavalry regiments were eventually transformed into armoured units with 
their histories and traditions intact that would continue to inspire and motivate 
continuing generations of soldiers. 
 
Some later historians have followed the Liddell Hart orthodoxy too.  In 1980 
Brian Bond was of the opinion that ‘the cavalry, by and large, was reluctant to 
change its mental outlook’ and cited in support Major General Horace Birks of 
the Royal Tank Corps (RTC), who asserted that the cavalry was ‘frightened of 
losing their horses and their hunting.’29  Kenneth Macksey of the Royal Armoured 
Corps in 1983 concurred: ‘Senior cavalry officers still clung to their horses.  
Royal Tank Corps officers persisted in believing that not only were the cavalry 
“supremely ignorant” of mechanical matters, but also unlikely to learn’.30  This 
thesis includes the testimonies of Royal Tank Corps officers seconded to train 
cavalry regiments in driving, maintaining and deploying AFVs; consideration of 
their experiences is made in each chapter. 
 
                                                 
28 French, E. G., Goodbye To Boot And Saddle, p.271. 
29 Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, p.175.  
30 Macksey, A History of The Royal Armoured Corps,p.50. 
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 Further examples of the Liddell Hart paradigm include John Ellis who, in his 
book Cavalry, originally published in 1978 and republished in 2004, referred to 
several examples to support his assertion ‘that right up to the outbreak of the 
next European conflagration there were many [in Great Britain] who refused to 
believe that the age of the horse warrior was past’.  Ellis quite relevantly quoted 
the speech made by the Secretary of State for War, Duff Cooper, who said, on 10 
March 1936, when ordering the mechanization of two further horsed cavalry 
regiments: ‘All the traditions of the regiment are bound up with their horses.  It 
is like asking a great musical performer to throw away his violin and to devote 
himself in future to a gramophone.  It is a great sacrifice for the cavalryman’.31  
The two regiments to which Duff Cooper referred were the 3rd Hussars and the 
9th Lancers and the account of their experiences is examined in Chapter Two of 
this thesis. 
 
Christy Campbell in his work on the tank pioneers in 2008 persisted with the  
‘Liddell Hart paradigm’ with his comments on the cavalry’s ‘forbearance’ in 
giving up their horses, and of the cavalry’s ‘reluctance’ to move to armoured 
fighting vehicles.32  Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham too were sure of the 
cavalry’s ‘instinctive [resistance to the] conversion to motorised and armoured 
troops’.33  They were critical of the post Great War Royal Field and Royal Horse 
Artillery for being obsessed with horses.  Bidwell and Graham failed to mention, 
however, Armstrong’s (later Vickers Armstrong) in conjunction with the War 
Office, successfully designed tractors of 1924.  Instead of horses, these so-called 
                                                 
31 Ellis, Cavalry, pp.181.182; Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p. 277; for the context see Minney, 
The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, pp. 92-98. 
32 Campbell, Band of Brigands, p.409. 
33 Bidwell & Graham, Fire-Power, p.152. 
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‘dragons’ towed the guns.  Two brigades of Field Artillery were mechanized and 
a report at that time commented that: 
 
one of these brigades was by reputation the most “horsey” brigade in the 
Royal Artillery; and had been chosen [for mechanization] for that 
purpose, because it was desired to see how officers and men who were 
devoted to horses would shape with tractors… [After an initial resentment 
at losing their horses, the officers and men] took the same detailed 
interest and pride in their machines as they had done with their horses 
and guns, and turned themselves into a highly efficient mechanized unit.34 
 
Liddell Hart’s enduring influence was considerable upon the longer term 
perspective reflected in much of the existing military historiography, and it 
continues still.35  Recent examples of this include the Chief of The Defence 
Staff, General Sir David Richards, calling for military ideas and equipment to 
change in response to the new nature of warfare such as ‘cyber attacks’.  Calling 
it a new ‘horse versus tank moment’, General Richards compared his critics ‘to 
the cavalry officers who insisted, long after the introduction of the tank in the 
First World War, that it would never replace horses’.36  In a similar vein Dan 
                                                 
34 TNA WO 32/3059 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Reconstruction of the Corps of 
Cavalry Point 3 in draft memorandum, marked ‘secret’ to C I D Sub Committee on the Strength 
and Organisation of the Cavalry from the Director of Mechanization, War Office, February 1928 
marked 13A; probably a submission to the Committee chaired by Lord Salisbury; Bidwell & 
Graham, Fire-Power, p.154 mentions four mechanized batteries in 1924. 
35 Holden Reid, Studies in British Military Thought, p.15. 
36 The Sunday Times, 17 January 2010; URL: 
http://timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6991030.ece  accessed 10.05.2011. 
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Byles, the Conservative Member of Parliament for North Warwickshire, in his 
speech on 16 September 2010 referred to ‘the old guard, resistant to change’, 
who had influenced the disbandment of the Experimental Mechanised Force [in 
1928].37  The ‘disbandment of the Experimental Mechanised Force’, or 
‘Armoured Force’ in as it was called later, will be discussed in Chapter Two of 
this thesis. 
 
Clearly, many believed Liddell Hart’s assertions were accurate, but revisionist 
cavalry historians have challenged the accuracy of his opinions.  
 
Timothy Harrison Place has stated: 
 
Until recently, historians’ understanding of the British armoured arm 
between the wars has been governed by what might be called the “Liddell 
Hart paradigm”… Indeed, the Army and the high command were far less 
hostile to mechanization than Liddell Hart had claimed.38 
 
Barton C Hacker, who in 1968 researched for his PhD thesis the ‘controversy over 
mechanization’, soon realised that Liddell Hart’s ideas on cavalry mechanization 
were the established primary orthodoxy, but Hacker came to other conclusions 
                                                 
37 See URL: http://www.theyworkforyou.com/debates/?id=2010-09-
16a.1037.0&s=mechanisation+cavalry#g1084.2 accessed 10.05.2011 - regarding the ‘Strategic 
Defence and Security Review’. 
38 Harrison Place, Military training in the British Army 1940-1944, p.95. 
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summarized below.39 In 1998, historian Brian Holden Reid pronounced that 
‘Liddell Hart’s own contribution [had] clouded’ the history of mechanization, 
which had done so much to influence the judgement of other writers’.40  
 
Liddell Hart’s historical depiction of the events surrounding the substitution of 
vehicles for horses contrasted starkly with the perceptions of those soldiers 
directly engaged in the process.  This suggests scope for scepticism about the 
accuracy of Liddell Hart’s and others’ indictment of the cavalry and its attitudes 
towards mechanization.  Liddell Hart complained of the ‘enormous number of 
influential people in the House [of Commons in 1933-1934] and in the counties 
who were pro-cavalry’, implying pro-horsed cavalry.  He cited General John 
Edward Bernard (Jack) Seely, a former Secretary of State for War (1912-1914) 
and distinguished Great War Yeomanry Cavalry officer who, in parliament in 
1933, ‘scornfully’ referred to tanks as ‘those petrol things’.41  Liddell Hart 
grieved that: 
 
A love of the horse and of hunting seems to blunt all their reasoning 
faculties… such a prejudice, of social roots, was no novelty in our military 
history… The Cavaliers of the twentieth century jeopardised their country 
                                                 
39 Hacker, Barton C, ‘The Military Machine:  An Analysis of the Controversy over the 
Mechanization of the British Army 1919-1939’, PhD, University of Chicago, 1968; p.14. 
40 Holden Reid, Studies in British Military Thought, p.15. 
41 Referred to by Kier, Imagining War, p.132 as an example of the anachronistic attitude that 
pervaded the interwar army officer corps. For ‘Jack’ Seely’s cavalry exploits see Anglesey, A 
History of the British Cavalry, Volume 5, pp.48, 73 & 199.  In Volume 4 Anglesey dated Seely’s 
appointment as  Secretary of State for war as 1908, p.377, but Hansard dates his appointment as 
1912-1914; URL: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/offices/secretary-of-state-for-war, 
accessed 22 April 2013. 
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under the influence of a similar social convention, the preference for the 
horse and prejudice against the machine.42 
 
It is interesting to note, but so far defies explanation, that examination of 
Liddell Hart’s diary and the notes made during the inter-war period have 
revealed little, if any such sentiments.    
 
Liddell Hart’s influence persisted nonetheless and had impacted upon historian 
Elizabeth Kier in 1999.   Kier quoted General Seely’s comments, cited by Liddell 
Hart, as if these had come from a serving officer rather than a retired Yeomanry 
Cavalry officer.  Kier questioned the ability of the British ‘gentleman officer 
[and his] subordinates with little or no initiative [to adapt to] the increased 
firepower, mobility and mass of modern warfare [that had] exploded the 
traditional dimensions of the battlefield’.43  In correspondence with the author, 
ffrench Blake challenged Kier’s assertion; he responded that ‘the cavalry were 
quite accustomed to speed and movement’.44   Kier also said: ‘Tanks, or [quoting 
Seely] “those petrol things,” had little place in the British Army officer’s vision 
of war’.45   To this comment ffrench Blake retorted: ‘If you haven’t got them, 
you can’t work with them or study [them]’,46 and in his 2003 article ‘The 
Mechanization of the British Cavalry’, David French agreed that a lack of 
equipment restricted the cavalry’s opportunity to perfect new techniques.47  
                                                 
42 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, pp. 242/243. 
43 Kier, Imagining War, p.132. 
44 Personal correspondence with ffrench-Blake (2009); by the author. 
45 Kier, Imagining War, p.132. 
46 Personal correspondence with ffrench-Blake (2009); by the author. 
47 French, D., ‘The Mechanization of the British Cavalry’, in War in History, July 2003, p.299. 
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Regarding Kier’s comments that ‘the regimental officer, with his rural and 
gentlemanly culture, could not easily adjust to a “garage mechanics” war, 
[because he] did not have the skills, understanding of technology and command 
structure’,48 ffrench Blake remembered, ‘it wasn’t like this – we adjusted easily 
and willingly’.49   
 
The merits of these comments will be carefully examined.  Research will probe 
whether the supply of AFVs with which the cavalry had to train was a significant 
factor in the change process and how enthusiastically the cavalry responded to 
mechanization when given the vehicles to do so.  Comments such as Kier’s are 
compared and contrasted with archival material and the testimonies of the 
officers and other ranks involved.  Kier’s analysis nonetheless has served to 
perpetuate the popular historiography of the cavalry promulgated by Liddell 
Hart.  
 
In part, the mythology of technophobic cavalry officers resistant to change is 
symptomatic of a broader indictment of the British Army during the immediate 
post-Great War period encapsulated in the notion of ‘lions led by donkeys’.  
Stephen Badsey concluded: 
 
By the last quarter of the twentieth century, the term 
‘cavalrymen’ in the context of the First World War had become 
little more than a vague expression of abuse. 
                                                 
48 Kier, Imagining War, p.133.  
49
 Personal correspondence with ffrench-Blake (2009); by the author. 
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This perception of the cavalry general and the cavalry charge has 
taken on the qualities of what are sometimes called zombie myths: 
those that will not die no matter how many times they are 
destroyed… The metaphor of an uncomprehending cavalry general… 
has spread beyond military studies into the general vocabulary of 
historians and readers of history, as a touchstone for all that is 
reactionary, foolish and futile. It is probably too well established 
ever to be removed.50   
 
David Keynon agreed with Badsey in his recent examination of the canon of 
Great War literature.51 Gervase Phillips viewed the cavalry as the British Army’s 
‘scapegoat’ arm that had been treated unfairly by military historians.52  Phillips 
demonstrated that the obsolescence of horsed cavalry had been overstated and 
distorted by traditionalist Great War historiography.53  Cavalrymen had been 
portrayed as technophobic and anachronistic, and Phillips argued that this was a 
distortion within popular Anglophile cavalry historiography.54  David French 
asserted that the underlying assumption that some British cavalry officers were 
‘so stupid that even their brother officers noticed… has dominated the literature 
on the mechanization of the cavalry between the wars’.55 
Gilman Barndollar argued that: 
                                                 
50 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, p.307. 
51 Kenyon, British Cavalry on The Western Front, pp.1/2. 
52 Phillips, Gervase 'Scapegoat Arm: Twentieth-Century Cavalry in Anglophone Historiography' in 
Vandervort, Bruce (ed.) [2007] The Journal of Military History Volume 71, No. 1, (Society for 
Military History, Lexington, Virginia), pp.37-74. 
53 Phillips, Gervase 'The Obsolescence of the Arme Blanche and Technological Determinism in 
British History' [2002] War in History Volume 9 No. 1, (Arnold, London), pp.39-59. 
54 Ibid., pp. 37-74.  
55 French, D., ‘The Mechanization of the British Cavalry’, p.296. 
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thanks to a handful of recent revisionist British cavalry historians the 
traditional view of twentieth century British cavalry, dominated by the 
biases of Liddell Hart and Royal Tank Corps has been challenged and 
perhaps even overturned.56  
 
This may be so, but there remains a general lack of detailed scholarship on the 
actual process of mechanization.  Very few historians have sought specifically to 
explore cavalry attitudes towards mechanization, and the degree to which there 
was any real evidence of resistance to change that was capable of challenging or 
supporting the prevailing orthodoxy of Liddell Hart which had been perpetuated 
by others. 
 
Some historians have attributed other reasons for the delay in mechanizing the 
cavalry.  The Marquess of Anglesey, in the last chapter of his much acclaimed 
eight volume A History of the British Cavalry has summarized, in a ‘much over-
simplified’  form, the events leading up to mechanization.57  He correctly stated 
that the background against which these events were acted out was complex: 
  
The period 1919-1939 was a depressing one in the history of the armed 
forces.  It was even more depressing for the mounted branch of the army, 
                                                 
56 Gilman Clough Barndollar, ‘British Use of Armoured cars 1919-1939’ PhD, Cambridge University 
2010, p.275. 
57 Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry, Volume 8, p.306. ‘Marquess’ not ‘Marquis’ is the 
correct spelling for the UK title. 
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for when these two decades, known aptly as ‘the lean years’ came to an 
end, it had for some time been clear that the [horsed] cavalry as a force 
in war, everywhere in the world, was facing the same death-throes 
experienced long ago by the dodo. 
 
Liddell Hart did acknowledge that the chance of mechanization was diminished 
by the Conservative Government under Baldwin that was ‘cutting down national 
expenditure in every direction; its belief that another war in Europe was most 
unlikely; and a widespread lack of public, and thus political, interest in 
modernising the Army’.58  From The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, the 
Secretary of State for War 1937-1940, R J Minney concurred: ‘The mood of the 
people was for peace… “Axe the services” was the popular and political cry, and 
Conservative and Labour ministries vied with each other in axeing [sic] them to 
the bone’.59 
 
Barney White-Spunner’s 2006 comprehensive history of the Household Cavalry 
regiments particularly commented on the shortage of adequate equipment for 
training, as did Allan Mallinson in his unreferenced history, Light Dragoons.60 
 
David French has examined the subject, and in his article he firmly concluded 
that ‘it was the lack of sufficient funding’ that retarded cavalry 
mechanization.61  This thesis will carefully consider this point. 
                                                 
58 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.173. 
59 Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, p.31. 
60 Mallinson, Light Dragoons, pp.221/222. 
61 French, D., ‘The Mechanization of the British Cavalry’, p.320. 
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Anglesey also included a brief, balanced and useful account of the officers and 
other ranks’ attitudes towards mechanization.62  The reorganisation problems of 
the British cavalry are explained in context, but his account lacked the detail on 
how the change process was managed and the practicalities of the transition 
from horses to AFVs.  ffrench Blake in his two books, The 17th/21st Lancers,63 
and later, A History of The 17th/21st Lancers 1922-1959, 64 covered the subject 
better than most others, but the process of change was not the detailed account 
gained from his interviews and correspondence for this thesis.  Robert H Larson 
in his work included the ‘social conservatism in the officer corps’ and ‘short 
sighted government policy’ as reasons for the delay in mechanizing horsed 
cavalry regiments.65 
 
Stephen Badsey attributed the failure to develop a ‘genuinely fast tank’ to the 
delay in changing horsed cavalry to armoured fighting vehicles.66  Genuinely fast 
tanks had been constructed between the wars, but, other than the Vickers Light 
tank, had not been produced in any quantity.  David French also wrote that not 
until the mid-1930s could ‘even half-satisfactory [armoured fighting] vehicles be 
anticipated’.67  Badsey also sets into context the dilemma facing the British 
Army after 1918.  He correctly argued that horsed cavalry was vulnerable on a 
modern battlefield, but until suitable mechanical armoured vehicles became 
                                                 
62 Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry 1816-1919, Volume 8, p.306 – 317. 
63 ffrench Blake, The 17th/21st Lancers, pp.78-82.  
64 ffrench-Blake, A History of The 17th/21st Lancers 1922-1959, pp.60-68. 
65 Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, p.15. 
66 Badsey, Stephen  'Cavalry and the Development of Breakthrough Doctrine' in Griffith, Paddy 
[1996] British Fighting Methods in the Great War, pp.138-174. 
67 French, D., ‘The Mechanization of the British Cavalry’, pp.298/299. 
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manoeuvrable over all terrain, horses would not become obsolete.68   David 
French too, attributed the delay in mechanizing the cavalry to the lack of 
suitable armoured fighting vehicles.69 An examination of Vickers’ ‘historical 
documents’ on tank development and production will test the proficiency of 
these opinions. 
 
Correlli Barnett, when questioning why the British Army came to rely on 
American tanks, laid blame for the lack of British tank development on ‘the 
incompetence of the British motor industry, and of British engineering in a wider 
sense’.  Barnett cited the later ‘cruiser’ tank, the so-called ‘backbone of future 
armoured divisions’ and singled out Nuffield Mechanization’s ‘over-hasty, 
botched and piecemeal testing’ for particular criticism. 70  Barnett’s opinion that 
the eventual production model of the cruiser tank, the ‘Crusader’ in 1941, was a 
most unreliable vehicle was entirely supported by the experiences of veteran 
cavalry officers Lieutenant Colonels Aiden Sprot of the Royal Scots Greys and R L 
Valentine ffrench-Blake of the 17th/21st Lancers, interviewed for this study by 
the author in 2006 and 2007.  Sprot confirmed, ‘British tanks, I am afraid were 
very, very bad, the Crusader and all those other ones’. 71 ffrench-Blake 
commented, ‘everything (the mechanization process) worked like clock-work 
except for the fact that our tanks were about as good as clocks for fighting in’.72  
                                                 
68 Badsey, Stephen  'Cavalry and the Development of Breakthrough Doctrine' in Griffith, Paddy 
[1996] British Fighting Methods in the Great War, pp.138-174. 
69 French, D., ‘The Mechanization of the British Cavalry’, pp 296-320. 
70 Barnett, Correlli, ‘The Desert Generals Revisited’, Talk given to the Annual General Meeting of 
the British Commission for Military History, 2005, p.7/8. 
71 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author.   
72 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. See also Danchev and Todman, 
War Diaries, 2 October 1940 ‘all the cruiser tanks must be pulled back at once for an overhaul’, 
p.112 and French, D., Raising Churchill’s Army, ‘cruisers had to be abandoned… because they 
broke down’, pp.98/99. 
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J P Harris felt that mechanizing cavalry regiments with light tanks ‘was both 
expensive and one of dubious wisdom’,73  but little else was available for the 
cavalry to use.  Harris was correct in as much that the light tank and its weapons 
were found to be inadequate when engaged against German armour in 1940.  
Former 15th/19th Hussar John Bennett remembered that in France in 1940, ‘we 
had nothing to touch them, we just turned and scoot you know’.74  Harris also 
wrote, however, remaining within the Liddell Hart paradigm, that ‘[although] 
most cavalry officers were prepared to accept mechanization… they had little 
enthusiasm for it.’75  Harris had previously referred to the ‘experiment’ of the 
3rd Hussars, but did not mention how their enthusiasm grew for mechanization 
once the process was underway.  It is reasonable too, to point out that the 
Vickers Light tanks, Marks IIIs and VIBs were successful when used by the 3rd 
Hussars against units of the Italian 10th Army at Beda Fomm in Libya in early 
1941. 
 
The reasons for the lack of tank development and AFV production are germane 
and significant to this thesis.  Insufficient, inadequate, obsolete AFVs on which 
to train the cavalrymen would have made the change from horses more 
challenging than it otherwise might have been both in duration and process. 
  
David French, in his 2003 article ‘The Mechanization of the British Cavalry’ and 
in his 2005 book Military Identities, examined the social and cultural aspects 
                                                 
73 Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.263. 
74 Personal interview with Bennett (2007); by the author; confirmed by Lucas in a further 
interview (2011); by the author. 
75 Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, pp.258/259. 
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within cavalry regiments, that ‘in some sense promoted’ mechanization; the 
determination to preserve their own regiment, horsed or armoured, the 
regimental pride of still being the ‘best cavalry regiment’ whether horsed or 
armoured, and the cautious welcome of mechanization given by both officers 














                                                 




‘Victory at Beda Fomm’ 
Depicts Vickers Light tanks Mark VIBs of the 3rd Hussars, 7th Armoured Division, celebrating the 








French’s views were explored in the experiences of veteran cavalrymen. 
Particularly worth recounting are those of Sergeant Ronald Lucas of the 
15th/19th Hussars and Corporal Charles Need of the 13th/18th Hussars 
                                                 
77 David Pentland [1997], a limited addition print by Cranston Arts - author’s collection. 
 32 
interviewed by the author in 2007.  Lucas recalled his enthusiasm for the change 
to AFVs:  
 
This is a new challenge, something completely new, I was excited about 
it.  I think the attitude was look, this is something new the horses have 
gone, and this is a new life for us.  The fact that you lived a life of 
discipline in effect, you did it.  We didn’t have people leave the army 
because they didn’t like it, some liked the tanks, belting around and 
things, but you stuck up for your troop, your squadron and your regiment, 
that came first, horse or armour.78 
 
Need also confirmed the strength of the regimental culture: ‘we were 
cavalrymen and proud of it, we thought that we were better than the rest - the 
best of the best’.79 
 
Hacker (mentioned above) concluded in his analysis of articles that were 
published during the inter-war period, that the opponents of mechanization 
which included, but were not exclusively cavalrymen, were not ‘simply stupid, 
irrational or blindly opposed to change’; nor were the advocates of 
mechanization ‘particularly far-sighted visionaries’ as there were sound practical 
reasons behind both, those arguing for mechanizing the cavalry, and those that 
                                                 
78 Personal interview with Lucas (2007); by the author. 
79 Personal interview with Need (2007); by the author. 
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were against it.80  Opposition to the substitution of tanks or armoured cars for 
horses came, Hacker speculated, from those involved with peace-keeping, so-
called imperial policing that was the ‘every day concern’ of the interwar army.81  
In ‘terrain and climate [that were ill-suited to armour] and enemy too elusive for 
tanks to bring to bay’, horsed cavalry played a significant role.82  Veteran Royal 
Scots Greys Sergeant James Randall, who served both as a horsed cavalryman 
during the British mandate in Palestine and later as a tank commander in battle, 
interviewed for this thesis by the author in 2006, confirmed Hacker’s reasoning: 
 
Oh yes, you could go anywhere on a horse… up into these little villages 
dotted about up in the hills, in fact in horse days we used to ride these 
patrols all over the country… Tanks wouldn’t have been any good, getting 
up these tracks in the hills on the sort of patrols that we did, and at any 
rate it would have been a waste of tanks – they were for modern warfare 
and we were not in modern war at that time, we were still peace keepers 
that was all.83    
What was written at the time either in favour of, or against, mechanization, 
what might have been said, or felt about mechanization that went unrecorded 
                                                 
80 Hacker, Barton C, ‘The Military Machine.  An Analysis of the Controversy over the 
Mechanization of the British Army 1919-1939’, PhD, University of Chicago,1968, pp. 209/210. See 
also French, D., ‘The Mechanization of the British Cavalry’, regarding the rhetoric in support of 
the Royal Tank Corps’ exclusive control of AFVs, p.311.                                
81 Ibid., p.251.                           
82 Ibid., also Gilman Clough Barndollar, ‘British Use of Armoured cars 1919-1939’, PhD, 
Cambridge University, 2010; armoured cars were not ideal either because their tyres were 
unsuitable, but were of use in the urban areas, pp.157 &177. French argued that armoured cars 
‘also had tactical limitations when performing internal security duties’;  French, D., ‘The 
Mechanization of the British Cavalry’, p.308. 
83 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author; French, D., ‘The Mechanization of the 
British Cavalry’, p.306.  
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was of little consequence.84  The only consequence was what happen and how, 
and why and when it actually took place as it did.  To reiterate the assertion of 
Lieutenant Colonel Aiden Sprot of the Royal Scots Greys, one of the most 
remarkable achievements of the British Army was that Regular horsed cavalry 
regiments were all armoured by 1942. 
 
Given the conflict of interpretation on the subject of cavalry mechanization, 
some crucial questions require analysis: were entire regiments of horseman 
trained to enable them to fight in AFVs, or just a capable few?  If so, when and 
how was this managed and was it successful?  Why did it take so long to 
mechanize the British Regular cavalry and to adopt and implement a policy that 
appeared such an obvious and logical decision and was always the intention of 
the Army Council?  Did a lack of esprit de corps and resistance to change retard 
its implementation; were cavalrymen ‘supremely ignorant of mechanical 
matters’ and difficult to train? Were suitable AFVs available in sufficient 
numbers for training purposes or did a lack of funding retard both the 
development and production of AFVs for the cavalry? 
 
These points have been investigated by researching archived records and 
collecting and analysing the oral testaments of some of the officers and men 
who took part.  Only through a critical examination of these areas of controversy 
will it possible to consider the mythology perpetuated by popular history.  In 
particular, this thesis will explore the fundamental question of whether any lack 
                                                 
84 See Ruskin, John [1886], 'The Crown of Wild Olive'. 
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of preparedness in this field, when war broke out in 1939, can be attributed, as 
Liddell Hart suggested, to cavalry intransigence.   
 
The principal purpose of this thesis is to fill this significant lacuna in historical 
understanding.  In so doing, it will review the prevailing orthodoxy, consider the 
reasons for the late move from horses to AFVs and document and critically 





In order to throw more light on this much-neglected issue of military history this 
thesis seeks to combine two distinct sources of information.  The first consists of 
a considerable body of research in governmental and departmental papers, 
regimental and manufacturer’s archives, press editorial opinion and notes and 
correspondence in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives of influential 
politicians and soldiers, and some leading figures involved with mechanization. 
 
The WO 32 files at The National Archives, covering the mechanization of the 
cavalry, and Army Council and War Office papers proved to be a particularly rich 
source of information about the policy environment and the parameters within 
which these decisions were agreed or deferred.  Cavalry regimental archived 
documents and journals have been reviewed for most of the Hussar and Lancer 
regiments, the Household Cavalry and the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards 
(Carabiniers and Greys).1  The archive material from the remainder of the 
Dragoon regiments was centralised some time ago and subsequently destroyed 
by fire. The Tank Museum Archives at Bovington and the Vickers papers at the 
Cambridge University Library provided essential information on the type, 
quantity, and in some cases the quality, of AFVs available to the army during the 
1930s.   
 
                                                 
1
 An amalgamation in 1971 of two regiments, the 2nd Dragoons, better known as The Royal Scots 
Greys, and the 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales’s Dragoon Guards) that was its self an 
amalgamation in 1922 of the 3rd and 6th Dragoon Guards. 
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The archival evidence examined in this thesis, particularly from cavalry 
museums, has been contrasted and compared with the recollections of cavalry 
veteran soldiers recorded during interviews undertaken by the author, together 
with analysis of interviews conducted during the 1970s, and held at the Imperial 
War Museum. The Second World War Experience Centre in Leeds also provided 
records and transcripts of interviews with soldiers involved with mechanization.  
These first-hand recorded testimonies of often long-dead former soldiers 
involved in mechanization have been amplified by oral evidence of some of 
those who still survive.  In this respect, Regimental Associations have been 
extremely helpful in facilitating interviews with these veterans. 
 
The paucity of written material on this topic makes oral history an essential 
medium that enabled this study to assemble sufficient reliable information for 
analyses and thereby to construct a thesis.2  Peter Hart, of the Imperial War 
Museum, London, acknowledged, and is supported by Seldon’s views,3 that oral 
history is sometimes attacked and disparaged.  Hart said that this criticism is 
from those without ‘the inclination to sit down and listen to hundreds of 
interviews’, and was correct that oral historians are apt to ‘develop warm 
personal feelings and deep admiration for their informants’.4  Once recorded, 
however, the interview ‘becomes evidence to be assessed on its merits as with 
                                                 
2 Sampson, Peter, ‘Qualitative Research and Motivational Research’ in Worcester, Robert M. and 
Downham, John (eds.) [1978] Consumer Market Research Handbook – Second Edition (Van 
Nostrand Reinhold Company, Wokingham), p.27 - ‘Uses and Limitations of Qualitative Research’. 
3 Seldon, Contemporary History Practice and Method, pp.3 & 5. 
4 Hart, Peter, the Imperial War Museum, London, from a preface to an as yet unpublished book 
that Mr Hart has kindly allowed me to quote. Personal interview and subsequent correspondence 
[2011]; with the author.   
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any other historical source’.5 It was said of the late Professor Richard Holmes in 
a published obituary that he: 
 
tended to avoid drawing on the reminiscences of veterans, mindful of the 
frailties of human recall.  “If you look at what veterans were writing just 
ten years after the end of the [Great] war, it’s quite different from what 
they were writing at the time”, he noted.  “The closer we get to events, 
the better our chance of finding out how people really felt”.6  
 
Holmes, however, ‘mined the full transcripts’ of the interviews carried out thirty 
years previously for the Independent Television series The World at War as a 
source for his later book about the Second World War.7 
 
Hart has argued that the defence of oral history ‘must start with the 
examination of the faults of other forms of evidence’.  Lack of alternative 
evidence was the challenge for this thesis.  Hart was sceptical of reliance on 
official accounts and war diaries that may have been written, ‘to help absolve 
senior officers from any form of criticism’.8  Consideration was given to this 
point when analysing regimental journals and similar sources.  Unlike battle 
reports, however, these accounts were not written under duress and little, if 
                                                 
5 Ibid.   
6 ‘Obituary Professor Richard Holmes CBE, TD 1946-2011’ from Bulletin  Number 90, June/July 
2011 of The Western Front Association, p.36 – republished by courtesy of The Daily Telegraph. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Hart, Peter, the Imperial War Museum, London, from a preface to an as yet unpublished book 
that Mr Hart has kindly allowed me to quote. Personal interview and subsequent correspondence 
[2011]; by the author.   
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any, disparity was found between these sources and the oral testimonies 
recorded during the 1970s for the Imperial War Museum, or those recorded more 
recently by the author.  The oral accounts add further information to regimental 
archived material because they impart the experience of what mechanization 
was really like, particularly for the subaltern and other ranks at the time.9  This 
was especially relevant to the experience of ‘other rank’ soldiers who previously 
might not have had an opportunity to record this specific aspect of their military 
experience.10  As Hart said: 
 
 [they provide] a level of detail that no-one would ever record in writing… 
[they] bring the past to life revealing and explaining all the nitty-gritty 
fundamentals that define the zeitgeist of the moment, the little wrinkles 
that allow you to feel what people were going through.11  
 
When interviewing elderly veterans careful consideration was given to the most 
suitable method.  A quantitative style of questionnaire was considered as a data 
capture medium, but rejected as inappropriate given the age of the 
interviewees and the relatively small sample of respondents able to discuss 
events which took place over seventy years ago.12 An intensive individual 
interview method was adopted in almost every instance.  This technique was 
appropriate to ‘seek to understand the experiences and practices of key 
                                                 
9 Seldon, Contemporary History Practice and Method, pp.5 & 8; as a resulting of information 
gleaned at interviews, archival documents were sometimes re-examined.  
10 Marwick ,The Nature of History – Third Edition, p.215. 
11 Hart, personal interview and subsequent correspondence [2011]; by the author.   
12 Flick, An Introduction to Qualitative Research, p.94.  
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informants and to locate them firmly in context’.13  It was not possible to 
assemble the informants as a group due to their age and wide geographical 
locations and so a group discussion was, unfortunately, impossible to arrange.  
This would have been useful with participants interacting on particular topics 
perhaps challenging each other’s assertions together with mutual memory 
stimulation that might have raised issues not previously considered.  However, 
there might also have been collusion, which would have been unhelpful.  It is 
acknowledged that qualitative research and intensive interviewing techniques 
may have limitations.14  Critics have alleged that the technique is ‘imperialistic, 
piecemeal and even idiosyncratic’ whereas a quantitative method is viewed as 
‘representative and reliable’.15  Devine argued that the validity of these 
criticisms ‘depend on the aims and objectives of the research project’,16 and 
explained: 
 
[Qualitative methods] are most appropriately employed where the goal of 
the research is to explore people’s subjective experiences and the 
meanings they attach to those experiences.  Intensive interviewing, for 
example, allows people to talk freely and offer their interpretation of 
events.  It is their perspective that is paramount… In-depth interviews 
allow people to tell their story in language with which they are familiar… 
                                                 
13 Devine, Fiona ‘Qualitative Method’s’ in Marsh, David and Stoker, Gerry (eds.) [2002] Theory 
and Methods in Political Science second edition, (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke), p.28. 
14 Coombes, Researching Using IT, p.95.   
15 Devine, ‘Qualitative Methods’ in Marsh and Stoker (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political 
Science second edition, p.204. 
16 Ibid., p. 205. 
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 This is sometimes referred to as a holistic approach.17 
 
It was important that discussions flowed naturally because it was an intention of 
this study to explore the attitudes, and particularly the behaviour, of those 
involved in mechanizing horsed cavalry because these were vital to the overall 
thesis.  Any real reluctance from the cavalry officers and men to give up horses 
for armoured AFVs would have been manifest in the speed of their response and 
resistance to change, possible obstruction to training, low morale, and in their 
later effectiveness in battle.  Sources were scrutinized and interviewees 
questioned carefully for any evidence of a reluctance to change and if this was 
demonstrated by their, or others’, behaviour.  
 
It is acknowledged that the horsed cavalry veterans still living are very few and 
their views may have been influenced by bias, forgetfulness and subjectivity.  A 
similar situation existed for those interviewed in the 1970s for the Imperial War 
Museum whose average age then was 73.18  Hart advised that the interviewer 
should employ a degree of scepticism, and should disregard ‘frankly 
unbelievable’ statements.  Therefore, with the experiences of the wide sample 
of veterans collected and analysed by the author, every effort has been made to 
‘triangulate’ the data and to take into account only those experiences 
frequently and consistently expressed.19   
                                                 
17 Ibid., p.199. 
18 Seldon, Contemporary History Practice and Method, p.6. 
19 Hart, personal interview and subsequent correspondence [2011]; by the author;   
Brewerton and Millward, Organizational Research Methods, p.151. 
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The key points covered in the interviews focused particularly on the veterans’ 
remembrances of the following:  
 The impact and significance of inter-war theorists Fuller, Liddell Hart et 
al.  
 Attitudes towards giving up horses for AFVs.  
 The similarity and differences between horsed cavalry tactics and AFV 
tactics. 
 Knowledge of experiments in mechanization and their outcome within 
other regiments.  
 The organisation and structure of training for officers and other ranks. 
 Equipment used for training.  
 The effectiveness of the training when later engaged in battle. 
 
The author is a mature student with extensive interviewing experience from a 
business background and this probably helped in establishing rapport, together 
with interviewees’ awareness that the author’s late father had pre-dated them 
as a horsed cavalry soldier.  With the permission of the veterans, and to ensure 
that all comments were accurately represented, almost all interviews were 
recorded (recording techniques were adjusted with experience, and one suffered 
a technical failure).20 Transcripts subsequently checked by the interviewees 
required few corrections.  Consequent correspondence, follow-up visits and 
telephone conversations with some veterans were most useful to clarify and 
                                                 
20 Sampson, ‘Qualitative Research and Motivational Research’ in Worcester and Downham (eds.), 
Consumer Market Research Handbook – Second Edition, pp.39/40 - outlines possible pitfalls in 
making recordings – some of which were encountered. 
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amplify certain points.21  So as not to lose any opportunity for more data, a 
questionnaire was used for two cavalry veterans where face-to-face interviews 
were impossible, and in one or two other cases, telephone interviews were 
employed.  No indication was detected that any interviewee was seeking to 
impress or eager to please by offering responses perceived as desirable.  The 
author’s opinion on the subject was neither requested by, nor expressed to, any 
interviewee.22 
 
The author considers that without the addition of the oral archived material the 
number of veteran cavalrymen still living was too small a sample to be presented 
as statistically significant.  Forty-nine veterans’ testimonies of their experiences 
of mechanization have been collected from personal interviews by the author 
and by correspondence, and accessed via archived interview material.23 
 
The assessment of public opinion between the wars, and its impact on policy-
makers and their deliberations, is far more problematical.  Public opinion was 
acknowledged by Liddell Hart in 1929 as politically important.  It was especially 
important in the government’s decision to allocate, or redistribute, money 
between the services.  Liddell Hart, a self-styled advocate of armoured warfare, 
argued that the public needed assurance that in ‘reducing the Army they were 
                                                 
21 Seldon, Contemporary History Practice and Method, p.9 amplifies the benefits of such 
relationships. 
22 Nowell, ‘Questionnaires’ in Gilbert (ed.),  Researching Social Life, pp.205/206; Sampson, 
‘Qualitative Research and Motivational Research’ in Worcester and Downham, (eds.), Consumer 
Market Research Handbook – Second Edition, p.35. 
23 Some veterans served in more than one unit. See Appendix K  
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getting a more efficient Army at less cost [by investing in mechanization that 
included the air arm of the services]’.24  
 
To explore more systematically the impact of public opinion in the late 1930s 
the British Mass Observation Survey Papers at University of Sussex were 
examined. Notwithstanding possible reservations about the methodological 
robustness of early public opinion-gathering techniques, these did provide a 
more representative insight into public opinion.  In an earlier age, public opinion 
must largely be inferred from the editorial comments of the press strongly 
influenced by the political allegiances of their proprietors and editors.  To gauge 
this aspect of opinion formation, copies of The Times and Daily Mail of the 
period were accessed at the British Library Newspaper Archives at Colindale. 
 
Careful consideration was given to examining the process used by Britain’s allies 
to armour the horsed cavalry within their own armies.  Competence in the 
necessary languages was the barrier to any primary research.  Secondary 
sources, however, clearly documented that the British cavalry was not behind its 
allies, or Germany and Italy, in converting from horses to AFVs.  In order to 
mechanize horsed cavalry suitable vehicles were, of course, necessary. Peden 
cites the Defence Review Committee’s comment of 1934: ‘until a vehicle is 
designed capable of replacing the horse and no such vehicle is in sight [the 
cavalry will remain mounted]’.25   
 
                                                 
24 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.149; in a note to Lord Thomson, then Minister of State for 
Air, a close confident of Prime Minister MacDonald. 
25 Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy, p.123. 
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British tanks of the Great War compared favourably to French and German tanks 
in their cross-country capability.  In the 1920s Great Britain led the way in tank 
development.26  In the early 1930s the Germans and Italians followed the same 
policy as Britain in developing light tanks of just over four tons.  British tanks, 
according to Peden, were not ‘technically backward… and were widely 
exported’,27 but by the late 1930s, were less mechanically reliable than their 
German counterparts.28  
 
Corum claimed that the German cavalry in 1932 adopted ‘mechanization before 
the cavalry of the other majors powers’ but, as will be seen, this was not so, and 
as with the British, some German cavalry units remained horsed well into the 
Second World War.29  Horsed cavalry was part of the German force that invaded 
Poland in September 1939 and the 1st Mounted Regiment of the German 1st 
Cavalry Division invaded Holland on 10 May 1940, France in early June and the 
Soviet Union in June 1941.30  German horsed cavalry was disbanded in November 
1941, but a shortage of vehicles prevented them from being ‘mechanized’ for 
some time.31 
 
The French Army was considered the ‘world’s most mobile’ army in the early 
1930s, but the cost of ‘motorizing’ its cavalry, estimated to be 1,126 million 
francs (approximately £18 million pounds sterling) was prohibitively expensive.32  
One mechanized cavalry division was formed in 1933 using some horses and an 
                                                 
26 Ibid., pp.58 and 122 &123. 
27 Ibid., p.123. 
28 Ibid., pp. 123 &124. 
29 Corum, in Winton (ed.), The Challenge of Change, p.50. 
30 Piekalkiewicz, The Cavalry of World War II, pp.27, 30, 43, 50-52. 
31 Ibid., p.48. 
32 Kiesling, in Winton (ed.), The Challenge of Change, p.13. 
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assortment of vehicles that included light tanks.33  In 1940 the French 6e 
Régiment de Dragons (la Reine), for example, went into battle mounted on over 
one thousand horses.34  
 
The United States cavalry was accused of being wedded to the horse and 
resistant to change in the same manner as has the British cavalry. The US Army 
Tank Corps was abolished in 1920 and what tanks there were (limited to 15 tons) 
came under the control of the infantry.  A mechanized force was assembled in 
1930, following the British Army trials in 1927, but also following the British 
Army, and for similar reasons, this was disbanded in 1931.  In the late 1930s, as 
a compromise and using both horses and vehicles, ‘Horse-Mechanized Corps 
Reconnaissance Regiments’ were formed.35 
 
The Soviet Army in Second World War made extensive use of horsed cavalry, in 
particular Cossack units which numbered 100,000 horsemen in 1941; some later 
served with the German Army.36  Over nine-thousand horsemen made up the 
17th, 20th and 44th Cavalry divisions of the 16th Army that defended Moscow.37  
The Italian Army too retained horsed cavalry; on 10 July 1943, Italian horsed 
cavalrymen armed with sabres charged Allied paratroopers invading Sicily, and in 
other actions, delayed the progress of the invading forces.38 
 
                                                 
33 Ibid., pp.13 & 14. 
34 Piekalkiewicz, The Cavalry of World War II, pp.28 & 29. 
35 Johnson, in Winton (ed.), The Challenge of Change, pp.187 – 190. 
36 Ure, The Cossacks, pp.221-229.. 
37 Piekalkiewicz, The Cavalry of World War II, p.48. 
38 Ibid., p.225. 
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Although the British Army took a long time to mechanize its horsed cavalry, it 
was neither behind its allies nor its enemies.  
 48 
Chapter One  
Mechanization - The First Phase - 1918 - 1929 
A policy of arms reduction, the perception of public opinion and particularly the 
absence of an aggressor, together with economics (mechanization was 
considered unaffordable1), are central to this thesis.  These factors affected 
both the process and the delay in re-equipping horsed cavalry regiments with 
AFVs.  Conversely, however, it was economic pressure that drove the decision to 
mechanize the first two horsed cavalry regiments in the latter part of the 1920s, 
but perversely stopped any further cavalry mechanization for another eight 
years.2  Economic management at any level is the application of choice, because 
there is never enough money to satisfy all needs. Government funds were 
limited, choices had to be made and therefore economic policy decisions were 
based on a perception of priorities.  Re-equipping the army in general and 
horsed cavalry in particular was considered neither a priority nor politically 
acceptable, except at times by the Treasury if large savings could be made by 
doing so.3  It is too counterfactual to question whether, had favourable 
economic conditions prevailed, the government would have mechanized the 
cavalry sooner, but to have done so the government would have had to ignore 
the foregoing factors, especially that of public opinion. 
                                                 
1 TNA WO 32/2846 Register 16/General/5558 minute 14 - Milne to Sir Laming Worthington-Evans 
3 November 1927. 
2 TNA WO 32/2842 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Cavalry - Report by the 
‘Salisbury Committee’; TNA WO 32/2845 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)):Future  
organisation of the Cavalry: Cavalry Committee: Final report 1926-1927; 20/Cavalry/612 7(a),  
6 June 1928; Sub-committee of Imperial Defence 1927-1928. 
3 TNA WO 32/2842 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Cavalry 
Committee: Final report 1926-1927; 20/Cavalry/612 no.6, 17 November 1927; also  
TNA WO 32/2845 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Future organisation of the  
Cavalry: Sub-committee of Imperial Defence 1927-1928; 20/Cav/612 minute 19, 8 June  
1928. 
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The question of mechanizing the army was marginal in the minds of both the 
public and politicians during the 1920s.  In any case, why should such a measure 
have even been contemplated?  After 1918, Germany and the Central Powers 
were defeated and Russia was weakened by revolution.  The expectation of the 
British public was that world peace would prevail.4  Prime Minister Lloyd 
George’s argument was that, ‘in the present circumstances (1919-1920) the 
Government could take some risks in defence but none in social and economic 
affairs’.5  
 
On 15 August 1919 the Government undertook what now would be regarded as a 
‘risk assessment’, the so-called Ten Year Rule.  The conclusion was that Britain 
was unlikely to take part in a major war for the next ten years.  The flaw, in 
what became a policy rather than an on-going risk assessment, was that it 
continued for too long and was not abandoned until 1932,6 but it dominated 
defence expenditure planning for much of the period.  Brian Bond and N H Gibbs 
argued the effect of the Ten Year Rule, and the dominance of the Treasury in 
defence expenditure, an influence that continued into the next decade.7  Later 
scholars that included John Ferris, concluded that the Treasury and the Ten Year 
Rule, a term not coined until after 1932, had little impact on the armed services 
until after 1924, but did so afterwards.8  Relevant to this thesis is the closure of 
                                                 
4 See later reference to Britain by Mass Observation – this majority view prevails almost until the 
outbreak of The Second World War.  
5 Quoted in Gibbs, History of the Second World War Volume 1, p.5. 
6 Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars, p.25; Gibbs, History of the Second 
World War Volume 1, Chapter III, pp.69-87. 
7 Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, p.39; see also Peden, British 
Rearmament and the Treasury. 
8 Ferris, ‘Treasury Control, the Ten Year Rule and British Service Policies, 1919-1924’ The 
Historical Journal Vol.30, No. 4, December 1987, pp.859-883; Ferris, Men Money and Diplomacy 
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the tank design centre in Woolwich in 1923 that impacted later on tank 
development.9 
 
In his book, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, Bond described 
in detail the role and responsibilities of the British Army after 1918.10 The 
Army’s every day function was to protect and police the British Empire, and in 
the immediate aftermath of the Great War, to support the Allies in occupying 
previous enemy territories.  Ireland was a troubled land and until the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty of December 1921, required the deployment of large numbers of British 
troops.   The cavalry was particularly useful both in Ireland and elsewhere as 
peace-keepers.11  
 
Of great concern to the British Government was the prospect of civil unrest 
within the United Kingdom in which troops would be needed to aid the civil 
powers.  A Bolshevik administration was taking control in Russia and in Great 
Britain the government was aware of both the grievances of working-class 
                                                                                                                                                    
chap 2; Bell, ‘Winston Churchill and the Ten Year Rule’, The Journal of Military History Vol.74, 
No. 4 October 2010, pp. 1097-1128. 
9
 Macksey, A History of The Royal Armoured Corps,p.47. 
10 Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, Chapter 1, pp.10 – 34. 
11 The Metropolitan Police estimate ‘a trained officer on a trained horse can be as effective as a 
dozen foot officers’ in situations such as demonstrations and riots; Directorate of Public Affairs, 
Metropolitan Police reference 205 86 (undated but approx. 2000).   
Peter  Neyroud CBE QPM, The Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, a trained public 
order commander, confirmed that ‘there is a credible case to be made in favour of horses as a 
key component of a strategy to manage disorder. Police horses can be deployed to divert 
crowds, disperse crowds and ultimately to break up crowds by force. They are much more 
effective than a cordon of police officers for most urban crowds because most urban crowds are 
not comfortable with horses and are very, very wary of a mounted section. Used effectively, 
they do add greatly to the flexibility of public order policing. They also add the capability to get 
police away from a hostile mob, which I imagine was a major consideration in India; personal 
correspondence [2013]; with the author. 
Mounted officers are still used extensively in India for law and order duties, ‘controlling huge 
crowds during rallies, processions, festivals etc.’  The Delhi police, for example, has 60 mounted 
officers distributed across 7 districts, during 2008 the mounted force undertook 12,384 hours of 
duty, each horse undertaking  5 to 6 hours per shift;  
URL: http://www.delhipolice.nic.in/home/mounted/mounted.aspx accessed 13.02.2013 
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people and of their expectations of a ‘big and rapid improvement in their social 
and industrial conditions’.12  A clear demonstration of the government’s concern 
was the Emergency Powers Act (1920), invoked by the government in 1921 and 
1926, when ‘the military authorities were told to be prepared to meet an 
outbreak of civil war’.13  George Orwell wrote in 1937 that:  
 
Throughout the whole nation there was a running wave of revolutionary 
feeling… By 1918 everyone under forty was in a bad temper with his 
elders, and the mood of anti-militarism that followed naturally upon the 
fighting was extended to a general revolt against orthodoxy and 
authority.14 
 
During 1919 major strikes were threatened that were intended to paralyse the 
transport network, especially in London, and to cut off the electricity supply.15  
The miners insisted the Military Service Act should be repealed, and threatened 
industrial action if it was not.16  By January 1920 ‘the industrial situation’ had 
put Field Marshal Sir Henry H Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) 
‘in a state of dreadful nerves on the subject’; there was talk of ‘Red revolution 
and blood and war at home and abroad’.17  At a conference on 2 February 1920 
                                                 
12 Middlemass, (ed.), Thomas Jones – Whitehall Dairies Volume I, pp.73-74; Thomas Jones to the 
Prime Minister, 8 February 1919.  
13 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.58. 
14 Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier, p.121. 
15 Middlemass, (ed.) [1969], Thomas Jones – Whitehall Dairies Volume I; Sir Maurice Hankey to 
Thomas Jones 10 February 1919, p.75. 
16 Ibid.,Thomas Jones of Sir Maurice Hankey, 26 March 1919,  pp.81-82. 
17 Ibid.,Sir Maurice Hankey to Thomas Jones,  17 January 1920, pp.97-98. 
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the ‘country’s defenceless condition’ was discussed; this issue had been 
previously voiced by Winston Churchill (Secretary of State for War) and the CIGS. 
The prospect of revolution was taken very seriously and the police force was 
considered inadequate to deal with large industrial strikes or sabotage.18 
Concerns extended for some time; on 4 April 1921 the Cabinet, at which the 
CIGS was present, discussed the so-called ‘Triple Alliance’ of the miners’, 
railway and dockworkers’ trades unions and a possible forthcoming strike.   It 
was suggested that more armed forces were needed.  Consideration was given to 
repatriating troops from Malta or Silesia and whether Yeomanry troops should be 
used.19  On 8 April a draft Royal Proclamation to call-up army reserves was 
discussed.20  Thomas Jones, the assistant to the Cabinet Secretary Maurice 
Hankey, noted with what seriousness the government considered both the 
strength of public opinion and possible actions.21 Had mass civil unrest occurred, 
horse mounted cavalry would have been invaluable in assisting the police in 
trying to restore order.  There was no revolution. 
 
The majority of Great Britain’s electorate, which now included enfranchised 
women of qualifying status, was more concerned about the basic necessities for 
life than international relations and policing the Empire, and the politicians 
responded accordingly.22  Rebuilding international trade was essential, therefore 
the maintenance of international peace was the prevailing objective of Great 
Britain and many other countries too. The League of Nations, its drive for 
                                                 
18 Ibid.,From Thomas Jones notes, 2 February 1920, pp.99-104. 
19 Ibid.,From Thomas Jones notes,4 April 1921,  pp.132-136. 
20 Ibid., From Thomas Jones notes, 8 April 1921, p.144. 
21 Ibid., pp.144 – 152. 
22 Gibbs, History of the Second World War Volume 1, p.81. Gibbs devotes Chapter II to ‘The 
Operation of The Ten Year Rule’, p. 35.  
 53 
‘collective security’, disarmament and non-military solutions to inter-national 
disputes, was fully supported.23  James Hinton’s view was that, for a time British 
foreign policy was, in part, subordinate to the League of Nations’ policy, and 
that with a ‘small army and vast Empire... support for the League was the 
cheapest way of maintaining the Empire’.24  The Versailles (1919) and Locarno 
(1925) Treaties, overseen by the League, were just part of the web of inter-
national undertakings that bound countries together in non-aggression, mutual 
defence pacts that ensured the sanctity of national boundaries. 
 
As has been said, popular newspapers shaped the views of the general 
population including their opinion on peace, war, cavalry and tanks.  As no war 
was foreseen for the next ten years, and with a growing ‘never again’ mentality 
among the people, it is doubtful whether the electorate gave much thought to 
the subject of tanks, other than the few people immediately affected, such as 
the Tank Corps25 and the armaments manufacturers.  Tanks were considered 
offensive weapons.  Such was the strength of opinion that tanks were offensive 
weapons that, within the Versailles Treaty, the French insisted Germany was to 
have no tanks or other ‘aggressive’ weapons within their limited armed forces.26 
Tanks did their job in the unique circumstances of the Western Front, but, it was 
thought, they were unlikely ever to be needed again.  There was, however, little 
doubt in the minds of the Army Council in 1921 that horsed cavalry would be 
mechanized; the General Staff ‘hoped’ horsed cavalrymen would transfer to an 
                                                 
23 See Appendix E – US President Wilson’s proposal generally supported by the British 
Government. 
24 Hinton, Protests and Visions, p.77. 
25 The Tank Corps was formed on 27 July 1917 and had developed (from March 1916) from the 
Heavy Section, later (November 1916) the Heavy Branch, Machine Gun Corps. The ‘Royal’ prefix 
was added from 18 October 1923. 
26 Richardson, The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy, p.4. 
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expanded Tank Corps that was thought must happen ‘in the near future’.27 The 
only questions that needed answers were when and into what mode of 
organization and vehicles were the cavalry to be moved.   
 
Tank development was reported from time to time in 1920s newspapers, but not 
on the front pages.  In earlier years the public had been wooed by dramatic 
reports of the derring-do of Allied tanks and their crews in the ‘all-arms’ actions 
of the later stages of the Great War culminating in the Armistice on 11 
November 1918.  On 1 July 1918, The Times reported the success of French light 
tanks on the north side of Villers Cotterets successfully attacking German 
positions.  The five-and-a-half ton tanks, it read, were ‘handy enough to work 
over steep and difficult ground’.28  Readers were excited again a few days later 
by the headline ‘Infantry, airman and tanks together’ to capture Hamel and 
Vaire Wood.  Through the smoke and uproar created by aerial bombing and 
artillery rolled the tanks, it reported.  The tanks, it later said, ‘contributed 
largely’ to the victory.  There were areas of ground, however, that made the use 
of tanks impossible and infantry had to be relied upon with ‘bomb and 
bayonet’.29 
 
The cavalry had its own share of press adulation too: ‘since the period of open 
warfare [began]’, the attack fell on the enemy ‘like a flash of lightning’,30 read 
                                                 
27 TNA WO 32/5959 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Scheme for reduction of Cavalry 
Regiments – hand written note p.3, 24 February 1921. 
28 The Times, ‘The success of Light Tanks’, p.8. 
29 The Times,  04.07.1918, p.6. 
30 The Times,  20.07.1918, p.7. 
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The Times, in a report on actions by infantry with cavalry and tanks between the 
Aisne and Marne Rivers.   
 
The cavalry came into their own… fighting on horseback for about the first 
time since the very early days of the war… debouching from the forest 
and seen by airmen at 2 p.m. … far beyond our original front.31   
 
A report of another action south east of Marcelcave on 12 August 1918 regarding 
horsed cavalry may later have influenced the tactical arguments in the minds of 
the public, military intellectuals, and theorists, and the government.  It 
informed its readers that the cavalry was held up by German machine-guns.  
Light tanks made an attack and the machine-gunners ran with the cavalry 
charging in pursuit ‘swords drawn, between them taking seven hundred 
prisoners’.32  Further reports followed, and although far from disparaging the 
cavalry, it explained that machine-guns and ground broken by old trenches and 
wire hampered the cavalry’s progress.33  
 
This certainly appeared to have influenced J F C Fuller, former Tank Corps Chief 
of Staff, later Staff College Chief Instructor, assistant to the CIGS, military 
theorist and journalist, who viewed cavalry as ‘excessively vulnerable in the face 
                                                 
31 The Times,  20.07.1918, p.7. There had been mounted actions since 1914, see for details 
Kenyon, Horsemen in No Man’s Land. 
32 The Times,  12.08.1918, p.12. 
33 The Times,  13 and 14.08.1918 p.7. 
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of modern firepower’.34  Fuller later thought that tanks could replace not only 
horsed cavalry, but infantry and artillery once it had abandoned ‘horse traction’ 
and adopted ‘cross-country mechanical traction… [artillery] would in effect 
become big-gunned tanks’.35  The debate on the vulnerability of horsed cavalry 
to ‘modern’ weapons had waged on since the early 1850s, but the cavalry had 
adapted and developed doctrine and had survived.36  Its survival was partly, if 
not entirely, due to the horse remaining the only capable cross country 
conveyance for ‘mobile’ troops that was speedier than soldiers on foot.  Each 
time the cavalry was engaged in conflict the debate on its future had re-
emerged.  The cavalry was ‘a well tried arm’37 and the successful charges made 
by J P D French’s cavalry division at Klip Drift during the Second Boer War (1899-
1902),38 and that of the 4th and 12th Australian Light Horse Regiments at 
Beersheba (Third Battle of Gaza 1917),39 were strong counter-arguments to the 
abolitionists of horsed cavalry.40  
 




                                                 
34 See Appendix C- biographies; Harris, Men, ideas and tanks, p.206; Ellis, Cavalry, pp.176/177. 
35 Harris, Men, ideas and tanks, p.206; Holden Reid, Studies in British Military Thought, p.17. 
36 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp. 2 &16; also Kenyon, Horseman in No Man’s Land, for 
detailed case studies. 
37
 LHCMA,  Broad 1-3; Lt. Gen. Charles Broad’s reply to Mr R Alastair Rickard’s letter, University 
of Ontario, May 21 1970. See Appendix C – biographies. 
38 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp.101-103. 
39 Ibid., p. 286; Ellis, Cavalry, pp.176/177. 
40 See LHCMA, Broad 1-3; Lt. Gen. Charles Broad’s reply to Mr R Alastair Rickard’s letter, 
University of Ontario, May 21 1970 in which he agrees with this assessment. 
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The crews drove their tanks into the thick of battle, shrinking before no 
obstacle, and attacking hostile centres of resistance and batteries under 
terrible fire of the machine-guns and special guns which the enemy 
concentrated upon them.  Each section of tanks overcame 15 to 20 
German machine-guns. 41  
  
Three years later, in an amendment debate in parliament, the disbandment of 
four British cavalry regiments was proposed in the interests of economy.  The 
Secretary of State for War, Sir Lamming Worthington-Evans,42 was reported to 
have said that the lessons of war had shown the cavalry vulnerable to machine-
guns and air attack; in future wars there would be times when cavalry could not 
be used.  It was not his intention to ‘reduce the mobility of the army, but to 
replace four cavalry regiments with tanks and armed motor-cars’.43  Confirming 
the disbandment of four cavalry regiments on 5 August 1921, another report 
informed readers, ‘the cavalry could be spared more easily and more safely than 
any other arm of the Services’.44  But in what vehicles did Worthington-Evans 
really think he could maintain the mobility of the army?  
 
Previously, in March 1919, following the Armistice of November 1918, Fuller had 
produced a ‘statement’ showing the current state of the Tank Corps, tank 
                                                 
41 The Times, 29.07.1918, p.7. 
42 From 13 February 1921 until 19 October 1922 and again from 6 November 1924 until 4 June 
1929. 
43 The Times, 12.04.1921, p.15; see Phillips, Gervase ‘Who Shall Say That the Days of Cavalry Are 
Over? The Revival of the Mounted Arm in Europe, 1853-1914’ in War in History, URL: 
http://wih.sagepub.com/content/18/1/5 accessed 01.12.2011 for similar assertions made in the 
mid nineteenth century that ‘the days of cavalry were passed’ due to the development of new 
weapons. 
44 The Times, 05.08.1921, p.8. 
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training, development and production.  His concerns for the future included the 
premature demobilization of Armies of Occupation through public pressure;  
Fuller thought it was going to be difficult to raise a ‘reliable Voluntary Army’ to 
replace the conscript army being demobilised.  If this happened, garrisoning the 
Empire and maintaining civil order within it would become difficult.  Fuller 
worried about the spread of Bolshevism that might also embrace Great Britain 
and argued ‘a force weak in man-power must be strong in machine power’, and 
the best machine power available at that time was the Medium D tank.45   
 
In 1919 tanks were considered too slow and their ‘radius of action too limited’ to 
be useful in a guerrilla type war waged by a local dissident force.  One  Medium 
D tank had been built, but more were needed to rectify ‘teething problems’, and 
it took four months, it was thought, to retrain an infantryman to be an efficient 
tank driver or gunner.46 Fuller urged a ‘speedy decision’ on what further tank 
requirements would be necessary, he foresaw ‘guerilla [sic] warfare and police 
work’ as the future role of the army for which it was not properly equipped.47  
Churchill, the Secretary of State for War (10 January 1919 - 13 February 1921), 
called for proposals for the ‘formation of a Tank Expeditionary Force’ and Fuller 
submitted these to the Army Council in mid-April 1919.  Fuller foresaw the role 
of the tank ‘in a guerrilla war… would be that of a moving blockhouse line which 
would clear an extensive area of country’.48  His report assumed the Medium D 
                                                 
45 TNA WO 32/5685 Army Organisation: Tanks (Code 14 (G)): Proposals concerning formation of 
tank expeditionary force and use of tanks in Russia – 1919; S.D.7 Minute 4 - DDSD to DSD, 31 
March 1919. 
46 Ibid., Minute 1, 25 March 1919. 
47 Ibid., Minute 4, 31 March 1919. 
48 Ibid., referred to in Minute 9 and marked 9A, 14 April 1919. 
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tanks to be available by April 1920.49  Fuller wanted a meeting arranged with the 
tank manufacturers to speed-up the production process with overtime or double-
shifting; ‘an immediate arrangement should be made with Vickers’, Fuller 
insisted.50 The Deputy CIGS Major General Sir Charles H ‘Tim’ Harrington’s 
comment encapsulated the difficulties faced by the post Great War Army 
Council: ‘Colonel Fuller’s schemes of “thinking ahead” are always interesting but 
he is not faced with the problem with which we are faced viz to get the best 
value out of a very limited sum of money’.51 The Master General of The 
Ordnance, Lieutenant General Sir W T Furse concurred: ‘We have more than 
enough we can do to keep afloat and abreast of immediate needs in almost 
every corner of the globe’.52  
 
The British Army’s tank establishment was effectively 531 vehicles in France, 
including 89 expected to be repaired and serviceable by 1 June 1919, and 414 in 
Great Britain and Ireland, including 95 ‘new types for which no spares [were] in 
existence’ and 30 Medium ‘C’ tanks also for which there were no spare parts.53  
Pertinent to this thesis, however, was Fuller’s point that the tanks currently in 
service were built for the unique circumstances of the Great War (Mark Vs and 
Mark V*s, Mark VIIIs and IXs and Medium A, B and Cs) and were unsuitable for a 
war of rapid movement,54 therefore, and by extension, unsuitable for replacing 
horses for cavalry work.  In terms of the future, Fuller considered the position of 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 TNA WO 32/5685 Army Organisation: Tanks (Code 14 (G)): Proposals concerning formation of 
tank expeditionary force and use of tanks in Russia – 1919; S.D.7 Minute 4 - DDSD to DSD, 31 
March 1919. 
51 Ibid., Minute 13, 6 May 1919. 
52 Ibid., Minute 14, 8 May 1919. 
53 Ibid., referred to in Minute 9,14 April 1919; marked 9A Appendix A. 
54 Ibid., marked 5A, 14 April 1919 and marked 9A Appendix A. 
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tank design as ‘satisfactory’, the emphasis being ‘towards high speed, extensive 
radius of action and greatly improved wearing capabilities’.  Regarding 
‘Experimental production’, one Medium D was completed, but still not 
satisfactory.  Variations on this Mark (the Medium D* and D**) were being 
produced and hoped to be ready for trials in July or August 1919 but, 
commented Fuller:  
 
The firms with whom contracts are placed are concentrating on 
commercial programmes and take little or no interest in war work [and 
the contracts placed] pre-armistice are now not considered satisfactory 
by the Contracts Departments… [There was] a dispute between Messrs 
Vickers and the Contracts department of the W.M.D…. At present all 
production has ceased… The only bright spot is the work which is being 
carried out by Woolwich Arsenal on the experimental light cross country 
Machines.55   
 
Lieutenant Colonel Philip Johnson did develop a ‘Light Infantry’ tank by 1921 at 
the Royal Ordnance Factory, in the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich, referred to by 
Fuller in his ‘Plan 1919’ report. 56  This model weighed eight tons with a top 
speed of 30 miles per hour (mph) and was ‘mechanically successful’.  No more 
were produced and, as was previously stated, Johnson’s tank design centre was 
                                                 
55 Ibid., Minute - 9 marked 5A, p.2. WMD presumably relates to the Ministry of Munitions, created 
in 1915, and responsible, with concurrent powers with the War Office, for procurement of 
munitions of war. 
56 Harris, Men, ideas and tanks, pp.165-172. 
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shut down in 1923.57  Vickers was working on its own light tank design and had 
by 1921 produced the light ‘tropical’ tanks Nos.1 to 3.58  It was possibly the 
development of these models that Winston Churchill had in mind in his speech to 
parliament in February 1920.  When Churchill, Secretary of State for War, 
announced the proposed strength of the peacetime army in February 1920, he 
waxed lyrical about ‘the most surprising development in tanks that have taken 
place since the war’.  Technical changes had been made he explained; tanks 
could now reach speeds up to twenty mph over ditches and hedges across 
country ‘a good deal faster than any fox hound’.  He also reassured members of 
parliament, read the report, that the new tank engines had ‘a refrigerating 
effect’ making them suitable for use in India and other hot climates.59  Churchill 
pointed out, however, that much of the tank development was experimental, 
but there had also been developments in anti-tank warfare too, such as rifle 
propelled grenades that were ‘capable of inflicting “mortal injury” on the new 
machines’.60   
 
Confusion might have been planted in the minds of members of the public keen 
on what economies might derive from these tank experiments because of 
criticism from Lord Weir 61 regarding the Army Estimates.  In January 1920, the 
Daily Mail, which boasted a 1,000,000 circulation, reported that Great Britain, 
                                                 
57 Macksey, A History of The Royal Armoured Corps, p.47; Fletcher, Mechanised Force p.5; 
Beale, Death by Design, pp.146/7 - after which the Director of Artillery was placed in charge of 
‘mechanization’. 
58 Vickers historical document 895, Tanks and Armoured Cars built by Vickers 1919 -1942, 
Cambridge University Library Manuscripts Department. 
59
 Gilman Clough Barndollar, ‘British Use of Armoured cars 1919-1939’,  PhD, Cambridge 
University, 2010; the interior of the India pattern armoured car was lined with ‘Raybestos’, a 
combination of asbestos and closely-woven copper wire that reduced radiated heat and it also 
contained ‘bullet splash’ – shards of armour plate that splintered-off inside the vehicle when it 
was hit with bullets on the outside, p.266. 
60 The Times, 24.02.1920, p.10. 
61 See Appendix C – biographies. 
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the inventor of the tank, had not maintained her lead.  Opinions of ‘experienced 
officers’ were asserted who were of the view that fast tanks could largely 
replace infantry and cavalry ‘and enable substantial economies to be effected in 
those arms’.62  If this was to happen, the report stressed, the tank must be 
perfected, and ‘the present Tank Staff… retained… and not starved of funds as 
at present appears to be the danger’.63 The paper’s ‘Military Correspondent’64 
supported this argument.  In his article under the headline ‘Threat to Tank 
Corps’, the Military Correspondent drew the public’s attention to the suggestion 
that tanks might be attached to infantry battalions; such a suggestion was 
‘condemned’ by Tank Corps officers and was compared in the article to the 
‘failure’ of machine-guns in the early part of the Great War when these weapons 
were originally attached to infantry battalions.65 Newspaper comments such as 
those in the Daily Mail in January 1920, however sincerely held these views 
might have been, were unlikely to improve inter-arms cooperation and endear 
the relatively new Tank Corps to the older service arms of infantry, cavalry and 
artillery, especially when they were each competing for a share of scarce 
financial resources; competition between them continued into the next 
decade.66  Much to the chagrin of the Tank Corps officers no doubt, and probably 
something of a relief to the other service arms, it was announced later the same 
month that the Tank Corps would remain intact, but greatly reduced in size.67 
                                                 
62 Daily Mail, 02.01.1920, p.6. 
63 Ibid. 
64 It would be interesting to know who the newspaper’s Military Correspondent was; 
unfortunately the Daily Mail has ‘no record of staff members from this time’; Reference 
Librarian, Associated Newspapers; personal correspondence with the author, February 2012. 
65 Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, pp.121/122; Griffith compared the ‘focus of 
naked empire-building and institutional infighting’ over the formation of the Machine Gun Corps 
with the later arguments over the development of the Tank Corps. 
66 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.125. 
67 Daily Mail, 02.01.1920, p.6. 
 63 
On Saturday 10 January 1920, the public might have thought that any funding 
problem had been solved.  Tank developments were forging ahead by leaps and 
bounds according to the newspaper reports.  Readers attracted by the headline 
in the Daily Mail ‘Tanks that can swim’ would have been astounded to read of 
the ‘extraordinary revolution in mechanical warfare already accomplished’.68   It 
seems that ‘strange monsters’ looking like tanks, but with ‘uncanny silence and 
swiftness of motion’ unlike the tanks seen in France, had been spotted travelling 
at 20 mph in the Bournemouth area.  With sprung tracks and powered by 
discarded 250 horse power Rolls Royce aero engines, these vehicles had been 
tested for over one thousand miles with just £10 worth of repairs becoming 
necessary.  In a slight to the mounted service, it reported that the speed 
attained, 16 to 17 mph across country, was ‘faster than the best mounted of 
hunting men, and it can run rings around any cavalry’.  One new version of this 
new Mark tank, superior to the Mark V*, was ‘one pattern [that] will cross rivers 
with ease’ and one that will ‘cross the Channel’ moving at 20 mph on land and 
fitted with a propeller for water.  The report forecasted that Jules Verne’s 
vision of 50 years ago ‘now stands on the point of realisation by British brains 
and British engineering skill’. 69  Liddell Hart also reported an experiment of a 
tank with a watertight hull held in the Christchurch area in May 1919.  This 
prototype tank, a development of the Medium D tank by Lieutenant Colonel 
Philip Johnson, ‘attained a speed of 28 mph… [and] repeatedly swam across the 
river, climbing out unaided on reaching the far bank.  But its reliability was not 
equal to its speed and performance’.70  It appeared to the newspaper 
                                                 
68 Daily Mail, 02.01.1920, p.6; Daily Mail, 10.01.1920, p.7. 
69 Daily Mail, 02.01.1920, p.6. 
70 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.94. 
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correspondent that two basic types of fast tanks were planned that could 
accomplish what infantry and cavalry ‘of the old type could never do’: a fast 
type relying on speed for protection, and a slower model, heavily armoured and 
armed, that only ‘mountains and precipices’ could stop. ‘Trenches will be 
useless’, it asserted.  The report ominously and futuristically stated that this 
tank will be an ‘Ideal police weapon for dealing with mobs’.  There would be no 
bloodshed, rioters would be anaesthetised by ejected gas; the tank itself, guided 
by wireless from an aircraft, would be sealed against gas attack and would be 
submersible too.71  As has already been stated, civil disturbance, even 
revolution, was anticipated and the report of such a weapon might have been 
viewed as a deterrent.  
 
The origin of the light tank, as a concept, lay in Major (later Lieutenant General 
Sir) Giffard le Quesne Martel’s ‘partially armoured one-man vehicle which could 
be used to assist infantry’. 72  Martel built the first one himself; further models 
were built by the company owned by Messrs. Carden and Loyd.  The so-called 
‘Carden-Loyd’ AFVs were trialled from 1925; twenty different marks were 
developed over the next six years.  Vickers acquired the Carden-Loyd Company 
in 1928 following which the so-called ‘Carden-Loyd-Vickers’ light tanks were 
developed from then on.73  Vickers produced 2.5 ton, two-man turreted light 
tanks from 1929; these were armed with one Vickers .303 machine gun and 
                                                 
71 Daily Mail, 02.01.1920, p.6. 
72 Vickers historical document 618, Cambridge University Library Manuscripts Department. 
73 Vickers historical document 895, Tanks and Armoured Cars built by Vickers 1919 -1942, 
Cambridge University Library Manuscripts Department. The spelling of ‘Carden-Loyd’ or ‘Lloyd’ 
varied throughout the Vickers’ papers, Loyd is sometimes spelt with the double ‘l’;  Foss, and 
McKenzie, The Vickers Tanks, used the single ‘l’ spelling, this author has done likewise. 
Also, Vickers historical document 618, Cambridge University Library Manuscripts Department. 
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protected with areas of 14mm (maximum thickness) armour, many of these 
tanks were exported.74   
 
Tank development was a conundrum: what type, what role, and who should have 
them, and for Vickers Armstrong, the only tank manufacturer for much of the 
inter-war period, what was the commercial viability of tank development and 
production.  Vickers origins can be traced from an engineering works on 
Tyneside established in 1847 by W G (later Lord) Armstrong to develop his ideas 
on hydraulic engines.  Armstrong merged with Sir Joseph Whitworth’s company 
in 1897.  Vickers of Sheffield was developing high quality steel castings; both 
Vickers and Armstrong-Whitworth grew by acquisition and merged in 1927 to 
form Vickers-Armstrong Limited.  Sir Noel Birch, Master General of the Ordnance 
from 1923 until 1927, retired that year from the army to become a director of 
Vickers.75  On 1 January 1928, under the chairmanship of Major General Sydney 
Capel Peck, 76 The Mechanised [sic] Warfare Board was created by the War Office   
 
to act in an advisory capacity on technical problems in connection with 
mechanical transport… and to secure liaison with the mechanical 
engineering industry so that the army may be in close touch with 
engineering and commercial production.77  
 
                                                 
74 Macksey, A History of The Royal Armoured Corps, p.52. 
75 Foss and McKenzie, The Vickers Tanks, p.9. See Appendix C – biographies. 
76 Major General S C Peck CB DSO pac (sc) was the first to be appointed to this position that 
reported to the Master General to the Ordnance; the Assistant Director of Mechanization was 
‘tank pioneer’ Colonel F A Pile DSO MC psc. 
77 Macksey, A History of The Royal Armoured Corps, p.52.  
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The War Office Selection Board had been told that Peck was ‘indispensable to 
mechanization’.78 On 28 January 1928 Giffard le Quesne Martel, mentioned 
above, in conversation with Liddell Hart at the Army and Navy Club in London 
speculated that Major General Peck, the Director of Mechanization, should have 
got the position at Vickers, but Birch, his superior, ‘cut him out, securing the job 
for himself.  Vickers will have a shock when they find out how little he [Birch] 
knows about the subject [mechanization]’.79  
 
In the meantime the Tank Corps had to manage with vehicles that had already 
been produced 80  and no suitable vehicles yet existed with which to mechanize 
or armour the British Army’s Regular horsed cavalry regiments.  The Tank Corps 
itself was short of men in 1919, ‘bled white through demobilization’, eight 
battalions remained, only three of which were ‘at war strength’.  The training 
school had ‘become practically inoperative’ and recruitment into the Corps was 
at a ‘standstill’.81  The Army Council’s expectation that cavalry regiments would 
soon move en-masse to the Tank Corps would have solved this recruitment 
problem.  It was, however, impossible for this to take place as the current AFVs 
were unable to match the speed and mobility of horsed cavalry and the army 
would have been denied their use as effective imperial policemen.   
 
                                                 
78 LHCMA – LH11/1928/1 Diary Notes – talk with David Campbell, Government House Aldershot, 
14 June 1928. General Sir David Graham Muschet ‘Soarer’ Campbell (28 January 1869-12 March 
1936) - General Officer Commanding-in Chief of the Aldershot Command 1927-1931.  Campbell 
was commissioned into the 9th Lancers on 15 March 1889 and took command of the regiment on 
the same date in 1912.  A Boer War and Great War veteran, he was a renowned equestrian 
sportsman. ‘Soarer’, that became his nick-name, was the name of the horse Campbell rode to 
victory in the Grand National on 27 March 1896. 
79 LHCMC – LH11/1928/3. 
80 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, pp.94/95. 
81 TNA WO 32/5685 Army Organisation: Tanks (Code 14 (G)): Proposals concerning formation of 
tank expeditionary force and use of tanks in Russia – 1919; referred to in S.D.7 Minute 9 DDSD to 
DSD  and marked 5A. 
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In 1923 the Tank Corps received the prefix accolade of ‘Royal’, but at the same 
time had remaining just 36 Medium C tanks.82  The change of title was 
recommended by the War Office Tank Corps Committee during April 1922 and 
accepted by the Army Council on 27 July 1922; it was part of a raft of 
recommendations to attract more officers to the Corps.83  Other 
recommendations included, notably: ‘There should be a separate tank Corps 
[sic] with a permanent list of officers’; this too was accepted.84 Also accepted 
was the recommendation for newly commissioned officers to come from both the 
Royal Military Academy Woolwich, where students underwent engineering and 
technical training for the Royal Artillery and Royal Corps of Engineers, and from 
the Royal Military College Sandhurst, where officer cadets underwent general 
military and leadership training for both cavalry and infantry units; applicants 
from Kingston and Duntroon, the Canadian and Australian  military academies, 
would also be accepted into the Corps.  It was advised that this balance of 
officer recruits best suited the ‘varied requirements of the [Tank] Corps’.85 A 
further recommendation was the accelerated promotion for officers who 
transferred from other arms, the exceptions were the Royal Army Service Corps 
and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps that were each short of officers and could 
not spare any for transfer.86  This offer of accelerated promotion, either or both 
through interest or opportunity, attracted applications from captains from 
cavalry and infantry regiments. 
                                                 
82 Macksey, A History of The Royal Armoured Corps, p.45. 
83 TNA WO 32/5072 Conditions of Service (Officers): Appointment, Gazetting and issue of 
Commissions (Code 59 (E)): Report of Peyton Committee on Formation of Permanent List of 
Officers for Tank Corps: establishment to be adopted and conditions on transfer and promotion; 
Register No.100/Tank Corps/151 p.6, 27 July 1922. 
84 Ibid., Report of Peyton Committee on Formation of Permanent List of Officers for Tank Corps: 
establishment to be adopted and conditions on transfer and promotion. 
85 Ibid., 28 April 1922. 
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Pressure continued, however, for the government to increase expenditure on 
social reform and with it the pressure to reduce expenditure on the armed 
services.89  In 1928 when, in the interests of further economy, the decision was 
taken to mechanize two horsed cavalry regiments with armoured cars, the 
Director of Mechanization, Major General Peck, gave thought to the cavalry’s 
future requirements.  ‘Up until this time armoured cars had been designed to 
function on roads only’, but now some cross-country capability was required ‘if 
they [the cavalry] were to be able to perform their reconnaissance duties 
satisfactorily’.90  He thought the following characteristics necessary: 
 
(i)      High road speed – ‘a speed across country depends entirely on that 
country and is therefore difficult to define.  The speeds of a race-
horse and a cart horse are the same when in a bog.’ 
(ii)      Fairly heavy armour. 
(iii) Must be able to cross a divisional bridge. 
(iv) Should be a commercial chassis if possible. 
(v)      If possible, ‘have a certain cross country capacity’.91 
 
In his memorandum to the sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence, he pointed out that the science of cross-country traction was 
                                                 
89 The Times, 24.02.1920, p.10. 
90 TNA WO 32/3059 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Reconstruction of the Corps of 
Cavalry Point 3 in draft memorandum, marked ‘secret’ to C I D Sub Committee on the Strength 
and Organisation of the Cavalry from the Director of Mechanization, War Office, February 1928 
marked 13A; probably a submission to the Committee chaired by Lord Salisbury. 
91 Ibid.  
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‘practically a new one, and moreover, is one of the most difficult that engineers 
have had to tackle’.  Some of the best known motor car companies were, he 
wrote somewhat pessimistically, ‘frequently having to withdraw their models 
after a few months production’ in spite of the fact that they had undergone 
sometimes ‘a year or two in [the] experimental stage’.  There were ‘frightening 
aspects’ to be considered when applied to the design of cross-country traction 
and ‘it is always necessary to have “something in hand”, both as regards speed 
and strength’.  Machines needed to be ‘fool-proof… good starters… gas-proof… 
quiet… inconspicuous’, and capable of being loaded and carried on standard size 
railway trucks.  Puncture-proof tyres were under experiment and intended for 
use on cavalry vehicles.  With these considerations and those of vehicle 
accommodation and maintenance training, and the continuity of investment 
required to provide them, ‘our progress in mechanization must be rather a 
gradual evolution’. Continuing on ‘hand to mouth each financial year’ as had 
been the case would not ensure success.92   
 
The Director’s specification for the cross-country capability of cavalry vehicles 
was supported later the same year in a report on the French Army’s manoeuvres 
on the Rhine.  Although these manoeuvres were held in dry weather, the report 
stressed that French horsed cavalry units were actually ‘held up’ by their 
mechanized cavalry units who were ‘seriously hampered by the scarcity and 
quality of the roads’.93  The French Army too was still to develop an armoured 
vehicle with a suitable cross-country capability. 
                                                 
92 Ibid.  
93 TNA WO 32/3579 OVERSEAS: Europe (Code 0 (V)): Report on manoeuvres of French Army and 
participation of British Cavalry 1928-1928, 10 September 1928, Appendix C. 
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Peck’s forecast that continuing on ‘hand to mouth each financial year’ would not 
ensure success proved correct.  Sufficient vehicles, armoured and unarmoured, 
were not available until well into the Second World War and British made tanks, 
with the possible exception of the Matilda tank, remained unfit for purpose until 
almost the end of the Second World War.  In February 1943 Martel wrote, in a 
secret and confidential note from the War Office, to Major General P C S ‘Hobo’ 
Hobart, who had commanded and trained the 11th Armoured Division and was 
then training the 79th Armoured Division: 
 
We have well trained armoured troops and a sound technique… on the 
other hand the equipment side is frightful.  So long as we can get 
American tanks it will be alright… But it is rather dreadful that we have, 
at present, no British tank that is any use.94  
 
This situation severely restricted the progress of cavalry mechanization.   
Badsey’s suggestion that cavalry mechanization was delayed by the failure to 
develop a genuinely fast tank was certainly true of the 1920s, but might not 
have been so for the 1930s had it not been for the further reduction in the 
defence estimates. 95  
 
                                                 
94 LHCMA - LH15/11/16-65; from Martel to Hobart, WO Room 15, 4 February 1943. See Appendix 
C - biographies. 
95 Badsey, Stephen 'Cavalry and the Development of Breakthrough Doctrine' in Griffith. Paddy 
[1996] British Fighting Methods in the Great War, (Frank Cass, London), pp. 138-174; p.164. 
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Without suitable equipment the task of armouring horsed cavalry in either 
armoured cars or tanks was impossible, regardless of what feelings existed for or 
against the idea.  Published literature of the types of tanks produced by Vickers 
or the Royal Ordnance Factory at Woolwich during the interwar period can, 
without careful examination, confuse the historian.  There were Marks and 
Models a plenty, but few were much more than prototypes. Charles Broad in 
1925 had worked on one tank known as the ‘Independent’ and wrote in 1970 that 
it was ‘a quite reasonable modern tank… sufficient speed… sufficiently bullet 
proof, and had a good radius of action, [but]… no more were built on account of 
expense’.96   
 
Between 1928 and 1939, eighteen different models are listed as having been 
produced by Vickers or their subsidiaries.97  Peter Beale accurately asserted that 
‘a large amount of effort was spent in projects that resulted in nothing useful’.98  
By 1928, however, Vickers had constructed the A6 Mk III tank, also known as the 
‘Sixteen-Tonner’.  The ‘Sixteen-Tonner’ was thought to be ‘the best Medium 
tank in the world at that time’99 at a cost of £16,000 each.100 Interestingly, on 27 
September 1928 at the Cavalry Club in a conversation over lunch with Liddell 
Hart, Brigadier (later General Sir) Frederick A ‘Tim’ Pile, the Assistant Director 
of Mechanization, said the ‘Sixteen-Tonner’ would cost £28,000, but the War 
                                                 
96
 LHCMA - Broad 1-3; Lt. Gen. Charles Broad’s reply to Mr R Alastair Rickard’s letter, University 
of Ontario, May 21 1970. 
97 Macksey, A History of The Royal Armoured Corps, p.50. 
98 Beale, Death by Design, p.67. 
99 Harris, Men, ideas and tanks p.238. 
100 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, pp.176 & 209. This aligns with Liddell Hart’s notes LHCMA - 
LH11/1930/8, ‘Talks with Colonel F A Pile, 15 October 1930’, the tank was costed at £12,000 and 
the engine another £3,000. 
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Office would pay no more than £15,000, and then only order ten.101  This was no 
great incentive for a commercial company to press on with the development of 
the ‘Sixteen-Tonner’.  The model suffered from some track problems, but its 
trials were generally satisfactory and it was considered ‘a fighting vehicle of 
great potential’.102  The ‘Sixteen-Tonner’ had a range of 100 miles and top speed 
of 30 mph, and according to Pile, 15 mph uphill.103  It was armed with a 3 
pounder gun and a machine-gun in its main turret, and two machine-guns in each 
of its forward-mounted subsidiary turrets.104  Commenting on 29 January 1929, 
Brigadier George M Lindsay, the Inspector of the Royal Tank Corps (1925 – 1929), 
said ‘the new 16 ton tank is far better mechanically and in fire-power than was 
ever thought at first’.  The plan was, Lindsay had expected,  for eleven more to 
be built to add to the three already available, but Lindsay now thought that only 
one more would be built ‘out of Peck’s own surplus from the experimental 
vote’.105  In fact only six ‘Sixteen-Tonners’ were ever built and so there was 
little opportunity to correct the teething problems and further develop the 
model.106   
 
                                                 
101 LHCMA - LH11/1928/1, Diary Notes, ‘Lunch with Pile at the Cavalry Club’; Beale, Death by 
Design, p. 49. 
102 Macksey, A History of The Royal Armoured Corps, p.52. 
103 LHCMA - LH11/1928/1, Diary Notes, ‘Lunch with Pile at the Cavalry Club’, 15 October 1930. 
104 Harris, Men, ideas and tanks, p.238. 
105 LHCMA – LH/1929/4, ‘Talk with Brigadier G M Lindsay’, 29 January 1929. 
106 Vickers historical document 895, Inter War Period, pp. 10/11, Cambridge University Library 
Manuscripts Department; Harris, Men, ideas and tanks, p.238 - six prototypes were built at a unit 
cost of £16,000 each; Macksey, A History of The Royal Armoured Corps, p.52 - three were built 
and Fletcher, Mechanised Force, pp.15 &16 - six were built – 1 by The Royal Ordnance Factory, 
p.18. 
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Abandonment of further ‘Sixteen-Tonner’ developments for the British Army was 
rooted in the 1931 defence expenditure cuts explained in the next chapter.107 
Writing in 1995, Harris suggested the failure to allow this model to go into 
production was a pivotal moment in both tank and doctrinal development.  The 
RTC, he suggested, ‘would have continued to use a single type of medium tank 
both for the close support of attacking infantry and for more mobile roles’.108  
Harris made no suggestion, however, that this tank could have been used for 
cavalry regiments, but he is critical of cavalry regiments being mechanized later 
into light tanks.109  Peden pointed out that the cavalry were equipped with light 
tanks because of ‘the absence of any satisfactory alternative’.110 
 
With hindsight, had the ‘Sixteen-Tonner’ been developed, powered by a diesel 
engine, it might well have been the vehicle suitable to armour horsed cavalry 
regiments and the RTC.  The suitability of the Mark III ‘Sixteen–tonner’ can be 
seen by comparing its specification to that of the much later M4 ‘Sherman’ tank 
[Table 1].  The A6 E2 prototype of the Mark III Sixteen–Tonner was powered by 
the Ricardo C1 less flammable diesel engine;111 the other marks had petrol 
engines as did the Sherman tank used in the European theatre.  Considered 
vulnerable to fire and explosion when hit by enemy fire, Sherman tanks were 
allegedly referred to by British soldiers as ‘Ronsons’, a popular cigarette lighter, 
                                                 
107 LHCMA - Broad 1-3; Lt. Gen. Charles Broad’s reply to Mr R Alastair Rickard’s letter, University 
of Ontario, May 21 1970;  Harris,  Men, ideas and tanks p.238; Vickers historical document 895, 
Inter War Period, pp. 10/11; Macksey, Kenneth [1983], A History of The Royal Armoured Corps, 
p.54. 
108 Harris, Men, ideas and tanks, p.278. 
109 Harris, Men, ideas and tanks, p.263, emphasis added. 
110 Peden,  Arms, Economics and British Strategy, p.124. 
111 LHCMA - LH11/1930/8, ‘Talks with Colonel F A Pile, 15 October 1930’, Pile was keen to try 
this new engine. 
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or ‘Tommy cookers’ by German soldiers.112 The numerous and successful Russian 
T-34 tank of the Second World War had a diesel engine, probably developed 
from the Russian T29 model with 22mm of armour; the ‘Sixteen-Tonner’ had 
been influential on its design.113  It was later established, however, that the 
vulnerability of the Sherman tank to fire and explosion was not due to its petrol 
engine, but to the position of the ammunition storage magazine.114 
 
The American M4 ‘Sherman’ tank used by some British Royal Armoured Corps 
regiments from 1942 was, nonetheless, both popular with the crews and 
generally successful as an all-round battle tank.  It is important to note, 
however, that during the inter-war period an all-round battle tank was not what 
was being considered for armoured or mechanized cavalry units expected to 
carry out the ‘light’ cavalry roles of reconnaissance, screening, pursuit etc.  
During the Second World War, the lighter, faster (up to 35 mph) American 
‘Stuart’ tanks, known to the British as Honey tanks, as well as armoured cars and 
scout cars, were also used by Royal Armoured Corps regiments, especially for 
reconnaissance work.115   
 
It was a light tank, however, that the War Office had in mind for cavalry 
regiments, or for cavalry work, whosoever should undertake that role. To fully 
replace a horse, it was thought a tank also needed to be amphibious. The need 
for a cheaper tank was the catalyst for the regeneration of light tank 
                                                 
112 Personal discussion with Buckley [2013]; by the author. 
113 LHCMA - LH15/11/1-11, 3; General Wavell’s Report on Red Army Manoeuvres 1936, Copy 18 –
Secret, pp.8,19 & 27. 
114 Personal discussion with Buckley [2013]; by the author. 
115 Personal interviews with Sprot and Randall (both of the Royal Scots Greys) [2007]; by the 
author. 
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development at Vickers armament manufacturers in 1931 that followed the 
abandonment of the medium (Sixteen-Tonner) tank programme.116  What a light 
tank was, was yet to be clearly specified; there can be some confusion, 
however, as in the archived records the term ‘light tank’ was often used to 
describe the ‘infantry armoured machine-gun carrier’.117  It is not always clear 
what was being developed and Liddell Hart noted in 1929 that ‘the progress of 
mechanization also suffers from the technical expert’s pursuit of an ideal 
machine that will meet every improbable condition, instead of being content 
with a cheap and practical one’.118  
 
The General Staff’s view, assessed David Fletcher, was that a ‘cavalry tank’ 
must be ‘a high-speed machine, capable of working in mobile exploitation and 
scouting roles normally allotted to [horsed] cavalry’.119  Beale’s later view was 
that the lead time for developing any new tank was three to six years assuming 
that there was a clear statement ‘of what tanks were supposed to do’. Without 
such a statement the major problem for tank designers, asserted Beale, was the 
lack of a detailed AFV specification that led on to ‘doubt, change, multiple 
designs and wasted resources’.120  Crucially, and in regard to this thesis, it 
‘created difficulties’ in setting up and delivering training for British Army tank 
crews.121 
 
                                                 
116 Vickers Archives 1870-1970 number 895, Inter War Period, pp.10/13 and Vickers historic 
document 618, Tanks 1934-1939, Cambridge University Library Manuscripts Department. 
117 See LHCMA – LH 11/1928/20, p.62. 
118 LHCMA – LH11/1929/12, ‘Memo of the Experimental Force and Re-organization of the Home 
Army’. 
119 Fletcher, Mechanised Force, pp.3/4. 





AFV A6 Mark III - ‘Sixteen-
Tonner’122 
M4 (BRITISH SHERMAN 1)123 
WEIGHT 39,200 lbs 66,500 lbs 
SPEED max 30 mph 
cross country 19 mph 
max 24-29 mph 
cross country  15-20 mph 
ARMOUR max 14 mm min 12 mm max 75 mm - 
turret 
ARMAMENT 1 x 3 pounder gun + 5 .303 
Vickers machine guns 
1 X 75 mm M3 gun 
2 x .30 cal + 1 x .5 cal. 
machine guns 
ROAD RADIUS Road - 100 miles road – 100-150 miles 
FORDING DEPTH Not known 3 feet 





                                                 
122 Harris, Men, ideas and tanks, p.238 & Fletcher, Mechanised Force pp.15 & 16: 
URL:http://www.wwiivehicles.com/unitedkingdom/tanks-medium/mk-iii.asp accessed 
02.04.2011. 
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By the late 1920s a tank suitable for armouring horsed cavalry had been built, 
but economic restraint was a priority and with no perceived threat to national 
security, these tanks were never developed or produced other than in prototype 
form.128  Liddell Hart commented in 1965 that in any case, in pressing for the 
substitution of tanks for horses, some members of the Labour Cabinet would  be 
going against ‘that party’s pacific ideals and anti-military tradition’, but ‘in the 
economic circumstances of the time no big change [in mechanized development] 
was practicable save by such compensating economies’.129  In 1928 he had noted 
that ‘the main trouble in the way of mechanisation [sic] is the capital cost… that 
had frightened off “His Worthiness” [Sir Laming Worthing-Evans, Secretary of 
State for War]’. 130   To bring the tank battalions up to strength and completing 
the mechanization of the artillery was estimated to cost £5,000,000 to 
£6,000,000, and equipping an armoured brigade would cost £1,500,000.131  He 
made no estimate of the cost of mechanizing the cavalry.  
  
It would have been a bold decision for the Army Council to risk any of its 
anticipated reduced budgets on such tank experiments.  Both as a policy and as 
a perception no war was foreseen in the next ten years and horsed cavalry was 
adequate, even more suitable, for imperial policing and as an aid to the civil 
powers; ‘armoured forces… added little capability to armies deployed for 
                                                 
128 Fletcher, Mechanised Force, p.2 states a £30,000 budget for development – the cost of a tank 
was £12,250. By 1922 the construction budget was £220,000 for 42 tanks; p.7; Harris, Men, ideas 
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129 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, pp.174 – 176. 
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Club’, 2 February 1928. 
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colonial peace keeping’.132  Had more money been allocated to the army, such 
experiments might have been risked, but as Lindsay despaired in 1929, ‘we have 
reached the “saturation point” of mechanised [sic] progress within the present 
money restrictions – unless and until a reduction of infantry takes place’.133 
 
The Army General Staff in 1921 ‘hoped’ horsed cavalrymen would transfer to an 
expanded Tank Corps that was thought must happen ‘in the near future’.134  The 
General Staff wanted cavalry regiments to transfer to the Tank Corps intact; 
that is to say, as whole regiments, thus retaining their regimental traditions (and 
so maintaining morale):135   
 
It is suggested that an endeavour should be made to retain the entity of 
the regiments by eventually transferring their names and numbers to new 
tank units, of which seven are proposed for 1922.  It offers a means of 
disposing of large numbers of officers it would otherwise be difficult to 
absorb.  It will also preserve the regimental traditions, plate, funds etc.136 
 
 
                                                 
132 Millet, Allan R  ‘Patterns of Military Innovation’ in Millet, A R and Williamson M, [1996] (eds.), 
Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge), p.340 cited 
in Gilman Clough Barndollar, ‘British Use of Armoured cars 1919-1939’ PhD, Cambridge 
University, 2010, p.8.  
133 LHCMA - LH11/1929/4, ‘Talk with Brigadier GM Lindsay Inspector of the Royal Tank Corps’, 29 
January 1929. 
134 TNA WO 32/5959 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Scheme for reduction of Cavalry 
Regiments – hand written note p.3, 24 February 1921. 
135 Ibid.  
136 TNA WO 32/5959 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Scheme for reduction of Cavalry 
Regiments. 
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This was not done in 1921, but implemented seventeen years later when The 
Royal Armoured Corps (RAC) was formed composed of Battalions of the Royal 
Tank Corps and the mechanized cavalry regiments of the Cavalry Corps.  In a 
minute to the Treasury in 1938, the War Office pointed out their concerns on 
‘esprit de corps’ that would ‘need careful handling’.137  The subsequent report 
from the ‘Sergison-Brooke Committee’ acknowledged that cavalry regiments had 
long traditions and ‘must retain their separate identity’; witnesses to the 
committee ‘stressed the importance of the regimental spirit’.138  In April 1939 
the Royal Armoured Corps was created on that basis and continues with the 
names and traditions of the cavalry regiments still intact, although with further 
amalgamations.139  This sequence of events demonstrated both the wisdom and 
the continuity of thinking of successive General Staffs; it also testifies more to a 
commitment to mechanize the cavalry, as soon as suitable AFVs were available, 
than to any resistance to do so. 
 
The General Staff of 1921 objected strongly to reducing the size of the cavalry 
arm by disbanding initially four regiments; the decision was regarded as ‘hasty’ 
and entirely for financial reasons when the demands on the army as ‘imperial 
policeman’ had expanded its role.140  There was no mention at this juncture, as 
there was the following year, of the Geddes Committee report; what can be 
inferred, therefore, was that the demand to reduce costs originally came from 
                                                 
137 TNA WO 32/16406 Committee on Organisation of Mechanised Cavalry and Royal Tank Corps: 
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140 TNA WO 32/5959 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Scheme for reduction of Cavalry 
Regiments. 
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the Treasury via the Secretary of State, Sir Laming Worthington Evans, 
‘consequent on the development of mechanical warfare’.141 
 
The War Office needed to overcome a number of problems to expedite the 
Treasury’s demands such as what to do with redundant soldiers. The ‘other rank’ 
soldiers could transfer to other units within their own corps of Dragoons, Lancers 
or Hussars to replace time-expired men and to save on recruitment costs, but 
redundant officers were a different matter.   Also, there was the need to 
maintain an equal number of regiments at home to relieve those serving abroad. 
Any reduction therefore, would mean the disbandment of an even number, two, 
four, six etc., and not an odd number of regiments.  How these regiments were 
to be chosen was another dilemma, for each regiment had history, patronage, 
regimental artefacts and silver.  After debate and deliberation ‘juniority’, that 
is to say the least old regiments in the Army List, was the criterion decided 
upon: those regiments formed or re-raised after the Peninsular War (1807-
1814).142  It was also felt that not all the regiments should be English ones and 
Irish regiments should share the burden too. The following regiments were 
selected: the 5th Royal Irish Lancers, the 19th (Queen Alexandra’s Own Royal) 
Hussars, the 20th Hussars and the 21st (Empress of India’s) Lancers.  The result 
of this decision added a further complication; the 19th Hussars and the 21st 
Lancers enjoyed royal patronage, and additionally, Queen Alexandra was 
Colonel–in–Chief of the 19th Hussars.  This problem, however, was overcome 
quite easily with King George V’s approval who ‘recognised the force of the 
                                                 
141 Ibid., draft of the subsequent Army Order and Royal Assent, July 1921.  
142 TNA WO 32/5959 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Scheme for reduction of Cavalry 
Regiments. 
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arguments’,143 and was later published in Army Order 319 1921 ‘Reduction in 
Establishments’.  The question of royal patronage is interesting in so much as 
the argument for adding the prefix ‘Royal’ to the Tank Corps in 1923 might have 
been thought to have made disbanding such a unit more difficult; clearly this 
was not the case. 
 
Protests over the disbandments rained down upon the Secretary of State, 
especially letters from past senior officers, notably from General Sir Dighton 
Probyn VC on 11 March, Field Marshal French on 15 March and Field Marshal 
Allenby on 23 March 1921.  The regiments were nonetheless expected to be 
disbanded by 31 March 1922.144  By July 1921 pressure was further exerted upon 
the War Office to reduce the cavalry by five more regiments, making nine in all, 
an ‘odd number’ that did not lend itself to the home/overseas balance of 
regiments.145  A number of alternative schemes were considered.  These 
included reducing the regiments of the Household Cavalry as they did not 
feature in overseas postings during peace time, together with, in some way, 
taking the opportunity to ‘restore to life the four regiments recently 
disbanded’.146  Commanding officers of several cavalry regiments were consulted 
as were the Commandants of the three cavalry brigades.  Here it is interesting to 
read the following comment, unsigned, but thought to be written by Major 
General Ivo Lucius Beresford Vesey, Deputy Director of Organisations at the War 
Office: 
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I am still of the opinion that the cavalry made a mistake in not accepting 
conversion to tanks, and I doubt the wisdom of accepting the views of 
existing Commanding Officers, who are naturally “crusted” horse soldiers, 
on a question in which opinion is likely to change very, very rapidly in the 
near future.  We would not allow similar objections on the part of 
mechanicalising batteries, or we would never make any progress.147 
 
No record has been found of any offer to, or rejection by, the cavalry to convert 
to tanks, although clearly some discussion must have taken place to induce this 
comment.  Such proof would add credence to the criticism that the cavalry 
resisted mechanization, especially that levelled by Liddell Hart but, as has been 
said, tanks appropriate for cavalry work did not exist at that time with which to 
equip the cavalry. 
 
Eventually, the Secretary of State proposed a scheme on 27 March 1922 that 
would meet ‘the least opposition’ and be acceptable to both the King 148 and the 
Cabinet.  Army Order 133 1922 was therefore issued announcing the 
amalgamation of the 1st and 2nd Life Guards to form ‘The Life Guards (1st and 
2nd)149; and, by taking two squadrons from the senior regiment and one from the 
                                                 
147 Ibid.  
148 The Royal Approval was granted 4 April 1922. 
149 White-Spunner, Horse Guards, pp. 489/490. 
TNA WO 32/2843 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Regiment of Household Cavalry:  
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junior regiment, the amalgamations of regiments of the Cavalry of the Line that 
became known as ‘the fraction cavalry’ or ‘the vulgar fractions’:150 
 
The 3rd/6th Dragoon Guards 
The 4th/7th Dragoon Guards 
The 5th/6th Dragoons 
The 13th/18th Hussars 
The 14th/20th Hussars 
The 15th/19th Hussars 
The 16th/5th Lancers 
The 17th/21st Lancers 
 
Later in 1922 David Lloyd George’s coalition government began to come apart.151  
Public opinion polls were not used until the 1930s so it is impossible to assess the 
mood of the voters in earlier elections, but in 1922 there were difficulties within 
the coalition, the country and in Ireland, and a period of political instability 
ensued. The General Election of 15 November 1922 returned a Conservative 
government and another election just a year later on 6 December 1923, returned 
the minority, almost ‘pacifist’ Labour Government of James Ramsey MacDonald. 
The Labour Government saw ‘solving the European problem’ as the objective; to 
reverse the decline in trade with Germany, Austria and Russia was considered 
the key to stimulating exports and reducing unemployment.152  MacDonald was 
believed to have influenced the political framework that enabled the Versailles 
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Treaty (1919) to be amended by the so-called ‘Dawes plan’ in July 1924.  This 
led eventually to ‘a massive infusion of American capital into Europe’,153 a 
reduction in tension, particularly between Germany and France, and an 
‘outbreak in common sense’ resulting in a number of treaties, notably the 
Locarno Treaty in 1925.154  The Labour Government only held office for eight 
months.  A Conservative Government under Stanley Baldwin, with Winston 
Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer, was formed on 6 November 1924 and 
served until June 1929.155  Economic orthodox thinking prevailed and influenced 
the decision for Great Britain to return to the Gold Standard at the pre-Great 
War rate of $4.86 to the £ sterling on 28 April 1925.156  The economist John 
Maynard Keynes opposed the decision and Churchill later admitted ‘that the 
decision was the biggest blunder of his life’, but ‘[Churchill] was hardly in a 
position to withstand the overwhelming official backing for a return to gold at 
pre-war parity’.157  The return to the gold standard seriously over-valued sterling 
and over-pricing British export goods. This hampered any fragile recovery in the 
export industries already burdened by excessive borrowing and speculation 
during the earlier, brief, post-war boom.158 The gold standard was not again 
suspended until 1931.159 ‘British trade failed to return to the pre-1914 levels... 
major industries (cotton, shipbuilding, coal, iron and steel) suffered heavily in 
the 1920s... resulting in long term unemployment in particular regions of the 
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country’160 New industries, however, such as the electrical, distributive and 




























1918            0.8      
1919  n/a     4652 
1920  691      3.9 1,933 1,334 223 -376 4346 
1921 2038    16.9 1,086 703 107 -276 3953 
1922 1543    14.3 1,003 720 104 -179 4094 
1923 1275    11.7 1,096 767 119 -210 4236 
1924 1130    10.3 1,277 801 140 -286 4367 
1925 1226    11.3 1,321 773 154 -394 4602 
1926 1385    12.5 1,241 653 125 -463 4413 
1927 1088      9.7 1,218 709 123 -386 4719 
1928 1217    10.8 1,916 724 120 -1072 4795 
1929 1216    10.4 1,221 729 110 -382 4910 
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161 Briggs, A Social History of England, p.276. 
162 Cook and Stevenson, The Longman Handbook of Modern British History, p.270; 1920 and 1921; 
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163 Steiner, The Lights That Failed, from Appendix A, Table A-5a. 
164 Ibid.  
165 Ibid. 
166 Houston, Domestic Monetary Management in Britain, p.157. 
 92 
Unemployment remained over 1,000,000 throughout the 1920s, and apart from 
1927, over 10% of the workforce.  The early ‘boom’ and then the ‘slump’ can be 
seen from the import and export figures with the ‘short period of boom’ around 
1928 drawing in imports, but increasing the balance of payments deficit.  The 
key figure of Gross National Product (GNP) demonstrates the ‘slump’, but then a 
sustained growth, with the exception of 1926 – the year of the General Strike – 
until the end of the decade. 
 
The British Government’s optimism of the Ten Year Rule together with a 
determination to ‘balance the budget’ restricted the development of a suitable 
AFV with which to mechanize horsed cavalry.  On the one hand there was no 
apparent urgency, if indeed such a vehicle would ever be required for a future 
war; on the other hand there was sustained pressure on the army, and especially 
on the cavalry, to economise.  Mechanization was one route expected to achieve 
a reduction in defence costs.   
 
The Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin and the Standing Committee on Expenditure 
had, in February 1927, received  from the Secretary of State for War, Sir Laming 
Worthington-Evans, some form of explanation on his ‘general mechanisation [sic] 
proposals’.  What was expected from him was, once again, a ‘substantial and 
immediate reduction of expenditure in respect of the cavalry’.167  In a report 
signed by the military members of the Army Council on 30 June 1927 and marked 
                                                 
167 WO 32/2846 Reduction of Expenditure on Cavalry; Baldwin to Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, 
20 July 1927. 
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‘secret’168 (which appears to have been sent by Worthington-Evans to Baldwin), 
it had been pointed out ‘that an efficient mechanical substitute for the horse 
does not at present exist’.  Worthington-Evans informed the Prime Minister that 
some ‘promising types’ of vehicles were on trial, but ‘it would be courting 
disaster to send them on active service in place of cavalry in their present 
form’.169  Baldwin and the Committee expected horsed cavalry ‘to be abolished 
in the near future’ and found it difficult ‘to justify the heavy expenditure 
involved in recruiting and training men for the Cavalry and in providing generally 
for the special requirements of that arm’.170  Baldwin noted Sir Laming had 
‘urged the Committee to refrain from pressing these considerations at the 
moment in view of the fact that comprehensive experimental tests of your 
mechanisation  [sic] schemes were about to be undertaken’.171  
  
The former cavalry subaltern Winston Churchill was still Chancellor of the 
Exchequer;172  for reasons of economy more than military doctrine, he insisted 
that cavalry regiments be mechanized or disbanded.173 This was a pivotal point 
for cavalry mechanization; the government’s determination to reduce defence 
spending in 1927 was the catalyst for the first move towards armouring the 
cavalry.  The decision was probably a political one, a compromise with the 
Treasury, or perhaps was seen by the War Minister as a small sacrifice to keep 
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the Treasury ‘off his back’ until a suitable AFV was ready.  Whatever the politics 
of the matter and even though no more was done to armour the cavalry for 
another eight years, this, as will be seen, was a significant moment in the 
history of the British Regular cavalry.  
 
Churchill put pressure on the War Minister with other suggestions too; these 
included a further amalgamation of cavalry regiments, except the Household 
Cavalry and the Royal Scots Greys, to whom he gave the sobriquet the 
‘Household Cavalry of Scotland’.174   Churchill also suggested a reduction of six 
regiments175  and the deployment of yeomanry regiments to supplement regular 
cavalry in the event of war, particularly in the role of ‘divisional cavalry’.  
Yeomanry regiments, suggested Churchill, with ‘additional instructors’ and ‘an 
obligation to serve abroad in the event of a national emergency [would provide] 
at a comparatively small cost… an ample margin and a pool to draw on’.176 
 
The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal George Milne 
acknowledged, without indicating any reluctance to comply, the principle that  
‘cavalry must give way to a mechanised arm… it may be five years, it may be 
ten’.177  Milne argued in the intervening period: 
 
 
                                                 
174 WO 32/2846 Register 16/General/5558 Minute 13A; Churchill to Sir Laming Worthington-
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175 WO 32/2846 Register 16/General/5558 Minute 14A. 
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The Army in war must have some fast moving troops which will be able to 
protect it, and to perform the close reconnoitring duties which aeroplanes 
cannot do.  Both these functions must be performed for the present by 
cavalry until we can afford mechanisation [sic]. You have cut them down, 
to what you consider, and what you have accepted, as the closest margin 
of safety.178 
 
As David French clearly identified, the General Staff were willing to mechanize 
the cavalry, but were short of funds to do so.179  It was a risk too far to reduce 
horsed cavalry still further.   
 
The Final Report of the Army Council’s Cavalry Committee had been presented 
earlier, on 4 January 1927.180  Chaired by Lieutenant General Sir Archibald 
Montgomery-Massingberd, a former Royal Horse Artillery officer, the committee 
considered mobility and what measures could be taken to reduce the weight 
carried by a cavalry horse, and the type of weapon to be used, especially the so-
called arme-blanche weapons of sword and lance. The committee was keen to 
mechanize as much of the cavalry division as was possible at that time, although 
this report expressed uncertainty on when or whether this was possible.  An 
earlier ‘Interim’ report, 23 November 1926, envisaged a two year period 
necessary to develop a ‘reliable cross-country armoured car’.181  Two years 
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later, 3 December 1928, Montgomery-Massingberd wrote of recent AFV 
developments to General Sir Philip W Chetwode, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army of India: ‘It looks to me as if the Cavalry will want the Light Tanks and the 
Infantry the Machine Gun Carriers [sic]’.182  He thought there to be not much 
difference between the two; the tanks had more armour and the machine-guns 
would normally be fired from them, whereas the machine-guns would usually be 
removed from the carriers and fired mounted on a tripod.  The trial had taken 
place of a ‘Carden-Loyd Tank… with a sort of armoured roof… [it] did 49 mph, 
for which a track is undreamable [sic].’183  The track life was now 2000 miles and 
Carden-Loyds were trying to raise this to 4,000 miles he reported.  In a later 
letter to Chetwode, 18 January 1929, Montgomery-Massingberd wrote in 
anticipation of a Carden-Loyd track ‘which would even stand the rocks of 
India’.184  In his previous letter he wrote that at a weight of 25 cwt the ‘cross-
country capacity of these [Carden-Loyd armoured fighting] vehicles is quite 
good’.185  But this may not have been entirely accurate; in September 1928 
Frederick ‘Tim’ Pile, the Deputy Director of Mechanization, had told Liddell Hart 
that the Carden-Loyds had ‘trouble with steering and [with the] axle and tracks 
coming off’.  There was to be a revised model, but with a top-speed of 20 
mph.186  Montgomery-Massingberd hoped too for ten to fifteen Austin Seven cars 
per cavalry regiment and to ‘get their Machine Gun Squadrons in Light Tanks we 
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186 LHCMA - LH11/1928/1, ‘lunch with Pile at the Cavalry Club’, September 27 1928. 
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ought to be able to have a very different Cavalry formation, [but] it is not going 
to be easy to handle a semi-mechanized Cavalry Division in the future.’187   
 
In the meantime, in early 1927, there was much to be considered.  In order to be 
completely mechanized the headquarters of cavalry divisions (three brigades 
each of three regiments) also needed cross-country vehicles for their dismounted 
troops and stores.188   However, if the rest of the cavalry had to remain horsed, 
read the report, so must the artillery needed to accompany it; the 13 pounder 
quick-firing field guns used by Royal Horse Artillery were considered no longer 
good enough for ‘modern warfare’. The more suitable 18 pounder models, 
however, were too heavy for the horse teams pulling them to keep pace with 
cavalry over a long distance.  The report recommended therefore, that when the 
cavalry was mechanized, so would be the horse artillery, adding further to the 
cost of any mechanization project.189  To improve the speed and endurance of 
the horsed units, the report continued, a reduction in the weight carried by the 
horses was recommended by removing from them to the first-line transport 
(motor lorries) some of the kit, such as great-coats, extra ammunition and 
rations.  The horse artillery first-line transport should be mechanized too and, 
except for a few mounted troops for reconnaissance and orderly duties, the 
engineers should be carried in mechanized cross-country vehicles and should 
carry bridging equipment.190  Similarly the Signals Section was to be mechanized 
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(in small cars) and to include soldiers riding motor-cycles.191 The field 
ambulance also was to be completely mechanized and the first-line transport of 
the Veterinary and Provost Sections.  Other recommendations included 
recruiting lighter weight troopers 192 ‘of a tall, slight, wiry type [of man]’, by 
reducing to the infantry standard the chest measurement criteria for troopers (a 
1 inch reduction in chest measurement could equate to a reduction of 7-10 lbs. 
in a man’s weight it was suggested).  The maximum weight of cavalry recruits to 
be reduced, therefore, from 10 stones and 7lbs to a maximum of 10 stones for 
men aged 20 years and over, and less for men of 18 and 19 years old.193 
Regarding cavalry weapons, read the report, the experience in Palestine and 
Mesopotamia (during Allenby’s Great War campaign194), indicated there was, in 
addition to the rifle, a need to retain one type of arme blanche weapon, but not 
both.195  To this report were added some modifications of detail; in particular 
two regiments of armoured cars ‘to be found from two of the existing Cav. 
Regts. [sic]’.196   
 
Milne, the CIGS, presented the report to the Parliamentary Under Secretary at 
the War Office, Colonel Rt. Hon. The Earl of Onslow, in July 1927.  Milne’s 
concerns were finance; to convert the two horsed regiments to armoured cars 
was estimated to cost £384,000, unless cars were used from an existing unit.  
The motor vehicles required for the other recommendations were estimated to 
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cost £242,000, and another £34,000 for the changes to the Royal Horse Artillery.  
There would, however, be some savings in the cost of horses.197  In a scrawled 
note dated 14 August 1927, the Secretary of State for War Sir Lamming 
Worthington Evans gave his approval ‘in principle’ for the detailed work for 
implementation to begin.198  No further progress took place, however, pending 
the report by Lord Salisbury’s Sub-Committee, yet to be appointed.  On making 
the decision how and when to communicate these changes to the Cavalry arm, 
the Adjutant General, General Sir Walter P Braithwaite, wrote: 
 
‘[he felt] that the good cavalryman will welcome this, and he is the man 
we want to carry with us.  The man who goes into the cavalry for a few 
years to have a good time, may talk large on the subject, and possibly get 
silly questions asked in Parliament, but I think we can ignore him and his 
hypothetical member that he may get to represent his views in 
Parliament.199 
 
No announcement was made at that time because neither the Secretary of State 
nor the Army Council was in complete control of its own destiny.  Worthington 
Evans, concerned, penned Minute 35 to Milne telling him Churchill would not be 
satisfied with the estimated expenditure reductions then offered by the Council.  
He would not sanction any announcement regarding mechanization, ‘so long as 
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there is a risk that something more drastic may become necessary’.200  The 
Cabinet, still anxious about the cost of the cavalry, agreed on 16 November 
1927, to appoint a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence to be 
chaired by Lord Salisbury, The Lord Privy Seal, and to include the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, ‘to enquire and report what strength of Cavalry of the Line 
should be maintained’.201  The following June (1928) the Cabinet had before it 
the Sub-Committee’s report together with its recommendation from the 
Committee of Imperial Defence.  The Sub-Committee could not propose any 
reorganization of the cavalry that would save money; the progressive 
mechanization of the cavalry’s  machine-gun equipment and transport, and the 
conversion of two cavalry regiments into armoured car units, however, ‘should 
be approved’.  It was desirable, the report recommended, that ‘as increased 
mechanization becomes possible, of making the fullest use of the traditions of 
the Cavalry and of the spirit and special qualities of its personnel in its 
mechanized substitute’.   The capital cost of mechanization was noted in the 
report and any progress in that direction had to have ‘regard to financial 
considerations’.202  Churchill, supported by the Secretary of State for Air, Lord 
Thomson, was ‘content’ with the mechanization of two cavalry regiments for the 
current financial year, but urged ‘that further measures should be taken as 
rapidly as possible to furnish the British cavalry with equipment suitable to 
modern war’; he would not be associated with a report that suggested 
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mechanization should not take place ‘as rapidly as we can possibly afford’.203 No 
disagreement to this sentiment by other Cabinet members was recorded. 
 
Churchill, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had the power to ensure 
mechanization could be afforded by allocating the necessary funds or allowing 
the savings in one area to be reinvested in AFV development. David French 
agreed: ‘Churchill’s policy meant that he [Worthington-Evans] did not have 
enough money to buy enough of them [AFVs]’.204 It was perverse of Churchill to 
both expect mechanization and at the same time demand cuts in the Army 
Estimates.  Winton was critical of the Treasury’s stultifying effect on 
modernizing the British Army: 
 
Every entry [was] scrutinized and compared with the previous year… each 
increase had to be explicitly justified.  This meant that savings in one 
area could not be automatically credited to additional expenses in any 
other area.205 
 
Winton’s last point that savings in one area of expenditure could not be 
automatically moved to another is crucial to this thesis.  Barndollar 
acknowledged too that the Army Estimates covered the running cost of the 
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army, but not the ‘substantial outlays in research and development and even 
more money to manufacture [AFVs]’.206  Savings made by the Army in reducing or 
mechanizing horsed cavalry could not then, automatically, be spent on further 
developing AFVs from which further savings could have accrued.  It was a short-
sighted, hand-to-mouth policy, but as with successive Chancellors, and Neville 
Chamberlain in particular, Churchill had other priorities that took precedent 
over mechanizing the cavalry. Without the financial resources to develop 
suitable cross-country vehicles, however, the army was unable to make much 
progress. 
 
In October 1928 two ‘schemes’ were considered to begin the process of 
mechanizing the cavalry.  The ‘Scheme A’ proposal was to amalgamate two 
existing cavalry regiments and call for volunteers from the cavalry to form an 
armoured unit; later to repeat the exercise with two other cavalry regiments by 
some form of rotation and remounting on horses the first unit.  The more logical 
‘Scheme B’ was implemented; to select two line cavalry regiments to be 
permanently converted to AFVs, one regiment in England and one in Egypt.  The 
advantages of ‘Scheme B’ were the officers and men’s probable preference for 
conversion rather than amalgamation; efficiency would be enhanced by keeping 
the regimental identity, and continuity would be more effective than a  
‘rotation’ of roles as with ‘Scheme A’.207 
 
                                                 
206 Gilman Clough Barndollar, ‘British Use of Armoured cars 1919-1939’, PhD, Cambridge 
University, 2010, p.23. 
207 TNA WO 32/2844 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Armoured Car Regiment:  
Organisation 1927-1928 - ‘Secret – Two schemes for the creation of cavalry armoured car  
units have been examined’, 15 October 1927, marked 3B. 
 103 
In 1928 the 11th Hussars and the 12th Lancers commenced their move from 
horses to armoured cars, but it took until April 1930 for the last of their horses 
to depart.208  Veterans interviewed in 1977 from the 12th Lancers, seeming 
typical of their peers, chose to join a cavalry regiment because of their keenness 
for horses.209  The 12th Lancers was a very efficient regiment, well led by 
officers who ‘knew a lot about horses, they were very able people and one 
needed to work hard to keep up with their standards’.210  The regiment’s role in 
war was chiefly reconnaissance, but by dismounting, three-quarters of a troop 
could carry out an infantry role working with other arms and getting around the 
flank of an enemy to pin them down.211  In peace-time the regiment’s role was 
internal security, particularly in India and Egypt.  The 12th Lancers was in Egypt 
in 1927; their horses had adapted to desert conditions, moving well over both 
hard and soft sand, and the climate was good for their health.212  The regiment 
had hoped to stay ‘horsed’ and become a horsed machine-gun regiment. 213  The 
news came in ‘1926 or 1927’ that the regiment would become an armoured car 
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regiment, remembered Sir Andrew M Horsburgh-Porter.  Interviewed in 1977 
having retired as a colonel after the Second World War, he was a subaltern at 
that time, and said he knew about the conversion to armoured cars when he 
joined the regiment in Egypt in 1927.214 George J Kidston-Montgomerie, 
interviewed in 1977 having retired as a colonel in 1949, was a second lieutenant 
with the 12th Lancers in 1929; he remembered rumours were circulating, but the 
final decision to implement mechanization was in 1928 and this is confirmed by 
the Army Council records. 215  Kenneth Savill, also interviewed in 1977 and 
having retired from the 1st (King’s) Dragoon Guards as a colonel in 1939, was a 
second lieutenant with the 12th Lancers at that time too.  Savill remembered 
that when the officers and men were told they were shocked at the prospect of 
losing the horses: 
 
[But] we got over it after about a fortnight or three weeks, when we 
talked to others, like the Tank Corps, and decided it wasn’t at all a bad 
thing.  It was a shock to start with and rather awful, you joined the army 
to be on a horse, to be a cavalry soldier.  We were allowed to keep two 
chargers each for quite a few years.216  
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The general reaction was one of shock, but the officers were pleased to stay 
within the comradeship of the regiment.217  Concern had been expressed that by 
disbanding cavalry regiments, or by requiring officers and men to serve in 
cavalry regiments without horses, the army would be disadvantaged.  Without 
horsed cavalry, it was suggested, the army would fail to attract the type of men, 
be they officers or ‘other rank’ soldiers, that were ‘by birth and upbringing, and 
by their habits in boyhood, natural leaders with a keen eye for the country’.218 
This much feared exodus from the 11th Hussars and the 12th Lancers of officers 
disenchanted by the loss of their horses did not materialise; examination of the 
Army Lists from 1928 to 1931 show that very little change occurred.  The 
commanding officer of the 11th Hussars, Lieutenant Colonel F H Sutton MC, was 
replaced and went onto ‘half-pay’, but this might have happened anyway.  The 
only officer to move to a Regular horsed cavalry regiment was Lieutenant P R R 
Dunne in 1930; he moved from the 11th Hussars to the Royal Horse Guards.  
Captain C H Tremayne moved to the Nottinghamshire Yeomanry as a Reserve 
Officer.  This regiment had converted to artillery in 1920, but was probably still 
‘horsed’.219  Two other officers left the regiment, Major J C Humfrey and 
Captain H A Jaffray; they no longer appeared on the Army List, together with 
Captain E Smith a year later.220  The 12th Lancers were even less affected by 
officer turnover: Captain S R F Spicer transferred to the Royal Wiltshire 
Yeomanry, a horsed regiment, to serve as Adjutant.  Captains R G Goldsmith and 
H Alsop disappeared from the Army List.  Lieutenant W S McCleery transferred to 
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the North Somerset Yeomanry, a horsed regiment, as temporary Captain and 
Adjutant.  Posting a regular captain to serve as an adjutant to a yeomanry 
regiment was normal practice.221  Examination of the Army Lists shows that 
there was usually some officer turnover from year to year.222 Asked if any officer 
had left the regiment, Kenneth Savill affirmed:  ‘No, none; they all went on with 
it, some of the older ones, I think, found it a bit difficult to assimilate the inside 
of a motor car’.223 Colonel Savill also said that the ‘other ranks’ were rather 
pleased with the prospect: 
 
On the whole, because they didn’t have to groom the horses anymore – 
from 6 am until 5 pm; grooming, feeding, cleaning – they thought they 
[armoured cars] would just need a bit a greasing and put petrol in, but 
they found they needed to do a bit more than that when the time came, 
but I think they rather looked forward to the change.224 
 
A team of instructors, both officers and NCOs, from the 3rd Armoured Car 
Company of the Royal Tank Corps, facilitated the management of change.225  
Colonel Savage later said that: 
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They were very nice people, 3rd Armoured Car Company, very helpful.  
They came over every day from Abbassia to train us.  They brought some 
armoured cars over and put them in a shed.226 
 
Lieutenant R D W ‘Robby’ Uniacke (later killed in battle during the Second World 
War), one of the RTC instructors was considered a most effective organiser.  The 
other officers in the team were subalterns ‘Pip’ Roberts (later considered by 
many the best armour commander of the Second World War: G P B ‘Pip’ Roberts 
CB DSO MC was a Captain in 1939 and by 1943 a Major General), and Lieutenant 
G L Prendaghast, (who served with the Long Range Desert Group during the 
Second World War).   
 
Later, the 12th Lancers took over all the 3rd Armoured Car Company’s vehicles.  
The 3rd Armoured Car Company was sorry to lose their armoured cars as they 
were destined for heavy tanks.227  ‘But there was no resentment’, said Savill.228 
George Lindsay confirmed this and reported that there was ‘good comradeship’ 
between the RTC and the 12th Lancers.229  After getting their armoured cars the 
12th Lancers were: 
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Bent on mechanization and they were very keen indeed, the men very, 
very keen and so were the officers and we had to get on with it quickly – 
Colonel Charrington (the 12th Lancers commanding officer) was a great 
inspiration in this – and he took to it like a duck to water.230 
 
Unlike the 11th Hussars, which underwent the mechanization process in one 
year, it took three years to mechanize the 12th Lancers.  The regiment 
mechanized by squadron: B Squadron was the first, from the summer of 1927 
(some months before the decision was confirmed by the Army Council231), whilst 
the other two squadrons, A and C, remained horsed.232  Horsburgh-Porter 
explained why B Squadron was chosen to lead the change process. The regiment 
was in an operational role in Egypt and could spare only one squadron at a time 
for retraining. The machine-gun section was ‘rather the elite of the regiment, 
specialists, more intelligent chaps,’ and B Squadron contained the machine gun 
section. The mounted men from B Squadron went to A and C Squadrons.  They 
were replaced in B Squadron by other men, presumably thought to be more 
suitable, from A and C Squadrons, and together with the machine-gun section 
retrained for mechanization. 
 
The 12th Lancers continued to exercise as a complete regiment as Savill 
explained: 
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Joint training was novel.  The colonel arranged exercises we could do 
together – the armoured cars couldn’t always go where the horses went, 
but armoured cars could go further and faster – horses seven mph over a 
twenty mile radius, the armoured car would go fifty miles.233 
 
In 1928 six officers were sent from the 12th Lancers for training to the Royal 
Tank Corps depot at Bovington.234  Training was for the Rolls Royce armoured car 
and the machine gun.  This course was especially arranged for the cavalry 
officers from both the 11th Hussars and the 12th Lancers.  The course took the 
students through ‘mechanics’ demonstrated by a cut down bench model Rolls 
Royce car so that the workings of the engine, electrics and brakes could be 
carefully examined.  The students were also taught to drive the car around 
Bovington.  This proved poor preparation for driving in Egypt where the sand 
could overturn an armoured car, buckling the steering arms and snapping a half-
shaft.  Machine-gun training was at Lulworth, firing the .303 weapon from the 
car’s turret.235  The veterans interviewed in 1977 praised the welcome, 
enthusiasm and support of the Royal Tank Corps instructors. 
 
1928 also brought training in wireless and all three squadrons of the 12th Lancers 
took part.  Five wireless sets were provided; one was for each squadron and two 
for Regimental headquarters. These sets were operated by Lieutenant Hepper 
and his men from the Royal Corps of Signals.  One wireless set was for forward 
communications with the squadrons and the other wireless set was for 
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communications with Brigade headquarters.236  At the same time the 11th 
Hussars had similar wireless sets issued in England.  These sets were powerful 
enough for the two regiments to communicate with each other between England 
and Egypt.  When horsed, the regiments had used flags for signalling, effective 
for up to a mile, but the increased range afforded by the armoured cars forced a 
change in technology, although flags still had to be used for some time.237 
 
As a horsed cavalry regiment, the three ‘sabre squadrons’ of the 12th Lancers 
were organised into four troops each of thirty men and horses.  As an armoured 
car regiment, a squadron operated five troops, each having three armoured cars 
with a crew of five men, saving up to forty horsemen from the establishment of 
each squadron.  Each car and its machine-gun were the responsibility of its 
crew.   Crew roles were intended to be interchangeable.  The regiment’s role 
and tactics for armoured cars evolved from the horsed cavalry tactics manual as 
there were no training manuals for armoured car regiments.238  Savill’s view was 
that armoured cars were not more effective than horsed cavalry, but could 
cover a larger area. The RTC had only used armoured cars on the roads, but 
Colonel Hornby, who had succeeded Colonel Charrington as commanding officer 
in September 1931, was determined to get into the desert.239  Techniques were 
developed for getting a stuck car out of the desert sand: bamboo racks and sand 
mats, together with a new design of tyre, wider and at a lower air pressure that 
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better traversed soft sand.240  ‘We soon learned being an armoured car regiment 
was a jolly good life’.241 
 
Sir Andrew Horsburgh-Porter (12th Lancers) was pressed during his interview in 
1977, to comment on the attitudes of officers and men to the 12th Lancers 
becoming mechanized.  Of particular importance was whether Colonel 
Charrington’s inspirational leadership was typical of other senior officers, he 
replied: 
 
Yes – I think so – the great thing was to get on with it quickly – and 11th 
Hussar officers were the same – no doubt the 11th and 12th were hand 
over fist the best trained regiments when war broke out and supplied a 
great many commanders to other mechanized units.242   The junior 
officers’ opinions don’t really count at all – all they wanted to do was stay 
on a horse, but they soon came round... Those who joined cavalry 
regiments, we liked playing polo, hunting or racing – we liked the 
horse.... Old ‘unmechanizable’ sergeants and warrant officers who had 
spent their whole time with horses, they were very upset, naturally, and 
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most of them, [but actually] very few of them, got transfers into other 
regiments. 243 
 
Kidston-Montgomerie agreed: the senior NCOs in particular, ‘old horsemen, the 
“rough-riders” were very sad’ at losing the horses.  Although most stayed, some 
NCOs did transfer to horsed regiments.  He stated that those who stayed might 
not have liked mechanization, but ‘they did it and got used to it; most of the 
corporals came through as good instructors’.  Horsburgh-Porter confirmed that 
once the work load of the other ranks in the mechanized B Squadron was 
compared with their own as horsemen in A and C squadrons, this had a ‘very 
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The Troop leader of a section of Lanchester Mk.II Armoured Cars of the 12th Lancers signaling by 
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As with the 12th Lancers, the 11th Hussars interviewees recorded in 1977 joined 
the regiment because they were keen horsemen.246 A high standard was 
expected of the officers and, until he had ‘proved’ himself, it could be an 
unfriendly place for a newly arrived subaltern.247  The regiment was at Aldershot 
and their role was reconnaissance.248  The regiment already had motorised 
regimental transport, lorries to carry the fodder, horse shoes and spare 
equipment,249 but interviewees had no remembrance of any talk of 
mechanization before the actual announcement.  This was made on 10 March 
1928 to the officers in the mess one lunch time by Major General Thomas Tait 
Pitman, the Colonel of the 11th Hussars.250  He inspired the officers by talking of 
the regiment’s proud traditions and hoped that no officer would choose to leave 
the regiment.251 At the same time, recalled Peter Wiggin, then a second 
lieutenant (interviewed in 1977 having retired a colonel in 1942), the 
commanding officer ‘Lieutenant Colonel Sutton said: “We all go or we all stay”, 
so we all stayed.’ 252   Viscount [Dudley] Allenby, interviewed by the Imperial 
War Museum in 1977, was a lieutenant and the Adjutant of the 11th Hussars from 
1927 until 1930.  Allenby joined the regiment in 1923 and said during the 
interview that ‘virtually every officer was told no one was to hand in their 
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commission, and no one did; the spirit was good’.253 The NCOs were told three 
days later on 13 March.  
 
The War Office  envisaged five phases to the management of change from horses 
to armoured cars involving the 21 officers and 415 men of the regiment each of 
whom had at least twelve months of service remaining:- 
 
1. Horses, except officers’ chargers and fifty riding horses, together with the 
saddlery no longer required, to be withdrawn between 20 and 30 April 
1928. 
2. 13 of the 21 Regimental Officers and 20 warrant officers (WO) and non-
commissioned officers (NCOs) to go to Wool for driving and maintenance 
training and to Lulworth for gunnery training – May to July 1928, the 
remainder to administer the regiment and train the men in driving and 
machine-gun work. 
3. During manoeuvres in August and September  two parties of officers and 
NCOs that have been trained by the RTC to be attached to the RTC’s 
armoured car companies;  parties of ‘other ranks’ from the 11th Hussars 
to go for driving and maintenance and gunnery training at the RTC 
schools. 
4. A return to the RTC schools for the first 13 officers and 20 WOs and NCOs 
for the second phase of training from September to December, to become 
fully qualified instructors in gunnery and driving and maintenance.  At the 
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end of this course they were to return to the regiment as instructors.  
During the same period at the regiment, driving and machine-gun training 
[was] to continue.  During December the arrival of the first allotment of 
armoured cars was planned. 
5. Those officers who had remained with the regiment were now to go for 
their training at Wool and Lulworth until March 1929 when they would 
return to the regiment for the training season after which they would 
complete their training at the RTC schools - September to December 
1929.254 
 
The last mounted parade of the 11th Hussars occurred in mid-April 1928 as 
planned, and then everything moved rapidly.  Most of the horses went as 
remounts to other horsed regiments, others were sold.255  The officers were 
upset at the prospect of losing the horses, but like the 12th Lancers, officers 
were allowed to keep two ‘chargers’ and Wiggin remembered fifty horses 
remaining for the men to appear mounted in the Royal Tournament.  Douglas 
Forster, then a subaltern (interviewed in 1977, having retired a lieutenant 
colonel after the Second World War) remembered: 
 
Practically everyone decided to stop on and see what happened.  We 
were allowed to keep two chargers and a soldier-servant as a groom – we 
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could hunt or use them as polo ponies – of course they all went in the 
end.  It was an order and that was that.  After one had got over the initial 
shock, one realised that we, and 12th Lancers, had the advantage; it 
appeared then that the cavalry was going to be mechanized over a period 
and we would be the first in.  It was up to us to do it well and others 
would look to our experience.256 
 
Wiggin confirmed this: 
 
The reaction was one of horror, we thought it would never happen to us, 
but as it would happen eventually to every cavalry regiment and we were 
getting in on the ground floor, we could see the advantage of being 
first.257 
 
Viscount Allenby spoke of the 11th Hussars’ resolve: 
 
[There was] utter determination to make a success of it – by then even 
the junior regimental officer knew the role of [horsed] cavalry was 
coming to an end sooner or later – and it was some years later – it 
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[mechanization] was a test and a challenge and useful for other regiments 
later on that it could be done and wasn’t dreadful.258 
 
Viscount Allenby also said that although losing the horses was disappointing, 
mechanization was seen as a bit on an adventure. As for the reactions of the 
‘other ranks’ to the news, neither Forster nor Wiggin could remember anyone 
wanting to leave the regiment.  Although not welcomed, except for not needing 
to do all the work associated with horse care, mechanization soon became 
accepted.259  ‘They were 11th Hussars and had to get down to it’.260 Some men 
were posted away, however, such as the farriers.261 
 
The 11th Hussar officers attended the course at Bovington almost en masse, 
including the senior officers, and had to rent a country house nearby for 
accommodation.  The initial course at Bovington also included 10 NCOs from the 
11th Hussars.  A sergeant and 6 other ranks attended a technical store-keeping 
course at the Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC) depot at Aldershot.262 Like the 
12th Lancers, the 11th Hussars much praised the enthusiasm and efficiency of 
the Royal Tank Corps instructors who taught the officers mechanics and how to 
instruct others.263 Although Wiggin remembered that: 
 
                                                 
258 Allenby, reel 1. 
259 Forster, reel 1.   
260 Wiggin, reel 1. 
261 Wiggin, reel 1. 
262 XI Hussar Journal Vol. XII, Aldershot, October 1928, No.2, p.53. 
263 Allenby, reel 1; Forster, reel 1.   
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There was some antipathy in those days, originally [between cavalry and 
Royal Tank Corps] because of different interests.  I want to make this 
quite clear that this disappeared a long time ago now’.264 
 
‘Mechanics’ at that time, appears to refer to planned, preventative vehicle 
maintenance such as changing the engine oil, lubricating wheel bearings, 
cleaning engine spark plugs, etc., together with basic repairs, such as replacing 
a broken wheel or water pump.  Although some soldiers in the Royal Tank Corps 
might have thought cavalry soldiers incapable of doing these things and resented 
their involvement with armoured fighting vehicles, Wiggin went on to say that: 
 
They [the Royal Tank Corps] seemed happy for us to take over 
reconnaissance.  The Tank Corps had no long distance reconnaissance 
vehicle and was more interested in being in large numbers and closely 
involved in  battle – the cavalry’s role was to see and not be seen – get as 
much information as you could in that way.  Relationships were good with 
the Tank Corps; they were very kind to us. 
  
The cavalry NCOs emerged as more ‘mechanically-minded’ than some of the 
officers and later became effective regimental instructors. Much time was spent 
driving as most of the officers had little previous driving experience, although 
                                                 
264 Wiggin, reel 2. 
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some owned cars, ‘and could change a wheel’.265  The armoured cars were 
heavy, clumsy and ‘the brakes were not very good’. 266 
 
Back at Aldershot the regiment was issued with a few, (probably Rolls Royce) 
armoured cars.  The regiment also had Morris ‘saloon’ cars in which to train 
soldiers to drive.  The newly trained officers taught the NCOs to drive, none had 
ever driven a motor vehicle before and there was a plethora of accidents and 
some ‘hair-raising moments up Guildford High Street’.267 By September 1929 the 
11th Hussars had been equipped with 22 Rolls Royce armoured cars and 6 
Lanchester armoured cars.268  This was half the army’s total establishment of 
armoured cars, other than the armoured cars in India, the army establishment 
was only 56 and the 12th Lancers had the other half.269  Gunnery was taught and 
eventually, the wireless.  Wiggin said that gunnery from the car was ‘very dicey 
in those days... it was very dicey if you hit the target at all’. He also added that 
wireless ‘was very slow in coming’. 270 
 
The full complement of armoured cars took a long time to arrive and lorries 
were used instead  of armoured cars for driver training,271  but discipline was 
maintained by keeping to previous horsed cavalry practice: routine vehicle 
maintenance replaced ‘stables’ and the old armoured cars with which the 
                                                 
265 Wiggin, reel 2. 
266 Forster, reel 2; Wiggin, reel 2. 
267 Forster, reel 2. 
268 XI Hussar Journal  Vol. XIII, Aldershot,  March 1929, No.1 p.10 and XI Hussar Journal  Vol. XIII, 
Aldershot, October 1929, No.2 p.54. 
269 TNA WO 32/2844 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Armoured Car Regiment:  
Organisation 1927-1928; ‘Armoured Car Regiments – Secret’, 1 December 1927, marked 9a;  
3rd Battalion RTC 12 cars, 12th Armoured Car Company 12 cars, 3rd Armoured Car Company  
(Egypt) 16 cars, 5th Armoured Car Company (Shanghai) 16 cars. 
270 Forster, reel 2; Wiggin, reel 2; the armoured car was armed with the .303 Vickers machine-
gun.  
271 Wiggin, reel 2. 
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regiment had been issued took a lot of work.  Traditions died hard; some officers 
continued to wear spurs, (as they were required to do until a change in dress 
regulations272) but spurs were totally impractical (and useless) for driving and 















                                                 
272 TNA WO 32/3302 Regimental Dress and badges: Other Arms (Code 43(K)): Wearing of spurs in 
mechanised and converted units 1937-1938. 













                                                 







A Lanchester 6x4 Armoured Car, 1938. 275   
Almost certainly of the 12th Lancers; note the officer is still wearing spurs and two of the men 
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Crown copyright Access: Unrestricted {{PD-). accessed 06.04.2011.  
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Out on exercise with the infantry, the 11th Hussars used motorcycle despatch 
riders for communication. Tactics, however, were mostly theoretical: 
 
There was a tactical school, but it was mostly discussions because we 
were the first, I don’t think anybody knew much – it was just one’s own 
common sense really, after all we had been trained with the horses [on 
reconnaissance].  The cars were so slow then, I think we thought we could 
have been better on a horse because if you went forward you had to get 
your information back – there was only the motorcycle... I certainly didn’t 
feel any safer in an armoured car than on a horse.  The tactical use of an 
armoured car was, up to a point, the same as a horse, but you could cover 
more distance, but I had never fought on a horse.277 
 
Wiggin explained, the Lanchester armoured car was particularly ‘very heavy, 
unwieldy and slow,’ and the men of the 11th Hussars did not like them; Wiggin 
implied the men’s preference for the Rolls Royce model.278  The maximum speed 
of each armoured car was similar at 45 mph. The Rolls Royce, however, weighed 
4.5 tons, with armour of 12 mm thickness and almost certainly accelerated at a 
greater rate than the Lanchester that weighed 7 tons, with 9 mm of armour.279 
Wiggin also said: 
 
                                                 
277 Forster, reel 2. 
278 Wiggin, reel 2. 
279 URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lanchester_6x4_Armoured_Car. accessed 06.04.2011. 
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The armoured car wasn’t meant to be an offensive weapon - it was like 
the cavalry - we had to fight to get our information, not to have a pitched 
battle... Reconnaissance with armoured cars was more restricted than on 
horses that could go across country - Salisbury Plain and the desert were 
OK – otherwise [the armoured cars were] restricted by roads, villages and 
bridges, but if you were fired upon, unlike the horse, you couldn’t get off 
the road, jumping a fence, but at least you were protected by a few 
inches of armour that you weren’t on a horse.  [We did not know] half the 
time, what we were doing.  We started writing the armoured car manuals 
plus training directives, probably for the whole British Army.280 
 
Each crew was allocated its own vehicle, in the way that a horseman had been 
allocated his own horse, to take pride in and to care for. Gradually ‘trades’ 
began to emerge: gunner, wireless operator, driver, car commander, but this 
seems not to have been fully in place until after 1932.  In the beginning the 
‘heavy maintenance’ was carried out by mechanical engineers in Aldershot, 
(probably the Royal Army Ordnance Corps), but later the 11th Hussars had their 
own regimental fitters.281  ‘It was difficult to start with... [but later] we got 
rather good at it and could repair our own cars’.282  In the years that followed 
some officers and NCOs went on advanced engineering courses at the College of 
Military Science in Woolwich.283  Wiggin remembered too that these were 
younger men and although not selected because of it, they were keen on 
                                                 
280 Wiggin, reel 2. 
281 Forster, reel 2. 
282 Wiggin, reel 2. 
283 Allenby, reel, 1; Wiggin, reel 2. 
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mechanics as younger men were at that time.284 The 11th Hussars was ‘a family’ 
and was determined to do a good job of something that they originally did not 
want to do. Ralph Younger, recorded in 1977, remembered that: ‘Both 11th 
Hussars and 12th Lancers were outstandingly good regiments and took 
mechanization in their stride, as they had to do’.285 
 
Recalling Steiner’s assertion that ‘the 1920s should be treated as a decade that 
followed an earlier war... rather than, as was common, the precursor of the war 
that followed,286  the question has to be briefly considered why the government 
gave such an ever decreasing spending priority to defence generally and the 
army in particular.  What were the influences, or lack of them, on their policy 
decisions?  Firstly, there was no direct military threat to Great Britain.287  
Secondly, economic choices; the Great War debt and ‘boom and bust’ of the 
1920s restricted the government’s expenditure options.  Donald Winch argued 
that after 1918 ‘it was one of the most confused, frustrating, and unsuccessful 
periods in the history of economic policy-making in Britain’.288  ‘The war had 
wrecked international finance and trade’,289 but post 1918 reconstruction and 
pent-up demand drove an ‘economic boom’; ‘factories were deluged with 
orders’.290  Around April 1920 this ‘boom’ collapsed.291   It was sudden and had 
                                                 
284 Allenby, reel 1; Wiggin, reel 2. 
285 Major General Ralph Younger, IWM Sound Collection, access number 913, recorded 1977, reel 
1. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare correctly claimed that the 
experience of the 11th Hussars and 12th Lancers showed that ‘the cavalry were willing, if not 
eager to convert themselves into mechanised soldiers’, quoted in Gilman Clough Barndollar, 
‘British Use of Armoured cars 1919-1939’, PhD, Cambridge University, 2010, p.341; French, D., 
‘The Mechanization of the British Cavalry’, p.299.  
286 Steiner, The Lights That Failed, Preface v. 
287
 Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy, p.98. 
288 Winch, Economics and Policy, p.73. 
289 Steiner, The Lights That Failed, p.182. 
290 Lewis, Economic Survey, p.18; see also Howson, Domestic Money Management In Britain, 
pp.9-30. 
 128 
the potential to do more economic damage to Great Britain than had the Great 
War itself. 
 
Expenditure on social projects was prioritised, undoubtedly influenced by the 
enlargement of the franchise in 1918 and 1928 to include women voters with 
different priorities, the growth of pacifism, partly stimulated by the fear of 
aerial attack in any future war, faith in the League of Nations to maintain peace 
by non-military means, and a general move by voters to the anti-war, anti-
militarist political ‘left’.  These factors gradually increased in their influence 
during the 1920s and into the 1930s and may have been of even greater 
significance on the government’s defence expenditure than has previously been 
properly acknowledged.  Cecelia Lynch has argued that during the interwar 
period, there was an ‘excessive preoccupation with the mood of the 
electorate’.292  The electorate’s mood of that period is open to speculation; 
there were no opinion surveys and politicians, in order to seek or retain power, 
reflected in their policies their own perception of what was public opinion.  
They needed to do so; as well as being democratic, the political class was 
mindful of the changes the Great War had brought about.  Monarchies had 
fallen, dynasties ended, and a Bolshevik government was ensconced in Russia.  
Until the mid-nineteen thirties the mainstream political parties, in terms of 
defence spending, had similar policies and would otherwise have stood little 
chance of success at an election. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
291 Middlemass,(ed.), Thomas Jones – Whitehall Dairies Volume I, p.96. 
292 Lynch, Beyond Appeasement, p. 4. 
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Table 2 – U K Government Spending per Fiscal Year ending (£ millions).293 
 
 1920 1925 1930 
Health care 25 38 46 
Education 110 135 154 
Defence 694 120 119 
Welfare 156 208 251 
Protection 34 33 37 
Transport 75 128 161 
General Govt. 19 18 12 
Other Spending 620 275 278 
Interest 375 383 413 
Balance -123 -122 -114 
Total Spending 1,985 1,225 1,356 
Public Net Debt +7,810 +7,585 +7,457 
 
In summary, in the 1920s politicians and public alike looked forward to a world 
of peace.  This expectation was reinforced by a growing web of inter-national 
treaties that confirmed non-aggression or mutual defence pacts.  The League of 
Nations successfully worked to resolve many disputes by non-military methods.  
In Great Britain successive governments told the armed services no war was to 
be planned for, for the ensuing ten years.  A peace movement, growing in 
numbers and influence, coupled with the electorates’ gradual drift to support 
‘anti-war’ left of centre views (see Appendix D), made increased defence 
                                                 
293 URL: http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/spending_brief.php  accessed 25.05.2011. 
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spending politically unacceptable.  Service budgets were consequently reduced.  
The army’s role was one of peace keeping both in Great Britain and the Empire; 
horsed cavalry was particularly useful for this purpose. 
 
Development in cross-country AFV engineering was in its infancy and needed a 
considerable financial investment to progress.  With little need by the 
government for the army, when a successful prototype tank was made, the 
government chose not to fund its production and further development.  The only 
vehicles with which to mechanize horsed cavalry regiments were the army’s 56 
armoured cars.  The officers and men of the regiments chosen to be mechanized 
were initially shocked and upset at the prospect of losing their horses, but they 
quickly saw the opportunity of leading the way to what both the General Staff 
and cavalrymen had expected to be the future for their arm of the service; in 
any case there was little choice, it was an order that had to be followed.  Morale 
remained high; almost all the officers, warrant officers, NCOs and men stayed 
with their regiments and successfully managed the change from horses to AFVs.  
When eventually engaged in battle the 11th Hussars and the 12th Lancers proved 
to be two of the British Army’s most effective armoured regiments during the 
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Chapter Two 
Mechanization Phase Two 1930 – 1936  
The Experiment - the dragons porté and the 3rd Hussars 
 
For historians, argued Malcolm Smith in 1984, ‘the problem of dealing with the 
Thirties… is still [that] the Second World War, such a crucial phase in British 
history, refracts perspectives on the Thirties’.1  For many of the electorate for 
much of the decade, the security situation was the least of their worries.  In 
Great Britain the political situation, moving from the late 1920s and into the 
early 1930s appeared if not unstable, then uncertain, with a minority Labour 
Government in power followed quickly by a Conservative dominated National 
‘coalition’ Government led by a Labour Prime Minister whose ‘sole, original 
raison d’être’ was financial recovery.2  The earlier politicians’ fears of civil 
unrest or even revolution appear reduced, but there was anxiety amongst the 
cabinet and security service regarding communist infiltration and subversion 
within the armed services.   The so-called ‘Invergordon mutiny’ was viewed by 
some as an industrial strike, but not by others in whom it evoked recollections 
that the downfall of both the Tsar and the Kaiser was aided and abetted by 
naval mutinies.3   ‘Invergordon produced an extensive purge of naval personnel.  
Almost a thousand were discharged’.4  There were attempts to subvert soldiers 
in British barracks; Ronald Lucas of the 15th/19th Hussars acknowledged, with a 
                                                 
1 Smith, British Air Strategy, p.306. 
2 Ibid., p.307. 
3 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, p.163. 
4 Ibid., p.164. 
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knowing smile, ‘yes, we knew about that’,5 and this led, in 1934, to the passing 
of the Incitement to Disaffection Act; few prosecutions have occurred under this 
Act.6  
 
As for army operations, there was no longer a military commitment in Turkey; in 
Ireland eight infantry battalions of British troops were needed, but only in 
Northern Ireland, and by December 1920 British troops had withdrawn from the 
Rhineland.  India was another matter.  In 1930 Gandhi began a civil disobedience 
campaign. Harold Pyman remembered in 1971, when he was posted there as a 
RTC subaltern in 1934 that the sub-continent of India ‘was in a state of political 
eruption and remained so for years… this usually resulted in some part of the 
Army being called out to assist the civil power in restoring order’.7  There were 
incursions on India’s North-West frontier to be dealt with too.  The 15th/19th 
Hussars were stationed in Peshwar, the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards in Kohat, the 
4th Hussars in Karachi, the 3rd Hussars in Lucknow and the 9th Lancers in the 
Mehow District. These horsed cavalry regiments, supported by RTC armoured car 
companies, were part of the large deployment of British troops on the sub-
continent.  There was a cavalry brigade in Egypt; in 1929 this was made up of 
The Royals, the 10th Hussars and the 12th Lancers (see Appendix B for detailed 
deployment of British troops that included Bermuda, Ceylon, Cyprus, Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, and West Africa).  The army in 1931 was, however, reduced in size 
from 325,000 to 207,537 men.  
                                                 
5
 Personal interview with Lucas (2012); by the author. 
6 Ibid., pp.164 -166; URL: http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldselect/ldrelof/95/9508.htm accessed 25.04.2013. 
7 Pyman, Call to Arms, p.20. 
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Within government, security concerns appeared on the horizon with unrest 
between Japan and China.  In 1932 the British Government appraised the 
nation’s defence capability and abandoned the ‘10 year rule’, but, Smith argues, 
‘no assumption took place while Geneva [Disarmament Conference] was in 
session’.8  This demonstrated the government’s cognisance of both the economic 
situation and public opinion hopeful for success at Geneva. 
 
The amazingly popular cinema had screened on the ‘newsreel’ in 1931 pictures 
of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.  This was an example of what future war 
would be like.  William Bate confirmed newsreels ‘were staple parts of the 
programme’, and particularly remembered seeing the bombing of Shanghai.9 
Stanley Chapman remembered newsreels of the Japanese bombing of Nanking, 
and later the war in Abyssinia; he said these stoked up fears of what aerial 
bombing could do.10 Bate and Chapman confirmed Hinton’s assertion that the 
newsreel footage of the bombing of Shanghai caused much anxiety.11 The 
Shanghai bombing ‘magnified worries of the peace groups and validated claims 
underlying the call for their [bombers] abolition’.12  In a speech on 10 November 
1932, Stanley Baldwin coined the phrase, ‘the bomber will always get through’, 
and ‘he [Baldwin] was right’, confirmed veteran cavalryman Robert Cruddace, 
(in correspondence in 2007 and who was serving in India in 1932).13 Winston 
Churchill, the Member of Parliament for Epping and a back-bencher at that time, 
                                                 
8
 Smith, British Air Strategy,p.124. 
9 Personal correspondence with Bate (2008); by the author.  
10 Personal interview with Chapman (2008); by the author. 
11 Hinton, Protests and Visions p.92.  
12 Lynch, Beyond Appeasement, p.107. 
13 Personal correspondence with Cruddace (2008); by the author. 
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who later worried about the danger of the ‘thermite (incendiary) bombs’,14 
recalled that Baldwin’s speech ‘produced so great an impression’ and put an 
‘official seal’ on these fears.15   
 
Financial constraints meant that ‘full security could not be achieved by 
rearmament’ alone, especially when threats from Japan were increased by 
concerns over Italy and Germany.16 A coherent policy was produced in which 
diplomacy, in the form of appeasement,17 was intended to play a dominant role; 
what was not dominant was a role for the army.   
 
The proximity of Germany and the growth of its air-force ‘concentrated 
attention and resources on this particular threat’.18  Hugh Trenchard (1st 
Viscount and Marshal of the RAF), Chief of the Air Staff, and his later cohorts of 
senior airmen, had ‘claimed that the bomber offered a wholly new method of 
waging war’, victory would come from destroying the enemy’s industry and 
supplies.19  What was required was a ‘first-strike capability’ air-arm to deter 
aggression on Great Britain’s particularly vulnerable industrial areas and densely 
populated conurbations and, perversely, to add weight to its negotiating position 
for disarmament.20  The cabinet discussed how this would relate to its 
disarmament policies.21   
 
                                                 
14 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.305. 
15 Churchill, The Second World War, p.133. 
16 Smith, British Air Strategy, pp.308 & 309. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., p.310. 
20 Ibid., pp. 44-46,62 & 310-311 & 314. 
21 Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark, p.87. 
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Bialer has asserted that the danger of air attack and concern over public opinion 
motivated the government to ‘search for an international air disarmament 
agreement’.22  Smith has placed this in context as the option most favoured by 
the cabinet, but as part of a three pronged policy: the development of a 
deterrent bomber force, a ban on bombing by international agreement and, as 
the cabinet eventually adopted in late 1937 and 1938 when it realised the 
combination of the first two had failed, protection by fighter aircraft and 
radar.23  
 
Major Clement Attlee, 24 the Member of Parliament for Labour, Limehouse, and 
shortly to be deputy leader of his party, called on the British Government to give 
‘a clear and decided lead at the [Geneva] Disarmament Conference’ to rid the 
world of the ‘menace of the air weapon’.25   At the beginning of the conference 
the dream of disarmament and peace throughout the world was within reach.  A 
rally of all Great Britain’s churches and religious organisations was held in the 
Royal Albert Hall presided over by the Archbishop of Canterbury.  
Congregational, Wesleyan, Roman and Anglo-Catholics, men, women and 
children sang and joined in prayer that the Geneva conference would be 
successful in eliminating bombers, submarines and all aggressive weapons. 26  
The conference expected an attendance of 2,400 delegates, representing 
1,700,000,000 of the world’s population, experts and secretaries together with 
500 journalists.  A further encouragement of success was the participation of 
                                                 
22 Bialer, The Shadow Of The Bomber, pp.3,9, 17 &18. 
23
 Smith, British Air Strategy, pp.311 & 317. 
24 See Appendix C - biographies.  
25 Manchester Guardian, 12.11. 1932.   
26The Times 14.02.1932 p.14; Daily Mail 05.02.1932 p.16 - The Church Assembly Resolution 
report; 09.02.1932 p.10 - bombing of Shanghi report. 
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Turkey and the United States as they were not members of the League of 
Nations.  A reduction to the $4,000,000,000 dollars spent on armaments by the 
sixty-one nations represented was hoped for that would help solve the economic 
problems experienced by most of them.27 
 
The Times end-of-session leading article explained to readers ‘probably the 
largest international conference of Governments ever held naturally had a few 
problems to overcome such as defining terms’.28  Great Britain’s support for the 
United States proposal of a ‘Ban on Tanks and Heavy Guns’ was a headline in The 
Times of 11 April 1932.  The obstacle to achieving arms reduction was the threat 
to a nation’s security; if aggressive weapons were banned, this would open the 
way to an overall reduction in military hardware.  The ‘solution was to remove 
[the] fear [of invasion… the] mechanization of attack’. 29 The proposal was to 
scrap all existing weapons and abolish their future manufacture.  The British 
Government ‘found themselves in substantial agreement’ with this proposal.30 
 
The Vickers engineering company, the only British commercial tank 
manufacturer at that time,31  it might be thought was alarmed at the prospect of 
disarmament, but demonstrated only a little concern by the ‘tank banning’ 
proposal, and the company was not deterred from their commercial pursuits 
abroad for sale of tanks.  There was some rationalisation of production, 
however, in as much that what little tank and Carden-Loyd ‘carrier’ production 
                                                 
27 The Times, 02.02 1932; report of the Conference President Sir Arthur Henderson’s comments. 
28 The Times, 25.02.1932, p.13. 
29 The Times, 12.04.1932; The Daily Mail, 21.04 1932, p.3. 
30 The Times, 12.04.1932. 
31 Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy, p.124. 
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there was that ‘had sunk to a mere trickle’, took place at the Elswick Works in 
Newcastle upon Tyne and all AFV manufacture ceased at Erith in Kent (the 
design and demonstration centre at Chertsey, Surrey remained operational until 
1953).32  Vickers development designer Sir John Carden suggested the company 
ceased making ‘any further new [tank] models for at least two years’.33  Carden 
encouraged the need to ‘keep ahead of everyone’ and implied possible 
competition coming from the War Office to manufacture AFVs at Woolwich 
Arsenal.  It is important to note that by Vickers’ own admission, until 1929 
Vickers ‘had no designs [of tanks] whatever of marketable value’; sometimes the 
design work had been rushed in order to get the Elswick Works into production 
and defray the development costs.34  By 1932, however, Carden thought Vickers’ 
range of tanks ‘very excellent and complete’ and ‘well in advance of anything 
anyone else is likely to produce for several years’, but he did question what 
would now be called Vickers’ marketing policy.35  Suggesting an improvement or 
variation to an existing development model (probably the ‘Sixteen-Tonner’ or 
perhaps the new turreted light tank undergoing tests in India), and clearly not 
anticipating a world-wide tank ban, Carden wrote: ‘If we make the machine 
bullet proof, this tank will be the most advanced in the world of its kind and if 
the War Office won’t buy it the foreigner will’.36  He was correct; between 1930 
and 1938 Vickers Six-Ton tanks, the downgraded version of the ‘Sixteen-Tonner’ 
discussed in the previous chapter, were purchased by Bolivia, Bulgaria, China, 
                                                 
32 Foss, and McKenzie, The Vickers Tanks, p.72. 
33 Vickers Papers; historic document 744, letter dated 08.01.1932 from Sir Noel Birch’s file in Sir 
Frank Yapp’s cabinet, Cambridge University Library Manuscripts Department. See Appendix C – 
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34 Vickers Papers; historic document 744, 8 January 1932, ‘Report on Suggested Future 
Development on Tank Work’. 
35 Ibid.  
36 Vickers Papers; historic document 744, 25 January 1932, letter from Sir John Carden to Sir 
Noel Birch. 
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Finland, Greece, Poland, Russia and Thailand.  Russia further developed this AFV 
to produce the T-26 model of tank and later, with the Christy suspension from 
the USA, the most produced Second World War T-34 tank (also mentioned in the 
previous chapter).37  
 
The cost of producing bulletproof plate escalated in Britain in the 1930s partly 
due to the increased price of imported nickel ‘which has risen due to this 
country [Great Britain] going off the Gold Standard’.38  There was concern 
expressed too about competition from Skoda and Madsen who ‘both had guns 
which are superior to ours [Vickers]’.39  Sir Noel Birch, former Master General of 
the Ordnance and Great War artillery general, a director of Vickers, on 27 April 
1932 wrote regarding, among other matters, trade with Latvia, Rumania and 
Poland, and ‘machine-gun tests’ from Greece: 
 
The Disarmament Conference at Geneva is now settling whether tanks 
should be retained in service or not.  I am not particularly anxious about 
this because Lord Hailsham [Viscount Hailsham, Secretary of State for War 
and Leader of the House of Lords] is in the Chair, but still it is a factor 
that must be taken into account’.40   
 
                                                 
37 Foss, and McKenzie, The Vickers Tanks, p.75; Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.390; Harris, 
Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.277. 
38 Vickers Papers; historic document 744, 11 January 1932, letter to Sir Noel Birch from E R 
Micklem, Elwick Works, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
39 Vickers Papers; historic document 744, 14 January 1932, letter from Sir Noel Birch to Colonel 
Neilson and Lord Falmouth. 
40 Ibid., see Appendix C – biographies. 
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Later, on 7 November 1932, the Chairman of Vickers, General Herbert A 
Lawrence, was obviously concerned about his ‘order-book’ and wrote to  Sir 
Maurice Hankey, 41 the Secretary of the Committee for Imperial Defence.  
Lawrence asked Hankey for greater support from the British Government as 
Vickers was providing ‘practically every requisite for the three [British] fighting 
services’ that required the maintenance of ‘large research and experimental 
establishments’; he wanted more orders, fewer restrictions on overseas arms 
sales, an extension of the ‘Export Credit Scheme’ and further assistance 
generally.42 A restriction on the sale of the ‘small tank’ to Poland had already 
been lifted.43 
 
Great Britain’s support at Geneva for the ‘tank-banning’ proposal did not enjoy 
universal support at Westminster, which probably alleviated Birch’s anxiety at 
Vickers.  Under the headline ‘Armoured Cars and Tanks’, Lord Stanhope was 
reported to have argued that banning all AFVs would restrict mechanization and 
its consequent reduction in manpower.  Light tanks and armoured cars, it was 
pointed out, were useful for imperial policing.  The British counter proposal 
should be to ban tanks that possessed the ‘knock-out blow’, those over 25 
tons.44 Such a counter proposal would have caused no difficulty as the British 
Army had no tanks of that size; the few Vickers Medium Mark II tanks in service 
weighed about 14 tons.45   
                                                 
41 See Appendix C – biographies.   
42 Vickers Papers; historic document 772. 
43 Vickers Papers; historic document 744, 21 September 1932, memo initialled ‘EB’. 
44 The Times, 01.06.1932, p.13. 
45 Fletcher, Mechanised Force, p.12. 
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The Daily Mail published an article by Winston Churchill on 26 May 1932 in which 
Churchill wrote of the hopes of millions of well-meaning people still attached to 
the disarmament conference, but, he asserted, it was easy to talk of peace and 
then leave the details until later or to be sorted out by technical experts.  
Dividing weapons into categories ‘Offensive (Naughty) and Defensive (Virtuous)’ 
was the ‘silliest plan of all’ he wrote: ‘Every weapon of war can be used for 
both.  The most offensive weapon of all is surprise’, and he asked: ‘How can this 
ever be banned’? 46  Liddell Hart saw a need to ‘transcend all such bickerings’; 
he had studied the problem and: 
 
came to see the root of it lying in the kind of weapons which inherently 
favoured the offensive.  If an international agreement could be attained 
for their universal abolition, there could be a real chance of nullifying the 
prospects of successful aggression.47   
 
Liddell Hart wrote of this difficult argument with which he had to come to terms 
as he had spent the past ten years preaching the concept of war as ‘lightning 
[attacks] with highly mobile mechanised forces’, and he published the essence 
of his argument in the Daily Telegraph.48 
 
                                                 
46 Daily Mail, 26.05.1932, p.12; see Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p. 207, re Churchill’s attack 
on the proposal  as  ‘a silly expedient’, in the House of Commons debate, 13 May 1932 and 
Liddell Hart’s response in his Daily Telegraph article, 17 May 1932. 
47 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.186; for his paper on this copied to Sir Sam Hoare and Lord 
Robert Cecil see pp.187-190. 
48 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I,) pp.194/195. 
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It is impossible to know how the many British newspaper readers and voters 
were influenced by Churchill’s argument or by Liddell Hart’s, but the British 
counter-proposal at Geneva to ban only ‘big’ tanks was supported by just three 
countries; thirteen other countries favoured the proposal to ‘declare all tanks 
illegal’.  The Times continued to report from the Geneva Conference together 
with the reactions of the British parliament, especially on what benefits 
disarmament might bring to the taxpayer.49 One Member of Parliament 
expressed his clear understanding of the role of the navy and air force in 
Britain’s defences: ‘But it was impossible [for him] to say that was true of the 
Army’, and this question [the role of the army] ‘ought to be thought through 
more seriously now than at any time since the [Great] war’.50  Concern was 
expressed, however, that in anticipation of the success of the disarmament 
conference the reduction in the defence Estimates were most severe.51 The 
actual defence expenditure estimate for 1932, as has been stated, was reduced 
to £103,199,000, described by Peden as the ‘nadir’ of the interwar years 
defence spending.52  
 
The League of Nations in 1932 had appointed a commission under Lord Lytton to 
review the Japanese declaration of a separate state for part of a disputed area 
of Manchuria.  The League accepted Lord Lytton’s report in which he said the 
state the Japanese had created was ‘against the popular will of the 
                                                 
49 The Times; examples include Mr G Hall (Aberdare, Labour), 08.02.1932 p.8 and Mr D Adam 
(Poplar South, Labour), 09.03.1932, p.6. 
50 The Times; an example is Mr Amery (Birmingham, Sparkbrook, Unionist), 09.03.1932, p.6. 
51 The Times; an example is Mr A Chamberlain (Birmingham, Unionist), 08.02.1932, p.8.   
52 Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, p.3. 
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inhabitants’.53 This ‘declaration’, which came in March 1933, was the reason the 
Japanese gave to leave the disarmament conference in Geneva and the League 
of Nations.54   On 30 January 1933, Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany.  
Earlier, at the peace conference, the German delegation had argued for more 
concessions as a tactic ‘to forestall’ Hitler’s further political advance.  The gap 
between Germany’s demands for military equality and France’s insistence on 
security could not be bridged argued Marks ‘for the Hitlerian tide was at the 
flood’.55   Neither had German expectations been fulfilled at the separate 
economic conference on war reparations at Lausanne in the summer of 1932. 
This further inflamed German resentment and exacerbated the political 
situation.56 These events in Manchuria, involving the Japanese, and the political 
situation in Germany, destabilised the conference to the extent that it staggered 
on through 1934,57 because ‘too much effort and public attention had been 
focused on the talks to abandon the scheduled summer session’.58  It ended with 
unfulfilled expectations.  
 
The British Government was then in a dilemma: an international agreement to 
ban bombing had failed, and Baldwin in Cabinet argued that if an agreement to 
limit air-forces could not be achieved ‘public opinion might be willing to agree 
to anything which could prevent a foreign air-force from getting any closer than 
                                                 
53 Gibbs, N. H. [1976], History of the Second World War Grand Strategy Volume 1 Rearmament 
Policy, (HMSO, London) p.75 The report of the Lytton’s Commission to the British Government – 
URL: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1932/nov/02/manchuria-report-of-the-lytton-
commission. 
54 Marks, Sally, The Illusion of Peace, p.136. 
55 Ibid., p.128. 
56 Ibid., p.135. 
57 ‘The Bureau of the Disarmament Conference continued to meet periodically until February 
1935’ - Steiner, Zara [2011], The Triumph of the Dark, p.55. 
58 Ibid. 
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they are today’.59  Regarding British air strength, Baldwin announced on 8 March 
1934, ‘[Britain] shall no longer be in a position inferior to any country within 
striking distance of our shores’.60  In response, first ‘deterrent’ and then ‘air 
defence’ became the government’s rearmament priorities.   
 
What is crucial to this thesis is that at that time there was no thought by 
politicians of sending another British Expeditionary Force (as in 1914) to fight in 
a land war on the continent of Europe in which AFVs would be required.  There 
had been such thoughts earlier by the General Staff, but the plans for an 
expeditionary force were scrapped until 1939. 61 The Royal Air Force was the 
priority which left the army, and tanks, well down the order for funding.  Smith 
has concluded that the government had little alternative given the economic, 
diplomatic and geographic parameters.62 
 
‘It was a most unpleasant position for me’ wrote Sir Archibald Montgomery-
Massingberd in 1946, who had been the CIGS from February 1933 until April 
1936, ‘for war loomed on the horizon… for three successive years… I knew the 
Army was totally unready for war’.63  Montgomery-Massingberd had in mind: 
Japan 1933, with the invasion of Manchuria, Italy 1935, when Abyssinia was 
invaded and Germany 1936, on their reoccupation of the Rhineland, and: 
 
   
                                                 
59 Bialer, The Shadow Of The Bomber, pp. 49/50. 
60 Ibid.  
61 LHCMA - MM159/1jjj. 
62
 Smith, British Air Strategy, p.317. 
63 LHCMA - 10/11-10/13 159/1ggg, The Montgomery-Massingberd Papers. 
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During my time at Aldershot [Commanding 1st Division], and as time went 
on so did the demand for mechanization.  But there was a break on it and 
a very severe one – the want of money.  During all the years between the 
wars, and especially between 1922 and 1932, the Army was starved and 
little or no money was made available for mechanization or the supply of 
tanks, guns and vehicles, when by trial these had proved satisfactory.64 
 
Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd has been much criticised, even blamed, 
for his tardiness to mechanize the army more than was achieved during his 
tenure of office.65  Harris wrote that Montgomery-Massingberd ‘became a bête-
noire’ for the newspaper journalist and later historian Basil Liddell Hart.66  
Liddell Hart’s criticism seemed centred upon the CIGS’s attitude to the RTC of 
which Liddell Hart was a great advocate.  Liddell Hart argued that the CIGS took 
a ‘definite line… that the RTC should not be expanded at the expense of the 
older arms’, and stressed Montgomery-Massingberd’s continued determination to 
‘placate’ the cavalry whose anxiety to keep their horses defied logic. 67   
 
Harris criticised subsequent historians’ assessments of Montgomery-Massingberd 
as ‘sometimes… unbalanced and unfair’.68  Norman Dixon’s influential book On 
The Psychology of Military Incompetence is an example.  Dixon employed similar 
derogatory rhetoric to Liddell Hart and linked Montgomery-Massingberd to 
General Sir Philip Chetwode for criticism of their ‘romantic behaviour’ towards 
                                                 
64 LHCMA - 10/11-10/13, 159/1ww, The Montgomery-Massingberd Papers. 
65 Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.242. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.265. 
68 Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.242. 
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horsed cavalry.69 Dixon condemned Chetwode, as Commander-in–Chief India, for 
not promoting cavalry mechanization on the sub-continent. This accusation 
ignores the fact that mechanization was taking place in other parts of the Indian 
Army such as the artillery, signals and engineers, as it was in other parts of the 
army in Great Britain as far this could be afforded; it was not in fact completed 
until 1937.70  In 1925 the Indian Army had 2,350 ‘mechanical vehicles’ and by 
1936 had 4,700.71 The accusation was also incorrect because examination of the 
correspondence between Chetwode and Montgomery-Massingberd demonstrated 
clearly both were keen to press-on with mechanization, but were frustrated by 
lack of funds.72 Montgomery-Massingberd wrote to Chetwode in December 1928: 
 
The question, as you know, is one of money, and one can’t carry out much 
in the way of experiments unless one has some machines to do it with.  
What we want most at present is Light Tanks or Machine Gun carriers, 





                                                 
69 Dixon, On The Psychology of Military Incompetence, pp.116-117. Dixon incorrectly ascribes 
Montgomery-Massingberd’s term of office as CIGS as 1926 until 1933, whereas he served only for 
three years as CIGS 1933-1936 and was Adjutant General from 1931-1933, p.164. 
70
 LHCMA - LH10/1937/206, ‘The Times’, 5 March 1937. 
71 LHCMA - LH11/1936/93. 
72 LHCMA - MM158/1a - 3 .12.1928 , MM158/2a - 18.01.1929; also ‘Handing Over Notes’  
(April 1936), MM158/t; The Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 10/1-10/10; Winton, To  
Change An Army, pp.29 & 31, assesses Chetwode as a ‘progressive’ officer who commanded  
a Corps that included a tank battalion in 1925 and deployed them in a wide flanking  
movement. 





Mr Philip Chetwode (on the right), a Subaltern in the 19th Hussars - on cavalry 
manoeuvres, September 1890 








                                                 







              Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, 













                                                 
75 URL: http:// images.google.co.uk accessed 08.08. 2012. 
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Montgomery-Massingberd was chairman of the 1926-1927 Cavalry Committee that 
recommended the ‘first phase’ of mechanization: the conversion of two cavalry 
regiments to armoured cars discussed in the previous chapter.  As CIGS he 
directed the implementation of ‘the second phase’ discussed later in this 
chapter.  The Field Marshal was also condemned for disbanding the Armoured 
Force in 1928.  Montgomery-Massingberd as Commander in Chief of Southern 
Command acknowledged the so called Armoured Force was ‘doing good work as 
an experimental organization’ under Brigadier Collins, but Montgomery-
Massingberd was concerned, and in his unpublished memoirs he explained why: 
 
It [Armoured Force] was definitely affecting adversely the morale and 
training of the Cavalry and Infantry.  In my opinion this organisation 
should not have been based on the medium Tank [sic].  What should have 
been done was to gradually mechanize the Cavalry Division and Infantry 
Divisions and not to introduce an entirely new formation based on the 
medium Tank.  Nor was it sound to pit the new formation, with its modern 
armaments, against the older formations in order to prove its superiority.  
What was wanted was to use the newest weapons to improve the mobility 
and firepower of the old formations by the introduction into them, as a 
result of trial and error, of modern inventions.  What I wanted, in brief, 
was evolution not revolution.76 
                                                 
76 LHCMA - MM 159/zz, Montgomery-Massingberd’s unpublished memoirs, [1946]; The  
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Academics and journalists have questioned this decision but, for those who had 
experienced assuming the leadership of an underperforming organization, 
starved of investment, as Montgomery–Massingberd had, this decision was 
entirely supportable.  To make any sort of progress in managing change the 
maintenance of morale was vital, and during the period in which Montgomery-
Massingberd made his decision, there were concerns about subversion in the 
military and recruitment problems.  Holding his unit together as a cohesive force 
was paramount; also there was little equipment with which to develop the 
Armoured Force had he chosen to do so.  Montogmery–Massingberd was an 
experienced and competent commander who cared for his people, and they 
seemed to have cared for him; John Kennedy who served under Montgomery-
Massingberd during the Great War and later in two other appointments, in a 
letter to Lady Montgomery-Massingberd wrote ‘we all thought he would be a 
great CIGS, and he was, and we all loved him… He was a wonderful judge of 
character’.77  Winton, who was largely critical of Montgomery-Massingberd, 
nonetheless argued that Montgomery-Massingberd was following his own vision of 
a future war; he foresaw a British Army equipped with AFVs in greater numbers 
than any other army it was likely to encounter. Rather than further develop one 
part of an armoured unit, he wanted to mechanize the whole army, but was 
frustrated due to ‘financial stringency’.78 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers.   
77 LHCMA - 159/3a and 159/3c 10/11 – 10/13, 20 February 1958 and 11 March 1958; The 
Montgomery-Massingberd Papers 10/1-10/10. 
78 Winton, To Change An Army, pp.89-99; Winton’s book is a biography of General John Burnett-
Stuart who did not enjoy a good relationship with Montgomery-Massingberd; pp.91 & 186/187. 
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As CIGS, Montgomery-Massingberd had to allocate appropriately his meagre 
budget between the needs of the current operations, and equipping and training 
the army to fulfil what he envisaged was its future role.  In this he had the 
foresight, not shared at that time by his political masters, to anticipate the need 
for a continental expeditionary force.79  As Harris has written, ‘If Montgomery-
Massingberd is judged on the decisions he made as CIGS he appears, on balance, 
an enlightened officer.’80 Therefore rather than retarding the modernization of 
the Army that included mechanizing the cavalry, Montgomery-Massingberd 
actually tried to further it. 
 
Charles Broad wrote in 1970 that Montgomery-Massingberd in 1933 had ‘begun to 
realise that there was something in the tank idea’ and envisaged the cavalry 
taking over the tank role; this had upset the Tank Corps officers.81  On 15 
October 1934 Montgomery-Massingberd informed the senior Army Council 
members of his thoughts on a ‘Mobile Division’.  These included a change from 
having an independent tank brigade and a cavalry division to the creation of a 
‘Mobile Division’ that include the tank brigade and one mechanized cavalry 
brigade ‘together with an adequate proportion of reconnaissance and supporting 
troops’.82  After implementation of these changes the remaining horsed cavalry 
would include a brigade of three regiments ‘for use as GHQ [General 
Headquarters] troops or for operations requiring horsed cavalry outside Europe’.  
The CIGS hoped that India and Australia would make up any shortfall of horsed 
                                                 
79 Kennedy, The Business of War, pp. 1,2 and 7; ‘Statement by the Chief of the General Staff’ 
(DRC7), 9 January 1934, PRO CAB 16/109, cited in Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.243. 
80 Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.244. 
81
 LHCMA - Broad 1-3; Lt. Gen. Charles Broad’s reply to Mr R Alastair Rickard’s letter, University 
of Ontario, May 21 1970 p.4. 
82 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/Cav/831, Minute 1. 
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cavalry should these be required for hostilities ‘outside Europe’.  He was 
expecting the horsed cavalry based in Egypt to be mechanized ‘eventually’, and 
later expanded this forecast to ‘as soon as we mechanize one regiment at 
home’; this was to best enable rotation and training. 83   
 
‘Mechanization’ in this instant was envisaged as equipping the cavalry regiments 
with four and two-seater cars for officers, two-seater cars for the scout troop 
and light trucks to transport the men.  The proposal was to experiment in April 
1935 with units of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade at Tidworth, one regiment, not 
specified at this stage, to be equipped with twenty light trucks (the 3rd Hussars, 
the 4th Hussars and the 9th Lancers made up this brigade at that time).  
Additionally, the 12th Lancers (already mechanized with armoured cars) was 
intended to form one squadron with Mark II and Mark IIA light tanks that would 
be transferred to the 2nd Cavalry Brigade from the tank brigade as Mark V tanks 
arrived to replace them. No evidence has been found that this actually 
happened; the 12th Lancers continued as an armoured car regiment throughout 
the forthcoming Second World War.  Extra funding to the existing Estimates was 







                                                 
83 Ibid., Minutes 1 and 3. 















                                                 
85 URL: http:// images.google.co.uk  accessed 14.07.2012. 
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Future drafting difficulties were envisaged with men being sent abroad, 
especially to India, unless troopers of mechanized regiments continued to learn 
to ride.86  Other concerns expressed by the Quarter-Master-General Sir Felix 
Ready, included the cost of vehicles and their accommodation that would 
include converting existing  buildings (probably the stables) into garages, albeit 
temporary, during the ‘experiment’; some cost savings were expected, however, 
with the redeployment of the displaced horses.87  Experience so far was, 
suggested the CIGS, who responded on 7 November, that it was ‘very difficult to 
train men of a mechanized unit to ride’ and only officers’ horses would be 
retained in the regiment.  He did not expand on what experience there was of 
training men to ride who were from mechanized units, but Colonel ffrench-
Blake’s regiment, the 17th/21st Lancers enjoyed ‘horsing’ Harold (‘Pete’) 
Pyman, and his family, when Pyman was posted with a team of instructors from 
the 9th Light Tank Company, Royal Tank Corps, in January 1938 to train the 
cavalrymen for mechanization.88   The CIGS was also against the cross-posting of 
men from mechanized to horsed regiments, presumably for the same reason, and 
expected the five British cavalry regiments based in India to remain horsed for ‘a 
few years’.89  This would necessitate keeping a similar number of horsed 
regiments at home to facilitate regimental rotation and training recruits to 
replace time-expired men serving in India, usually between 85 and 115 men 
annually.90  Egypt would be garrisoned only by mechanized cavalry regiments.  
                                                 
86 Ibid., Minute 2. 
87 Ibid., Minute 4 & 5. 
88 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake [2006]; by the author;  Pyman, Call to Arms, pp.27-29. 
89 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/Cav/831, Minute 3. 
90 Ibid., Minute 4. 
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The consultation and discussions completed, the War Office, on 8 December 
1934, notified the various Army Districts and commanders that in 1935 
experiments would begin: 
 
in the 2nd Cavalry Brigade with a mechanized cavalry regiment… the 3rd 
King’s Own Hussars have been specially selected for these experiments 
and, in recognition of the regiment’s action in volunteering for this 
important duty, the Army Council wishes it made clear that the claims of 
the 3rd King’s Own Hussars to remain horsed will not be prejudiced by this 
experimental mechanization should it be eventually decided to mechanize 
part of the cavalry.91 
 
The regiment’s equipment was listed and included eight light cars, three 
‘general service’ trucks and ten ‘personnel’ trucks, with an additional fifteen 
light cars for the scout troop, headquarters and four sections.  Machine-gun 
tripods and rifle grenade ‘dischargers’ completed the list of equipment; all 
animals and their equipment, surplus to requirements during the experiment, 
were to be withdrawn.92  The task of mobile troops was outlined as follows: 
 
(a) Reconnaissance and protection. 
                                                 
91 Ibid., 1C War Office letter to various military commands, schools and overseas establishments, 
8 December 1934. 
92 TNA WO32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/Cav/831; 1C War Office letter to various military commands, schools and overseas 
establishments, 8 December 1934. 
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(b) In battle to delay the enemy: to safeguard the flank; to form a mobile 
reserve, or to cover withdrawal. 
(c) Special missions and raids.93 
 
It was pointed out that in its existing form the cavalry division, made up of 
armoured cars, two horsed cavalry brigades, mechanized artillery and supporting 
troops, was unsuited to its task because the horse mounted troops had neither 
the speed nor range to keep up with tanks with which they had to cooperate.  A 
new formation, a Mobile Division, was the answer.  Made up of three brigades, 
the Mobile Division included armoured cars, mechanized cavalry and tanks, with 
mechanized artillery and mechanized supporting troops. The Mechanized Cavalry 
Brigade consisted of an armoured regiment of light tanks, similar to a light tank 
battalion of the Royal Tank Corps.  This new Mobile Division was planned to 
replace the existing Tank Brigade and the Cavalry Division. It was envisaged that 
these changes would make the new Mobile Division ‘capable of [a] wide range of 
action and would have increased striking power’.94 
 
The organization envisaged for the mechanized cavalry regiment differed little 
from that of a horsed cavalry regiment: a Head Quarters Squadron ‘possibly 
including; signal troop, administration troop, mortar troop’, and a scout troop 
consisting of ‘six sections each of three light cars’; three ‘Mechanized Squadrons 
– each of three troops of three sections’.95  The ‘section’ organization was a 
little different to a horsed cavalry regiment in which a section was eight men, 





but usually two men were horse-holders (the ‘Number 3s’ of each half-section of 
four men) allowing the other six men to fight dismounted. 96 This method, 
introduced in the 1870s, was practiced, with some difficulty, during the Great 
War.97  Ronald Lucas, who joined the 15th/19th Hussars in November 1935, said 
he carried out dismounted sword drill, but ‘never ever’ trained for dismounted 
action with his rifle.98 In the Mechanized Regiment what was envisaged was a 
rifle section or a machine-gun section, of all eight men made up of a 
commander, six troopers and one driver.  Tactics to be adopted were all 
outlined in the letter: ‘In general the tactics of mechanized cavalry follow the 
principles laid down in Cavalry Training Volume II’. The principles of dismounted 
action tactics were also unchanged; in Cavalry Training Volume II, speed and 
mobility was stressed and advised: ‘A cavalry leader will, before deciding to act 
dismounted, consider whether he could not achieve his object by remaining 
mounted’.99 The motorized squadron was expected to remain mounted 





                                                 
96 Personal interview with William Cross [2012]; by the author; Cavalry Training (Horsed)  
1937, pp.70 & 71;  there were other methods of ‘horse-holding’: ‘With Coupled Horses’ and 
‘With Linked Horses’, this enabled more than three-quarters of the men to come into  
action dismounted, but this has no relevance to a comparison with a mechanized troop. 
97 War Diary of B Squadron, the 19th Hussars TNA WO 95/1466 - see especially, 26 August 1914, 
‘one man cannot apparently hold 4 horses that are fit under heavy fire at close range’.  The 
technique remained in the Cavalry Training (Horsed) manual at least until 1937, pp.163/163. 
98
 Personal interview with Lucas [2012]; by the author. 
99 Cavalry Training (Horsed) 1937, p.161.  
100 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/Cav/831; 1C War Office letter to various military commands, schools and overseas 
establishments, 8 December 1934; see Badsey, Doctrine and Reform; throughout, for the debate 

















                                                 
101 Original photograph by the Daily Sketch, this image from The 3rd Hussars Regimental Journal. 
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By 1935 when the 3rd Hussars ‘experiment’ in mechanization commenced at 
Tidworth, this regiment had already built up two years motor vehicle 
experience; confidence was growing in its ability to take on increasing amounts 
of repair work.102 Although there was understandable anxiety to change, it was 
decided: ‘the only course was to give the [mechanization] experiment a real and 
whole-hearted trial’.103  It is important to note that in spite of some anxiety and 
some scepticism, very little officer turnover occurred in the 3rd Hussars during 
this period of change.104  The 3rd Hussars had returned from India in November 
1932 after eleven years abroad and went from Southampton to York.105 New 
recruits, untrained and mostly unskilled, replaced two hundred ‘time expired’ 
NCOs and men,106 and one hundred NCOs and men who remained in India and 
had been posted to other units.107  In 1934, whilst still at York, the 3rd Hussars 
took over from the RAOC the responsibilities for mechanical transport.  They 
received four six wheeled 30 cwt. lorries, one 15 cwt. tender, six motorcycles 
and later, six Austin cars.  The motorcycles and cars went to the 
communications troop, the other vehicles to regimental transport.  Some men 
with mechanical transport experience were posted into the regiment, although 
                                                 
102 3rd King’s Own Hussars Magazine Vol.1 No.3 Jan.1935, p. 8. 
103 Bolitho, The Galloping Third, p. 242.  
104Army Lists January to March 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937; Lieutenants Whitaker and Crewdon 
disappeared from the List between 1934 and 1935, Captain C D Phillips was listed as an 
‘unemployed Captain on half pay’ in 1936.  In 1937 Majors Sandford and C F Clarke and 
Lieutenant Hutton-Wilson disappeared from the List.  Captain C A Peel transferred to the 4th 
Hussars as a captain; this regiment was in the process of mechanizing.  Captain Forestier-Walker 
transferred to the already mechanized 11th Hussars as a Major and Lieutenant Colonel Grubb MC 
was promoted full Colonel and became an instructor at the Senior Officers School, Sheerness. 
105 The 3rd The King’s Own Hussars Historical Records 01.04.1932 – 31.03.1933, p. 2 File 1716 
Regimental Archives Warwick; Bolitho, The Galloping Third, p.242.  
106 French, D., Military Identities, p.36 and p.172;  this also happened to other regiments later 
on, examples being the 13th/18th and 15th/19th Hussars – personal interviews with Lucas (2007); 
and Need (2007); by the author.  
107 Bolitho, The Galloping Third, p.242. 
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from which unit is not recorded.108  What was recorded is the authorisation for 
the appointment of two troopers to ‘Driver Mechanic’, these men to be 
‘mustered as tradesmen’.109  This appeared to have been part of an 
authorisation for all ‘Regimental Cavalry of the Line’ to do likewise, presumably 
to deal with the motorized regimental transport that was to come or had already 
arrived.110 
   
The 3rd Hussars regimental magazine noted in January 1934 that the motorized 
transport was new and therefore difficult to evaluate, but it was acknowledged 
to be certainly quicker than using horses.  There were, however, insufficient 
vehicles.  Signals Troop learning to ride their Triumph motorcycles and to drive 
the Austin cars experienced ‘quite a lot of fun and thrills’, and with seven weeks 
training their driving improved ‘tremendously’.111 In December 1934 the news 
came that the 3rd Hussars: 
  
had been selected as an experimental mechanized cavalry regiment and 
that experiments were to be carried out with a variety of mechanical 
vehicles during the next two years.  For these experiments A Squadron 
was selected to mechanize, whilst B remained a horsed squadron and C 
took in recruits.112 
                                                 
108 Regimental Transport Notes in the 3rd The King’s Own Hussars Magazine Vol.1 No.1, January 
1934, pp. 7 and 8, Regimental Archives Warwick. 
109 The 3rd The King’s Own Hussars Historical Records 01.04.1933 – 31.03.1934, p.2. File 1716.  
110 Ibid. 
111 Regimental Transport Notes in the 3rd The King’s Own Hussars Magazine Vol.1 No.1, January 
1934, pp. 7-8. 
112 The 3rd The King’s Own Hussars Historical Records 01.04.1934 – 31.03.1935, File 1716, p.2.  
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There was no reference or record found in the regimental archives that the 3rd 
Hussars had volunteered for this experiment as was stated in the War Office 
letter of 8 December quoted above.   Hector Bolitho wrote that:  
 
Brigadier-General Kelly, the Colonel of the regiment, invited Colonel 
Grubb and the second-in–command to dine with him at the Station Hotel 
York [November 1934].  He explained that the Inspector of Cavalry had 
been asked by the Chief of the Imperial General staff ‘to select a cavalry 
regiment to carry out an experiment in mechanization to replace horsed 
cavalry’, and the 3rd Hussars had been chosen for the task.113 
 
Liddell Hart said the decision to mount part of the cavalry division in light 
trucks, the men then to fight dismounted as infantry, was ‘an imitation of the 
French Army’s recent steps towards converting its horsed cavalry into motorised 
troops, called dragons porté’.114  He was critical of the ‘hesitant and fumbling 
way the Army Council took to what turned out to be the decisive step towards 
mechanising [sic] the cavalry in preference to expanding the Royal Tank 
Corps’.115  By ‘expanding the Royal Tank Corps’ it is inferred that Liddell Hart 
meant with tanks, but only enough tanks existed at that time to equip the RTC’s 
existing four battalions.  It was evidence, he wrote in 1965, ‘of a disbelief in the 
value of armoured forces’.116 However, there were other army mechanization 
                                                 
113 Bolitho, The Galloping Third, p. 242, emphasis added. 
114 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.261. 
115 Ibid., p.262. 
116 Ibid., p.263. 
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priorities in 1934 with which Liddell Hart, as a newspaper military 
correspondent, would have been aware: the replacement of horse limbers (the 
detachable front part of a gun-carriage, usually a two wheeled wooden box, for 
transporting artillery shells) with trucks and the motorization of the infantry for 
which an increase of funds was allocated.  The Estimates of 1936/1937 
therefore, provided less money for tanks and other tracked vehicles than was 
provided the previous year.117  
 
Some evidence has been found, however, to support Liddell Hart’s assertion that 
disbelief existed in the value of armoured forces.  Prior to 1936 the Master 
General of The Ordnance (MGO), the Great War tank pioneer Sir Hugh Ellis, was 
reported to have harboured doubts of the value of tanks in a future war.  Sir 
Noel Birch of Vickers met with Lieutenant General Ellis at the War Office on the 
afternoon of 30 October 1936; Birch’s notes of the meeting include the 
following: 
 
The MGO said that he has again changed his mind about tanks and now 
thinks that instead of being useless owing to anti-tank guns, rifles, mines 
etc. they will be of some use to the Army but that they will occupy a 
secondary position to what they have done in the past.118 
 
                                                 
117 Ibid., p.276. 
118 Vickers historic document 744, ‘Sir Noel Birch’s Interview with The Master General of The 
Ordnance at the War Office on the Afternoon of 30th October 1936’. 
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Birch did not record when or why Ellis said he had changed his mind about tanks. 
Ellis clearly had been dubious about the deployment of AFVs in a modern war.  
Light tanks in the Spanish war ‘had not come up to scratch’ and Ellis’s 
supporters had said ‘we told you so [which] exasperated even more the tank 
enthusiasts’.119 Perhaps the recent news of the success of the Soviet T-26 tanks 
in Spain had encouraged his change of mind.120 Ellis was MGO from 1934 until his 
retirement in 1938. With his Great War experience as the Tank Corps’ first 
commander Ellis was the most senior general officer with AFV battle experience 
and therefore influential regarding their use.  Ellis was ‘frequently the last word 
on all matters relating to Tanks, … [but] the trouble with Sir Hugh Ellis [was] as 
a matter of fact [he] did not believe in tanks, or at any rate, not enough’.121  It 
may have been on Ellis’s instigation that the cavalry, the 3rd Hussars, had to 
‘experiment’ with vehicles other than tanks.  Ellis’s later change of mind in 
1936, together with the gradual availability of the light tanks, could have been 
the catalyst for the switch from trucks to tanks with which horsed cavalry 
regiments eventually were equipped.   Liddell Hart recorded  in his notes on the 
Tank Corps dinner, 23 November 1936, that Hugh Ellis ‘used to be generally 
popular [with the RTC, but now] is held largely responsible for the failure of 
tank supply that recently aroused the Cabinet’s anxiety’.122 
 
Earlier, in late 1934, the 3rd Hussars experiment had been ordered.  A draft of 
thirty-two ‘other ranks’ was posted from the 3rd Hussars to the 10th Hussars in 
                                                 
119 Ibid. 
120 Beevor, The Battle For Spain, pp.195-196; Lannon, The Spanish Civil War, p.46. 
121 LHCMA - the Lindsay papers 139-141, quoted from a copy of a contemporary subscription news 
sheet, ‘The Week’, 8 December 1937 sent to Lindsay by Admiral Sir Alexander Ramsay. 
122 LHCMA - LH11/1936/110, ‘Notes on the Tank Corps dinner’, 23 November 1936. 
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Lucknow, India, that same December 1934.123  It is not known from which 
squadron they came or how they were selected. These men could have been 
considered unsuitable for mechanized training, might have been the most 
experienced horsemen to go to India, or who had the longest time yet to serve.  
It was, however, probably just a routine draft to replace time-expired men 
serving in India and therefore of no significance to mechanization.  The 
reorganisation of the regiment began on 5 January 1935 with the formation of 
the ‘nucleus’ of the mechanized squadron.  Within two weeks of this 25 NCOs 
and men were sent to the Royal Army Service Corps Driving School at Feltham.  
They were trained in driving and maintenance and on their return to the 
regiment engaged as instructors.124  On 9 February 1935, 127 horses left the 
Regiment:  38 horses to the 15th/19th Hussars, 21 to the 4th/7th Dragoon 
Guards, 20 to the 9th Lancers, 8 to the 16th/5th Lancers, 8 to the Military 
Mounted Police, 17  were destroyed, 8 sold and 7 troop-horses were reclassified 
as ‘Chargers’.  The remainder of the Regiment’s horses were posted to B 
Squadron.  By 1 March just forty-two chargers and 93 troop horses remained.125   
 
The regiment was supported throughout by its past officers: 
 
The consensus of opinion [of the former officers] is one of the greatest 
regret at the loss of the horses, but at the same time they are unanimous 
in wishing the Regiment to move with the times, and they consider that 
                                                 
123 The 3rd The King’s Own Hussars Historical Records 01.04.1934 – 31.03.1935, p.2, File 1716 
Regimental Archives Warwick.  
124 Ibid.   
125 Ibid. 
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the eventual mechanization of the Cavalry is inevitable in some form or 
other.126 
 
The experiment generated interest from Dominion regiments in Canada, 
Australia, South Africa and New Zealand and this will have contributed to the 
motivation of all ranks of the 3rd Hussars to ensure its success.127  The support of 
the former officers, past custodians of the regiment’s traditions and history, was 
such an important factor too, giving ‘permission’ as it were, for the regiment to 
move forward.  Had these former officers objected and not taken a pragmatic 
view, the effect on morale, especially of the officers and senior NCOs, could 
have presented a major management problem.  Significant to this study is that 
no evidence has been found of criticism, equivocation or resistance to 
mechanization from these former horsed cavalry officers. 
 
In the autumn of 1935, following the ‘training season’, the officer commanding 
3rd Hussars, Lieutenant Colonel Grubb, submitted his report in which he assured 
his superiors that: ‘Every effort has been made throughout to keep the tactics of 
Mech. Cav.[sic] to the principles laid down in Cav. Training Vol. II with motor 
vehicles substituted for the horses’.128  These principles included both mounted 
and dismounted action (mentioned earlier): the approach march, deployment 
                                                 
126 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936, 20/Cav/831; ‘3rd. Hussars Experiment in Mechanization, April-September, 1935’.  
127 See Mayo, ‘The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization’ in Thompson, Kenneth (ed.) 
[2003] The Early Sociology of Management and Organizations, especially Chapter V p.95; 
Gillespie, Manufacturing Knowledge – A history of the Hawthorne experiment; the Introduction 
is a useful summery. 
128 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/Cav/831; ‘3rd. Hussars Experiment in Mechanization, April-September, 1935’. 
 165 
and the mounted attack, the methods of advancing under fire and the use of the 
ground (for cover and concealment).129 Grubb was sure mechanized cavalry 
could successfully carryout their assigned role, and ‘probably be found to be 
able to do more than horsed cavalry’;  further training would have to advance, 
however, and include cooperation with light tanks and mobile artillery next year 
‘if the experiment is to be carried further’.  Grubb advised that such a formation 
be led by one commander.   
 
Significant at this stage of AFV development, was Grubb’s comment that 
‘wheeled vehicles are more mobile than track or semi-track vehicles’, therefore 
more suitable for mechanized cavalry.  Clearly Grubb was dissatisfied with the 
performance of the tracked vehicles so far developed.  Grubb found motor 
cycles the most mobile.  The ‘section’, as currently organized with a NCO and 
seven men, gave insufficient ‘power of dispersion’, and was certainly a 
significant change from horsed cavalry.  One man on a horse was a mobile unit, 
whereas the entire mechanized section of eight men became one unit because it 
relied for its mobility on one truck.  If the truck broke down the section became 
immobile, whereas it was unlikely all eight horses in a section would go lame at 
the same time.  Grubb wanted more motorcycles for scouting, sending messages 
and keeping in touch with other units.  Also, he recommended four troops to a 
squadron rather than three to more effectively take advantage of the higher 
speed of the advance; four troops per squadron ‘leap-frogging’ could be better 
employed than three, he argued.130 
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A Squadron The 3rd The King’s Own Hussars 1936. 131 
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The weapons with which the regiment had been issued were insufficient to stop 
enemy AFVs – armoured cars and light tanks – that might be encountered by 
mechanized cavalry in their reconnaissance or screening roles.  An anti-tank gun 
was necessary, and Grubb believed the French Army were using suitably armed 
armoured cars and light tanks for this purpose, sent ahead of their horsed 
cavalry.  Grubb was doubtful of the suitability of the current British Army 
armoured cars, but was sure something of this nature was essential, four to eight 
vehicles for each cavalry regiment whether horsed or mechanized.133  Wheeled 
vehicles, whether cars or motorcycles, had limited scope in ‘enclosed country’, 
such as woodland, compared to horsed cavalry, and the men had to be prepared 
to go forward on foot to reconnoitre the enemy.  Grubb compared this to ‘the 
German Jager [sic] battalions in 1914’.  He had doubts about the Bren light 
machine-gun mounted on a tripod for covering fire compared to the performance 
of the Vickers machine-gun, and suggested the mortar troop (yet to be formed) 
be replaced with a troop armed with Vickers machine-guns.134 The men 
transported by motor vehicle after long marches were markedly ‘fresher’ than 
horseman had been after a similar experience.  He suggested consideration be 
given to breaking up the separate large scout troop and incorporating smaller 
scout troops with the squadrons enabling closer cooperation.  The mortar and 
signals troops had not been formed at that time so their progress could not be 
reported upon.135 
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Driver training had been rushed in order to fulfil the expectations of the 
experiment, the men’s aptitude had not been properly assessed, consequently 
accidents occurred and vehicles were damaged.  Grubb pressed for both a need 
to ‘sort out the most adaptable recruits’ to train as drivers, and a driving school 
organised similarly to riding schools.  He had concerns that only half of the 
present recruits ‘would make efficient drivers’.  Grubb was, however, pleased 
with the Morris trucks with which the regiment had been issued as ‘Section 
vehicles’, but some design modifications would be required in future such as 
strengthening the front axle and heightening the position of the radiator to 
overcome particular obstacles.  Regarding the cars, Grubb preferred the 
























The Hillman Minx saloon of 1935 – it is not clear if a version of this vehicle was ever partially 










                                                 










The Hillman 10 HP Armoured Car ‘did not get beyond the experimental stage’, but may have 








                                                 










Austin Seven Two-seater in Service Dress.  
This was basically the 1934/35 civilian model with only minor modifications.  Nearly 900 of this 
version was delivered to the British Army.  It superseded the earlier type which had military 
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Grubb’s was a long and comprehensive report covering many aspects of the 
experiment so far and clearly he felt positive with the outcome.  Grubb’s 
remarks and recommendations were generally supported by the Commanding 
Officer of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, Colonel, acting Brigadier, F B Hurndall, and 
by J Blackiston Houston, the Inspector of Cavalry.140  It was acknowledged by 
General Burnett-Stuart, General Officer Commanding Southern Command, who 
preferred the term ‘motorized’ to ‘mechanized’, that the experiment had been 
carried out with ‘great thoroughness and keenness by all ranks who took part… 
and warrants further trial and experiment on a larger scale’.141  The various 
comments attached to Grubb’s report, as it was forwarded up the echelons of 
command, indicated some differences between the various senior officers of the 
concept or role of mechanized (or motorized) cavalry, and consequently in the 
detail of what were the most suitable weapons and equipment. Burnett-Stuart 
was, nonetheless, hopeful that a ‘motorized’ cavalry regiment ‘will find it easier 
to get recruits [than did horsed cavalry]’.142 
 
Further cavalry mechanization was ordered by the Army Council in a letter to all 
commands on 18 December 1935.  It referred to the 3rd Hussars experiment and 
confirmed the Army Council’s belief in the need to replace the [horsed] cavalry 
division with a mechanized mobile division, but making a change to the mobile 
division’s structure to that proposed the year before.  Consequently: 
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as and when funds permit, two mechanized cavalry brigades will be 
formed in the United Kingdom, each of two motor cavalry regiments and 
one cavalry light tank regiment, and the cavalry brigade in Egypt will also 
be converted into a mechanized formation with one cavalry armoured car 
regiment, one cavalry motor regiment and one cavalry light tank 
regiment.143  
 
The following regiments intended for conversion were: 
 
To motor cavalry –     The 10th Royal Hussars – after returning from India 
      The 8th King’s Own Royal Irish Hussars - Egypt 
      The 4th Queen’s Own Hussars 
      The 3rd King’s Own Hussars 
      The 1st King’s Dragoon Guards 
 
To light tank cavalry – The 9th Queen’s Royal Lancers 
       The 7th Queen’s Own Hussars - Egypt 
       The Queen’s Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards) – to be brought 
home early from India. 
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The selection of these particular regiments was not entirely in line with the 
Army Council’s policy of the ‘juniarity’ of those regiments unaffected by the 
previous amalgamations.   
 
The cavalry armoured car regiments, the 11th Hussars and the 12th Lancers, 
mechanized in the late 1920s were unchanged.  Three of the regiments, the 3rd 
Hussars, the 8th Hussars and the 9th Lancers were already ‘partially 
mechanized’, no dates were set, however, for the conversion of the rest. 144  The 
reason for this was the lack of suitable vehicles for equipping them for their 
assigned role.   In Egypt, the plan was for the cavalry to take over tanks from 
the RTC battalions as and when the new ‘I’, or ‘infantry’ tanks became 
available.145 
 
On 27 January 1936, the 3rd Hussars were instructed to extend the experiment, 
and the regiment was reorganised as an ‘Experimental Motor Cavalry 
Regiment’.146  Thirty horses were retained ‘in order to keep equitation alive in 
the Regiment’. The horses, less the 30 to remain, were distributed to the 
Queen’s Bays, the 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, the 15th/19th Hussars, 
the 16th/5th Lancers and the Remount Depot at Melton Mowbray.147  Further 
personnel postings took place from the 3rd Hussars; again there are no details of 
whom, and why these particular men were chosen. In March thirty-four other 
                                                 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., 14 October 1935. 
146 TNA WO 32/2847, 06.01.1935 – ‘Cavalry Re-Organization’; note of the decision to extend the 
trials of the 3rd Hussars as a cavalry motor unit and to organise and equip the 9th Queens Royal 
Lancers ‘with token equipment, as a cavalry light tank regiment’ signed, C P Heywood Major 
General Director of Staff Duties; The 3rd The King’s Own Hussars Historical Records 01.04.1935 – 
31.03.1936 p.2 File 1716.  
147 The 3rd The King’s Own Hussars Historical Records, 01.04.1935 – 31.03.1936 p.3 File 1716.  
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ranks went to India to the 13th/18th Hussars, still a horsed cavalry regiment, 
and eighteen other ranks to the ‘partially mechanized’ 8th Hussars in Egypt (see 
Chapter Three).  A further 28 men came into the 3rd Hussars from the 3rd 
Carabiniers (Prince of Wales’s Dragoon Guards) who were still a ‘horsed’ 
regiment 148 in addition to the 132 new recruits who had joined the regiment 
since June 1935.   
 
As has been said, concern was recorded in 1935 that only 50 per cent of the 
recruits enlisting in the 3rd Hussars at that time would actually make efficient 
drivers.149  The veteran cavalrymen interviewed as part of this study underwent 
no selection or mechanical aptitude tests whatsoever and, as was stated in the 
previous chapter, officers posted from Sandhurst to the 11th Hussars and the 
12th Lancers were not chosen for any mechanical aptitude either.  The volunteer 
system of army recruitment between the wars did not incorporate any selection 
testing, other than a medical assessment, and neither were the authorities 
empowered to direct a recruit to join a particular branch of the service.  Having 
joined his chosen Corps (Cavalry, Artillery, Infantry etc.), the Army Act 
prevented a soldier’s transfer to an alternative one.150  Until 1927 the Cavalry 
Corps itself was divided into Dragoons, Hussars and Lancers ‘of the Line’ and a 
transfer between these three was forbidden without the soldier’s agreement.151 
 
                                                 
148 The regiment was renamed in 1928 and was previously the 3rd/6th Dragoon Guards.  The 
regiment was posted to India in 1936 and was mechanized between 1938 and 1939. 
149 TNA WO 32/2847 ‘Cavalry Re-Organization’.  How and why particular men were posted in or 
out of these regiments is unfortunately unknown.  Such records that may exist for men serving 
during this period are governed by the rules of disclosure and are only available to surviving next 
of kin through the Army Personnel Centre, Historical Disclosures Department.   
150 French, D., Raising Churchill’s Army, p.66. 
151 TNA,WO32/3059,  Register  No 27/Cavalry/1247, minute 2, ‘Reconstitution of Corps of 
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Asked how the men were selected for particular tasks in 1942, Lieutenant 
Colonel Sprot of the Royal Scots Greys said in 2007 that some of the older men: 
 
who obviously couldn’t handle mechanics were posted.  They were just 
too old, been a cavalryman all their life, never even been inside a 
motorcar probably. Everyone was happily posted who couldn’t fathom 
mechanics. 152 
 
The inference from Colonel Sprot’s remarks is that only a few men were posted 
as unsuitable for mechanical training; Sergeant William Cross, interviewed for 
this thesis in 2010, remembered that up to half the men in the Royal Scots Greys 
were posted out, although he was away training in Cairo during part of the Greys 
transition from horses to tanks, and his remembrances might not be entirely 
accurate.153  Ronald Lucas of the 15th/19th Hussars, interviewed for this thesis 
in 2007, did not know how or why he was chosen to train as an instructor; there 
was certainly no selection test.154 Perhaps Sergeant Lucas’s civilian engineering 
experience had been entered on his army records.  Later, after the 
commencement of the Second World War, when it was clear more armoured 
units were needed, men from infantry regiments underwent aptitude tests to 
segregate those suitable for armoured and mechanical training from those men 
                                                 
152 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author; also Sprot, Swifter Than Eagles, pp.7-11. 
153 Personal interview with Cross (2010); by the author.  
154 Personal interview with Lucas (2007); by the author.  
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to stay as infantry.155  After 1942, and therefore beyond the scope of this thesis, 
the Army’s Adjutant General Sir Ronald Adam, established the Directorate of 
Personnel Selection to ‘devise and implement intelligence and aptitude tests for 
recruits and serving soldiers whose units were converted to other arms’.156  It is 
counter-factual, but nonetheless interesting, to speculate on what a positive 
difference systematic psychometric testing would have made to the cavalry’s 
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In spite of the justified apprehension over the change from horses to 
horsepower, the comments in the 1936 copy of the 3rd Hussars regimental 
magazine were noteworthy and illustrate how the soldiers’ opinion changed from 
disbelief to belief in, and commitment to, the successful outcome of the so-
called ‘experiment’.  Earlier the 3rd Hussars found it a ‘distasteful proposition 
for horse lovers’ to have to dispose of many young horses that had been trained 
by the regiment since their return from India, ‘amongst which are some of the 
best show jumpers in England’; they were ‘comforted’ by the knowledge that an 
experiment to replace horses with motorcars and motorbikes was ‘doomed to 
failure’ and the horses would soon be returned to the 3rd Hussars.159  With the 
determination and leadership to perform as ordered the experiment in 
mechanization did not fail, however, and their enthusiasm for it grew into 
passion: 
 
When we got going, we got keener and keener on the task.  Moreover, the 
more we delved into it the more we believed in it, until finally we 
became convinced that the days of cavalry mounted on horses, are very 
nearly over.  None of us who have fought in war can be anything but 
overjoyed to think that no 3rd Hussar will ever see his ‘long-nosed pal’ – 
his best pal suffering in war – suffering in silence, from privation, 
weariness or mutilation.160 
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This comment might have been propaganda to encourage the reluctant, but 
more probably was a genuine reflection of the feelings of the majority of the 
officers and other ranks.  The article acknowledged the sadness felt at the 
prospect of losing the horses and the ‘inexplicable comradeship’ between horse 
and rider, but accepted that the superior speed of motor vehicles over horses 
was more in line with contemporary thought and actions.161  It must be 
considered too that at that time motor vehicles were a novelty and learning to 
drive was a worthwhile skill to acquire for a later civilian life.  By August 1936 
all except two horses had left: Mary the drum horse was bought by the regiment 
‘for sentimental reasons’ and placed in retirement.162   The remaining cavalry 
tradesmen, saddlers and farriers were cross-posted to the 4th/7th Dragoon 
Guards, the Queen’s Bays, the 3rd Carabiniers, the 4th Hussars and the 
13th/18th Hussars.  The last troop horse to leave the 3rd Hussars remained with 
the Queen’s Bays who took over the station when the 3rd Hussars left for 
Aldershot in October 1937.163  
 
Harris has argued that Lieutenant Colonel Grubb, the 3rd Hussars Commanding 
Officer, was given a narrow objective: to see if motorised cavalry soldiers armed 
with rifles and machine-guns could perform similar functions to those of horsed 
cavalry, such as reconnaissance, screening and pursuit.164  Every effort was made 
by Grubb to make the tactics of his mechanized cavalry squadron conform to the 
principles laid down in the Cavalry Training Manual, with motor vehicles 
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substituted for horses.  These tactics included ‘The duties of cavalry’ of which 























                                                 












                                                 
166 URL: http://www.antique-swords.eu/british-hussars/3rd.html accessed 21.07.2012 
 184 
The demands on the cavalry were to be ‘inquisitive and aggressive’ and to 
search widely and continuously.167 The cavalry training manual draws attention 
to the susceptibility of cavalry to observation from the air and the need to move 
widely dispersed; 168 which was of relevance and concern to Lieutenant Colonel 
Grubb, and commented upon in his report.169 What the 3rd Hussars motorised 
cavalry unit was free from was any concern of the ‘economy of horse flesh’.170 A 
motor vehicle had a greater range and road speed than a horse. The 
Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command, Major General John Burnett Stuart, on 
28 October 1936 in a letter to the Under-Secretary of State for War Sir Herbert 
Creedy, expressed concern that the eight-seater wheeled vehicle that was being 
used by the 3rd Hussars was ‘entirely unsuitable’ and what was needed was a 
‘handy cross-country tracked vehicle with crews of not more than four’.171  
Percy Hobart had foreseen the unsatisfactory nature of these vehicles; he 
supported mechanizing the cavalry, which appeared ‘to have great 
potentialities’, but not in vulnerable, rubber-tyre unarmoured vehicles.172 A 
debate ensued over the type of vehicle that was most suitable for motorized or 
dismounted cavalry; the conclusion was that the wheeled ‘scout’ vehicle gave 
insufficient protection to the troopers, and that it would be better to wait to 
equip the cavalry with light tanks that were expected to be available from 
1938.173  
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By January 1936, the regimental mechanical transport unit of the 3rd Hussars 
was becoming redundant, as there was ‘really no Regimental Transport’ for 
them to maintain.174  The vehicles now forming part of the mechanized squadron 
had formed the ‘Regimental Transport’ for the 3rd Hussars conveying forage, 
horseshoes, spare ammunition and other equipment when the regiment was 
‘horsed’.  Eventually each squadron was to have its own lorries.  The original 
mechanical transport personnel, with a ‘splendid office and stores, workshop 
and competent staff’, became the regimental ‘Technical Branch’ as ‘advisors 
and experts’ to the mechanized squadron.175  The Technical Branch had grown in 
competence and experience and was able to carry out the heavy vehicle repairs 
previously carried out by the RAOC workshops.176   
 
In March 1937 the order was received to convert the regiment from motor 
cavalry to light tanks, but the regiment was told that there was a temporary 
shortage of tanks with which to equip them.  During the 1937 training season the 
Regiment used ‘tokens’ instead of tanks.  15 cwt. ‘box vans’ and Austin cars had 
to suffice as ‘token’ tanks:  ‘If there is one word in the English vocabulary which 
every 3rd Hussar would like abolished, it is the word “Token”’, reported the 
Regimental Journal in April 1938.177  The 3rd Hussars reorganised as a Light Tank 
Regiment without tanks, with three troops per squadron and five ‘tanks’ and two 
‘carriers’ per troop.  The cars and vans used as token tanks were painted a 
different colour to ‘avoid confusion’.178  In an exercise or drill, some of the cars 
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would perform their normal role as signals or scouting vehicles and the vans as 
supply vehicles.  Other cars and vans, painted a different colour, would perform 
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By September 1938, only A Squadron and HQ Squadron had been equipped with 
tanks.180  It is not recorded from where these tanks came or of what type they 
were; they might have been either the Vickers Light tank Mark V, a two-man 
tank, or the Mark VIB three-man tank.  B Squadron was photographed mounted 
on horses in Wiltshire in 1935 (page 158) and one troop of the same squadron 
was photographed mounted in tanks in Cambridgeshire in 1937 (page 191).  The 
latter photograph causes some confusion as the Regimental Journal states that 
although B Squadron expected tanks to arrive by spring 1938, the type had not 
been specified; 181 therefore B Squadron did not have tanks in 1937, at least not 
on a permanent basis, and probably neither did A Squadron. It is speculated that 
the photograph was ‘posed’ for propaganda purposes to demonstrate progress in 
re-armament.   
 
Whilst waiting for the tanks to arrive in 1938, B Squadron lost many of their 
experienced men posted away and new recruits enlisted.  A Squadron too 
suffered from a turnover of troopers, a large number of its ‘best men’, 
mechanically trained, were posted to the 8th Hussars, by then a mechanized 
regiment, and were replaced by 40 new recruits.182  New recruits joining the 
regiment were, after 7 April 1938, sent away for training for six months to the 
RTC depot at Bovington.  On 22 August 1939 the 3rd Hussars moved to Houghton 
Down, Stockbridge, and by then were equipped with 24 of the ‘new type’ of 
                                                 
180 Third King’s Own Hussars Historical Records 01.04.1936 – 31.03.1937, p.3 File 1716, 
Regimental Archives Warwick; Bolitho, The Galloping Third. 
181 3rd The King’s Own Hussars Journal Vol. II No.1, April 1938, p.9.   
182 Ibid., p.7.   
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light tank (the Vickers Mark VIB 183), ninety-two wheeled vehicles and six 
dragons.184  
 
In less than five years the 3rd Hussars had transformed themselves from an old 



















                                                 
183 Bolitho, The Galloping Third, p.247. 
184 3rd King’s Own Hussars Historical Records 01.04.1938 – 31.03.1939, p.2 File 1716. 






















                                                 


















                                                 






Dragons were ‘tractors’ used for towing guns 
[This illustration is a Light Dragon tractor towing a 3.7 inch howitzer on Carriage Mk IV and 









                                                 
188 URL: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:3.7inchHowitzerTowedByLightDragonTractor.jpg. 
accessed 07.04. 2011. 
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Although the 3rd Hussars’ ‘experiment’ was a successful demonstration of how 
the change from horses to AFVs could be managed, the veterans interviewed for 
this study by the author had no knowledge whatsoever of the 3rd Hussars’ 
‘experiment’ and what influence, if any, this had had on the mechanization 
process of their own regiments.  Nonetheless, and unbeknown to these veterans, 
the experiment might have been a considerable influence on the training 
programme and management of other cavalry regiments undergoing this huge 
process of change. It had taken five years to completely mechanize this 
regiment, but not through any lack of industry on its part. The 3rd Hussars 
supplied many trained men to other cavalry regiments whose experience must 
have helped when, under the pressure of war, cavalry regiments later managed 
to ‘mechanize’ in less than 12 months. The 3rd Hussars started the Second World 
War, equipped with 52 Mark VIB tanks, and served in Norway, North Africa, 
Crete, Italy and Java, and were re-equipped, from 1942, with Crusader, Grant 
and Sherman tanks. The regiment lost 26 officers and 157 other ranks during this 
conflict.189 
 
Great Britain entered the 1930s with growing concerns about the world’s 
financial and trade situation and not about security. To a large extent, economic 
recovery and then resilience remained the priorities throughout the decade to 
sustain the country should a long war materialize – the so-called ‘fourth arm of 
                                                 
189 3rd King’s Own Hussars Historical Records; WARHM: 1202 (Box 2) QOH-DOC-10,  ‘Report on 
action fought by 3H Regimental Group in area NE of TEL EL AQQAQUIR 2 Nov 1942’; Regimental 
Archives Warwick.  After suffering ‘grievous’ losses in destroying over 15 enemy field-guns, 
88mm and 74mm and 50mm anti-tank guns the regiment had (at the time of that report); A 
Squadron 5 Crusader tanks, B Squadron 7 Sherman, 5 Grant and 1 Crusader tank, C Squadron 3 
Grant and 1 Crusader and HQ Squadron 3 Grant and 1 Crusader tank.  By then the Vickers Mark 
VIB tanks were considered obsolete;  Bolitho, The Galloping Third, pp. 246, 247 & 270. 
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defence’.190  Public opinion was largely anti-war, invigorated by Great War 
remembrance and commemoration, and a growing fear of aerial bombing.  The 
‘depression’, in the wake of the ‘Wall Street Crash’, retarded what weak 
economic development had begun earlier necessitating further cuts to defence 
expenditure and a reappraisal of priorities and costs; the outcome favoured the 
air-arm.  For a time the Government was uncertain, the military was unpopular, 
recruitment a challenge (students from some leading universities resolved not to 
fight ‘for King and Country’, perhaps influenced by the so-called ‘Joad 
resolution’ of the Oxford Union), and there was some real and some perceived 
unrest within the armed services. International peaceful co-existence was 
encouraging to begin with in Europe, but not in the Far East.  At the 
Disarmament Conference there was strong support for banning tanks, heavy 
weapons, and as part of an integrated policy, Britain was looking to ban aerial 
bombing too.  Politically, economically and defensively this would be much 
welcomed by the British Government. It presented an opportunity either to 
divert part of the defence budget to social projects, which suited the 
electorate, or to reduce expenditure altogether, which suited a government 






                                                 
190 Smith, British Air Strategy, pp. 183, 184 and 189; Self, Neville Chamberlain, pp.267-269. 
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UK Government Spending per Fiscal Year (£ millions).191 
 
 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Health 
Care 
58 64 74 75 78 84 89 96 104 
Education 164 163 153 152 158 168 177 185 193 
Defence 117 113 111 116 122 146 195 206 266 
Welfare 260 271 289 291 292 304 311 318 326 
Protection 41 41 39 40 41 44 46 50 57 
Transport 168 169 145 151 148 152 160 154 173 
General 
Govt. 
11 12 12 12 13 13 13 14 14 
Other 
Spending 
283 284 275 276 287 302 323 343 314 
Interest 406 405 403 349 335 334 336 345 352 
Balance -124 -126 -130 -142 -124 -120 -124 -123 -73 
Total 
Spending 
1,384 1,397 1,372 1,320 1,348 1,429 1,526 1,589 1,725 
Public Net 
Debt 
7,401 7,422 7,632 7,810 7,788 7,784 7,785 8,014 8,150 
 
 
Overall public expenditure reduced in 1933 and again in 1934, and for the next 
two years did not exceed the 1932 level.  Defence expenditure continuously 
reduced until 1933, but did not start to recover significantly until 1936, after the 
failure of the disarmament conference and the year after the 3rd Hussars 
experiment began at Tidworth.  The development of medium tanks ceased, and 
                                                 
191 URL: http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/spending_brief.php accessed 04.07.2011. 
 196 
those AFVs that were made by Vickers were largely for the export market; the 
British Army therefore, remained short of AFVs with which to mechanize the 
cavalry.  
 
Tensions grew, firstly with Japan followed by Italy and Germany.  The British 
Government reviewed the nation’s defence capability and the financially 
restrictive 10 Year Rule was abandoned.  Considering it less abhorrent to the 
electorate and following an integrated strategy, the government prioritised the 
Royal Air Force for development.  The Army General Staff correctly forecast an 
expeditionary force would be needed should a war occur on the European 
continent, but this was not an opinion supported by the government. Restricted 
by funds to purchase equipment, the army nonetheless continued a programme 
of modernization.  Gradually mechanizing horsed cavalry regiments was included 
in this programme, but with what vehicles with which to equip the cavalry was 
unclear, as the future of tanks, what type and their role in war, was for a time 
uncertain.   
 
The 3rd Hussars was chosen to experiment with motor vehicles and did so with 
enthusiasm and success, although the vehicles initially employed were later 
considered unsuitable.  This was a major change for a horsed cavalry regiment, 
but as with the 11th Hussars and the 12th Lancers (mechanized earlier with 
armoured cars), the change process was well led and successfully managed.  
Officers stuck to their task, NCOs became able instructors, and most of the men 
trained to become competent drivers and mechanics.  Although initially unhappy 
with parting with their horses, and assured of their return if the experiment 
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failed, neither officers nor other ranks demonstrated any resistance or hesitation 
to fully embrace the assignment as ordered.  In December 1935 further horsed 
cavalry regiments were designated for conversion to motor-lorries or light tanks 








Mechanization - The Third Phase 1936 – 1939. 
The Mobile Force in Egypt and the Mobile Division at Home.  
 
Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd in 1946, as already recounted, wrote of 
the unpleasant position of knowing, in the mid-1930s, that the British Army was 
totally unready for war, an opinion supported by the First Lord of The Admiralty 
Sir Samuel Hoare, later Viscount Templewood.1  The Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria was principally the concern of the Royal Navy; the German 
reoccupation of the Rhineland, in terms of any military action, seemed to have 
concerned no one much, as Templewood confirmed: ‘Hitler’s challenge… had 
been ignored’, except perhaps by Winston Churchill.2  Abyssinia, however, was 
the concern of the Army and mechanizing the horsed cavalry regiments in Egypt 
became a priority. In December 1935 Montgomery-Massingberd ordered further 
horsed cavalry regiments to be designated for conversion to motor-lorries or 
light tanks as soon as these vehicles became available. 
 
Montgomery-Massingberd was faced with a problem that he alone could not 
solve: a largely pacificist electorate that was given due regard by government 
ministers, together with an almost global economic depression that had engulfed 
Great Britain in its wake. The country was recovering slowly, but only in a 
swathe from the West Midlands down to London and across South-East England; 
                                                 
1 LHCMA - 10/11-10/13 159/1ggg, The Montgomery-Massingberd Papers, Kings College London; 
Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp.138/139 re the lack of British military strength. 
2 Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p.201; Gilbert, Churchill A Life, p.552. 
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the rest of the country remained in a parlous state.  The poor, unable to pay 
tax, needed state assistance, and those enjoying increased affluence were 
reluctant to put this at risk.3  The Treasury had to perform a fine balancing act 
and the net result for Montgomery-Massingberd and the army was little 
investment in modernization.   
 
It was not so much the ‘social mix’ of the population that was significant, but 
the ‘voting mix’ that had changed since the political class took Great Britain to 
war in 1914.  The changes in the Representation of People Acts in 1918 and 1928 
enfranchised the whole adult population, regardless of income, gender, 
education and social status. To get elected and stay in power, politicians had to 
reflect the views of their voters. Public opinion became a crucial factor in policy 
making, but opinion surveys of public attitudes were not used until Harrison and 
Madge began the Britain by Mass Observation surveys in the late 1930s.  Public 
opinion could only be assessed by behaviour and the media’s agenda.  Study of 
the 1930s invokes some sympathy for Baldwin’s plight to get the British people 
behind a policy of rearmament.4  Templewood’s comment is crucial to 
appreciating the whole appeasement and rearmament issues; although the 
National Government had ‘an overwhelming majority’ before the 1935 General 
Election, it had no mandate as such for rearmament, only economic recovery. 
Prior to 1936 rearmament would have met formidable opposition.5   
 
                                                 
3 For illumination see, for example, Stevenson and Cook, The Slump  and Hobsbawm, Industry 
and Empire, Section II ‘Between the Wars’. 
4 Barnett, Corelli 'The Illogical Promise' in Panichas, George A. (ed.) [1968] The Promise of 
Greatness: The War of 1914-1918, (Cassell, London) p.571.   
5 Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp.134 & 194. 
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Of the 2,146,062 women’s signatures presented in a petition at the Disarmament 
Conference in 1932, 1,000,000 were British 6  women who had become voters, 
and had different views from men on peace and war. Later surveys showed that 
women’s views were above all ‘to keep the peace’ and ‘stop the men from going 
to war again’. An observer in Ilford noted one woman respondent’s retort that 
she ‘was all for peace – war was silly and futile’; she hated Hitler and Mussolini 
‘for bringing us close to it’.  In all surveys following the Czechoslovakian crisis, it 
was the women who indicated a pro-Neville Chamberlain and appeasement 
opinion; 59% of those women surveyed supported Chamberlain with only 4% 
against, and there were 30% ‘don’t knows’.  It should be noted that 46% of men 
surveyed supported Chamberlain too, with 20% against and 16% ‘vague’.7  
 
Faith in the League and the policy of ‘collective security’ continued, indicated, 
for example, in the Fulham (West) by-election result of 1938. This previously 
‘safe’ Conservative Party seat was won by the Labour Party candidate Dr Edith 
Summerskill.  Her election leaflet was headlined ‘Peace before Party – Vote for 
Summerskill Peace and Security Through The League’.  As well as political 
activists, four Non-Conformist church ministers signed this leaflet.8  The Labour 
Party, Summerskill argued, ‘wanted to build up an international police force’ 
and participate in collective security.9  The League of Nations had faced ‘an 
ominous test’ when Mussolini attacked Abyssinia10 (that was the catalyst for 
cavalry mechanization in Egypt), but there was still much to commend the 
                                                 
6 The Times, 08.02.1932, p.11. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Britain by Mass Observation papers (1938); ‘Fulham’. 
9 Ibid., D 2/A. 
10 Brittain, Testament of Experience, p. 136. 
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League and the optimism of much of public opinion could be justified by the 
League’s success.   
 
In later analyses of inter-war attitudes regarding the League of Nations, Cecelia 
Lynch has stressed that Manchuria (1932), Adolf Hitler (1933), Abyssinia (1935), 
the Rhineland (1936), Spain (1936-1939) and the Sudetenland (1938) showed ‘the 
futility of relying on international polity to stop aggression… the idealism [of the 
1920s] unravelled in the 1930s’.11  Sally Marks argued that the establishment of 
the League of Nations ‘constituted one of the dangerously misleading illusions of 
peace’.12  This may have been so, but only with the benefit of hindsight.   
 
It was this so called ‘illusion’, the belief that peace between nations could and 
might prevail, that so much influenced the defence expenditure decisions 
pertinent to this thesis.  It was in this environmental mixture of fear, hope and 
determination that the popular peace movement, with support from pacifist 
‘left’ politics, had grown, gathered momentum, and had influenced government 
policy.13 Much of the general population continued to believe that another war 
was avoidable,14  but nonetheless the fear of being bombed grew as a major 
issue of public concern, and was especially worse for mothers with young 
                                                 
11 Lynch, Beyond Appeasement, p.95. 
12 Marks, The Illusion of Peace, p.15. 
13 Barnett, Corelli 'The Illogical Promise' in Panichas, George A. (ed.) [1968] The Promise of 
Greatness: The War of 1914-1918, (Cassell, London) pp.566/567. 
14 Hinton, Protests and Visions, p.90; also Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p.236, re ‘public 
opinion, still apathetic’, also p.239 ‘the hope of peace had not been finally abandoned’.  
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children.15  The National Government was ‘particularly sensitive’ to public 
pressure, and the bomber affected the ‘man in the street’ who was a voter.16   
 
The civil war in Spain confirmed the public’s fears.  Colonel ffrench-Blake 
remembered seeing Zeppelins over London during the Great War and said ‘they 
seemed no threat and were easily shot down’, but ‘no one realised about 
bombing till Guernica’.17  Kay Ash remembered: 
 
‘Spain, about the bombing, what I can remember is people, terrified, on 
the street, running for cover.  That’s what stayed with me, that’s what 
you imagined would happen here when the bombing came, yes, they [the 
British] were so sure it was [coming]’.18 
 
Colonel Sprot said, because of Spain, concern over ‘war and bombing’ moved 
from ‘possibility – then gradually a probability’.19   
 
In the mid-1930s the political ‘left’ produced some anti-arms trade films: ‘Hell 
United’ showed the destructive power of modern weapons and the so-called 
‘double – dealing’ of the arms trade.  This short film called upon the audience to 
write to their Member of Parliament and to support demonstrations and strikes 
                                                 
15 Harrison & Madge, Britain by Mass Observation, pp. 49-51. 
16 Bialer, The Shadow Of The Bomber  p.7; see Kyba, J P., ‘British Attitudes Towards 
Disarmament and Rearmament 1932-1935’, PhD, London School of Economics, 1966, for an 
analysis of public opinion. 
17 Personal correspondence with ffrench-Blake (2008); by the author. 
18 Personal interview with Ash (2008); by the author.  
19 Personal correspondence with Sprot (2008); by the author. 
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against any further arms expansion.  The film was almost certainly produced to 
support the successful campaign for the establishment of a Royal Commission 
(see Conclusion) on the production and sale of arms.  This opened in 1934 and 
must have dampened investment in arms manufacture until it was concluded. 
 
The Times, in late 1935, supported rearmament and claimed to represent public 
opinion.  Its Leader suggested the Opposition was promulgating the argument 
that the British Government was tricking ‘the people to vote for vast 
armaments’, accusing the Government of ‘making the running in an armaments 
race’.  The Leader pointed out how much government arms expenditure had 
fallen over the previous eight years, and if the Opposition was committed to 
collective security the deficiencies in armaments ‘must be made good’.  The 
Leader supported the Prime Minister in his recent speech in Wolverhampton and 
his assertion that a modern navy and an industry ready to expand quickly, should 
there be an emergency, was entirely ‘consistent with membership of the 
League’.20  Two days later the Leader reinforced the point that in making good 
defence deficiencies, ‘there is no trace of any abandonment of the effort 
towards disarmament’.  ‘The overwhelming majority of the British public now 
approve constructive rearmament’ a February 1936 Leader confidently stated.  
Progressive and determined League policy had to have the resources ‘at its 
back’.21  Montgomery-Massingberd’s view, written in 1946, was that between 
                                                 
20 The Times, 30.10.1935, p.15; the Leader states that ‘effective expenditure on defence fell 
from £103,446,000 in 1925/6 to £85,756,000 in 1932/3’. 
21 The Times, 04.03.1936, p.13. 
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1933 and 1935 ‘the seriousness of the military situation seemed gradually to 
dawn on the British public’, but he offers no evidence to support that opinion.22 
 
By July 1936 The Times reported ‘good progress in rearmament’ and commented 
upon the extra funds that were forthcoming.  The RAF was just ahead of the 
navy at £11,700,000 with the army at £6,600,000.  The Leader still supported 
collective security: ‘strong British Forces [were] a stabilizing force in a disturbed 
world’.  Readers were assured that Britain threatens no one, but with weak 
armed forces Britain may encourage aggression.23 From late July until October 
1936 the newspaper berated Labour and condemned pacifism together with 
congratulating the government on the rearmament progress.  The 21 July Leader 
claimed Labour was ‘prey to a number of obsessions’ from the ‘limitless pacifism 
of Lansbury’ to the collective security view that seemed to mean ‘that other 
nations will fight our battles’. A change of government, it proclaimed, having 
commented on recent by-election results, would bring no change of policy 
because ‘essentially [there was] complete unity, and behind such a policy [of 
rearmament] there was overwhelming public support’.24  Templewood asserted 
that following the 1935 General Election, Baldwin’s hands were free for a 
definite programme of rearmament’.25 
 
Recent historians have identified this period 1935-36 as pivotal in the change in 
public opinion. Steiner wrote that the 1935 general election victory was due to 
the Conservative manifesto pledge ‘to uphold the Covenant and maintain and 
                                                 
22 LHCMA - MM 159/1iii. 
23 The Times, 10.07 1936, p.17. 
24 The Times, 27.07 and 29.07.1936. 
25 Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p.194. 
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increase the efficiency of the League’.26  Ceadel argued that from 1936 the 
popular peace movement declined rapidly from its zenith of the Peace Ballot.  
He called 1936 ‘the major watershed of the decade’ for momentous events: the 
re-militarization of the Rhineland, the Italian defeat of Abyssinia, and the civil 
war in Spain.27  Lynch’s view was that the peace movement was ‘deeply divided’ 
over the British rearmament programme, principally ‘the legitimacy of the need 
for new weapons, the principles behind acquiring them, and the stated potential 
purposes of the programme’.28 The failure of economic sanctions applied via the 
League of Nations to persuade Italy to withdraw her troops from Abyssinia 
caused further fractures in the peace movement; that ‘division’ in the peace 
movement ‘allowed the government a freer hand in determining its perceptions 
of British interests’.29  Lynch concluded that ‘popular and academic discourse’ 
had blamed arms limitations and appeasement on ‘individual leaders, economic 
or security requirements, or structural constraints – factors that do not involve 
social agency’.  She cited Walter Lippmann, an influential journalist, who in 
1943 blamed the Second World War on the peace movements in both Great 
Britain and the United States for their failure to ‘keep pace with the growth of 
German and Japanese armaments’.30  Lynch expressed difficulty, however, in 
tracing the peace movements’ activities to strategic and military decision 
making.31  This is understandable; many strategic and military decisions would 
                                                 
26 Steiner,The Triumph of the Dark, p.120. 
27 Ceadel, Martin 'The Peace Movement between the wars: problems of definition' in Naylor, 
Richard & Young, Nigel (eds.) [1987] Campaigns for Peace, The British Peace Movement in the 
Twentieth Century (Manchester University Press, Manchester), p.88. 
28 Lynch, Beyond Appeasement, p.109. 
29 Ibid., p.112. 
30 Lippman, Walter [1943], US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, (Little, Brown, Boston), 
cited in Lynch, Cecelia [1999], Beyond Appeasement, pp.3-5. 
31 Lynch, Beyond Appeasement, p.5. 
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have been taken by a combination of politicians and soldiers with different 
agendas and influences.   
 
Correlli Barnett argued that despite the absence of opinion polls, statesmen had 
to take account of the ‘eruption of mass opinion’ following the ‘un-caging of the 
little man’ - the extension of the franchise in 1918 and again in 1928.  Public 
opinion had become a significant force within society.32  As mass communication 
widened and became more sophisticated, this brought a greater intimacy 
between the leaders and the led, asserted Barnett. ‘The emergence of mass 
electorates… may have set limits on what elected leaders could do’, argued 
Steiner.33  Field Marshal Alan Brooke, after a particularly trying day, recorded in 
his diary on 9 July 1941 that ‘[politicians] are always terrified of public opinion 
as long as the enemy is sufficiently far’.34  The 1930s were a difficult time in 
which to govern.  There had to be fiscal constraints.  Not only was the pay of 
military service personnel cut, but also unemployment benefit, and means-
testing was applied to state benefits.35  Civil Service salaries were cut by 6% and 
teachers’ salaries by 11%.36  Although the ‘Ten Year Rule’ was abandoned and 
rearmament began, the financial risks the nation faced were considered more 
dangerous than the military risks.37  A White Paper dated 4 March 1935 
‘announced the official policy of rearmament, but it went into practice only 
slowly… [in financial terms] its first effects being on the 1936 budget’.38  This 
                                                 
32 Barnett, Corelli 'The Illogical Promise' in Panichas, George A. (ed.) [1968] The Promise of 
Greatness: The War of 1914-1918, (Cassell, London) p.560-71.   
33 Steiner,The Triumph of the Dark, p.3. 
34 Danchev and Todman, (eds.) [2001], War Diaries, p.170. 
35 Evans, On The Breadline, p.29; Stevenson and Cook, The Slump, p.2.  
36 Stevenson and Cook, The Slump, p.17. 
37 Howson, Domestic Money Management In Britain, p.120. 
38 Ibid., p.120. 
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allowed, or perhaps compelled, the second tranche of cavalry mechanization, 
the 3rd Hussars’ ‘Experiment’ [described in the last chapter], also the formation 
of the Mobile Division in England and the mechanization of the Cavalry Brigade in 
Egypt described as follows. 
 
In accordance with the Army Council’s orders, the 8th Hussars held their last 
mounted parade in Egypt on 11 November 1935 and began the change process 
from horses to petrol-driven vehicles.39  The prime source of the record of the 
activities of the 8th Hussars was the Regimental Diary.  This unique document 
provided an almost daily account of the life of the regiment from 1923 until the 
outbreak of war in August 1939.  The Regimental Journal expands and 
illuminates the diary entries in reports of several of the notable and amusing 
occurrences.   
 
Clearly the regiment had orders to begin conversion before this was officially 
notified to all other Army Commands the following month.  The 11th Hussars, 
also stationed in Egypt, trained the 8th Hussars in driving and maintenance 
during 1936.  As with other cavalry regiments, the 8th Hussars was not without 
some previous experience of motor vehicles:  Captain D W Daly, Lieutenant J D 
Paton and Second Lieutenant S E R O’Neill, officers from the regiment, were 
sent from Germany to Aldershot on 5 March 1928 to attend a six-wheeled-lorry 
driving and maintenance course.  The ‘motorization’ of the ‘first-line’ transport 
came after a reduction in horsed transport wagons in 1927, of six wagons and 
                                                 
39 QRH 285, October, November and December, 1935, Regimental Diary 1923-1939 8th KRI 
Hussars; The archives of the 4th Queen’s Own Hussars and the 8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars, The 
Queen’s Royal Hussars Home Head Quarters, Regent Park Barracks, Albany Street, London, NW1 
4AL. 
 208 
eight horses, and the reduction of one squadron.  This was the case for each of 
the twelve cavalry regiments serving at home and on the Rhine Station where 
the 8th Hussars were at that time.40  
  
All but two of the Hotchies [sic] guns were to be withdrawn [and the] 
machine gun squadron to be mechanised in due course, and to comprise:- 
Headquarters, 4 Troops of 2 machine guns (Vickers) each – making 8 
machine guns in all, an increase of 4 over the present Peace 
Establishment.41 
 
The number of signallers was reduced from 18 to 12 and ‘the total strength of 
the Regiment to be reduced by the following: - 3 Officers, 93 Other Ranks and 
113 animals’.42  Some men were prematurely transferred to the Army Reserve 
and one officer was reassigned as Adjutant to the Staffordshire Yeomanry.  What 
happened to the other men no longer allowed on the establishment is not 
specifically recorded, although throughout the regimental diary are recorded 
numerous transfers and drafts in and out of the 8th Hussars, to and from other 
cavalry regiments of the line.43  
 
                                                 
40 19 March 1927, instruction from the War Office recorded in QRH 285, Regimental Diary 1923-
1939 8th KRI Hussars.  
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid.  
43 Ibid., 19 and 20 March 1927. 
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The mechanization of the Machine Gun Squadron might not have taken place as 
soon as it could have done, perhaps even deliberately, as The Journal of The VIII 
King’s Royal Irish Hussars reported in January 1928, recording events following 
their return to barracks at Wiesbaden after the annual machine-gun course of 
April 1927 at Sonnenberg Ranges: 
 
During this period of training we had a slight touch of ‘shell shock’, owing 
to a rumour arriving that Whitehall had decided to mechanize the world, 
including the Machine Gun Squadron.  Ford cars, Crossley tenders, hay 
carts [sic] and other mysteriously-driven vehicles were to be issued 
instead of our equine friends: but somehow or other, our Quartermaster 
neglected to indent for them. Mechanization may be alright, but two 
miles or so of bad ground with guns, tripods etc., would be all wrong, for 
such distances would have to be covered, on some occasions, when 
mechanical vehicles would become bogged down or ditched.44 
 
Later in the same journal appeared the following poem that summed-up 
someone’s contemporary thoughts on mechanization.  Although the regiment 
was only to be partially mechanized with lorries, the poem makes clear that the 
assumption was, in 1927, that tanks would soon replace cavalry horses: 
 
                                                 
44 ‘Machine Gun Squadron Notes’, The Journal of The VIII King’s Royal Irish Hussars Volume 1. 
January, 1928 No.1, p.17. 
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The days of the cavalry soldier are over, 
If certain great brains have their way. 
In future they’ll issue us petrol for clover  
When mechanization holds sway. 
 
Then what will they do for a livery stable 
When horses are taken away? 
And how will some elderly gentry be able 
To shake up their livers each day? 
 
And who will provide all the horses for training? 
Will umpires ride cycles, or run? 
To some, I’ve no doubt, ‘twill appear entertaining, 
But umpires won’t think it much fun. 
 
Can tanks, doing escort, compete by their crashing 
With horses that gladden the eye? 
Will tractors, in races, excite us by smashing 
The fences the horse used to fly? 
 
When tanks take the place of the obsolete “hairy” 
D’you think that the horse show will last? 
Will prizes you won with your jumpers be merely 
The sign of a decadent past? 
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Will the hunting field, too, be by tankettes invaded? 
Will hounds be let out of a box? 
Will we on machines, from our horses degraded,  
Soon chase an electrical fox? 45 
 
The Machine Gun Squadron was partially mechanized by the summer of 1928 for 
manoeuvres with the French Cavalry, one troop in six-wheeled lorries loaned to 
them by the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC), and the other troop mounted with 
pack-horses.  At the end of September the Machine-Gun Squadron ‘parted with 
our petrol mounts… and awaited their successors’.46  Some new-comers to the 
now mechanized squadron enjoyed not having to care for horses, but some 
regretted it. 
 
The first-line transport for the manoeuvres was: 
 
improvised out of existing station transport, and consisted of four-horsed 
L.G.S. (Light General Service) wagons, five 30-cwt. Vulcan lorries and four 
3-ton Albion lorries.  There were also six 3-ton Albion lorries for supplies, 
working in two echelons.47 
 
The road journey by lorry was very slow, with an average speed of four miles per 
hour, ‘due to break-downs and certain of the lorries being unable to get up the 
                                                 
45 The Journal of The VIII King’s Royal Irish Hussars Volume 1. January, 1928 No.1, p.33. 
46 Ibid., January, 1929 No.2, p.11.  
47 Ibid., p.3.  
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steep hills’.48  By May 1929 the Machine Gun Squadron was entirely mechanized 
with six-wheeled lorries and enjoyed not having to ‘box the horses, forage and 
saddles’ when the squadron departed for its annual machine-gun course; they 
expected the sabre squadrons, still horsed, to be ‘secretly green with envy’.49  
The performance of the wheeled vehicles must have improved considerably; on 
the course held at Bitche, ‘the lorries put up some quite astonishing 
performances and lived up to their reputation of being able to go almost 
anywhere’.50  
 
On 4 October 1929 the regiment left Germany for Aldershot, England; the 
advance party under the second-in-command Major Pope MC had already left on 
24 September.  All their horses were ‘evacuated’, in six parties, via Antwerp and 
not taken over by another regiment, as all British troops left Germany at around 
that time.  The last party of horses arrived at Aldershot on 11 October.51  During 
1930 the Machine-Gun Squadron was supplied with new guns and Carden-Loyd 
machine-gun carriers that came with the reputation ‘that they could do almost 
anything, even turn round and snap at you’.  However, ‘on the first day out one 
absolutely refused to start, and another gave up the ghost well out in the Long 
Valley and was ignominiously towed home’.52  Not enough Carden-Loyd carriers 
appear to have been issued for the entire squadron; in a demonstration at Miles 
Hill for the Imperial Press Congress on 10 June 1930, ‘the Squadron turned out 
two troops, one mounted and the other mechanized’.53  Driver training 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., January, 1930 No.3, p.8. 
50 Ibid., p.9. 
51 QRH 285, Regimental Diary 1923-1939 8th KRI Hussars. 
52The Journal of The VIII King’s Royal Irish Hussars Volume 1. January, 1929 No.4, p.13. 
53 Ibid., p.14. 
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continued and on 29 December 1930 ‘4 Tprs. [Troopers] Passed Trade Test for 
Trade of Driver I.C. Class III at Feltham’.54 The Carden-Loyd machine-gun troop, 
together with a sabre squadron, took part in a demonstration for Staff College 
students at Jubilee Hill in July 1931 and another, under Major E A Staniland, for 
the OTC (Officer Training Corps) at Miles Hill.  Part of the Machine Gun Squadron 
was still mounted on horses and provided some of the Divisional Cavalry 
Regiment for the concentration of the 1st Division on exercise in August 1931.55 
The Divisional Cavalry Regiment was made up of units from several cavalry 
regiments, because of an acute shortage of trained men: 
 
Owing to the shortage of trained men in the Regiments, the Inspector 
General of Cavalry cancelled his usual Inspection of individual Units and 
instead took the 1st Cavalry Brigade on a Tactical Scheme on this day.56 
 




 I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that the 
present state of the national finances has necessitated the adoption of 
widespread measures of economy throughout the country. 
                                                 
54 QRH 285; recorded 30 December 1930 in the Regimental Diary 1923-1939 8th KRI Hussars. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid.  
 214 
 In these measures the Army and all the Services of the Crown have 
been called upon to bear their share.  The Army Council are confident 
that All Ranks will be ready to make the sacrifices demanded of them in 
order to contribute to the restoration of national prosperity. 
  I am Sir, 
     Your obedient servant, 
       (SD) H. J. Creedy 57 
 
These diary records demonstrate how the national and international economic 
situation impinged on the everyday life of a cavalry regiment, and particularly 
on the ordinary trooper who received the least remuneration. Whatever reaction 
there was to the pay cuts was not recorded.  In the previous chapter of this 
thesis the so-called mutiny of the Atlantic Fleet at Invergordon of September 
1931 was cited as the reaction of naval ratings to their pay-cuts.  
 
Army recruitment in the 1930s was of concern and a cut in pay will not have 
helped this matter.  It has been considered whether this factor affected 
mechanization or was affected by it.  In England the popular pacifist culture and 
anti-war sentiment was reaching its zenith in the run-up to the League of 
Nations World Disarmament Conference, particularly as the Great War 
commemoration had emphasised the ‘lost generation’.58  The Army found 
recruitment challenging and although unemployment was on the increase a 
                                                 
57 Ibid.  
58 A term used later, possibly originally by Ernest Hemmingway, but also associated with Vera 
Brittain in Bishop and Bostridge (eds) [2004], Letters From A Lost Generation, (Abacus, London), 
that described those who had served, and more particular those who had died in the Great War. 
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military service career was not as popular as it once might have been.  
Recruitment problems continued for some time throughout the 1930s.  In 
February 1935 the Regular Army was 3,300 below recruiting establishment.59 The 
Times reported the First Lord of The Admiralty Sir Sam Hoare’s concerned 
speech at Margate in early October 1936.  Hoare said: ‘Perverted pacifism and 
partisan obstruction have had their effects on the recruiting figure of the army’.  
There was a need, he continued, ‘to destroy the pernicious prejudices that 
undoubtedly do exist, and persuade young men to adopt an inspiring and 
invigorating career’.60  On 31 October The Times again reported concerns about 
army recruitment.61  There was certainly anxiety about the recruitment of 
officers in the Royal Tank Corps for example; in 1935 it was estimated that in 
order to fulfil the mobilization requirement by 1939, 550 officers would be 
needed for two ‘contingents’, 96 of whom could come from India and 150 from 
the Supplementary Reserve, but leaving 300 hundred more officers who had to 
be found from somewhere. An armoured car company was proposed with the 
objective of training future officers.62   
 
Gary Evans has analysed the British General Army Reports that indicated to him 
‘the cavalry was consistently able to recruit to establishment until 
mechanisation [sic] commenced’;63 and he dates this from 1935.64  But the 8th 
                                                 
59 LHCMA - LH15/12/9, 5; War Office Memorandum, Army estimates, 14 February 1935 p.4. 
60 The Times, 02.10.1936. 
61 The Times, 31.10.1936. 
62 TNA WO 32/2859 ARMY ORGANIZATION: Territorial Army (Code 14(K)): Officer’s producing 
Units for Royal Tank Corps: Formation of 1935-1938; Reg No. 20/Gen/5496 minute 8 – the 
22(London) Armoured Car Company (Westminster Dragoons) Territorial Army was formed from an 
existing County of London Yeomanry regiment; also The Lindsay papers, LHCMA - LH15/12/1-2, 
A2b14. 
63 Evans, Gary, ‘The British Cavalry 1920-1940’,PhD, University of Kent, 2011, p.145. 
64 Ibid. 
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Hussars’ diary does not support this assertion regarding ‘trained men’.  Evans 
and Gilman Barndollar agree that ‘the army [as a whole] struggled to recruit to 
full establishment’.65  Regarding the recruitment of officers, Evans wrote that 
1936 and 1937 ‘saw the mechanisation [sic] of the cavalry enlarged’; this he 
insisted ‘had no effect upon the recruitment of officers to the cavalry.  The 
level of officer recruitment in the Royal Tank Corps (RTC), however, reduced’.66 
The ‘Percentage Strength of Annual Establishment – Officers’ indicated an 
overall decline of some 8% from 1932 to 1937; a decline of 25% in the RTC, but 
the cavalry arm was consistently above 100% of its officer establishment.67  
Evans asserted: ‘The cavalry never failed to recruit its officer cadre whether 
mechanised or mounted; mechanisation [sic] was never an issue for officer 
recruitment’.68 The reason for this may have been because most cavalry 
regiments had been in existence for two to three hundred years and had long 
traditions of family patronage, the Tank Corps had not.  Sons, grandsons and 
great-grandsons would join ‘The Regiment’ whether mechanized or not.  A 
browse of the Army Lists shows many examples including interviewees for this 
thesis, Val ffrench-Blake of the 17th/21st Lancers and Aiden Sprot of the Royal 
Scots Greys, whose fathers had served in their respective regiments.69  
 
Because the RTC ‘continued to recruit strongly to the ranks’, Evans speculated 
that recruits were more attracted to the RTC than to horsed cavalry regiments.  
                                                 
65 Ibid; Gilman Clough Barndollar, ‘British Use of Armoured cars 1919-1939’, PhD, Cambridge 
University, 2010, p.29. 
66 Evans, Gary, ‘The British Cavalry 1920-1940’, PhD, University of Kent, 2011, p.163. 
67 Ibid., Chart 2. 
68 Ibid., emphasis added. 
69 ffrench-Blake’s father was actually a 21st Lancer; he was killed in action in the Great War – 
the 17th and the 21st Lancers were amalgamated in 1922 – see Chapter 1. 
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The medical requirements were, however, less stringent for the RTC than for the 
cavalry and infantry, ‘[but] the insinuation would appear to be that some of the 
lower ranks of the cavalry were more against mechanisation [sic] than the 
officers’. 70  Evans was correct that there is insufficient information to support 
this and therefore this is open only to speculation.  Furthermore, veterans 
interviewed for this thesis confirmed the confusion of some recruits thinking the 
cavalry was already mechanized, and that the officers and other ranks got on 
with the job of mechanization and did not seek postings to those regiments that 
remained horsed.  ‘Talk of mechanization was always there, a couple of 
regiments were already mechanized’, recalled Corporal Charles Need of the 
13th/18th Hussars when interviewed in 2007.71  Some recruits, remembered 
Need, had joined the cavalry believing it to be already mechanized, such as 
Benny Hunter, a tractor driver from Hull and Percy Britain, a bus driver who 
later became a motorcyclist in the signals unit.72   
 
However, in August 1936, the 4th Queen’s Own Hussars too were short of men.  
The Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Scott-Cockburn speculated: 
 
recruitment for the Army is very bad at the present… this is partly due to 
the fact that unemployment is so good, partly due to the ease with which 
the dole is obtained, and partly due to the fact that young fellows do not 
                                                 
70 Evans, Gary, ‘The British Cavalry 1920-1940’, PhD, University of Kent, 2011, p.165.  
71 The 11th Hussars and the 12th Lancers. 
72 Personal interview with Need (2007); by the author.  
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know what the Army can do for them.  Every regiment in the British Army 
is under strength.73 
 
David French has examined the social and cultural aspects of mechanization 
within cavalry regiments: the regimental pride of still being the ‘best cavalry 
regiment’ whether horsed or armoured, and the ‘cautious’ willingness to accept 
mechanization by both officers and men.74 This cautious acceptance of 
mechanization was supported by veteran cavalryman Sergeant Ronald Lucas of 
the 15th/19th Hussars, who saw mechanization positively, as an exciting new 
challenge.  Like it or not, however, Lucas’s first loyalty was to his regiment, 
whatever equipment it was ordered to use.75  Need, of the 13th/18th Hussars, 
confirmed how proud cavalrymen were to be part of that service arm.76   
 
It is doubtful therefore, that mechanization had any bearing on recruitment.  If 
the RTC attracted more men than the cavalry to the ranks, the physical 
requirements might have been a factor; so too might have been the foresight to 
learn a skill more in tune with the needs of civilian life.  All the veteran 
cavalrymen interviewed for this thesis, however, initially joined their regiments 
either because of a connection with family and friends, or due a keenness to 
work with horses.  Once they became soldiers other factors, such as esprit de 
corps, became more important to them. 
                                                 
73 Speech given by Lieutenant Colonel J Scott-Cockburn, 24 August 1936, reported in IV Hussars’ 
Journal 1936 pp.34 &35. 
74 French, D., Military Identities, p.263. 
75 Personal interview with Lucas (2007); by the author. 
76 Personal interview with Need (2007); by the author. 
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Whatever the reasons were, the British Army, including some cavalry regiments, 
were short of men.  A significant indication of this is recorded in the Regimental 
Diary at the bottom of the page for December 1931 that only one recruit had 
attested for the 8th Hussars that month; and by June 1937 recruitment was still 
a challenge for the 8th Hussars.  A discussion group of young officers and NCOs 
was held in the regimental library to consider ‘How to improve recruiting’. 
Regrettably no record of their conclusions has been found.77  Mechanization of a 
sort, however, had continued for the 8th Hussars; ‘all Horses of Signal Troop 
were transferred to Sabre Squadrons, Signallers being trained as Austin Scouts 
and vice versa’.78  On 4 October 1932 the regiment moved to Hounslow, and 
probably as a result of economies, ‘lost several motors’ along with the Carden-
Loyd machine-gun carriers, with the machine-gunners being re-mounted on 
horseback.   
 
By January 1933: 
 
The Regiment now consists of Regimental Headquarters, comprising: 1 
Administrative Troop, 1 Band Troop, 1 Machine Gun Troop (on pack 
[horses]), 1 Signal and Austin Scout Troop, also 3 Sabre Squadrons of 3 
Troops each.79  
 
 
                                                 
77 28 June 1937; QRH 285, Regimental Diary 1923-1939 8th KRI Hussars. 
78 Ibid., 1 December 1931.  






The 8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars crossing Chertsey Bridge on their march to Hounslow,                    
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On 19 December 1933 the 8th Hussars, after a break of eleven years, returned to 
Egypt, but not until autumn 1935 did the ‘stop-go’ policy in mechanization end 
for them.  The Regimental Diary recorded en bloc October, November and 
December 1935 that marked ‘the rapid development of the Regiment as a 
mechanised force’:81  
 
Initial preparations for the change-over were commenced about the 9th 
September when a party proceeded to Helmieh [outside Cairo] to undergo 
training with the 11th Hussars, and the majority of the remainder 
received tuition on the Vickers machine gun.82 
 
All the regiment’s horses were transferred to the 1st Royal Dragoons that had 
recently arrived in Egypt from India.  On 25 November, the whole of C Squadron 
was sent for training at Helmieh and the regiment was anticipating equipping 
with modified 15 cwt. and 30 cwt., Ford V8 vehicles and ‘V.B. (Vickers-Berthier) 
light automatic’ machine-guns ‘in favour to the Vickers machine gun, and all 
personnel were instructed in its use’.83  By 18 December C Squadron was 
equipped to ‘proceed by road to Mersa Matruh… as part of the newly formed 
Mobile Force’.84  
 
                                                 
81 QRH 285, October, November and December, 1935, Regimental Diary 1923-1939 8th KRI 
Hussars. 
82 Ibid.  
83 Ibid.  
84 Ibid.  
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The ‘Mobile Force’ was the seed-corn of the 7th Armoured Division, later to 
achieve lasting fame as the ‘Desert Rats’.  The Mobile Force comprised the 7th 
Hussars ‘in an assortment of light tanks, Marks III and VIB’, the 11th Hussars in 
their old armoured cars [see Chapter One], and the 1st Royal Tank Regiment 
that had ‘left England in March with all the light tanks available there and with 
new [replacement] tracks [that] did not fit’.85 The Mobile Force also included 
the 3rd Regiment Royal Horse Artillery equipped with ‘dragons’ towing 3.7 inch 
howitzers, and the 8th Hussars in their machine-gun mounting Ford trucks.   The 
brigade was completed by Corps troops from the No.5 Company Royal Army 
Service Corps (RASC) and the 2nd/3rd Field Ambulance, Royal Army Medical 
Corps.  The force was supported by the RAF with Lysanders of No.208 Army 
Cooperation Squadron, Gloster Gladiator fighters of No.80 Fighter Squadron, and 
Hawker Hart light bombers of No.45 Bomber Squadron. 86 
 
Back in Abbassia, the Regimental Headquarters and A Squadron of the 8th 
Hussars were trained in driving and maintenance by their own regimental 
instructors who had, in turn, been trained by the 11th Hussars. ‘The barrack 
square was converted into an improvised garage for this purpose’.87   The 
regiment was augmented in January 1936 by a sergeant and seventeen other 
ranks from the Royal Corps of Signals from England. Later this troop was 
designated ‘H Troop Cavalry Division Signals’.88 The same month brought some of 
the first casualties resulting from mechanization; Lance Sergeant Winkers and 
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86 Ibid. 
87 QRH 285, October, November and December, 1935, Regimental Diary 1923-1939 8th KRI 
Hussars.  
88 Ibid., January 27, 1936. 
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Trooper Dawson died when their Ford 30 cwt. vehicle overturned whilst on a 
reconnaissance mission with C Squadron.89 
 
By 17 January 1936, a year after the regiment began the change process from 
horses to vehicles, A Squadron too was able to proceed by road to Mersa Matruh 
and Regimental Headquarters followed on 22 January.90  This was a striking 
example of successful change management that mirrored in many respects that 
of the 3rd Hussars ‘experiment’ in England (see Chapter II).  This could not have 
been achieved without good leadership, strong motivation, and the collective 
will of the troopers of the 8th Hussars to succeed in what they were ordered to 
do.  In less than five months officers and troopers who had previously been 
horsemen joined the Mobile Force as a mechanized, or perhaps, motorized 
regiment.  The training continued. On 29 January a sergeant and fifteen other 
ranks commenced a driving and maintenance course with the RASC and a Light 
Aid Detachment (LAD) joined the regiment to support them.91 Although not 
recorded as such, the LAD detachment could have been from either the RASC or 
the RAOC.  During February and March the regiment took part in ‘schemes’, 
‘exercises’ and ‘battle-drills’ for visiting general officers that included the CIGS, 
Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, and the Inspector General of Cavalry.92  
In June 1936: 
 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 11 January, 1936.  
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of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME). 
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The following remarks by the GOC-in-C in connection with the Annual 
Part:II Inspection of the Regt. are republished for information:- 
 
“I think the whole hearted way in which this Regt. adapted itself to 
mechanization which must have been a wrench to many, reflects 
the greatest credit to All Ranks”.93 
 
The entire regiment left Cairo by road on 26 June 1936, ordered to proceed to 
Palestine ‘to assist in quelling disturbances between Arabs and Jews’.94  The 8th 
Hussars camped on the outskirts of Jerusalem.  Throughout July patrols were 
regularly sent out and after some fire-fights in which six ‘enemy’ were killed, 
‘armed bands’ were rounded-up in the Nablus area.  Reconnaissance around 
Jericho was undertaken by RHQ and B Squadrons and escort troops sent out to 
protect working parties repairing damaged telegraph wires.  C Squadron moved 
to patrol the Gaza area, and troops from B Squadron, later reinforced with A 
Squadron, moved to Beersheba to search for arms and ammunition and to 
protect work on the constantly sabotaged railway line.  There were a number of 
exchanges of gun-fire and bombing incidents in the area, and throughout July, 
August and September, this work of patrolling and protection continued with a 
number of armed men apprehended. On 11 October, news was received that 
‘The Arab Committee’ had ordered the rebellion to cease ‘unconditionally’, 
‘offensive action’ by British forces ceased, ‘except to meet unprovoked 
                                                 
93 Ibid., June 1936.  
94 Ibid.  
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assault’.95 The regiment returned to Cairo on 14 and 15 November 1936 and 
ended the regiment’s first action as a mechanized unit. 
 
Recorded in the Regimental Diary were other activities pertinent to the 
development of mechanization within the unit; NCOs attended three-month 
driving and maintenance courses at Bovington in England at the end of 1936, and 
in January 1937 a draft of one captain, 88 troopers and 4 [band] boys from the 
3rd Hussars replaced time-expired men who went home to the Army Reserve.  By 
1937 the 3rd Hussars had been ‘mechanized’ [see previous chapter] – their ‘best 
men’ from A Squadron were posted to the 8th Hussars.  This draft of 3rd Hussars 
included Charles Newman, who had joined the regiment on what he described as 
a ‘cold December day in 1935’.96  During his first year in the 3rd Hussars he had 
been taught to drive ‘all the regimental vehicles, tanks, lorries, staff cars and 
motor cycles’, had qualified as a marksman with a Bren machine-gun and was 
recommended for training as an instructor.  Newman had not, however, been 
through riding school.97 In November 1936 he was, without prior warning, placed 
on a ‘draft of 90 men to be posted to the 8th Kings Royal Irish Hussars stationed 
in Abbassia, Egypt’. 98 They sailed on 28 December 1936.  When the men arrived, 
after fourteen days at sea and a similar number of hours by train, they were 
distributed among the three squadrons of the 8th Hussars; Newman was placed 
in A Squadron.  He recalled: 
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The Regiment was in the process of mechanisation [sic] and was currently 
equipped with Ford pick-up cars and open backed lorries… the backs of 
the vehicles were fitted with machine-guns, with seats for the gunners 
and racks for ammunition, water etc.  These had been specially designed 
for desert warfare and for controlling riots in the Egyptian cities; there 
was always something going on in Cairo… Hard going it was too.99  
 
Newman remembered that in 1937 the regiment had ‘several old tanks for 
training in driving and gunnery, and a lot of time was spent on these’.100 
 
In April 1937 Lieutenant D R W G Charlton was sent to the Royal Tank Corps 
Central School for a course on driving and maintenance and several NCOs took 
part in instructors’ courses elsewhere.  Later in April all available officers were 
lectured on ‘Imperial Defence in relation to the re-armament programme’ and in 
June, on ‘Supply of Forces in the Field’ and the ‘Latest Developments in Radio 
transmission and Wireless Transmission [sic]’.  On 28 June 1937, 8th Hussar 
Major J P Robinson was appointed to the British Military Mission attached to the 
Egyptian Army as an ‘instructor of Motor Cavalry’.  This was an indication of the 
competency achieved by both the regiment and by Major Robinson.101   By the 
end of 1937, Charles Newman, who had completed several courses, considered 
himself ‘a fully-fledged tank crew member.  As a driver or gunner I could live 
with the best’, but Newman struggled with wireless communication.  In time, 
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there were more tanks on which to train, ‘a couple of Armoured Cars’ and Bren 
carriers, but new tanks were still not available.102  In the following March 1938, 
some NCOs attended a ‘2. Pdr. A/T [anti-tank] Gun Course’ and the regiment as 
a whole took part in ‘Command Manoeuvres’.  These were, according to the 
commanding officer, ‘a real test of stamina’ in which ‘a high standard in driving 
and tactical work was well maintained’ and, compared to the previous year, ‘the 
most marked improvement in the handling of vehicles over difficult country and 
in keeping formation’.  The Brigade Commander expressed similar compliments 
relating to the performance of the 8th Hussars.103  In November 1938, Major 
General P C S (Percy) Hobart, GOC Mobile Division, lectured officers on the 
‘Working of [the] Mobile Division’.104 The Mobile Force had become the Mobile 
Division in October 1937 ‘when sufficient equipment has materialized, [with a 
role] provisionally defined as reconnaissance before the main forces made 
contact’.105 Although the Mobile Division became the 1st Armoured Division in 
April 1939,106 it can be argued that it was in effect the genesis of later British 
Army armoured divisions that included the 2nd, particularly the 7th Armoured 
Division, and to some extent, because of Hobart’s command and influence, the 
11th Armoured Division.  
 
Under Hobart’s supervision, the commanding officer, adjutant and two other 
officers of the 8th Hussars took part in Brigade war games and a subsequent 
conference.  On 12th November all officers, together with 60 warrant officers 
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and NCOs, attended Hobart’s lecture on tactics.  Research has not determined 
the content of these tactical lectures, but in his lectures at the Staff College at 
Quetta in 1926, Hobart had used examples of cavalry successes, especially from 
the American Civil War, to illustrate his points.107  Many of the 8th Hussar 
officers the next day saw a demonstration given by 1st Battalion RTC in ‘the use 
of smoke projected from Light Tanks’. 108 Live firing exercises took place later 
that month. 
 
Cavalry officers had been allowed to keep two horses for sport and exercise at 
government expense after their regiment was mechanized, but in January 1939 
this entitlement was reduced to one horse.  Although noting this order, the 8th 
Hussars diary makes no reference to the disposal of the redundant animals.109  
During 24 and 25 January 1939, the 7th and 8th Hussars exercised together as 
mechanized units on ‘opposing sides’.   
 
On the outbreak of war the Light Armoured Brigade (later re-named the 7th 
Armoured Brigade) of the Mobile Division was formed by the 8th Hussars, still 
mounted in obsolete Mark III tanks and their Ford ‘pick-up’ trucks, the 7th 
Hussars in light tanks, and the 11th Hussars in Rolls Royce and their newly 
acquired Morris armoured cars. The Brigade was commanded by Brigadier H E 
Russell and the Division by Major General P C S Hobart.  In November 1939 the 
8th Hussars returned to Helmieh ‘to be brought up to full tank strength, [but] 
had to wait until the end of April [1940] before this was accomplished’. A and B 
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Squadrons were equipped with Vickers Mark VIB tanks, but C Squadron continued 
with Mark III light tanks,  C Squadron was eventually ‘fitted out with old Vickers 
Mk VI tanks’ later in 1940. 110   Charles Newman, by then a sergeant and a tank 
commander, was put in charge of one of these: 
 
The main armament was one heavy machine-gun in the turret and a light 
machine-gun in support.  As I recall it, I had a crew of three and the 
speed was supposed to be 35mph, but it had long fallen far below that.  
Fifteen of these comprised a Squadron and in support of the tanks came 
the ‘thin-skins’; lorries and runabouts, staff cars, water cart, wireless 
vans etc.  Each of the lorries had a specific load to carry.  There was 
much to be carried in desert warfare: petrol, a variety of ammunition to 
fit all requirements, water, reserve food rations, a fitter’s lorry equipped 
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The 7th Hussars, as part of the cavalry brigade, were in Egypt in 1936 where the 
soldiers began the change process from horses to vehicles.  The regiment had 
been stationed in Aldershot from 1931 until 1934 when the 7th Hussars moved to 
Hounslow as a precursor to sailing to Egypt on 18 September 1935.  The 7th 
Hussars, as with most other cavalry regiments, already had some experience of 
motor vehicles before January 1936 when the news was received that the 
regiment was to convert to a ‘Light Tank Regiment’.  From 1927, with the issue 
of fourteen six-wheeled lorries, their horses had been relieved of carrying the 
heavy equipment such as machine-guns and tripods. 114  These vehicles were 
unable to keep pace with the mounted squadrons and were mechanically 
unreliable.115  At Aldershot between 1931 and 1934 however: 
 
‘The formation of a scout troop of an NCO and 9 men on RHQ (formed as 
part of Regimental Headquarters) was an innovation.  These are mobilized 
in Austin 7s (cars) and are organized as two sections of three cars 
each’.116 
 
These vehicles ‘in the hands of a dashing Hussar subaltern’ seemed to have been 
enjoyed with a high road speed and some cross-country capability; it prepared 
the way for the conversion to a fully mechanized regiment.117 
                                                 
114 Brereton, The 7th Queen’s Own Hussars, p.164/165. 
115 Ibid. 
116 The 7th Hussars Unit Historical Records 1910-1939, Section 1718, 01.04.1932 – 31.03.1933 
Regimental Archives Warwick. 
117
 Brereton, The 7th Queen’s Own Hussars, p.164/165. 
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All the horses had gone by July 1936, to the Remount Depot at Abbassia; five 
horses only remained: the officers’ chargers and ‘private horses’.118  The 
regiment’s 530 NCOs and men were given the opportunity to transfer out to 
other horsed cavalry regiments; quite what would have happened had they 
elected to do so was not recorded.  Only sixteen decided to take-up this offer, 
which indicated the high morale and esprit de corps of the unit.119 
 
On 4 April the GOC British troops in Egypt had asked the Under Secretary of 
State (USS) in London whether a date had been set for the regiment to be 
converted and from where the light tanks would be sourced, if not from the 1st 
Light Tank Battalion of the RTC.120  The reply of 30 April was inconclusive, but 
the USS requested the commencement of preliminary training in driving and 
maintenance of light tanks.121   By 25 May 1936 the GOC Egypt confirmed that 
the 7th Hussars had commenced this training.122  Driving and maintenance 
courses began the same month and continued throughout the year:  
 
Results were good, the majority of the Regiment being trained.  
Squadrons were trained independently in their new duties, B Squadron 
                                                 
118 IWM; Younger, reel 1; The 7th Hussars Unit Historical Records 1910-1939, Section 1718, 
01.04.1936 – 31.03.1937. Brereton, The 7th Queen’s Own Hussars, p.169, the horses remained 
for training young officers. 
119
 Brereton, The 7th Queen’s Own Hussars, p.164/165. 
120 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/General/5512 (S.D.2.) marked 20A, 4 April 1936. 
121 Ibid., marked 21A, 30 April 1936. 
122 Ibid., marked 22A, 16 May 1936. 
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being the earliest trained, co-operated with the Canal Brigade and the 
Cairo Brigade in the their exercises.123 
 
It was established that light tanks would not be issued to the 7th Hussars until 
sometime in 1937.124  The Unit Historical Records verified that in April and May 
1937 ‘field firing schemes were carried out for the first time in tanks’.125  Major 
General Ralph Younger, recorded in 1977, who had been a subaltern with the 7th 
Hussars in 1936, was vague about the officers’ and men’s reaction to 
mechanization.  Operational necessity over-ruled sentiment, but, remembered 
Younger, some ‘reactionary people’, ‘horsy’ junior officers who were unlikely to 
progress beyond the rank of major, said they would leave the regiment: 
 
Some thought it [mechanization] was bound to happen sometime.  The 
prevalent mood was one of acceptance with regret.  [Of] the ‘other 
ranks’, under ten per cent regretted mechanization; some were 
surprisingly adaptable - the farriers for instance.126 
 
Younger was on leave in May 1936 when the process began to armour the 7th 
Hussars and when he came back in July ‘mechanization was in full swing. It was 
                                                 
123 The 7th Hussars Unit Historical Records 1910-1939, Section 1718  01.04.1936 – 31.03.1937.  
124 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934 -1936 20/General/5512 (S.D.2.) marked 1A to all Commands, unsigned and undated, but 
referred to on 30 September 1936 by E K Squires DSD to Army Council members – marked (DF(a). 
125 The 7th Hussars Unit Historical Records 1910-1939, Section 1718, 01.04.1937 – 31.03.1938.  
126 Younger, reel 1; The Army Lists show no turnover of officers occurred between 1936 and 
1937. 
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a bit of a bombshell because it changed a way of life’.127 Younger recalled that 
training was limited because of the shortage of spare parts for the tanks, 
especially tracks that broke in the desert; the regimental records confirmed 
this.128   Those chosen for instructor training were trained by a team from the 
6th Royal Tank Regiment under Major G J N Culverwell: ‘Mostly senior NCOs and 
very nice people they were too – high class chaps’.129  Machine-gun and driving 
and maintenance training had recommenced in April and May 1937 and in August 
new ‘tradesmen’ appeared on the muster roll: ‘Driver mechanics were trained, 
also [a] Technical Storeman and Driver Operators’.130 Major General Younger 
speculated that: ‘It took probably until Christmas 1937 to get enough of our own 
[7th Hussars qualified instructors]’, and he thought that instructors were 
probably selected because of their ‘education, intelligence and they already 
instructed in something else’.131 
 
During the next year the strength of the regiment was 20 officers and 544 other 
ranks.  Some horses must either have returned, or the ‘all but 5’ that had left 
the regiment for Abbassia had not included officers’ mounts because the 
establishment numbered ‘40 horses’. These horses would have been the two 
chargers each officer was allowed to keep until the beginning of 1939.  In 
February 1938 a draft of 188 troopers from the 9th Lancers joined the 7th 
Hussars.  These 9th Lancers had already undergone mechanization training in 
                                                 
127 Younger, reel, 2. 
128 Younger, reel 2; The 7th Hussars Unit Historical Records 1910-1939, 01.04.1938 – 31.03.1939.  
129 Younger, reel 2; The Army List 1937.  
130 The 7th Hussars Unit Historical Records 1910-1939, Section 1718, 01.04.1937 – 31.03.1938. 
131 Younger, reel 2. 
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Great Britain which enabled the rotation of mechanized regiments and the 
replacement of time-expired men in Egypt. 
 
The formation of a mechanized cavalry brigade in Egypt was a response to a 
possible threat from Italy.  The Cavalry Brigade was made up of the 7th Hussars, 
eventually mounted in light tanks, the 8th Hussars in machine-gun mounted 
trucks, and the already mechanized 11th Hussars who had been a great help to 
the 8th Hussars with their mechanized training.  
 
The Army at home in the United Kingdom struggled on to modernize, criticised 
by the media, underfunded by the Government, and unsure of the role it would 
be called upon to play should a war occur.  Assigned by the Army Council as a 
‘Light Tank regiment’ in December 1935, the Queen’s Bays at Aldershot in 
October 1937 still needed vehicles.  ‘A few light tanks’ as training vehicles were 
supposed to have been issued to the regiment during the winter of 1936/37.132  
This was outlined in a draft letter of October 1936 announcing a further change 
in the organisation of the Home Mobile Division.  Motor cavalry regiments would 
now form part of the brigades making up the division.  In future, each brigade 
would consist of two cavalry light tank regiments and one mechanized infantry 
rifle battalion.  The first of these brigades was to be formed at Tidworth with its 
rifle battalion to be selected later.  The cavalry light tank regiments chosen 
                                                 
132 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/General/5512 (S.D.2.) draft marked 1A to all Commands, unsigned and undated, 
but referred to on 30 September 1936 by E K Squires DSD to Army Council members – marked 
(DF(a). 
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were the 9th Queen’s Royal Lancers and the Queen’s Bays (2nd Dragoon 
Guards).133   
 
Although these proposals, put forward by the CIGS, had been approved by the 
Secretary of State, the problem of implementation was one of finance for 
vehicles.  These proposals required £500,000 more money than had been 
approved by the Treasury, and its further authority was necessary to procure the 
increased numbers of vehicles and equipment.134  Although not specified, these 
included ‘more suitable types of vehicles’ than trucks for cavalry regiments, 
other than those destined for light tank regiments.  Notwithstanding Grubb’s 
original and optimistic report on the ‘experiment’ carried out by the 3rd Hussars 
(see previous chapter p.164), their trucks, unsurprisingly, had been found 
inadequate, but would still have to be used for training until a ‘hoped for… 
something better’ was developed and procured.135     
 
Charles Newman, in training with the 3rd Hussars in 1935 and 1936, and before 
being posted to the 8th Hussars (p.225), experienced his first funeral parade 
that had resulted from using these unsatisfactory trucks:  
  
One of our own group was killed on driving instruction.  We were taking 
instruction on an open-backed 15 cwt. truck.  Several of us were riding in 
the back of the truck and the other actually taking instruction.  He drove 
                                                 
133 Ibid. 
134 TNA WO32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/General/5512 (S.D.2.) 5255G/34 minute 2 DFA to DSD, 1 October 1936. 
135 Ibid., 5255G/34 minute 3 DSD to DFA, 2 October 1936.  
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too fast over a humpback bridge.  We were all thrown up and all landed 
back in safety except one, who was thrown higher and landed on his head 
in the road.  So we had our first experience of death in the services.136 
 
E K Squires, DSD for the Army Council, clearly concerned about the vehicles, and 
the credibility of the Army Council in providing them, urged agreement to tell 
regiments of this intention and soon:  
 
We cannot allow them [the army units] to believe that it is our intention 
never to provide anything more suitable than the vehicles which they are 
now going to receive.  The regiments concerned have long been waiting 
for the word ‘go’; we are most anxious and so are they that they should 
get rid of their horses at once, and devote their energies to training 
themselves in their re-organized form.137 
 
Following his assertion, the Director of Finance of the Army Council (DFA) 
acquiesced.138  The tone of the DSD’s minute was certainly one of frustration, 
perhaps even anger, not at what he was expecting the cavalry to do, but with 
the unsatisfactory or ‘token’ equipment he had to ask them to use with the hope 
that ‘something better’ soon would be produced for them.  This was not the 
                                                 
136 Newman, ‘From Cairo to Berlin With The Desert Rats’, p.26 Volume 1 Number 3, November 
2002. 
137 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/General/5512 (S.D.2.) 5255G/34 minute 3 DSD to DFA, 2 October 1936.  
138 Ibid., 5255G/34 minute 4 DFA to DSD, 2 October 1936.  
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‘hesitant and fumbling’ attitude of the Army Council that was criticised by 
Liddell Hart, but one of an organization making an intensive effort to achieve 
the best possible results with limited resources.139 Asked in 2007 if he or his 
comrades were resentful about the equipment with which they were expected to 
train, and later to use in battle, veteran cavalrymen Ronald Lucas and John 
Bennett of the 15th/19th Hussars both said they were not.  The country was in a 
poor state and could not afford anything better, Lucas recalled, but neither of 
these former soldiers had realized, until engagement with the enemy on the 
Louvain Ridge in Belgium in 1940, how poorly the Vickers Mark VIB tanks would 














                                                 
139 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.262. 








The 15th/19th Hussars in Bren-gun carriers withdrawing from Louvain 14 May 1940; the Regiment 








                                                 
141
 Mallinson, Light Dragoons, opposite p.210. 
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The 15th/19th Hussars returned from Dunkirk having lost two of its three 
squadrons.  By July 1940, when the regiment was restored to the order of battle, 
the replacement troopers that filled the ranks had never been cavalry 
horseman.142 
 
On 5 October 1936, DSD Squire’s letter was despatched to all commands, the 
content of which had been eventually approved in draft by his Army Council 
colleagues, and in particular the Director of Finance.143 A further, more specific 
letter, was sent on 12 October 1936 with details of when and what vehicles the 
regiments could expect to receive.144  The Queen’s Bays were to receive 15 cwt. 
trucks, motor cycles, 6 Mark II Light tanks and ‘20 Utility tractors… issued for the 
purpose of giving training in driving tracked vehicles and not as tactical 
vehicles’.  The 4th and the 10th Hussars were to be similarly equipped, but 
without any Light tanks.  It was ordered that all riding horses were to be 
‘handed-over’ by 31 March 1937.  Temporary garaging arrangements were 
required for the incoming vehicles as the ‘conversion of barracks cannot yet be 
made’.  Regimental instructors were to be trained at the RTC Schools of Driving 
and Maintenance and Gunnery at Bovington. Until instructors were trained, 
Commands were expected to make local training arrangements with whatever 
resources were on hand.145 
 
 
                                                 
142 Ibid., pp. 230-236 & p.238.  
143 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/General/5512 (S.D.2.) marked 25A War Office to all Commands, 5 October 1936. 
144 Ibid., War Office to all Commands, 12 October 1936. 
145 Ibid.  
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Motor vehicles were first anticipated by the 4th Hussars some years earlier, for 
the coming winter of 1928/1929 when the regiment was stationed in Meerut, 43 
miles north-east of Delhi, India.  Morris six-wheeler lorries were expected and 
some NCOs and men were being prepared ‘to forsake their swords for the 
steering wheel’.146 Before Christmas 1928 the lorries had arrived, driven by road 
over 400 miles from Rawalpindi to the Brigade Camp at Gurgaon, 15 miles 
southwest of Delhi, where the regiment was engaged in exercises.  The driving 
party was led by Lieutenant J E Armstrong with twenty-four men from the 
regiment ‘who had attended a course of driving instruction at the M.T. depot’.147  
The regiment was pleased with their lorries: 
 
These proved extremely mobile across all sorts of country and saved pack 
horses a great deal of work in the transportation of Machine Guns, the 
addition of two extra wheels enabling these comparatively low-powered 
machines to negotiate boulder-strewn hillsides with amazing ease and the 
minimum of strain.148 
 
On 12 November 1930 the 4th Hussars returned to England 149, first to York in 
1931/1932 and then to Aldershot in 1935 via Colchester where they had stayed 
                                                 
146 IV Hussars’ Journal, Vol.II, August 1928, pp. 1&2 
147 Ibid., p.2 
148 Ibid. 
149 Scott Daniell,  4th Hussar, p.288. 
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one year.  Six-wheelers remained in operation for the ‘Brigade Exercises’ of 























                                                 





Morris Commercial D-type 6 wheeler (D 6x4 1926-1932) made to a War Office specification with a 










                                                 
151 Photograph by Jim Riglar from URL: http://www.morrisregister.co.uk/2632D.htm accessed 
12.09.2012. 
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In February 1932 the lorries went and the Machine-Gun Troop, reduced in size 
due to the cuts in military expenditure, was remounted on horses.  The 
experienced men, surplus to requirements as machine-gunners, were either 
transferred to the ‘sabre-squadrons’ or were redundant and placed on the Army 
Reserve.152  The Signal Troop, however, learned to drive two-seater Austin cars 
and motor cycles; the latter certainly was much enjoyed with ‘ardent motor 
cyclists endeavouring to get “fifty” out of “her” as they scorched alongside the 
married quarters’.153  Much applauded was the ‘coolness’ of the MT (Motor 
Transport) instructors in indulging the troopers’ enthusiasm for their motor 
vehicles.154  The following year the Signals Troop, fully mechanized, anticipated 
the installation of wireless.  The Signal Officer, Mr R St. Aubyn, still a subaltern 
although he had joined the regiment in 1925, was also the MT Officer.    The 
previous Signals Officer was also a subaltern, Charles G G Wainman.  It is 
interesting to note that these roles were given to relatively junior officers of the 
regiment, perhaps because of a younger person’s enthusiasm for motor vehicles 
and wireless than any lack of importance of the task.  Wainman resigned his 
commission in 1933 and St. Aubyn in February 1934. The reasons are not known, 
but it is reasonable to speculate that frustration in officers’ career progression, 
pay cuts and lack of investment in the Army may have been the cause.  The 
troop was sorry to see Wainman go, and St. Aubyn was appreciated by his troop 
for the interesting approach he took to their training.155 
 
 
                                                 
152 Ibid., Vol.IV, October 1932, p.8. 
153 Ibid., p.9. 
154 Ibid., p.8. 



















                                                 
156 Photograph by J E Strutter, Colchester, IV Hussars’ Journal, Vol.V, October 1933, p.8; IV 




The 4th Queens Own Hussars Regimental Journal, published between October 
and December 1936, led with the assertion that ‘the most important event since 
the last publication of the Journal has been the decision to mechanize the 
Regiment’.157  In Aldershot, the 4th Hussars had almost all their 250158 horses 
taken away in October 1936 with ‘those that were fit for further service sent to 
other units, while the older ones went to good homes’.159  Vehicles ‘for driving 
instruction and for training purposes’ were issued, although the type was not 
recorded as ‘the final decision was… pending… as to the type of vehicle that is 
to be issued to mechanized cavalry regiments’.160  There was some coming and 
going of officers, but apart from Captain J E Armstrong, a keen polo player who 
returned to India to serve with the 15th Lancers of the Indian Army, it appears 
that the mechanization of the 4th Hussars might actually have attracted officers 
to transfer into the regiment.  Some officers retired; these were Great War 
veterans whose service had expired.  Captain C Peel was posted in from the 
‘motorized’ 3rd Hussars, Captain J H F Collingwood from the Queen’s Bays, also 
undergoing mechanization, and Major E G G Lillingstone was posted in from the 
still ‘horsed’ Royal Scots Greys to become second-in-command of the 4th 
Hussars.161  At the regimental ‘Balaclava Dinner’, Lieutenant Colonel J Scott-
Cockburn spoke to officers and veterans of the regiment about mechanization.  
                                                 
157 IV Hussars’ Journal, 1936 p.1 
158 Scott Daniell, 4th Hussar, p.289. 
159 IV Hussars’ Journal, 1936, p.1. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid., pp.1&34. 
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He explained that all European armies were mechanizing, that the 11th Hussars 
and the 12th Lancers, mechanized with armoured cars: 
 
 
‘six of seven years ago [had become] the best armoured car units in the 
whole Army (see Chapter One).  [These two regiments] had ‘retained 
their spirit and their traditions despite the change… the cavalry spirit and 
traditions, which we ourselves have exemplified in this Regiment for 250 
years, are too valuable to lose’. 162  
 
He reported that many of the 4th Hussars’ horses had gone to other regiments, 
but that a colonel of one them had said: ‘It is all very well getting the horses 
and that sort of thing, but you are really better off than we are, because it is 
only a matter of time before we shall be modernized too’.163 
 
All ranks were busy on ‘mechanization courses’, the regiment’s former Rough 
Riding Master was considered by the Royal Tank Corps School, Bovington, to be 





                                                 
162
 From a speech given by Lieutenant Colonel J Scott-Cockburn at the 24th Balaclava Dinner, 24 
August 1936; reported in IV Hussars’ Journal, 1936, pp.34 &35. 
163 Ibid. 












The 4th Hussars last mounted ceremony: the Mounted Party for the Coronation of King George VI, 





                                                 
165 IV Hussars’, Journal 1937; Lieutenant J de Moraville retired later that year to train horses; he 



















                                                 
















                                                 
167 IV Hussars’ Journal, 1937; at that time the regiment’s strength was 15 officers, 120 other 




Light tanks arrived, Mark VIBs, in November 1937, wrote Scott Daniel; these 
tanks had not arrived when the regiment was camped at Corneybury Park in 
August, there the regiment was equipped with 15 cwt trucks. The tanks being 
used for training (pages 255/6) appear to be Vickers Mark II, Mark III or Mark V, 
earlier models than the Vickers Mark VIB.  As with other cavalry regiments 
undergoing mechanization, the change process was managed and facilitated by 
sending away a number of officers and NCOs to train as instructors.  This built-up 
a cadre of competent staff ‘who in turn passed on their knowledge of mechanics 
to the rank and file.  In this way machine-mastership took the place of 
horsemastership’.168  The regiment was soon fully equipped.  Other than the 
11th Hussars and the 12th Lancers, the 4th Hussars, claimed Scott Daniel, were 
the first horsed cavalry regiment to be fully equipped with AFVs.169  This might 
have been so, but the 4th Hussars did not keep the tanks for very long.  Vickers 
Mark VIB tanks were in use when Tony Booth ‘walked into Warburg Barracks and 
reported to the guardroom’ at the start of his army service on 4 July 1938,170 but 
in October 1938, the regiment left for Tidworth with just lorries.171  They took 
over the ‘Candahar Barracks’ [sic] vacated by the 12th Lancers, but did not 
apparently take over their armoured cars.  The 1st (Kings) Dragoon Guards, the 
                                                 
168 From a speech given by Lieutenant Colonel J Scott-Cockburn at the 25th Balaclava Dinner, 
1937; reported in IV Hussars’ Journal, 1937, pp.33 & 34. 
169 Scott Daniell, 4th Hussar, p.291. 
170 Booth, Tony [December 2009] ‘The Lost Hussar’ in The Chronicle - The Journal of The Queen’s 
Royal Hussars Historical Society, p. 49 - The archives of the 4th Queen’s Own Hussars and the 
8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars, The Queen’s Royal Hussars Home Head Quarters, Regent Park 
Barracks, Albany Street, London, NW1 4AL. 
171 Scott Daniell, 4th Hussar, pp.289 and 292. The 4th Hussars were brigaded with the 3rd 
Hussars and the Kings Dragoon Guards in the 1st Light Armoured Brigade, 1st Armoured Division; 
p.294. 
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4th Hussars and the 12th Lancers formed the 1st Light Armoured Brigade at 
Tidworth.172  By the outbreak of the Second World War the 4th Hussars was fully 
trained and theoretically ready for action, but then this regiment lost many of 
its trained and key personnel and its vehicles, and much equipment, posted 
away to the cavalry regiments of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF).  The 
regiments left at home were denuded of both men and tanks.  On taking over 
Southern Command, following the evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk and 
Cherbourg in May and June 1940, Alan Brooke commented in his diary that ‘the 
shortage of trained men and of equipment is appalling’; he failed to see how the 
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176 IV Hussars’ Journal, 1938; Scott-Cockburn, mounted on his own ‘charger’ Carclew, a chestnut 
gelding born in 1905, won the coveted Kadir Cup in 1924, 1925 and 1927 and on the other 
occasions was beaten only by the eventual winner.  Carclew was a troop horse with the 19th 
Hussars until the regiment was disbanded in 1922.  Both horse and Scott-Cockburn were 
transferred to the 4th Hussars (as was the author’s father) and Scott-Cockburn bought Carclew 
‘out of the ranks’ as his ‘charger’.  Carclew died of heart attack aged 32 on 4 November 1937. 
See Scott Daniell, 4th Hussar, pp.283-285.  Scott-Cockburn and Carclew’s story epitomizes how 
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The 9th Lancers of the Second Cavalry Brigade, like the 3rd Hussars described in 
the previous chapter, was originally assigned to an ‘experimental’ role and 
armoured training began for them in spring 1936.  The horses went: some to 
other regiments, others sold: 
 
It was a depressing business, but the new work in hand left us no time for 
sentiment.  We were allowed to retain the officers’ chargers and, until 
the autumn, 40 of our best troop horses, [to enable the regiment] to 
compete with success [at the Tidworth Show and] a final display in full-
dress uniform at the Tattoo.178 
 
Brigadier-General179 D J E Beale-Browne, Colonel of the 9th Lancers, praised the 
leadership of the regiment’s commanding officer Charles Norman, who led the 
regiment from March 1936 until October 1938, for enthusing the regiment during 
the period in which: 
 
He had to face the difficult task of changing over from horses to 
mechanization.  The readiness with which the regiment then carried out 
its new duties and 
                                                 
178 Bright, (ed), The Ninth Queen’s Own Royal Lancers 1936-1945, Preface p.xx by Major General 
C W Norman CBE. 
179 The rank of Brigadier-General in the British Army was discontinued after the Great War, but 
revived as just Brigadier in 1928; Beale-Browne obviously chose to continue with his old rank 
title. 
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accepted this unpopular decision was largely due to the tact and 
personality of its commanding officer.180 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Norman was equally praising of his troops: 
 
I want here to pay tribute to the loyalty with which all ranks took to their 
new role and to the enthusiasm which they displayed in learning it.  For 
the younger soldier it was no hardship: it was an adventure; and they 
were at the same time equipping themselves for civilian life.  But the 
older dog does not easily learn new tricks, and some of our senior NCOs 
naturally found it hard work not only to learn the new techniques but to 
become instructors.181 
 
It would be astonishing if anything other than praise had been written in the 
preface to a regimental history written in 1951 following the action the regiment 
had seen during the Second World War.  There was, however, an independent 
contemporary witness to the events of 1936. Robert Bright, a Royal Tank Corps 
officer who later became a brigadier, was tasked with the role of Technical 
Officer to advise the 9th Lancers in training on, and maintenance of, the 
Carden-Loyd carriers with which they had been issued.  Interviewed in 1977, 
Brigadier Bright said a Lancer’s training in this period was identical to that of a 
                                                 
180 Brigadier-General Dermond J E Beale-Browne in Bright, Ninth Lancers, Preface p.xvii. 
181 Major General Norman in Bright, Ninth Lancers, Preface p.xx. 
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RTC Trooper. Understandably the cavalrymen had neither the technical 
knowledge nor the driving ability of the Royal Tank Corps men to start with, but: 
 
[the 9th Lancers] were intelligent, keen to learn and easy to teach, but 
they did start from scratch. [There was a] more elementary form of 
driving instruction – it made no difficulty – the standard of NCO was better 
in the cavalry than in the Tank Corps.  It was traditional in the cavalry - 
for officers left more to the NCOs than we did in our Corps – they had 
more initiative than our own NCOs were expected to have.182 
 
Pressed to confirm the orthodox view that cavalrymen had greatly resisted 
mechanization, Bright said emphatically: 
 
No! [not in 9th Lancers]... I should think that the senior ranks were very 
sad to see the horses go, but on the whole it was accepted by the junior 
officers and other ranks, it was regarded as inevitable and accepted as 
such.  They were keen to learn – if they were going to do it, they were 
going to it as well as they could.  They weren’t resentful at my level, 
neither were they difficult to instruct.183 
 
 
                                                 
182 Brigadier Robert H Bright, IWM Sound Collection, access number 787, recorded 1977, reel IV.  
183 Bright, reel IV. 
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Again, officers and NCOs went on courses arranged at Bovington and locally at 
Perham Down.  RTC officers, including Robert Bright, came to assist the 
regiment with local training.  The regiment received ‘worn-out’ Carden-Loyd 
carriers: 
 
Small, weapon-less armoured vehicles whose over-heating Ford engines 
scalded the occupants with super-heated steam from their cooling system.  
After every exercise the plain around Tidworth was dotted for miles with 
our mechanical casualties.184 
 
Special arrangements were made to get food out to the stranded crews until the 
vehicles could be recovered by the regimental fitters and those from the Royal 








                                                 













                                                 
185 URL: http://www.wwiivehicles.com/unitedkingdom/carriers/carriers.asp. accessed 7 April 
2011; a number of different models were constructed that weighed approximately 4 tons, 
powered by a Ford petrol engine, the carrier had a top speed of 30 mph. 
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In 1937 the 9th Lancers had the Carden-Loyds replaced by ‘ancient light tanks’, 
mainly of the earliest marks, though a small number of Vickers Mark V tanks 
were issued too (see illustration below).  These had machine-guns and wireless 
sets and the soldiers of the 9th Lancers began to feel ‘we were really getting 
somewhere’.186 The number of ‘mechanical casualties’, however, remained high 
as these tanks had come from Egypt, and been returned to England as 
‘unserviceable’: 
 
Their turrets still had desert sand on the floor; the engine transmissions 
and the tracks in a sad state.  The routine of recovery and feeding the 
crews after an exercise had, therefore, to be maintained; but at least 
they were tanks.187 
 
These tanks were transferred to other regiments the following year, presumably 
to give these regiments some training and experience in tank driving and 
maintenance.  The 9th Lancers continued training their soldiers using trucks 
‘pretending to be tanks’. 188  On 3 February 1939, 118 troopers from the 9th 
Lancers were posted to the 7th Hussars in Egypt.189  Although these men were 
supposed to be already mechanically qualified, sixty of them were sent for 
driving and maintenance training.  Perhaps the reason for their unfinished 
training was the lack of suitable vehicles in England; however, the situation 
                                                 
186 Bright, Ninth Lancers Preface p.xxi. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
189 The 7th Hussars Unit Historical Records 1910-1939, Section 1718, 01.04.1937 – 31.03.1938 
Regimental Archives Warwick. 
 264 
regarding vehicles for training was no better in Egypt where the 7th Hussars had 
been equally challenged by a shortage of armoured vehicles. 
 
The reports of the experience of each cavalry regiment so far ordered to 
mechanize would suggest their ‘Achilles heel’ was not a resistance to change or 
a reluctance to give up their horses, but a lack of AVFs with which to train and 
equip.  To reiterate an earlier point in this chapter, insufficient numbers of the 
general public or the political class anticipated another European war.  Of those 
that did, few foresaw another British Expeditionary Force again having to fight in 
France and Belgium for which tanks would be needed, and until early 1939 this 































                                                 
190 Chamberlain and Ellis, British and American Tanks of World War II, p. 23. 
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Liddell Hart credited Neville Chamberlain, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, as 
‘the chief promoter of the expanded rearmament plan’ and the Cabinet member 
who more clearly than his colleagues ‘realised the grave extent of the [defence] 
deficiencies’.  Chamberlain realised that the priority must be to build up air and 
naval resources rather ‘than in building up great armies’ and this was the 
government’s policy.191  Chamberlain ‘was quite sure we shall never again send 
to the Continent an Army on the scale of that which we put into the field in the 
Great War’.192  The Treasury’s concern, as was Chamberlain’s, was that 
increased expenditure on armaments would ‘endanger the country’s economic 
stability’.193  What is particularly relevant to this thesis is the extent that the 
Treasury ‘through financial control could force ministers and defence 
departments to make decisions, which otherwise might have been avoided, 
about priorities’.194 Even when the Cabinet made decisions, it appeared the 
implementation of these decisions was often affected, either in timing or 
sometimes in content too, by the Treasury’s peculiar, Byzantine-like 
organizational structure.195   
 
Sir Warren Fisher 196 was the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury with whom it 
is said the Chancellor had a ‘particularly close’ rapport developing ‘into 
something approaching adoration [until] ‘Munich’, after which there was a 
divergence of views. Fisher had such a relationship with Chamberlain, built up 
                                                 
191 Smith, British Air Strategy, p.310. 
192 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, pp.385/386. 
193 Bialer, The Shadow Of The Bomber, p.138; Peden, Arms Economics and British Strategy, 
pp.346-348. 
194 Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, p.14. 
195 Ibid., pp.14, 203/204; Peden details the Treasury’s role and organisation structure in Chapter 
II and Peden’s Appendix I and II. 
196 See Appendix C - biographies. 
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during the crucial period 1931 to 1937 that he ‘retained considerable influence 
over him’. 197  Fisher, in 1933, urged the Cabinet to review Britain’s defences.  
This was agreed and the Defence Requirements Committee (DRC) was 
established in November 1933.198   
 
Robert Self was quite clear in his analysis that Chamberlain was determined to 
dominate the priorities of this committee from its inception; he ‘was always a 
pragmatic and reluctant re-armer’, and saw no need to prepare an army for the 
Continent.199  Fisher, according to Peden, persuaded the Cabinet to halve the 
DRC’s recommended expenditure for the army in favour of the Royal Air 
Force.200  Chamberlain had no military experience; he was not a Great War 
combat veteran, but a professional politician with a ‘life-long’ and ‘sincere’ 
commitment to social reform ‘motivated by genuine humanitarian impulses’.201 
With his passions, and having to govern within the predominating pacifist culture 
of that time, any expenditure on the army that implied perhaps a return to the 
trenches of the Great War was a low priority for Chamberlain.  Robert Self 
attributed Chamberlain with being ‘the greatest single force in shaping British 
defence policy between 1934 and 1939’.202  Peden agreed, Chamberlain ‘made 
the most important contribution to the formation of defence policy’.203   
 
                                                 
197 Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, p.54.  
198 Ibid., p.56.  
199 Self, Neville Chamberlain A Biography, p.236. 
200 Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, p.56. 
201 Self, Neville Chamberlain, p.105. Examination of the breakdown of government expenditure 
for Chamberlain’s period of stewardship indicates his motivation more to social expenditure than 
defence - Table 4. 
202 Ibid., p.235. 
203 Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, p.55. 
 268 
The General Staff intended that in the event of German belligerence the army 
would occupy the Low Countries.  Firstly, this reduced the risk from bombing by 
denying the enemy their use and thereby decreasing the Luftwaffe’s bomber 
range over England by some 80 miles.204 Secondly, by facilitating the RAF’s 
operation from the Low Countries’ airfields it increased the British bomber 
threat to Germany.205 These operationally pragmatic proposals required a British 
Expeditionary Force to take and defend the Low Countries and their airfields.   
 
When Chamberlain realised that the bulk of the proposed £76.8m of the Defence 
Estimates of February 1934 would be directed to the formation of an 
expeditionary force to hold the Low Countries (and France) he was ‘alarmed’.206  
Whilst he acknowledged Germany as a potential enemy whose possible hostility 
needed deterring, Chamberlain was still keener on disarmament than 
rearmament,207 views that appeared very much in line with those held by a 
substantial number of the electorate.208   
 
But by dint of his [Chamberlain] arrogant self-assurance and overriding 
concern for financial prudence, [he] succeeded in overturning its 
conclusions [those of the Defence Requirements Committee (DRC) that 
                                                 
204 WO 32/4612 09.09.1935 p.14; Bialer, The Shadow Of The Bomber, pp.128/129. 
205 Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, pp.201-6. 
206 Self, Neville Chamberlain, p.237. 
207 Ibid., p.237/8. 
208 See Appendix F. 
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included the Chiefs of Staff] and imposing his own strategic vision on the 
cabinet.209  
 
Chamberlain’s revised plans, driven more by financial expediency than by 
defence considerations, was to prioritise expenditure for the Royal Navy and the 
RAF; the former to protect the sea-lanes, the latter to provide the deterrent.  
Chamberlain ‘effectively established the defence agenda for the next five 
years’. He ‘swept aside thought of an expensive continental commitment’ and 
made the judgement that France would be safe behind its defences,210 but he 
ignored the political necessity to support them.    
 
Liddell Hart and Bialer subsequently argued that the value of this strategy was 
diminished later by the increased range of aircraft.211 Smith explained that the 
bomber of the early 1930s could not reach Germany from Britain, but by 1936 
the range of British bombers had increased sufficiently for the RAF to no longer 
require a field force to take and defend the airfields of the Low Countries.212  
Harris is adamant that giving army rearmament the lowest priority set back any 
real development by about two years.213   
 
                                                 
209 Steiner, The Triumph of the Dark, p.51; see also Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p. 37, 
for comments on Chamberlain’s personality leading sometimes to mistaken decisions. 
210 Self, Neville Chamberlain, p.238; Winton, To Change An Army, p.177. 
211 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, pp.304/305; Bialer, The Shadow Of The Bomber, p.138; 
Group Captain Harris presented a similar argument to the War Office on 17 May 1935, quoted in 
Bialer p.140. 
212
 Smith, British Air Strategy, pp.87 & 88. 
213 Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.253. 
 270 
Harold Winton summarized ‘the debate [that] raged back and forth’ during the 
mid to late 1930s over the role of the army in national defence.214 The debate 
was between what he called the ‘blue water or limited liability strategy… to use  
Britain’s geographic isolation from the continent as the basis for a plan that took 
a long view of a possible European war’ and, what Winter dubbed, the 
‘continental intervention’ strategy.  This strategy centred on Britain being 
unable to ‘ignore [the] ensuing calls for help’ from France and Belgium should 
Germany invade them.  There had existed a tactical need to defend and to deny 
the enemy the use of the air bases in the Low Countries that were well within 
bomber range of eastern England.215  Winter argued; ‘The protracted uncertainty 
over the army’s role produced by this debate significantly influenced its 
deliberation over mechanized and armored [sic] warfare’.216  Chamberlain, as 
Prime Minister, created this uncertainty because of his policy of ‘hoping for the 
best whilst preparing for the worst’.217  But as Self correctly asserted, 
Chamberlain ‘gave mixed signals as to the appropriate balance to be struck 
between these two positions as circumstances and audiences varied’.  
Chamberlain’s propensity to ‘hope for the best’ outweighed the necessity to 
‘prepare of the worst’.  He stoutly resisted the mobilisation of industry for war, 
in case this should provoke Hitler following their so-called ‘peace for our time - 
Munich agreement’ of September 1938. 218   
 
                                                 
214 Winton and Mets, (eds.), The Challenge of Change, p.92.  
215 Ibid., pp.91 and 92; see Howard, The Continental Commitment, especially pp. 96 – 143. 
216 Winton, and Mets, (eds.), The Challenge of Change, p.92. 
217
 Self, Neville Chamberlain, pp.332/333 
218 Ibid., there is a type-setting error in the first edition of this publication, Dr Self has confirmed 
the above interpretation is what was intended. 
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A significant change in public opinion followed ‘Kristallnacht’ in November 1938, 
and intelligence reports from Germany about a possible invasion of France and 
Holland in January 1939. Chamberlain at last accepted ‘the long avoided 
continental commitment’.219   The French Government pressured the British 
Government to commit more than the Royal Navy and the RAF to the defence of 
France.  A land commitment was required from Britain, it was argued, to 
reassure French public opinion and stiffen their resolve to resist a German 
invasion.220  The various Cabinet defence committees, the Foreign Secretary 
Lord Halifax and the War Minister Leslie Hore-Belisha, 221 were united in 
presenting to the Cabinet on 5 February 1939, the case for expanding the army 
with concomitant funding.  Even at this hazardous stage in European affairs, the 
Prime Minister, supported predictably by Sir John Simon,222 procrastinated on 
borrowing money to fund the army. 
 
Both argued along the same lines.  The cost of defence was continually 
rising and there was no obvious limit to the necessary demands being 
made by the three Services.  Since financial strength and stability were 
themselves an important item in national defence, then overspending 
might well destroy the cause it was designed to protect.223 
 
 
                                                 
219 Self, Neville Chamberlain, p.346; Gibbs, History of the Second World War Volume 1, p.491; 
and details pp. 491- 526. 
220 Gibbs, History of the Second World War Volume 1, p.496. 
221 See Appendix C - biographies.    
222 See Appendix C - biographies.   
223 Gibbs, History of the Second World War Volume 1, p.510. 
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A compromise was reached at a later meeting and a commitment given to the 
French Government.224  The need for armouring the cavalry was now clear, 
unequivocal and urgent.  The ability of the British armaments industry to 
recover quickly from the effects of a starvation of investment was causing 
anxiety to the Chiefs of Staff.225 ‘There were very few armaments factories still 
functioning in the country and it took time to get them going’.226 The question 
was: how much time both industry and the army had to prepare for war.  
 








                                                 
224 Ibid., pp.510/511 and 515. 
225 Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, p.95; Gibbs, History of the Second 
World War Volume 1, p.80. 




Mechanization - Finalé 
 
The whole cavalry mechanization process when ordered to proceed was, from 
start to finish, from the 11th Hussars and 12th Lancers in the late 1920s to the 
Royal Scots Greys in 1942, beset with challenges owing to insufficient AFVs being 
available with which to train and equip the regiments.  The few that were 
available, as has been said in the previous chapters and will be re-stated in this 
one, were often in poor condition and usually technically obsolete.  Michael M 
Postan has calculated that the British Army never reached its full complement of 
wheeled vehicles until 1939, and by then had only half its complement of 
tracked vehicles.1  Regarding the wheeled vehicles, John Bennett of the 
15th/19th Hussars remembered that his own regiment: 
 
was pretty well equipped when the balloon went up in ’39.  But what 
made me laugh was when we had a big influx of trucks.  Now all these 
trucks were commandeered from different companies, they weren’t 
proper army trucks.  When they turned-up we had to paint them ‘cause 
they had all the names on them, furniture trucks, coal lorries… We had to 
paint them khaki and paint the names out – of course you could always 
see the names on the side.2 
                                                 
1 Postan, British War Production, p.6 – emphasis added. 
2 Personal interview with Bennett (2007); by the author. 
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Barney White-Spunner, who joined the Blues and Royals in 1979 and later 
became the Commanding Officer of the Household Cavalry Regiment (1996-
1998), asserted that the regiments in 1939 were ‘more deficient in terms of 
material and training than their forebears had been twenty-five years before’.   
Field days included non-existent anti-tank guns and machine-guns represented 
by football rattles.  ‘Getting hold of the proper equipment was to be a minor 
war of its own’.3  This had serious implications for the cavalrymen involved with 
the change process from horses to AFVs and featured significantly in the 
remembrances of veterans interviewed for this thesis.  AFVs in appropriate 
numbers for the required task did not exist; they had not been manufactured, at 
least not for the British Army. 
 
Commercially, the early 1930s were challenging times for Vickers and other 
engineering companies. Vickers Armstrongs’ relationship with the War Office 
required care and adroitness. The orders from the War Office were described by 
former Master General of the Ordnance (MGO), General ‘Curley’ Birch, when he 
was Vickers’ Managing Director, as ‘nothing.  We shall certainly get no bulk 
orders this year [1930] and very likely lose money on what we do get’.4  Vickers’ 
Directors were anxious to avoid any agreement with the War Office that would 
restrict the overseas sales opportunities essential for their survival.  The War 
Office had offered Vickers what is usually known as a ‘cost plus contract’.  This 
form of contract allows a company an agreed profit margin, or mark-up, on its 
cost of production as a contribution to its overheads.  Such a contractual 
                                                 
3 White-Spunner, Horse Guards, pp.497-502. 
4 Vickers historical document 744; letter from Sir Noel Birch to Mr J D Siddeley CBE, Armstrong 
Siddeley Motors Ltd., Coventry, 1930. 
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relationship has its flaws.  It is often commercially unattractive to a 
manufacturing company, especially one in heavy engineering.  In Vickers case, 
10 per cent was allowed on the cost of producing a given order plus a fixed 
‘grant’ to assist with the design and development costs.5  A 10 per cent ‘profit’ 
on production costs was unlikely to cover Vickers’ overhead costs, and would 
arguably have not been viable for them in the longer term.  The advantage to 
the buyer of this type of contract, when effectively negotiated, was a reduction 
in supply costs, and this attempt by the War Office was forced by the 
depression. In the long term, however, such a contract could put the continuity 
of supply in jeopardy, as a supplier’s income would be insufficient to replace 
worn out plant, machinery, and, ultimately, buildings.  However, a cost-plus 
contract can also reward inefficiencies. There is a greater incentive for the 
producer to allow the costs of production to increase, on which this premium 
can be added, than to reduce costs with speed and efficiency.  This rather 
unsophisticated arrangement between the War Office and Vickers was proposed 
to replace an agreement that, in the past, appeared fairly open-ended regarding 
research and development expenditure. It is not clear from the archived records 
whether or not Vickers accepted this arrangement for future orders.  To do so 
would have given little longer term incentive to further develop their business 
with the War Office, but to refuse to accept it could have resulted in orders 
being placed elsewhere.  This was what, to some measure, took place: the War 
Office looked ‘in house’ for the development and production of AFVs through the 
Royal Ordnance Factories, particularly the Royal Arsenal at Woolwich. 
 
                                                 
5 Vickers historical document 744, memorandum from Sir Noel Birch to Mr Yapp, 1930. 
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The MGO, Sir Hugh Ellis, insisted on Vickers being in competition for War Office 
AFV orders with the Royal Arsenal, later the Nuffield Organization, and the 
Vulcan Foundry.  To reiterate, in his interview with the MGO, 30 October 1936, 
Birch noted the MGO had ‘changed his mind’ and no longer thought tanks 
‘useless, owing to anti-tank guns, rifles, mines etc… they will still be some good 
to the Army’.6 At the same interview, the MGO informed Birch of the 
development of the A7E3 tank at Woolwich Arsenal.  Sir Hugh Ellis – the first 
commander of the Tank Corps during the Great War - somewhat naϊvely 
expected these commercial competitors, Vickers and Nuffield, to share 
information together and with the Royal Arsenal; his was quite naturally the 
patriotic view of a former soldier to produce the best possible AFV for the British 
Army, but hardly practical in a commercial, competitive environment.7  As it had 
been unclear in the past what type of tanks, if any, would be suitable for the 
British Army, it was reasonable therefore, that Vickers concentrated on their 
export market.   
 
In 1936 a reasonably detailed specification was produced for the War Office by 
the Superintendent of Design (S of D) for a fast ‘medium’ tank.  The S of D was 
accountable to both the Director of Artillery and the Director of Mechanization.  
This document signed, evidence suggests, by Campbell Clarke, the Deputy S of 
D, refers to the Tank Committee of the Mechanical Warfare Board, with which 
the S of D would have had some form of organizational relationship, if not for its 
                                                 
6 Vickers historical document 744; Sir Noel Birch’s interview with the MGO at the War Office on 
the Afternoon of 30 October 1936.  The development of anti-tank ordnance was clearly a concern 
to those responsible for developing an armoured warfare doctrine; see Winton and Mets, (eds.), 
The Challenge of Change, p. 18, regarding concern in the French Army and American views. 
7 See also Fletcher, Mechanised Force, p.117. 
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full accountability.8  This AFV, with a crew of five and armed with a 2 pounder 
gun, or a 3 inch howitzer, together with two .303 machine-guns, had a 
specification that required a speed of 25 mph on level roads, 18 mph across 
country and 10 mph to be maintained on an incline of 5.75 degrees.  This tank 
was to be capable of crossing a trench 8 feet wide and a vertical obstacle 2.5 
feet high and have armour plate 14 mm thick to protect the occupants.9  The 
AFV was to be no more than 16 tons and be fitted with wireless sets numbers 2 
and 7;10  it was designated the A7E3 and wanted for trials in November 1936.11   
 
The rationale behind the preceding debate regarding the new medium tank with 
which, it was envisaged, the Royal Tank Corps would be equipped from 1936, 
was a desire to use a single engine rather than dual engines that took up 
valuable space and added to the vehicle’s engineering complexity and overall 
weight.  However, ‘no such single engine [existed at that time] which can give 
the required power and torque’.12 The stumbling-block was always ‘price’; how 
much was the War Office prepared to pay?  That is not to say that an infinite 
budget would have produced engineering perfection, but time and again price 
was the predominant factor.  With the development of the Horstmann 
suspension system for light tanks, for example, the War Office needed Vickers’ 
price halved before agreeing to order 33 sets of them.13  The ‘Ricardo’ engine, 
highly regarded by the War Office, was thought by Sir John Carden too expensive 
                                                 
8 For a detailed narrative of the organization structure for tank design see Beale, Death by 
Design, pp. 146 – 159. 
9 TNA WO 32 3349 General and Warlike Stores: Tanks (Code 45E): Introduction of A.7.E.3. 
Medium Tanks and report of tests 1933-1936; Minutes 72 – 75, 3 November 1936 – 11 May 1937. 
10 Ibid., marked 5A - Conference on the specification of the A7E3 Medium tank, 13 February 1934 
11 Ibid., Minutes 72 – 75,  3 November 1936 – 11 May 1937. 
12 Ibid., letter from the Design Department, Royal Arsenal, Woolwich to Colonel M A Studd MGO5 
War Office, 15 December 1933. 
13 Vickers historical document 744; memo from Charles Bridge to Mr Wonfor, 22 March 1933. 
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for Vickers to incorporate into his AFV designs.14 The Ricardo engine in question 
was a diesel fuelled engine, at £400 per unit and was not installed to power 
production models made by Vickers; the Meadows petrol engine, however, at 
£110 to £200 per unit, featured in several production models.15  A Vickers’ 
representative, Captain A J Nannini, visited the Royal Arsenal on 31 October 
1936, probably ordered there immediately by Birch to find out exactly what was 
going on.  Nannini reported: 
 
[that those] responsible for the design and development of tanks… are 
unable to obtain concrete specification for armament, armour and 
performance of future medium and heavy tanks, owing to the fact that 
the General Staff are unable to arrive at agreement with regard to the 
tactical employment of tanks.16  
  
The specification outlined above does seem clear enough to a non-technical 
reader, but for the design engineers it was apparently insufficient.  The main 
concern was again the costs and how they might escalate.  The technical 
development of an anti-tank gun would always be ahead of that of a tank, it was 
argued, because the cost of an anti-tank gun would ‘usually be less than one 
                                                 
14 Ibid., memo to Sir Noel Birch from C W Craven , 3 June 1932. 
15 Ibid., memo to Sir Noel Birch from C W Craven , 3 June 1932; Vickers historical document 618 
Vickers Armstrong Tanks 1934 – 1939. 
16 Vickers historical document 744; Sir Noel Birch’s interview with the MGO, 30 October 1936, 
attached document of Captain Nannini’s report.  The French Army was going through the same 
hiatus of decision making; see Winton, Harold R. and Mets, David R. (eds.) [2003], The Challenge 
of Change – Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941, (University of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln and London), pp.7-24 
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quarter the cost of a tank’ to develop, and quicker to build.17  The 40mm 
armoured plate that had become the requirement for a tank to withstand the 
latest anti-tank projectile ‘would be prohibitively expensive’.18  At the time the 
A7E3 was specified, therefore, it was already known that 14mm of armour was 
ineffective.  There is corroborating evidence of the designer’s dilemma to 
support Nannini’s report; the MGO told Birch he favoured two new models of 
tanks, one with 30mm armour plate and another of 60mm armour plate, and was 
hoping for news of these by the end of November 1936.19  Until then it was 
difficult for the design team to progress. 
 
A two hour demonstration to Ministers of AFVs, guns and searchlights took place 
on Monday 2 November 1936 at Aldershot, but almost certainly the A7E3 AFV was 
not ready for this.20  The demonstration was supposed to include two types of 
vehicles to carry mechanized cavalry, the current service medium tank, a 
‘modern experimental’ medium tank and an ‘infantry’ tank.21   Duff Cooper, 
Minister of State for War, attended the demonstrations,22  but unfortunately his 
diary entry made no comment on this; ‘there was no certainty of war’ he wrote, 
                                                 
17
 LHCMA - Broad 1-3; Lt. Gen. Charles Broad’s reply to Mr R Alastair Rickard’s letter, University 
of Ontario, May 21 1970, p.5. 
18 Vickers historical document 744 Sir Noel Birch’s interview with the MGO, 30 October 1936 
attached document of Captain Nannini’s report.  
19 Vickers historical document 744; Sir Noel Birch’s interview with the MGO, 30th October 1936.  
So rapid was the later development of both armour plate for AFVs and anti-tank ordnance, that 
in 1933 the MGO was expecting anti-tank ordnance to penetrate 12mm - 16mm of armour plate; 
by 1938 trials were being conducted with the 25 pounder quick-firing field-gun against 70mm 
armour plate produced by the British Steel Corporation; TNA WO 32/3478 Manufacture of Warlike 
Stores: Shells (Code 54(E)): Provision of Anti-tank, armour piercing Shell 1927-1941. 
20 Vickers historical document 744; Sir Noel Birch’s interview with the MGO, 30 October 1936; 
TNA WO 32/3349 General and Warlike Stores: Tanks (Code 45E): Introduction of A.7.E.3. Medium 
Tanks and report of tests 1933-1936; minute 72, 3 November 1936. 
21 Vickers historical document 744; ‘Demonstration for Cabinet Ministers’, Monday 2 November 
1936 11 am. 
22 Vickers historical document 744; Sir Noel Birch’s interview with the MGO, 30 October 1936. 
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implying no urgency,23  and Duff Cooper’s main concern at that time, and no 
doubt those of the Cabinet, was King Edward VIII’s impending abdication.24   
When the A7E3 was tested it was reported ‘the performance of this vehicle is 
promising, but the reliability needs improvement’.25 Failures enumerated in the 
report included that the suspension was barely adequate for cross country work, 
12 to 15 mph was the limit of its speed and after nearly 200 miles some 
component parts of the suspension assemblies began to fail. There was a 
problem with the engine overheating in ambient temperatures above 71 degrees 
Fahrenheit, and some aspects of maintenance were difficult for a driver trained 
to the normal level of competency.  This was a damning report, but the 
necessary modifications were possible.   
 
What is significant to this thesis is that in May 1937 there was still no satisfactory 
fast medium tank available with which to equip either the Royal Tank Corps or 
horsed cavalry regiments, or both.   
 
In February 1938 ‘a great deal of thought’ was given to designing a suitable 
vehicle for ‘mechanised cavalry’ to enable them to carry out their ‘multifarious 
duties… under the new conditions which will exist in the movement and 
engagement of modern mechanised armies’.26  These ‘multifarious duties’ 
included the traditional cavalry roles of close and distance reconnaissance, 
protective duties, pursuit and covering withdrawals, raids, and acting as a 
                                                 
23 Cooper, Old Men Forget, p.200. 
24 Norwich, Duff Cooper Diaries, pp. 229-233; Sir Samual Hoare was also present and similarly 
made no mention of the demonstration, but much of the King’s abdication - Templewood, Nine 
Troubled Years, pp. 215-224. 
25 TNA WO 32/3349 General and Warlike Stores: Tanks (Code 45E): Introduction of A.7.E.3. 
Medium Tanks and report of tests 1933-1936; Minute 75, 11 May 1937. 
26 Vickers historical document 744; ‘Cavalry Tank’, unsigned draft, 25 February 1938. 
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mobile reserve.  The unsigned document appeared to be, as no other evidence 
exists, the draft design of the sales literature for a 30 mph, tracked machine-gun 
carrier, with no turret and an open two man cockpit.27  The document is 
significant as it acknowledged the role of cavalry under ‘modern’ battle 
conditions, and Vickers’ effort to design a satisfactory vehicle.   
 
Earlier, in June 1937, Birch had summarized Vickers’ position in the world and 
home tank market. The production of such a machine-gun carrier for the cavalry 
could have been the response to his confidential memorandum.28   Birch 
acknowledged the ease with which Vickers had previously dominated the market 
for AFVs and forecast this again would be true in ‘two or three years’ time… 
when we are free to re-enter the market’. This suggests some trading restriction 
had been imposed upon them by the government.  He acknowledged the need to 
perfect a new design and the two years required to achieve it, but the untimely 
death of the designer Sir John Carden would hinder this.  Birch complained, 
implying Nuffield and the Royal Arsenal, ‘Home competitors have learnt to 
manufacture at our expense’.29  Regarding foreign competitors, Birch made the 
telling comment, ‘[they] have not been hampered to the same extent as we [the 
British Army] have’.  Birch knew the Germans had ‘great numbers of anti-tank 
guns [and] every nation will have armour-piercing shells for field artillery’.  He 
foresaw the development of a 47mm gun.  A 40mm gun could already penetrate 
armour at 30 degrees from 500 metres.30 It seems likely Birch was aware of the 
                                                 
27 Ibid.  
28 Vickers historical document 744; no.341/344, confidential memorandum signed by Noel Birch, 




German Krupp 88mm gun, designed for air defence, but used also as an anti-tank 
weapon in the Spanish Civil War the previous year.  He made no mention of this 
weapon, however, which became the gun most avoided by British tank crews 
during the Second World War.31  
 
 In a later memorandum, 11 July 1938, Birch was surely aware of the effects of 
anti-tank guns and the inadequacy of the Vickers Light Tank; he wrote, ‘The 
history of the Spanish War will soon receive detailed circulation and here the 
light tank has fallen out of favour’. 32   
 
His comment in 1937 regarding the shortage of horses was an interesting 
confirmation that much of the public’s opinion was that a war was not 
inevitable: ‘The cavalry will be obliged to have tanks or tracked vehicles with 
covered sides as the horse supply problem is getting increasingly difficult’.33  
Birch was well informed and close to government; it is surprising therefore, that 
he gave the reason for cavalry mechanization as the shortage of horses rather 
than a growing concern of a war.  He urged the need for amphibious AFVs: ‘The 
cavalryman must not be less mobile than he is now, and the horse can swim 
rivers’.  Above all, the AFV must be ‘armour-piercing bullet proof… Bullet proof 
plate research’ was continually being developed.  Birch called on the Board of 
Directors to allocate at least £100,000 for AVF research.34  Major General A E 
                                                 
31 Personal interview with Bennett (2007); by the author; Macksey, A History of The Royal 
Armoured Corps, p.75; see also Kershaw, Tank Men, p.121;  German 88mm Flak guns could 
penetrate 60-80mm of armour.  Also, p.341, seventeen out of a force of nineteen tanks from the 
3rd Royal Tank Regiment were knocked out by German 88mm Flak guns in Normandy 18–20 July 
1944. 
32 Vickers historical document 744; marked 385/386; ‘Future Research in Tanks’, 11 July 1938. 
33 Ibid., marked 341/344; Confidential memorandum signed by Noel Birch, 22 June 1937. 
34 Ibid. 
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Davidson, Army Director of Mechanization, had informed Vickers six months 
before that the Mark VI (Light tank) ‘was satisfactory enough as a bullet resisting 
tank’ and the MGO would not consider any change of model ‘from 18 months to 
two years’.35  
  
Clearly in 1937 Birch knew the need to press on with AFV development. He 
foresaw, with the development of anti-tank weapons, the obsolescence of the 
Vickers Mark VI Light Tank even before it had been supplied to some cavalry 
regiments, and until the specification of a fast medium tank was agreed, 
however unsatisfactory, the cavalry would have to use what was being produced. 
In the meantime Vickers continued to satisfy a foreign market including, up to a 
point, the army in India. 
 
It has been argued that the reluctance of the Government of India to mechanize 
Indian Army cavalry regiments was a negative influence on the mechanization of 
British horse cavalry.36 It was the War Office that was reluctant in the first 
instance; in 1929 George Lindsay, the Inspector of the RTC, urged the Director of 
Mechanization, General Peck, not to carryout mechanical warfare experiments 
in India as it was too far away to send and supervise the vehicles. Lindsay 
recommended Egypt. 37 
 
                                                 
35 Ibid., memorandum to Sir Charles Craven, with a copy to Mr Yapp, 23 November 1936;  almost 
certainly this was written by Sir Noel Birch as majority of this file (January 1930 - July 1938) 
contains correspondence between Birch and Yapp, either by direct memorandum or by copy. 
36 Quoted in Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.258. 
37 LHCMA - LH12/12/7,4; Lindsay to Peck, 27 May 1929. 
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Harris clearly was correct in that ‘the Army at home was often considered little 
more than a depot for India’.38  Five British cavalry regiments were required to 
be stationed in India and Harris has drawn attention to the Adjutant-General Sir 
Cecil Romer’s comments in November 1934: ‘As cavalry regiments at home were 
progressively mechanized it was going to become increasingly difficult to find 
drafts for India’.39  In practice, this did not become an insurmountable problem 
as the pace of mechanization in both the British and Indian Armies was similarly 
restricted by the lack of appropriate equipment.  In 1936 Lindsay, by then the 
army commander of Assam District, complained to General Wavell that 
‘equipment and vehicles are coming along several months late… Egypt has taken 
most of the available stuff’.40   
 
When in 1937, an acceleration in the pace of mechanizing British cavalry 
regiments was anticipated, the CIGS, Field Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell,  expressed 
concern that ‘until the question of the mechanization of British cavalry 
regiments in India is settled… we can only mechanize six cavalry regiments at 
home, and two in Egypt.’41   The CIGS later reported that the Government of 
India had agreed ‘to the “progressive mechanization” of the four British cavalry 
regiments in India – the fifth regiment to be withdrawn “as soon as it can 
conveniently be released”’.42   
 
                                                 
38 Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.215.  
39 Ibid., p.258. 
40 LHCMA - LH15/12/14, 8; Lindsay to Wavell who had enquired about mechanization in India, 28 
March 1936. 
41 TNA WO 32/4633 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Appeal against the proposed 
mechanisation resulting in the retention of the Royal Scots Greys and the Royal Dragoons as 
horsed regiments 1936-1937, Minute 9 CIGS to AG, 24 March 1937. 
42 Ibid., Minute 14 to CIGS to AG, 19 October 1937. 
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Illustrations of light tanks in India may give an impression that these were 
commonplace on the sub-continent.  This was not so, and although ffrench-Blake 
in 2006 was adamant that there were no tanks in India, only armoured cars that 
had to keep to the roads, this too seems incorrect.43  Light tanks were tried and 
tested in India. Records show the failed tests of two Medium D tanks in 1922 and 
the two hybrid tanks based on the Mark I and II medium tanks in 1925. 44  Four 
light tanks, Mark 1A, were tested in India, starting in Chaklala in 1931.45  The 
tests continued during 1932 and the subsequent War Office report referred to 
only three tanks, of slightly different specifications, although a fourth tank 
might have been a duplicate model of one of the others.  Two Carden-Loyd 
carriers had been in India since 1928 and Fletcher cites the one occasion these 
vehicles saw active service; their relative success led to the trials of these light 
tanks.46 ‘Cooling trials’ were carried out on pattern, or specification, numbers 1 
and 2, and by December 1933 pattern No.1 had travelled 2,967 miles.  The 
Director of Mechanization complained of excessive wear, but conceded, 
‘modifications will result in a substantial increase in life’.47  
 
The tank designated in the War Office Report as ‘Mark 3’ was favoured; it had a 
steadier gun platform, a speed of up to 20 mph, a better power to weight ratio, 
greater radius of action because of a bigger fuel tank, and this model cost less.48  
The problem with the other two models was stones jamming the sprockets that 
                                                 
43 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
44 See for example Fletcher, Mechanised Force, p.73. 
45 Ibid., pp.74/75; TNA WO32/3348 General and Warlike Stores: Tanks (Code 45E): Introduction 
of Light (2 man) Tank Mark IV 1932-1935. 
46 Fletcher, Mechanised Force, pp.74/75. 
47 TNA WO 32/3348 General and Warlike Stores: Tanks (Code 45E): Introduction of Light (2 man) 
Tank Mark IV 1932-1935; minutes Report 374 - 13A and 18A, December 1933. 
48 Ibid., minute 12 ‘India Pattern Tank’. 
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drove the tracks.  An order was placed with Vickers for twenty-nine ‘Carden-
Loyd, Light Tanks – Vickers Experimental’.49 These light tanks saw active service 
in a minor action in September 1935, but the Indian Government thought these 
vehicles ‘insufficient for the rugged conditions’ with which they had to 
contend.50  A new variant was designed,51 the Mark IVA, trialled and ordered 
with improvements in ventilation and brakes.  Fletcher speculated that no fewer 
than 16 were ordered followed by orders for the Mark IVB (Indian Pattern).  
These orders were delayed and in 1938 the Royal Tank Corps was withdrawn 
from India and all their AFVs were transferred to newly mechanized Indian 
Cavalry Regiments.52  
 
Interestingly, Barndollar identified that a unit of the RTC first operated light 
tanks in 1935.  These were Mark II models and the RTC worked in combination 
with the Indian Army’s 18th King Edward’s Own Cavalry regiment.  These tanks 
evidently proved better than armoured cars as they were more manoeuvrable 
and had a better cross-country capability except in wet and swampy areas.53 
 
Lieutenant Colonel R L V ‘Val’ ffrench Blake, a Lieutenant in the 17th/21st 
Lancers when their mechanization programme began in India in 1938, was 
interviewed for this study in 2006.  He recalled that he had been expecting 
                                                 
49 Ibid., India Office to MGO, 14 July 1933; Vickers Historical document 895; ‘Tanks and 
Armoured cars Built by Vickers – Carden-Loyd – Vickers Light Tanks’, designated A4E19 (India 
Pattern 1933). 
50 Fletcher, Mechanised Force, p.77. 
51 Vickers Historical document 895; ‘Tanks and Armoured cars Built by Vickers – Carden-Loyd – 
Vickers Light Tanks’, designated ‘Indian Pattern No.2’ and similar in specification to the Mark IV 
Light Tank. 
52 Fletcher, Mechanised Force, p.78. 
53
 Gilman Clough Barndollar, ‘British Use of Armoured cars 1919-1939’, PhD, Cambridge 
University, 2010, pp.270/1. The 18th King Edward’s Horse was mechanized in 1940. 
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mechanization since 1934, and said ‘[horsed cavalry] was extremely dull… very, 
very boring’.54  He would have left the army after three years of service had his 
boredom not been relieved by the excitement of the polo field.  Mechanization, 
when it came, ‘released the pressure’.  On commissioning into the 17th/21st 
Lancers in 1933, ffrench-Blake said: 
 
the first thing I asked was are we going to be mechanized... They said we 
are going to be mechanized sometime soon; it’s long overdue and we 
ought to have been mechanized much earlier.  The mechanization of that 
period [late 1920s] fizzled out in spite of everybody being in favour of it 
including Chetwode,55 our chief cavalryman at the time, [who] was in 
favour of mechanization.  Horsed cavalry was so stifling, even the training 
was stifling, we weren’t really allowed to test our horses in any way and 
they were not in any way capable of great endurance.  The main object 
was to keep them looking fat, fit and shiny, which is not really what you 
want.  We never trained in what you might call endurance, speed and 
fitness.56 
 
The 17th/21st Lancers began their tank driving training in Mk II light tanks in 
January 1938. The regiment’s last mounted parade was 4 January and the horses 
went, but as with other cavalry regiments, the officers were allowed to keep 
two ‘chargers’.  ffrench-Blake recalled that these ‘chargers’ actually consisted 
                                                 
54 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
55 See Appendix C - biographies. 
56 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
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of two polo ponies each.57  All the horses had gone by 14 January, having left by 
train for Secunderabad.58  ‘Mechanical training in India was brought down first of 
all to driving and maintenance and everyone had to learn to drive a tank.  There 
was little confidence in the Light tank.  They were a bit primitive, no wireless 
sets’.59 
 
The first mechanical vehicle, a four-seater Ford open touring car 60, arrived on 6 
February, but had to be pushed by four men from the station as a petrol ration 
had yet to be authorised for it; the ‘not yet mechanized’61 Regimental 
Quartermaster-Sergeant was at the steering-wheel.62  The Commanding Officer 
and the Adjutant led from the front and drove out the first Mk II tank that 
arrived the same month.  They had to walk four miles back to the barracks after 
the tank had shed its tracks.  The turret fell off the second Mk II tank to arrive.63  
 
The regiment was issued ‘two tanks, ten instructional lorries, two staff cars, a 
number of motorcycles and extra machine guns [with which to train on].  They 





                                                 
57 Ibid., p.63; The White Lancer and The Vedette Spring 1938, p.13. 
58 The White Lancer and The Vedette Spring 1938, p.13. 
59 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
60 ffrench-Blake, A History of The 17th/21st Lancers, p.80; ffrench-Blake, A History of The 
17th/21st Lancers 1922-1959, p.63. 
61 ffrench-Blake, A History of The 17th/21st Lancers 1922-1959, p.80. 
62 The White Lancer and The Vedette, April 1939, p.4. 
63 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 

















                                                 







Officer Commanding C Squadron, the 17th/21st Lancers signalling with flags as there were no 







                                                 




















                                                 













                                                 






































                                                 


















                                                 
71 URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:IWM-KID-226-Light-tank-MkII.jpg. Accessed 15.02.2013. 
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Lieutenant H E (Pete) Pyman 72 and his team of four sergeants and eight other 
ranks from The Royal Tank Corps joined the 17th/21st Lancers to assist the 
regiment with their mechanization training.73   Thomas Bishop’s late brother was 
one of the men from a Royal Tank Regiment sent to ‘mechanize’ a cavalry 
regiment in India, but not the 17th/21st Lancers. Bishop’s brother told him the 
Tank Corps was all ‘shit and efficiency and the cavalry all bull and brass’.74  
Pyman and his men joined the 17th/21st Lancers in January 1938:  
 
and spent an immensely happy year with them for it was a very good 
regiment under an excellent commanding officer, Lt. Col. Pat Harris.  But 
as good as he was, I think he was particularly lucky to have to have as his 
adjutant at that time Dick Hull, who later became, as a Field Marshal, 
Chief of Defence Staff to HM Forces.75 
 
The RTC soldiers included driver/mechanics and formed a cadre on which ‘the 
Lancers had to build a system of instruction’ for the new subjects that had to be 
assimilated.  In round figures, explained Pyman, two hundred men had to be 
trained, equally divided between tanks and lorries, and ‘other wheeled 
vehicles’.  These men required three months training while another one hundred 
                                                 
72 Pyman was soon promoted captain and eventually became Lieutenant General Sir Harold 
Pyman KCB, CBE, DSO; ffrench Blake, The 17th/21st Lancers, p.64. 
73 ffrench Blake, The 17th/21st Lancers, p.64; Pyman, Call to Arms, p.27. 
74 Personal interview with Bishop (2008); by the author. 
75 Pyman, Call to Arms, p.27. 
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men trained to be gunners that required just six weeks.76  Pyman described how 
the training was organised: 
 
The first six weeks of the Driving and Maintenance classes were devoted 
to the general principles of the internal combustion engine, and the 
second to the particular types of vehicles themselves.  As soon as this 
stage was finished, the Regiment was able to take over drivers’ duties 
from the RTC cadre.  In addition, the return of the first batch of students 
from the Ahmednagar gunnery course greatly increased the strength of 













                                                 
76 Ibid., pp.57 & 58. 




















                                                 
78 The White Lancer and The Vedette, April 1939, p.22; rear rank - L/C Stein, L/C Jones, L/C 
Kirkpatrick, L/C Cornock, L/C Henderson, L/C Sutherland, L/C Barnard, L/C Kendall, L/C Bailey; 
front rank – Cpl French, L/Sgt Powell, L/Sgt Haslett, Sgt Davies, Captain H E Pyman, Sgt Wood, 


















                                                 








Driver training for the 17th/21st Lancers, 1938.  Captioned - ‘Oh dear! Oh dear! - The adjacent 







                                                 
80 The White Lancer and The Vedette Spring 1938 p.11; clearly an ‘in joke’, a photograph of a 
mishap during tank driver training in India. 
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In January 1938 Pyman reported that the Regimental instructors had ‘progressed 
excellently, knowledge more academic that practical’, which was 
understandable, and he wanted to retain one RTC NCO in each squadron. 81  The 
Regimental journal lists the names of 16 NCOs who had passed the Driving and 
Maintenance Instructors course during 1938/39, another 10 NCOs the elementary 
course that was, presumably, what had to be passed in order to progress to the 
instructor’s course, and 12 NCOs who had passed various armaments courses 
together with just two NCOs, Corporal C Evans and Lance Corporal G Tippett, 
who had passed the wireless instructors course at Bovington.82  Pyman was 
confident the regiment would produce a ‘very promising technical officer’ 
especially with the addition of a senior RTC NCO to support him. 83   
 
The Squadron commanders were able to take responsibility for their own vehicle 
maintenance by the beginning of May 1938 and by June the regiment had forty-
eight trained drivers.84  Not everything had gone to plan, however, as Pyman had 
reported to Harris on 20 June 1938.85  A ‘shortage of vehicles, instructional 
turrets and other kit [that included guns for the Mk IV]’ had restricted progress, 
the five lorries promised were still to arrive, also the instructional vehicles were 
beginning to suffer from over-use and insufficient time to clean and maintain 
them.  There were inevitably ‘duller’ students, but Pyman was clearly 
encouraged by the number of ‘bright boys appearing who will work up to Driver 
Mechanic standard’.86  Some instructors who had returned from Ahmednagar 
                                                 
81 LHCMA - Pyman 1/1-28, 1/6 ‘Royal Tank Corps Cadre 17/21 Lancers’. 
82 The White Lancer And The Vadette, April 1939, p.49. 
83 LHCMA - Pyman 1/1-28, 1/2 and 1/7. 
84 Pyman, Call to Arms, p.28. 
85 LHCMA - Pyman 1/1-28, 1/7; Pyman to Harris, ‘Progress Report’, 20 June 1938. 
86 Ibid. 
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were singled-out for special mention; Sergeant Beeby was ‘outstanding’, 
Corporals Sheean, Smith and Wylie, were ‘well up to standard’ and Sergeants 
Fowler and Davies soon would be. Pyman had selected Lieutenant M E L 
Heathcote as ‘exactly the sort of person’ wanted as the Technical Officer.87 
 
ffrench Blake explained the army pay structure: 
 
Everyone had to learn to drive and maintain their vehicle because their 
pay depended on being a driver [see Appendix H for some of the tasks 
that had to learnt].  Gunnery got no extra pay because there was no 
status for a tank gunner. They [the men] could be a tradesman driver, 
they could be a tradesman signaller, but you couldn’t be a tradesman 
gunner.  You either had to learn to drive to get your pay or you had to 
learn Morse code to be a signaller. 88 
 
Pyman also reported that ‘gunnery has not the same vocational value as D and M 
[driving and maintenance]’.89 
 
                                                 
87 Ibid; Lieutentant Heathcote is referred to in three different ways in the regimental archives:- 
M.L.E. Heathcote, M.L.E. Edwards-Heathcote and Michael L. Edwards-Heathcote. He was 
commissioned into the 17th/21st Lancers in 1934 and joined them in India. He did become the 
regiment’s first Technical Adjutant and later became an expert on Matilda tanks. He was Acting 
Captain 22.11.1939 to 3.4.1940 and from 12.9.1940.  After organising various training 
establishments and tank replacement groups, he returned to the regiment in Greece in 1945.  
Subsequently he organised hunter trials, race meetings, musical rides and riding schools. He was 
at the Royal Military College of Science and rose to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He retired 
from the Army in 1962 and died 20.9.1998. 
88 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
89
 LHCMA - Pyman 1/1-28, 1/7; Pyman to Harris, ‘Progress Report’, 20 June 1938. 
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ffrench-Blake recalled the determination of Lieutenant Colonel P V Harris, his 
regiment’s ‘non-mechanized’ commanding officer: 
 
[He] looked after his soldiers first, and to see that they got their extra 
pay by becoming drivers.  We were rather starved in material and men in 
the gunnery department, which was myself, a Corporal [Tizzard], and a 
Private [Moss].90   
 
In India, as in England, the light tanks first issued to the cavalry regiments had 
no guns fitted on which to practise.  ‘They were supposed to have .303 machine 
guns and .5s [Boys anti-tank rifle]’.91 ffrench Blake wondered if the .5 had ever 
existed, as he had never seen one. The Bren machine gun, by then his regiment’s 









                                                 


























                                                 

















                                                 
94 URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bren_light_machine_gun. The Bren was a modified version 
of Czechoslovakian-designed light machine guns, the ZB vz. 26 and its descendants, which British 
Army officials had tested during a firearms service competition in the 1930s. The later Bren 
featured a distinctive curved box magazine, conical flash hider and quick change barrel. The 
name Bren was derived from Brno, the Czechoslovak city where the Zb vz. 26 was originally 
designed, and Enfield, site of the British Royal Small Arms Factory. 
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Later the 17th/21st Lancers received four Medium tanks of 1922 vintage in which 
to practise, but there was no ammunition for the main armament.  ffrench 
Blake, was in charge of the gunnery department:   
 
The only gun we had was a 2 pounder without any mountings, so it just lay 
on the bench and we could open the breech and that was it.  All that 
could be done to train the gunners was to take the gun apart and put it 
back together again.   We only had machine guns, we knew about these 
already.95 
 
Pyman and his men were engaged in further training classes in early 1939.   
Pyman did not record when his cadre returned to their RTC regiment or to 
another cavalry regiment, but he went to the Quetta Staff College as a student 
in January 1939.   
 
The 17th/21st Lancers returned to England in May 1939, first to Colchester, 
armed with just rifles and revolvers and without transport.  The regiment was 
brought up to strength with returning reservists who were ‘without mechanical 
training’.96 Later the regiment moved to Newmarket, Suffolk, to be part of the 
newly created motor machine-gun brigade of the 6th Armoured Division.  They 
were equipped with .303 Vickers machine guns transported in an assortment of 
                                                 
95 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
96 ffrench Blake, The 17th/21st Lancers, p.83.  
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‘Austin pick-up trucks… [and] four old medium tanks’.97  ‘Then the Matilda tank 
arrived which had thick armour and hardly moved at all.  It only had one 
machine-gun; it did not have a 2 pounder gun’.98  Valentine tanks arrived later 
and more extensive exercises began. ffrench-Blake remembered:  
 
There were a great many of the Valentines, which we had got by then, 
had broken down and shed their tracks miles from home.  The crews were 
sometimes stranded and unable to get hot food.   
 
 
Colonel ffrench Blake said that this was the catalyst for issuing ‘tank cookers’ to 
each crew, and the tank cooker brought with it a huge social change:  
 
This was part of the great social breakdown between officer and man 
because you no longer had the officers retiring to the officer’s mess and 
the sergeants to the sergeant’s mess; everybody cooked in their tanks or 
their lorry or whatever it was while you were in the field, so you not only 
travelled in it, but you cooked in it and you slept under it in row – one, 
two, three, four – however many it was.  He [the officer] would ‘bivi 
down’ with his men, a sort of tarpaulin-like lean-to would be attached to 
the side of the tank and we would all have some form of sleeping-bag – 
not provided by the army – we lay in a row there.  We became what you 
                                                 
97 Ibid. 
98 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
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might call a social group.  That was a very good change and a really good 
one for esprit des corps, and the relationship between officers and 
soldiers was far, far closer than ever before.  It changed when we got the 
cooker – that was the big change really. 99   
 
ffrench-Blake confirmed that although ‘training facilities were not very good’ in 
India, and most of the tanks had no guns, ‘the regiment devised its own tactical 
roles, adapting the old cavalry tasks of reconnaissance, protection, and the 
rapid occupation and holding of ground’.100 The only difference was the method 
of conveyance, an armoured vehicle instead of a horse.101  In his history of the 
regiment ffrench-Blake wrote: ‘The men of the 17th/ 21st Lancers soon showed 
that they could master the tank as well as they had mastered their horses: the 
pity was that they had not been set to the task ten years earlier’.102 
 
The 17th/21st Lancers in 1940 moved to Marlborough to join the new 6th 
Armoured Division, which was forming under Major–General J T Crocker. With 
them in the 26th Armoured Brigade, along with the 2nd Lothians and Border 
Horse, was the 16th/5th Lancers.103 
 
The 16th/5th The Queen’s Royal Lancers had been on the North-West Frontier of 
India and had been patrolling on their horses when the outbreak of war was 
announced.  A war in Europe was something of a surprise to them because 
                                                 
99 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
100 ffrench Blake, The 17th/21st Lancers, p.80. 
101 Scott Daniell, 4th Hussar, p.290. 
102 ffrench Blake, The 17th/21st Lancers, p.82.  
103 Ibid, p.83.  
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keeping up with news from home had been difficult for the ordinary trooper.  
There were no radios to listen to and letters from home took three months to 
arrive.  George ‘Yorkie’ Husband, a trooper then and interviewed for this thesis 
in 2010 recalled: 
 
The war in Europe had no effect on us; we should have been in India for 
another year.  The officers told us that war was declared and we had to 
come home.  There was a full mounted parade on 9 November [1939], 
they told us [the] day after, on the 10th, but ‘bush telegraph’ had let out 
news.  We knew we would not fight on horseback as there was no [horsed] 
cavalry left in England. [The 16th/5th Lancers had relieved the 13th/18th 
Hussars on the N.W. Frontier and it was troopers from the Hussars who 
had told the Lancers about mechanization in England].  We were all 
annoyed horses were going to be destroyed – horses were all we had - and 
.303 machine-guns [on the N.W. Frontier], horses came first and last.104    
 
The day after the parade all four hundred and thirty horses were shot and only 
one was spared, a grey show-jumper, later to represent England in a leading 




                                                 





















                                                 































The 16th/5th Queen’s Royal Lancers N W Frontier India, 1939 









                                                 
















                                                 
109 Author’s collection. 
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Thomas Parnell of the 16th/5th Lancers, recorded in an interview for the Second 
World War Experience Centre in October 2000, explained that a few of the 
regiment had attended ‘conversion’ courses, but these courses were stopped 
when war was declared.  After this the regiment first moved to Port Said where 
those who had attended the conversion courses were separated from the rest of 
the regiment and sent to the Royal Armoured Corps Depot at Cairo.110  The 
remainder of [the] regiment proceeded to England.  Once in England ‘three 
hundred odd men [from the regiment] went to form “2nd Tanks”, to be [a] 
nucleus, those who didn’t have a special job.  I was regimental baker’, said 
George ‘Yorkie’ Husband.   Husband therefore stayed with the regiment with one 
hundred and twenty others, those he said, with perhaps a suggestion of 
nepotism, ‘who either knew something or somebody’.  
 
The Army Lists for this period recorded no transfer of officers from 16th/5th 
Lancers to the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment, or to any other regiment, and the 
records of individual troopers are not yet available to other than their next of 
kin. 111  Neither the archives of the Queen’s Royal Lancers Museum nor those of 
the Royal Tank Regiment can confirm these transfers either.  Major Colin 
Hepburn, the Regimental Secretary the Royal Tank Regiment, however, believes 
transfers from the 16th/5th Lancers to the 2nd RTR could have taken place, but 
were not recorded because ‘it may not have been regarded as significant, or 
even too embarrassing to mention’.112   Equally interesting were the regimental 
records of the transfers of returning RTR reservists who were then posted to the 
                                                 
110 Interview with Thomas Parnell by Dr Peter Liddle, October 2000; Tape 623, The Second World 
War Experience Centre, Yorkshire. 
111 The Army Lists. 
112 Personal correspondence with Major Colin Hepburn (2012); by the author. 
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5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards; ‘all who resented being called trooper and 
[being] made to wear a side cap at first [instead of the RTR black beret], but 
they got over it and became “Skins” [5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards] in the 
end’.113 
 
Conscripts who had all been trained at the Royal Armoured Corps centre at 
Bovington replaced those men transferred out of the 16th/5th Lancers.  None, as 
far as Husband could remember, were former horsed cavalrymen.  The men from 
Bovington, NCO instructors among them, trained the remaining one hundred and 
twenty Lancers to operate in tanks.  The 16th/5th Lancers soon had more men 
who had trained directly in armoured vehicles than those who had previously 
served as horsemen. If Husband’s recollections were correct, the 2nd Royal Tank 
Regiment had a greater number of former horsemen within its ranks than it had 
original tank men, and certainly the 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards had 
among its ranks of former horse cavalry troopers a high proportion of men from 








                                                 
113 Ibid.  A ‘side cap’ (see below) in the British Army it was usually worn towards one side of the 
head.  The Royal Tank Corps (and the Westminster Dragoons) wore black berets – these fitted 
much more securely on the head and the colour masked oil stains and were more practical for 









Lieutenant Colonel RSS Baden-Powell of the 5th Dragoon Guards wearing a side cap in 1899.114 
 
 
The Royal Tank Corps beret. 
 





                                                 
114 URL: http://www.pinetreeweb.com/5th-dragoons-boer-war.htm. Accessed 12.01.2013. 
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Matilda and Churchill tanks did not reach the 16th/5th Lancers until late 1941; 
until then the regiment was equipped similarly to the 17th/21st Lancers with 
only .303 Vickers machine-guns and some Austin cars.115 
 
But what of the remainder, the cavalry regiments stationed in England in the 
late 1930s?  They got on with the job of mechanization equally quickly and 
efficiently, except for two of them.  The exceptions were the Royal Scots Greys 
and The 1st (Royal) Dragoons, usually known as The Royals.  In these two 
regiments mechanization was resisted by two senior officers.  It is likely 
therefore, that the myth regarding the cavalry’s reluctance to mechanize 
originated from these much publicised, but relatively minor, events.   
 
The Royal Scots Greys’ Commanding Officer created quite a commotion when in 
1937 he expected that the Greys might lose their horses, a prospect to which he 
strongly objected.  Lieutenant Colonel Cyril Gaisford St. Lawrence lobbied 
Members of Parliament and stimulated a press campaign that resulted in 
questions being asked in parliament.116  The public and some historians might 
have inferred from this press campaign that all cavalry regiments were resistant 
to mechanization.  This was not the case, and neither were The Royals nor the 
Greys.  The issue with the Greys appeared on examination to be about Scottish 
nationalism not mechanization.   The evidence is not clear as to how the rumour 
began that the Greys might lose their horses, not even to Buckingham Palace.117  
                                                 
115 Personal interview with Husband (2010); by the author and confirmed in the interview by Dr 
Peter Liddle with Colonel G R Simpson DSO, in May 2004, Tape 2480; The Second World War 
Experience Centre, Yorkshire. 
116 Wood, In The Finest Tradition, p.130. 
117 TNA WO 32/4633 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Appeal against the proposed 
mechanisation resulting in the retention of the Royal Scots Greys and the Royal Dragoons as 
 318 
On file is an early reference to the controversy in a personal letter dated 22 
October 1936.  This letter was from retired Lieutenant Colonel G F A Pigot-
Moodie MC, to a War Office official whose identity and signature, other than that 
of ‘Victor’, has not been established.  Pigot-Moodie, who signed himself 
‘Doodie’, asked if his friend knew ‘if they proposed to put my old Regiment into 
motor cars’.118  Pigot-Moodie believed, correctly as it turned out, that one 
cavalry brigade was to remain horsed whist all the other Regular cavalry 
regiments were, or would soon be, mechanized.  Significant to this thesis is 
Pigot-Moodie’s comment on the attitude of the troopers: 
 
Scotland will not like to lose the grey horses.  Serving soldiers will not 
make [illegible] move in that direction because they have been told to do 
their best to make mechanisation [sic] a success and they are obedient 
people.119  
 
On 24 October an acknowledgement was sent to Piggot-Moodie with a promise to 
‘scout around [for] any proposal to mechanise the Greys’.120  A reply on 5 
November accurately informed him:  
                                                                                                                                                    
horsed regiments 1936-1937; 24A letter from Alexander Hardinge, Buckingham Palace, to the 
Secretary of State for War, 30 October 1937, wondering ‘what was the origin of the rumours 
about the Greys which have caused such a stir’. 
118 Ibid., 1A.  In 1934 ‘Doodie’ Pigot-Moodie, then the regiment’s Commanding Officer, toured 
Scotland with 270 officers and other ranks and 250 horses to publicize the regiment and increase 
recruiting.  He was successful, recruitment increased by around 30% the following year; Wood,  
In The Finest Tradition, p.129.  
119 TNA WO 32/4633 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Appeal against the proposed 
mechanisation resulting in the retention of the Royal Scots Greys and the Royal Dragoons as 
horsed regiments 1936-1937: F.M. B.M. No 3104 1A 




No definite decision has been taken as to which Cavalry Regiments are to 
be mechanized in the future, but I fear that we cannot rule out the 
possibility that the Greys will be one of the Regiments which will lose 
their horses.121  
 
This information was supported by correspondence between the Department of 
Agriculture and Fisheries, apparently on behalf of Walter E Elliot, Secretary of 
State for Scotland, and G D Roseway of the War Office.  In reply to Elliot’s 
enquiry on 1 December 1936, Roseway stated:  
 
The position is that further mechanization of the Cavalry is in 
contemplation in certain circumstances, but no definite decision has yet 
been taken to which Cavalry regiments are to be selected if this further 
mechanization proceeds.122 
 
On 11 March 1937, Elliot received a letter signed by the Lord Provosts of 
Scotland’s five major cities.  Not wishing ‘to express an opinion on a question of 
military organisation’, the Lord Provosts made clear to the minister the 
‘considerable concern in Scotland’ at the prospect of mechanizing the Royal 
                                                 
121 Ibid., F.M. B.M.No 3104 4A. 
122 Ibid.  
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Scots Greys and the ‘strong feeling in Scotland that Scotland’s only cavalry 
regiment should be retained as a mounted regiment’.123  On 15 March 1937 Elliot 
wrote personally to A Duff Cooper, the Secretary of State for War.  He expressed 
sympathy for the views of the Lord Provosts, enclosed their letter with his own 
and asked that further consideration be given to mechanizing the Greys.124  Duff 
Cooper was clearly cognisant of public opinion and ‘the mind of the British 
people that was unprepared for war… In a democracy such as ours the 
Government was bound, in forming policy, to take public opinion into 
account’.125  Duff Cooper had mouthed platitudes before.  On 10 March 1936, 
when the mechanization of the 3rd Hussars and the 9th Lancers was ordered, he 
said that those who were sorry to see the end of horsed cavalry likened 
horsemen to virtuoso musicians forced now just to play recordings. 126   Lobbyists 
for the Greys thought they were pushing at an open door, as proved to be so for 
them. 
 
Representation from Scottish organizations continued to be made to Duff 
Cooper’s successor, Leslie Hore-Belisha.127 Lieutenant Colonel St. Lawrence 
apparently started his lobbying campaign on 14 October 1937 with letters to a 
number of Scottish Members of Parliament.128 This invoked correspondence from 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 20/Cav/887 1D. 
124 Ibid., 20/Cav/887 7A. 
125 Cooper, Old Men Forget, p.196/197. 
126 Ellis, Cavalry, pp.181.182; Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p. 277; for the context see 
Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, pp. 92-98. 
127 TNA WO 32/4633 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Appeal against the proposed 
mechanisation resulting in the retention of the Royal Scots Greys and the Royal Dragoons as 
horsed regiments 1936-1937: 20/Cav/887 1A The Association of Lowland Scots 13 October 1937 
citing an article of 15 September in The Scotsman. 
128 Ibid., 20/Cav/887 16A – C, E, G & E, 17 D, F, H, L & M & 18A with cutting from The Cork 
Examiner,18 October 1937. 
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them and Scottish organizations, such as the Saint Andrew’s Society,129 that 
streamed into the War Office.  The Duke of Atholl, the ‘President of so many 
Caledonian Societies’, pointed out, ‘rightly or wrongly the political reaction [in 
Scotland] will be intense’, whether or not mechanizing ‘the Greys [was] a good 
thing or not from a military point of view’.  Atholl forecast a ‘real “emeut”’ if 
mechanizing ‘the Greys’ happened, not on account of objections from the 
Regiment’, he stressed, but from what he called ‘the national conscience’.130   
 
Elements of the Army were concerned too.  It was demonstrated earlier in this 
thesis that attracting recruits to the Army was challenging.  Brigadier (later 
General) Charles Willoughby Moke Norrie, the Commander of 1st Cavalry 
Brigade, was concerned that since the press campaign recruits to the Royal Scots 
Greys of his 1st Cavalry Brigade131 had ceased.  Previously, ‘continuous’ 
recruitment to the regiment had been maintained which contrasted to the poor 
performance for other regiments.  The Royal Scots Greys was a glamorous 
regiment and ‘catch the eye… mounted on grey horses… [and] is connected to 
Scottish national traditions’.132  The General Officer Commanding the Aldershot 
Command forwarded Norrie’s concerns, in which, regarding recruitment, he was 
‘in full sympathy’, to the Under-Secretary of State at the War Office.133 
                                                 
129 Ibid., 20/Cav/887 16J. 
130 Ibid., 20/Cav/887 17B; letter from Atholl to Sir Herbert Creedy, copied to the Secretary of 
State for War, 16 October 1937; ‘emeut’ is from the French ‘Que m’émeut’, that which moves, 
stirs or upsets me. 
131 1st Cavalry Brigade (1937); the 2nd Dragoon Guards (The Queen’s Bays), the 2nd Dragoons 
(Royal Scots Greys) and the 4th (Queen’s Own) Hussars. 
132 TNA WO 32/4633 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Appeal against the proposed 
mechanisation resulting in the retention of the Royal Scots Greys and the Royal Dragoons as 
horsed regiments 1936-1937, 14 October 1937, 20/Cav/887 1A. 
133 Ibid., 20/Cav/887 17P.  The signature of the Lieutenant General is not clear although it 
appears to be that of Sir Maurice Grove Taylor ‘i/c Admin. Aldershot Comd. 1/4/34 to 
14/12/37’.  October 1937 was the hand-over point in the commands of Sir John Gathorne-Hardy 
and Sir John Dill, both of whom were infantrymen and Taylor was a Royal Engineer; the signature 
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Norrie,134 somewhat incongruously, because he was an experienced cavalry 
officer, must have actually contemplated the possibility of taking these horses to 
war.  Absurdly he stated, agreeing with St. Lawrence in his letters to Members of 
Parliament,135 that the horses could be dyed with permanganate of potash to 
make them less conspicuous, as they had been in the Great War.136  Norrie 
acknowledged most of the cavalry ‘will have to become mechanized at a very 
early date’, but if a few regiments remained horsed, the Royal Scots Greys had 
‘a very special claim’ for consideration. He asked for a decision as soon as 
possible so that recruitment could continue.137   
 
Brigadier-General Sir Ernest Makins, Member of Parliament for Knutsford, and 
the Colonel of The Royals since 1931, mounted an equally notorious campaign to 
keep his own regiment horsed; he even lobbied the King.  Makin’s argument was 
based around St. Lawrence’s ‘spurious’ claim that the Greys were the 
‘Household Cavalry of Scotland’ (the epithet coined earlier by Churchill).  If this 
was the case, and The Greys were allowed to keep their horses, argued Makins, 




                                                                                                                                                    
cannot be identified to either of these officers.  The appointment of GOC Aldershot Command 
dates from 12 October 1937 and this letter was sent on 19 October.  If it was sent with Dill’s 
approval, he had not been many days in post. Source; The Army List. 
134 See Appendix C - biographies.   
135 TNA WO 32/4633 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Appeal against the proposed 
mechanisation resulting in the retention of the Royal Scots Greys and the Royal Dragoons as 
horsed regiments 1936-1937, 14 October 1937, 20/Cav/887 17M. 
136 Ibid., Permanganate of potash had also been used in the South African War (1899-1902); 
Wood, In The Finest Tradition, p. 112. 















                                                 
138 URL: http://images.google.co.uk/ accessed 07.11.2012. 
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28 October 1937.  The Army Council knew there were insufficient vehicles to 
mechanize all cavalry regiments and to supply the growing Royal Tank Corps, 
and horse-mounted soldiers remained useful for imperial policing.139 With 
pressure from the press and politicians, perhaps the Army Council took the 
obvious line of least resistance.  The ‘Informal Army Council Précis (No.3)’ of 
October 1937 made no reference to the press campaign, but of course the 
members were aware of it.  The catalyst for mechanizing more horsed 
regiments, it was said, was the agreement by the Government of India to accept 
them.  The distribution of cavalry regiments would be:- 
 
At Home: -  
Mechanized regiments (including one armoured car regiment) - 11             
Horsed regiments – 1.   
Egypt: - Mechanized regiments (including one armoured car regiment) – 3.  
India: - Mechanized regiments – 4.  
Palestine: - Horsed regiment -1140 Being the most suitable conveyance at the 
time for the imperial policing role. 
 
The précis stated ‘in the not far distant future, all Cavalry Regiments of the Line 
will be mechanised [sic] except two which will remain horsed’.141   The 
Household Cavalry regiments were not ‘Cavalry of the Line’ and not included in 
that list.   The ‘seniority’ of each regiment was appended to the précis together 
with details of those ‘affected by amalgamation or mechanisation [sic] since 
                                                 
139 LHCMA - Broad 1-3; Lt. Gen. Charles Broad’s reply to Mr R Alastair Rickard’s letter, University 
of Ontario, May 21 1970, p.5. 
140 Ibid., 20/Cav/887  21A. 
141 20/Cav/887  21A. 
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1921’.   The previous selection criteria for amalgamation and mechanization had 
been ‘juniority’.  This principle had been adhered to up until now, with the 
exception of the mechanization of the 3rd Hussars (see Chapter Two).  Had this 
principle been applied in October 1937, the order for mechanization should have 
been the Royal Scots Greys and The Royal Dragoons thus ‘leaving the 3rd 
Carabiniers (the old 3rd Dragoon Guards and 6th Carabiniers) and the 4th/7th 
Dragoon Guards, the two oldest amalgamated cavalry regiments horsed’.142  The 
principle of ‘juniority’ had been the Army’s policy.  When further mechanization 
was mooted, therefore, the mechanization of the Royal Scots Greys and the 
Royal Dragoons would have been expected, so stimulating the campaign to keep 
these regiments horsed.  Leslie Hore-Belisha, the new Minister of War, had 
perhaps been unaware of the principle of ‘juniority’.  He remained unclear as to 
what had led to the assumption that the Royal Scots Greys and the 1st The Royal 
Dragoons were to be mechanized.  He told Hardinge:  
 
It must have been obvious to every Cavalry soldier that owing to the 
accepted necessity for further mechanization of the Cavalry that the 
Greys might have to be mechanized and certain people have jumped to 
the conclusion that the Army Council had already decided to mechanize 
the Regiment.143 
 
                                                 
142 Ibid., emphasis added. 
143 Ibid., 24B letter to Lord Hardinge, Buckingham Palace, from the Secretary of State for War, 3 
November 1937. 
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Hore-Belisha thought ‘undoubtedly one prime cause’ was the letters from St. 
Lawrence to the Scottish Members of Parliament, but the question of which 
regiments were to remain horsed was not put before the Army Council until 28 
October 1937. 
 
It was the last time such a decision was necessary and the two oldest regiments, 
the Greys and Royal Dragoons - although unaffected by amalgamation - were 
allowed to remain horsed. 144  Gaisford St. Lawrence and Makins had won their 
argument, but Makins certainly went on to rue his success.145     
 
This incident was not the first time Makins had pressed for the cavalry to remain 
unaffected by the obvious need to modernise.  Makins did so during the House of 
Commons debate on the 1933/1934 Army Estimates, and is cited by Liddell Hart 
as an example of ‘the predominant outlook of that period’.146  Some other 
cavalry officers had been something of a bête noire for Liddell Hart too: Field 
Marshal Chetwode and General Seely were two of his so-called pro-cavalry 
‘people in the House [of Commons] and in the counties’,147 Chetwode in 
December 1920 had spoken, as Fuller described it, ‘for the cavalry’ in a debate 
with J F C Fuller (with Winston Churchill in the chair) at the Senior Officer’s 
School.  ffrench-Blake asserted:  
 
 
                                                 
144 Ibid., 27 October 1937, 20/Cav/887 21A. 
145 White-Spunner, Horse Guards, pp.495/496; Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, pp.239/240; see 
Appendix C re Makins biography.                                                                                 
146 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.239. 
147 Ibid., p.242; a further reference to BLH’s frustration with Chetwode, this time over the use of 
aircraft, see p.329. 
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Sir Philip Chetwode in fact held some views in favour of mechanization, 
which he must have been forced to conceal in this debate.  The discussion 
was indecisive and no positive action seems to have come from it.148 
 
Chetwode’s opinion, as Liddell Hart must have known, as it was in his own files, 
was that mass mounted combat was ‘plainly not worth the money’; motor 
transport was faster over roads, but horses still surpassed motor vehicles off-
road, as Chetwode stated, ‘with all that means’.  Horse mounted soldiers were 
still required in 1920, particularly for reconnaissance.149 In 1926 Chetwode, at a 
cavalry exercise, was concerned that ‘under the pressure of modern weapons 
and modern methods of movement, if we [the cavalry] are to take our full share 
of work in war, we must increase our speed, increase our radius of action and 
increase our hitting power’.150  Chetwode’s exercise was intended to suggest 
‘what weapons and mechanical devices are most likely to help [for the future]’, 
and recommended, among other things, a regiment of light tanks, two 
companies of armoured-cars and mechanizing first-line transport.151 
 
Chetwode, in 1937, described St. Lawrence as ‘an idiot’, but was ‘overjoyed, 
and only wished there were going to be more [horsed regiments] left’.152  This 
gives some credence to Liddell Hart’s comments on Chetwode’s attitude to 
                                                 
148 ffrench-Blake, A History of The 17th/21st Lancers 1922-1959, p.60. 
149 LHCMA - LH15/12/5 85-87. 
150 LHCMA - LH 15/12/5, Cavalry Staff Exercise by Lt. Gen. Sir Philip Chetwode, 19-22 April 1926. 
151 Ibid. 
152 TNA WO 32/4633 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Appeal against the proposed 
mechanisation resulting in the retention of the Royal Scots Greys and the Royal Dragoons as 
horsed regiments 1936-1937; Chetwode to General Sir Harry Knox, Adjutant General, 2 November 
1937. 
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mechanization, but this does appear incongruous when set against Chetwode’s 
comments, his earlier efforts to mechanize the Indian Army, and ffrench-Blake’s 
opinion of Chetwode’s overall enthusiasm for cavalry mechanization.  Liddell 
Hart insisted that Chetwode, ‘a bluff and breezy cavalryman of imposing 
personality [had] dismayed [him] by his continuing belief in the value of horsed 
cavalry… and by his inclination to discount the value of tanks’.153  Liddell Hart 
failed to date this comment, but he again cites Chetwode’s ‘gleeful’ comment of 
1932.  This was on the development of the Halger-Ultra bullet154 ‘that sounded 
the death knell’ to Liddell Hart’s armoured forces theories.155   ffrench-Blake 
disagreed,  ‘Sir Philip Chetwode… the most influential cavalryman serving at that 
time… declared himself on paper in the War Office to be in favour of 
mechanizing the cavalry’.156   
 
The Royal Dragoons and the Royal Scots Greys remained horsed cavalry 
regiments, the remainder were mechanized.  Makins and Prince Arthur of 
Connaught, Colonel of the Greys were informed of the decision on 1 November 
1937 prior to the announcement in the House of Commons on 2 November 
1937.157  The Colonels of the regiments to be mechanized were also informed of 
                                                 
153 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.70. 
154 The Halger-ultra bullet was developed by Dr H Gerlich, of Kiel, Germany and ‘at short 
distances can penetrate armor plate more than one and a half inches in thickness’ (40mm) and 
was very accurate – Major J K Boles ‘The new Halger-Ultra Bullet’ [1932] in Field Artillery 
Journal No.4 July 1932 p.445; Team Civil Air Patrol Digital Publications Library; URL: 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/111453828/Field-Artillery-Journal-Jul-1932 accessed 07.11.2012. 
155 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.242. 
156 ffrench-Blake, A History of The 17th/21st Lancers 1922-1959, p.62. 
157 TNA WO 32/4633 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Appeal against the proposed 
mechanisation resulting in the retention of the Royal Scots Greys and the Royal Dragoons as 
horsed regiments 1936-1937; Knox to Makins and to Lieutenant Colonel T Thornton, Equerry to 
His Royal Highness Prince Arthur of Connaught,  1 November 1937. 
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the decision.158  White-Spunner was sure that not all the men of the Royal 
Dragoons were as keen to keep the horses, fond of them as no doubt most of 
them were, as Makins assumed.  There were still men serving, he noted, who 
had suffered the ‘frustration’ of long periods of inactivity or serving as infantry 
during their time in The Great War.  It seemed to some that another war was 
likely and this time they wanted to play a full role.  There were similar feelings 
among the officers of the Royal Scots Greys; Major General (Charles) Clement 
Armitage, General Officer Commanding the 1st Infantry Division (later General 
Sir Clement), told Liddell Hart that St. Lawrence’s officers ‘by no means shared 
his objections [to mechanization]’.159  Later the officers of the Greys were 
disappointed to be left out of the start of the Second World War.160  White-
Spunner recalled Humphrey Wyndham’s frustration that if Winston Churchill’s 
advice had been taken in 1918, The Life Guards and The Blues ‘would have led 
the way in the mechanization of the cavalry, instead of being made to follow 
it’.161  Before two years had passed General Makins was again lobbying the King, 
but this time for AFVs for his regiment.162   
 
In September 1939 The Royals were in the Middle East, The Blues were in 
Windsor and The Life Guards were in London.  The Blues and The Life Guards 
formed a composite regiment for deployment. Two other regiments were 
formed, one as a reserve that also continued what ceremonial duties there were 
in London.  The third regiment was for training new men.  The composite 
                                                 
158 Ibid., examples include letters from Knox to General Sir George A Weir, the 3rd Carabiniers 
and General Sir Herbert A Lawrence, the 17th/21st Lancers. 
159 LHCMA - LH11/1937/82, ‘Talk with Major General C C Armitage’, 1 November 1937. 
160 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author. 
161 White-Spunner, Horse Guards, pp. 496/497; see Appendix C - biographies regarding Colonel 
The Hon. Humphrey Wyndham. 
162 Ibid., pp.504 & 505. 
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regiment – to be named 1st Household Cavalry Regiment (1HCR) - soon joined 
The Royals in Palestine as part of the First British Cavalry Division.  Like some 
officers in the Greys, some 1HCR officers ‘experienced an uncomfortable feeling 





















                                                 















                                                 














                                                 
165 URL: http://www.warwheels.net/MarmonHerrington3INDEX.html accessed 15.02.2013; 
armament, 13.9 mm Boys Anti-tank rifle & Vickers .303 machine gun. The Mark 3 was a major 
redesign aimed at addressing the inadequacies of the earlier Mark I and Mark II recon cars. 
Attention was focused on all the original design problems as well as improved chassis flexibility. 
The biggest problem of the earlier cars was the absence of 4x4 capability and thin armour 
thickness.  The vehicle crews continued to upgrade the main armament with captured weapons, 
the German 20mm gun being a favourite. 
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After Makins lobbied for his regiment to be mechanized, The Royals were, 
unusually, given a choice between being equipped with tanks or with armoured 
cars.  Armoured cars were chosen and the horses went in December 1940.166  Six 
South African modified Mark III Marmon-Herrington armoured cars arrived from 
the Royal Army Ordnance Corps in February.   
 
By 22 February A and B Squadrons had completed their wireless and driving and 
maintenance courses at the Royal Armoured Corps School, Abbassia.  There had 
also been a ‘technical course’ for certain personnel.  It is significant that no 
reluctance was shown by the officers and other ranks to mechanize the 
regiment, but the same problem persisted of a lack of equipment with which to 
train.  ‘Throughout the regiment great enthusiasm is being shown by all ranks in 
the various branches of mechanical training… [but further training within the 
squadrons] was considerably hampered by a lack of equipment’.167   
 
Training continued by using the existing horsed cavalry motor transport, but no 
additional signals equipment was made available.168  C and Head-Quarters 
Squadrons commenced their mechanical training at Abbassia on 24 February 
1941.169  The squadrons carried-out ‘tactical’ and firing exercises under the 11th 
Hussars Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel J Leatham.170  By 29 March 
1941, The Royals were equipped with twenty-nine Marmon Herrington and four 
                                                 
166 War Diary; The Royal Dragoons, January 1941; Household Cavalry archives, Windsor. War 
Diaries 1st Royal Dragoons 1939/46 Box 22; ‘Consequent on the receipt of G.H.Q., Middle East 
letter No. CRME/4011/A.G.1 dated 4 Jan 41 the unit was reorganised as an Armoured Car 
Regiment – Royal Armoured Corps on War Establishment I/1931/5F/1’.  
167 War Diary; The Royal Dragoons, February 1941. 
168 War Diary; The Royal Dragoons, February 1941; ‘Wireless training was carried out with five 
No.11 sets and three No.1 sets held on our old establishment’. 
169 Ibid.  
170 Ibid. 
 334 
Rolls Royce armoured cars, also eleven No.9 wireless-sets; the regiment was, 
however, short of lorries for the B echelon (supply).171  Twenty more armoured 
cars were collected in April.  All the available equipment was diverted to A 
Squadron, after which A Squadron deployed for action with the 7th Armoured 
Brigade, 7th Armoured Division.172  B Squadron proceeded to action on 31 May 
1941 under the command of the Australian Division, and C and HQ Squadrons 
received orders to move to ‘the Western Desert on or after 15 June 1941’, to 
join the 11th Hussars.173  
 
1HCR continued on horseback until February 1941 when the regiment was issued 
with 15 cwt. trucks as a forerunner to armoured cars.  This enabled the 
personnel to train on driving and maintenance.  An emergency occurred in Iraq 
whose oil was vital to the British war effort.  The pro-British Iraqi ruler was 
ousted by a pro-German and Italian ruler, who then besieged the mostly RAF 
servicemen at the Habbaniya air base.  The 1HCR was deployed in its training 
trucks as part of the force assembled to rescue those besieged. 174  In March 
1942, after the Iraqi surrender,  1HCR moved to Cyprus where sixty-three 15 
cwt. trucks and forty-eight ‘carriers’ together with some other vehicles were 
taken over from Skinner’s Horse.175  During April and May 1942 sixty-seven 
                                                 
171 Ibid., March 1941; the officers were conducted through various schemes and ‘TEWTs’ (tactical 
exercises without troops). The 11th Hussars, to which some officers from The Royals were 
attached, had been an armoured car regiment since 1930; amongst 7th Armoured Division in 
Egypt the regiment was considered very experienced; personal  interview with Davidson (2009); 
by the author. 
172 Ibid., April and May 1941. 
173 Ibid., June 1941. 
174 White-Spunner, Horse Guards, pp.506-519. 
175 War Diary; Household Cavalry Regiment Volume No.31 March 1942 (no box number – filed 
under 1HCR War Diary 1942). Household Cavalry archives Windsor.  Skinner’s Horse, 1st Duke of 
York’s Own Skinner’s Horse, an Indian Army Regular cavalry regiment of some renown.  The 
regiment was raised on 23 February 1803 by Captain James Skinner and was still horsed in 
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armoured cars arrived by ship enabling the regiment to organise as an armoured 
car regiment.176  In September 1942 1HCR joined the 8th Army.177  
 
The remainder of the horsed cavalry regiments in England had rushed to 
mechanize, as much as the dearth of vehicles had allowed.  Manoeuvres on 
Dartmoor for the 10th Hussars were in their ‘motor wagons representing light 
tanks’.178  During 1938 ‘some eighteen year old obsolete Mark IV light tanks and 
a number of Bren carriers’ arrived at the regiment.179  At the outbreak of war in 
September 1939, most of the 10th Hussars, and the other regiments with which 
they were brigaded, were still using the obsolete Mark IV tanks armed only with 
machine guns.180  Just one squadron per cavalry regiment in the 2nd Armoured 
Brigade had the new cruiser tanks.181  At some time, a number of Mark VI tanks 
arrived and were issued to half of each squadron.  It was the Mk VI tank in which 
most of the regiment fought in France.182  On 21 May 1940 the regiment 
embarked from Southampton for France with tanks yet to be fitted with guns.  
‘The 2 pounder guns [for the cruiser tanks] were still in crates and lashed to the 
sides of the tanks’.  They were fitted when the tanks disembarked in France,183  
only then could training the gunners on this type of weapon begin. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
September 1939, but was converted to a mechanized reconnaissance unit soon after. URL: 
http://www.skinnershorse.co.uk/historic.htm accessed 03.06.2010. 
176 War Diary; 1HCR, May 1942; some armoured cars were given up leaving the regiment with 45 
vehicles, June 1942. 
177 Ibid., September 1942. 
178 X Royal Hussars Gazette Volume XVII, October 1937 No.1, pp.6/7. 
179 Brander, The 10th Royal Hussars, p.105; it was certainly after April 1938 as the Gazette 
Volume XVII April 1938 No.3 states, ‘We have not up to the present received any tanks’, p.93. 
180 2nd Armoured Brigade, 1st Armoured Division at that time included the 10th Royal Hussars 
(Prince of Wales’s Own), the 2nd Dragoon Guards (The Queen’s Bays) and the 9th Queen’s Royal 
Lancers. 
181 Brander, The 10th Royal Hussars, p.106. 
182 Ibid., p.108. 
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In England, at Fulford Barracks, York, also in 1938, the 15th/19th Hussars began 
their driving instruction in 15 cwt. trucks as no tanks were available.186  The 
parade ground was turned into an obstacle course.  Four men with an instructor 
in a vehicle learnt to steer, change gear and reverse the trucks.  This was 
practiced all day for five or six days, after which road driving was undertaken 
eventually leading to some sort of qualifying test.  By the summer of 1938, the 
15th/19th Hussars had some ‘obsolete’ Carden-Loyd tracked vehicles in which to 
train.  Driving skills were then practiced on the old horse training area as the 
tracks of the Carden-Loyds tore up the tarmac of the parade ground.  The Mk VI 
tanks arrived in mid-1939, the majority of which were in a poor condition.187   
 
John Bennett reflected: 
 
There was a bit of a scramble for those, but there were a few boys from 
the farms who could drive tractors, they were the ones who could get on 
well driving the tanks.  I did a week or two on the Mk VI Vickers at various 
times.  There was a bit of a difficulty driving the tanks, handling the 
tracks you know, turning and that, you had to slow the tank down on the 
corner, you went too fast you went straight through a wall the other side 
of the road.188  
 
                                                 
186 Personal interviews with Jeffcut (2007); and Bennett (2007); by the author. 
187 Mallinson, Light Dragoons, p.221; personal interview with Bennett (2007); by the author.   
Personal correspondence with Eric Clayton (09.05.2008); by the author. Clayton complained that 
learning Morse code and flag waving was thought to be a waste of time. 
188 Personal interview with Bennett (2007); by the author. 
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Eric Clayton’s experience was similar:  
 
Sometimes there was a problem leaving the tank testing ground, ninety-
degree turn right, down the hill which by reaching the bottom the 
steering had used up the air pressure, and then there was nothing left for 
the right hand turn onto the main road, which meant continuing across 
the road and knocking down a stone wall before stopping in the front 
garden of the house on the corner.189 
 
When mechanization eventually came about some of the men were sorry to see 
the horses go.  ‘Nobody wanted to give up their horses’ explained 13th/18th 
Hussar Charles Need, although he knew the days of horsed cavalry were over.190  
Basil Jeffcut, of the 15th/19th Hussars, agreed that the horses were greatly 
loved, and when they were led down to York railway yard to be despatched to 
an unknown destination the men ‘said good-bye to them with lumps in their 
throats’.191 Jeffcut also recalled, as did Bennett,192 that the feelings regarding 
the horses’ departure was not helped by disturbing rumours regarding their 
ultimate fate. 
 
In England as in India, gunnery could not be practised much by the cavalry 
undergoing mechanization. ‘Everyone had to have a go on the Bren’, 
                                                 
189 Personal correspondence with Clayton (2008); by the author. 
190 Personal interview with Need (2007); by the author. 
191 Personal correspondence with Jeffcut (2007); by the author. 
192 Personal interview with Bennett (2007); by the author.  
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remembered Bennett, but not in the tanks: the tank guns, .303 machine-guns 
and .55s Boys Anti-Tank rifles, did not arrive for the 15th/19th Hussars until 
after war was declared and the regiment had arrived in France.193 Asked how the 
gunners were able to train, Sergeant Lucas retorted: ‘they didn’t’.194  In a later 
interview, however, Lucas said that training took place in France after the 
regiment was equipped.  Therefore the gunners should have been competent in 
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August 1938, the 15th/19th Hussars first ‘mechanized’ camp at Binnington near Scarborough 
attended by John Bennett ‘for about three weeks… we didn’t know what we was doing.’196 








                                                 
196 Thompson, The 15th/19th The King’s Royal Hussars; illustrations 49 and 50; Personal interview 
with Bennett (2007); by the author. 
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The 13th/18th Hussars had done ‘some familiarization training [on vehicles] with 
the Royal Tank Corps in Peshawar’, India, before they returned to Shorncliffe 
Barracks, England, in November 1938.197  Shorncliffe Barracks had not been 
equipped or prepared for a mechanized cavalry regiment, but the War Office 
made a grant of the extraordinarily meagre sum of £10 ‘to equip a driving and 
maintenance school with engines and parts to be bought for instructional 
purposes’.198  The Mk VI tanks arrived for the 13th/18th Hussars at Shorncliffe 
Barracks in the summer of 1939, about the same time as the 15th/19th received 
their tanks: 
 
Most were well worn.  The majority of them failed to make it to the 
barracks from the railway sidings. It could have done little to inspire 
confidence amongst the onlookers in Shorncliffe, but for the 13th/18th it 
was thoroughly disheartening.199   
 
Charles Need was a recalled reservist to the 13th/18th Hussars, his service with 
the Colours having expired when the regiment returned from India in 1938 and 
before the regiment was mechanized.  When Charles Need reported back to his 
regiment, by then stationed at Tidworth, he was put into the tank-training unit, 
but there were no tanks with which to train.  Some Royal Tank Regiment 
reservists had been drafted into the 13th/18th Hussars presumably, as with the 
other cavalry regiments, to help with training and to provide the nucleus of a 
                                                 
197 Mallinson, Light Dragoons, p.221. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Mallinson, Alan [2006], Light Dragoons, p.222.  
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skills base on which the regiment might build its mechanical knowledge.  Need’s 
former troop sergeant told him to say that he could ride a motorcycle, but he 
could not and did not wish to lie.  There were some arbitrary decisions taken; 
the 13th/18th Hussars’ regimental band was disbanded to form a motor cycle 
despatch troop using 500cc Nortons.200  What transferable skills were utilised 
when this was done is open to speculation, but bandsmen, being musicians, were 
some of the best-educated and intelligent men in a regiment, and this might 
have been the reason.  Mallinson recorded: ‘When the 13th/18th’s motorbikes 
arrived there were still no instructors.  The bandsmen were simply given the 
handbook, told to teach themselves driving and maintenance, and generally “get 
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Some of the former horsemen who had previously ‘passed riding school’ were 
posted to Palestine where British cavalry regiments were still horsed.  A 
comrade of Need’s was one who was posted to Palestine.  Need remembered his 
friend had already been on a course to train as a ‘fitter’, but was posted to join: 
 
a composite squadron of the Life Guards and the Blues and Royals, or just 
The Blues as they were then, and he went there and I suppose that suited 
him up to a point.  But eventually he went from the Blues and Royals 
squadron to the Ordinance Corps, something to do with the job he was 
doing, and I don’t know what happened to him then.203  
 
But Need was ‘unlucky’ and was posted to the Dock Labour Corps and was later 
moved to the prisoner of war camp staff.  Here he joined other men from all 
different regiments, ‘but they were all cavalrymen, we were put together as 
though we were all the same regiment’.204  All these men had been horsed 
cavalrymen and had not so far undergone mechanical training for whatever 
reason.  During the BEF’s retreat to Dunkirk, Need found himself at Bergues, 
part of the Dunkirk defence perimeter.  Here his group of cavalrymen fought a 
rear guard action, in true cavalry tradition, for about a week in infantry-vacated 
foxholes while, as what seemed to them, the rest of the British Army passed 
through the village.  Armed with Lee Enfield rifles and a light machine-gun none 
of them had been trained to use, they fought on through dive bomber attacks 
                                                 
203 Personal interview Need (2007); by the author. 
204 Ibid. 
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until eventually relieved by French soldiers.205  These cavalrymen had performed 
a role for which they had been trained, a rear-guard action, but with neither 
horses nor tanks for transport.  
  
Back in the regiments, ‘they [the 13th/18th and the 15th/19th Hussars] managed 
somehow’, said Mallinson.  By the ‘eve of war [both regiments] had been 
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Queen Mary inspecting her regiment, the 13th/18th Hussars, at Shorncliffe, summer 1939. 
In the photograph can be seen an example of the regiment’s transport: the Vickers Mark VI Light 
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The Royals, 208  as has been said, were sent to Palestine in the autumn of 1938 as 
part of a counter-insurgency operation.  The Royals joined the Royal Scots Greys 
and, other than the Household Cavalry in London, were the last remaining 
Regular horsed cavalry regiments.209  Lieutenant Colonel Sprot praised the work 
of Captain ‘Teacher’ Davidson and his six sergeant instructors from the 42nd 
Royal Tank Regiment who joined the Greys to get their training underway: 
 
It’s quite interesting because when you think back to then, that only 
about, not more than 50 soldiers, knew how to drive a car, nobody had 
cars in those days and the 50 who could were usually officers’ batmen, 
and the very few members of MT [Motor Transport] troop – nobody else 
could even drive a car let alone a tank.210   
 
Although every cavalryman was supposed to be trained as a driver, James 
Randall, quite exceptionally, managed to avoid learning to drive then, and for 
the rest of his life.211  In Palestine the Greys started their driver training in a 
truck.  Colonel Sprot remembered: 
 
 
                                                 
208 The Royal Dragoons, always called ‘The Royals’, were founded in 1661 as Tangier Horse and 
became the Royal Dragoons in 1684.  The Regiment amalgamated with The Royal Horse Guards, 
always called ‘The Blues’, (also founded 1661), in 1969 to form ‘The Blues and Royals’; White-
Spunner, Horse Guards, p. xii ‘Author’s Note’. 
209 Ibid., p.495. Some Yeomanry Regiments remained horsed. The Cheshire Yeomanry claims the 
distinction of ‘the last British regiment to fight on horses’. The Regiment finally parted with its 
horses in March 1942; Verdin, The Cheshire (Earl of Chester's) Yeomanry. 
210 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author. 
211 Personal interview with Randall (2007); by the author. 
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We used to go off in a three-tonner we had, probably ten to twelve 
people in the back, and I had to teach them how to drive, and it was 
great fun in Palestine.  We used to take our sandwiches and pick up an 
orange (when we stopped to eat them).212  
 
The Greys in Palestine were: 
 
‘thrilled [to receive two Mk IV tanks] although they were always breaking 
down’… The bulk of the troop horses went away in June [1941] to the 
remount depot, and we were allowed to keep 20 chargers for recreation 
and were to remain in Jenin in August 1941.  We got these two Mk IV 
tanks – they were British tanks. These tanks had no means of wireless 
internal communications so you couldn’t talk to your driver, so we tied 
strings round the two arms and steered them like a horse – with reins – so 
I suppose that was a throwback to cavalry otherwise you would have to 
shout down to the bottom of the tank.  We had a very amusing time.  I 
remember my very fiery Squadron Leader, Roland Findlay, and we had, 
after the MK IVs, we very shortly then got two General Stuart tanks – the 
light American tank [the M3 Light Tank known as a ‘Honey’].  In front of 
them you had a driver and if you wanted, a co-driver and they both had a 
flap that went up in front and they were very useful to sit on if you 
wanted some fresh air as you were going along.  And the idea was that the 
                                                 
212 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author. 
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teacher would sit on the flap of the co-driver telling the driver what to do 
as he was being taught, and the very fiery Roland Findlay was going hell 
for leather across the Plain of Eacha El Arane in Palestine, and the 
sergeant was trying to slow him down doing this and he just said, ‘Take 
your fucking hand away!’ and went even faster.  So we had a lot of fun 
doing all this, but we did learn, and I think, very remarkable that we 
learned so much. Eacha El Arane – a wonderful place - an enormous 
expanse from Nazareth to Haifa – the hills of Nazareth.  A wonderful 
training ground – no one thought of all the damage that we were doing to 
people’s property.  So that’s what we did and then suddenly we up-sticks 
and were sent down to Egypt to the desert.213 
 
The cavalryman, both officers and other ranks, had to adapt to other changes in 
his life-style, not just to a change in his form of transportation.  Communications 
changed: no longer would the men move as a body of horsemen, directed by the 
call of a trumpet.  ‘[A trumpet] was the only way, with 700 horses, [but] you 
never knew the trumpet calls and had to have a trumpeter handy by you to 
ask’.214  In an AFV the required formation was eventually directed in battle, but 
not always in training, by wireless communication.215  The cavalrymen’s 
individual role changed too when he became part of a tank crew.  As a horseman 
he was still part of a team, but he was an individual soldier with a dual role, 
equipped and trained to fight with sword and rifle mounted or on foot.216  In an 
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AFV he became part of a crew, with just a revolver for personal protection.217  
His weapons platform changed from his personal conveyance, unprotected by 
armour, but alive, free and fleet of foot, to a mechanical confinement with 
noise, heat and odour that had to be shared with other men.218  As George 
Husband explained, it was a different world for all of them and it ‘takes a bit of 
getting used to, one horse and you together and then you finish up [in a tank] 
with five of you’.219   
 
Anticipated or not, this was a huge cultural change for cavalry regiments.  As 
horsemen they had a personal responsibility firstly to take care of their animal, 
then their kit and then themselves.  They were all trained in a similar way as 
riders, swordsmen and riflemen.  Some, a minority with in a regiment, had 
additional training and specialist roles, such as machine-gunners, signallers, 
saddlers, farriers and bandsmen.  In an AFV all the men had specialist roles and 
had to weld together to form an effective fighting team; driver, signaller/gun-
loader, gunner, commander, and there were vehicle maintenance duties to be 
shared too.  The supplies echelon of the regiment, in soft-skinned trucks, had 
different jobs to do, but evidence from research suggests all were similarly 
trained as tank crewmen to replace battle casualties.  This new close team-work 
between all ranks changed the nature of leadership within a cavalry regiment 
too. 
 
                                                 
217 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author.  
218 Interview with Parnell by Dr Peter Liddle (2000); Tape 623 – The Second World War 
Experience Centre. 
219 Personal interview with Husband (2010); by the author. 
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‘The man who commanded my tank, he was an officer’, recalled Sergeant James 
Randall of the Royal Scots Greys, later a tank commander himself:   
 
Now, back in [horsed] cavalry days officers had a completely different life 
to troopers, they had two servants, one to look after the horse, one to 
look after the kit.  We didn’t get close contact with them, but in a tank of 
course you are living cheek by jowl… you all had to muck in and share 
everything. 
 
James spoke with affection of his first tank commander; they shared books 
together that had been sent out from England.  James was sad to recall that this 
officer was later killed fighting in Italy.  George Husband’s tank commander was 
a lieutenant (16th/5th Lancers); everyone was on first-name or ‘nick-name’ 
terms, he recalled, ‘there was no rank in a tank’,  but in horsed days in India if 
an officer was addressed in such a manner, ‘your feet would never have touched 
the ground, rank meant rank until the tanks’, explained Husband.220  ‘Yorkie’ 
Husband added that the men had been reluctant to take promotion if it would 
mean a move to a different tank crew.  
  
‘The great beauty about the Armoured Corps [was] being part of a tank crew, a 
troop of tanks, it was complete and utter team work’, reflected Thomas 
                                                 
220 Personal interview with Husband (2010); by the author. 
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Parnell.221  This was later stressed in the ‘Operator’s Guide’ for the Royal Tank 
Regiment; ‘The whole secret of this “tank business” lies in team work, and in 
particular in the team work of the tank crews’.222 
 
Every cavalry regiment, as far as evidence can confirm, was trained using the 
original programme laid down by the War Office in 1928 when the conversion to 
armoured cars of the 11th Hussars and the 12th Lancers was ordered.223  The 
ratio of 1 NCO to 6 or 7 troopers, was most effective for leadership and close 
instruction; it is doubtful that any trooper struggling with the change would have 
gone un-noticed or unsupported.  Specialist trainers were developed, led by 
regimental officers trained in that particular function; for example, the signals 
officer took charge of signals training,  the ‘Technical Adjutant’ commanded the 
gunnery and maintenance training.  But other specialists were seconded to the 
regiment too; a Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) detachment 
became part of every mechanized cavalry regiment.  Although this must have 
happened after the REME was established in 1942, ffrench Blake recalled: 
 
Quite early in mechanization it was quite obvious that we had to have 
these.  They [the REME soldiers] trained the fitters and so you got 
                                                 
221 Interview with Thomas Parnell by Dr Peter Liddle (2000); Tape 623 The Second World War 
Experience Centre. 
222 Personal correspondence and telephone conversations with Hodgeson (2008); by the author; 
Operators Guide 110th REGT RAC (The Border Regt.) 1942 copy kindly supplied by Hodgeson.  
223 TNA WO 32/2844 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Armoured Car Regiment:  
Organisation 1927-1928 20/Cavalry/619 War Office letter to all Commands, 4 April 1928;  
See Chapter One. 
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regimental fitters as well as REME fitters.  Initially they were under the 
Royal Tank Regiment officer.224  
 
Before 1942 these engineers would have come from the RAOC.  The 15th/19th 
Hussars in York had fitters drafted to them in 1938 or 1939, although Lucas could 
not recall from which corps or regiment; these fitters would probably have come 
from the RAOC too.  When he returned to his regiment from his mechanical 
engineering course he felt rather superior, but ‘I soon got taken down a peg [by 
these fitters, and his own regimental fitters] from the old motor transport 
section, because these guys had been doing it for a long time’.225  The Royal 
Scots Greys had their own regimental fitters too, until the REME was formed in 
1942, when more fitters were posted in and some of the regimental fitters 
transferred to the REME.226  There was also a detachment of men from the Royal 
Corps of Signals who dealt with technical problems and radio set breakdowns 
and they may have helped with training.227  John Bennett confirmed that men of 
the Royal Signals joined the 15th/19th Hussars too, ‘towards the end of ’39, just 
before the war broke out’.  The arrival of these signalmen came as something of 
a surprise to Bennett, but, ‘they manned some of the tanks as wireless operators 
which we was [sic] short of, we had a certain amount of wireless operators, but 
not enough to man all the tanks and the Bren carriers’.228 
                                                 
224 Personal interview with Bennett (2007); by the author. 
225 Personal interview with Lucas (2007); by the author. 
226 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author; The Corps of Royal Electrical and 
Mechanical Engineers was formed 1 October 1942 from the Royal Army Ordnance Corps 
Engineering Branch and trades and technical elements of the Royal Army Service Corps and Royal 
Engineers.  Source; The British Army web site, accessed 30.01.2013.  
227 Personal interviews with Sprot (2007); and Randall (2007); by the author. 




We had classrooms; quite a lot of it had to be done on a board, how an 
engine worked, how a gun fired and how a wireless set worked and ah… 
we had that awful Morse code we had to learn.  I remember sitting around 
the officers’ mess billiard table – di di di da di and things.229 
 
ffrench Blake commented: 
 
As far as signals were concerned in India, we were still using what my 
father had used [in the Great War]… flags, lamps even a helio and that 
was all… they [the men] had to get their trade. The signaller, or radio 
operator, had to double-up as the tank gun-loader when in action. 230  
 
In the three-man crew of a Stuart (‘Honey’) tank, the commander had to double-
up as the gun loader.  Each trade or crew role was trained separately in the 
beginning.  Recollected Sprot: 
 
                                                 
229 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author. 
230 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
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But in the end the object was to get everyone doing everything.  It was 
quite a complicated thing for someone who had never driven a motorcar 
to then suddenly start driving a tank.  And for someone who had never 
played with a wireless before – nobody had wirelesses in those days.  It 
was remarkable, I think, that within those few months we went from a 
completely horsed regiment to a completely mechanized one.231 
 
The trainers drafted in from the ‘technical Corps’, the RAOC, REME and Royal 
Signals, and from the RTC, were soon supplemented and later superseded by 
regimental instructors.  Whilst the basic regimental training was taking place on 
driving and maintenance, a number of cavalry officers and NCOs were sent away 
for training.  These men become specialist instructors themselves, and returned 
to their regiments qualified to teach driving and maintenance, signalling or 
gunnery.232  Ronald Lucas, a lance corporal by mid-1938, was chosen to leave his 
barracks in York and go to Aldershot to train as a mechanical engineer.  The 
training was an intense nine-month course.  The trainers were civilian 
instructors.  There were a hundred men from all different regiments on the 
course that included a period of time spent at the Medow’s tank engine 
manufacturing plant, and six weeks at the Royal Tank Corps Head Quarters at 
Bovington. Lucas returned to his regiment as a Sergeant Instructor tasked with 
training the men on motor vehicles especially back axles and gearboxes.  The 
former horse stables had been converted to workshops where gearboxes were 
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stripped down.233  Basil Jeffcut also became a NCO instructor and Aiden Sprot 
qualified as a gunnery instructor.234  In Egypt many officers, including Sprot, and 
many NCOs, went to the Royal Armoured Corps School at Abbassia to train as 
instructors in gunnery, driving and maintenance, and wireless.  There was not, 
however, a tank commander’s course. Sprot recalled: ‘I don’t think that there 
was a commander’s course; that is the sort of thing that you naturally pick up’.  
When there were enough instructors trained from within the regiment, men like 
‘Teacher’ Davidson and ‘Pete’ Pyman and their NCOs from the Royal Tank 
Regiment, went elsewhere.   
 
To reiterate, no evidence has been found that any form of aptitude or 
intelligence tests were used within horsed cavalry regiments to determine which 
of the men would be most suitable to train for the different roles.  Nor has 
evidence been found that any form of psychometric test was employed to 
successfully balance the personalities of the crew members to ensure cohesion.  
In that regard, however, strong leadership that inculcated a clear sense of 
common purpose together with tight deadlines to achieve the task almost 
certainly overcame any personality clashes.  Sprot speculated that selecting men 
for particular jobs had been down to choosing those who were clearly more 
intelligent or better educated, and directing them towards the more specialist 
trades such as signalling.  It was quite often the signallers who later became 
tank commanders 235 as was the experience of James Randall, a former school 
teacher. His boyhood experience in Scouting, and his knowledge of Morse code 
                                                 
233 Personal interview with Lucas (2007 & 2012); by the author. 
234 Personal correspondence with Jeffcut (2007); personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the 
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235 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author. 
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and semaphore, helped him to be ‘pushed into’ a wireless operator/loader 
role.236   Randall went to Abbassia on a wireless instructor’s course; he 
remembered: 
   
We did two or three months training on the edge of the desert between 
Cairo and Alexandria.  We would go out on schemes practicing mock 
battles and map reading and you got used to receiving messages over the 
wireless, and I spent all my time with a pair of earphones on. 237  
 
ffrench-Blake considered it was more difficult to train a horsed cavalry trooper 
than an armoured cavalry trooper.  The main difference was learning to ride a 
horse ‘which was more difficult than to teach a chap to drive a motor car, but 
you still had to be a “marksman” to get your pay, and that continued until we 
got the Valentines [tanks] and abandoned the rifle as a weapon.’238  Sprot still 
mused on the ‘remarkable’ success of their training.  Before mechanization so 
few men in the Royal Scots Greys had driven a motor vehicle, or had had any 
experience of wireless-sets, and after ten months of hard work and intensive 
training the regiment was fit to do battle with Rommel’s Panzers in the North 
African desert.239 Almost every man in the regiment had previously been a 
horseman.240  Many of the men of the Greys had been posted out to Palestine 
from the Army Reserve in England.  They had not all been Greys originally, but 
                                                 
236 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author. 
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had previously served, for at least six years, as horsemen in a cavalry regiment.  
‘A complete mixture’, said Randall, ‘all talking about the regiment they had 
served with in India before the war’.241  There were, however, also some men 
who had previously served in a mechanized cavalry regiment such as the 4th 
Hussars.242  
 
When a cavalry regiment was mechanized, not every cavalryman was trained or 
succeeded in their training in armoured warfare.  Any details of why certain men 
were not trained and what happened to them might only be determined if and 
when records become generally available.  The older soldiers and NCOs, a good 
70% in the 15th/19th Hussars, started to ‘disappear’ soon after the horses left.  
Many could have been ‘time-served’ men and were discharged only to be 
recalled later, like Charles Need, and perhaps sent out to the Royals or the 
Greys as horsemen.  Some of these men were unhappy at being recalled to The 
Colours.243  Some horsemen, it was thought by Bennett, were sent to re-mount 
depots to serve with what remained of the army’s horses.244    
 
The tactical training provided to the officers during or after the mechanization 
process seemed sparse.  To reiterate, Sprot was quite sure there was no training 
for a tank commander; that had to be learnt ‘on the job’.245 Raymond Bullock 
confirmed this to some extent.  Although he attended a tank commander’s 
course during his training for the Guard’s Armoured Division at Pirbright in 
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1942/1943, he recollected, ‘even with a tank commander’s course we didn’t get 
into tactics’.246 What little evidence was found regarding tactical training came 
from Colonel G R Simpson.  In his interview for The Second World War 
Experience Centre in May 2004 he commented that ‘senior officers’ attended a 
tactics course.247  The veterans interviewed for this thesis were either subalterns 
or ‘other rank’ soldiers during the ‘mechanization period’ and perhaps were not 
senior enough to attend such a course. 
 
Harrison Place wrote that: 
 
Ultimately, doctrine was disseminated by word and deed… officers and 
NCOs instructed their men by demonstration, explanation and practice.  It 
is likely that that much of what those officers and NCOs taught their men 
they had themselves learned in much the same way.248 
 
ffrench Blake, the longest serving horsed cavalry veteran interviewed, was 
adamant that the doctrine was the same anyway for armoured cavalry as for 
horsed cavalry:  
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It was our doctrine, as it were, and it was easy to adapt that to light tanks 
that could go across country; they should go for longer distances, they 
could shoot when they get there because they had their weapon with 
them and the only thing you didn’t have to do was to tie them up at 
night.249  
  
The use of light tanks in a cavalry role did depend, ffrench-Blake explained:  
  
Entirely on the cross-country ability of your vehicle and that depends on 
the sort of ground you are on.  A horse will go through practically 
anything, even quite deep mud, but of course, it is extremely vulnerable 
while it is doing it.  On [Operation] Torch, the tanks were all right, but 
the Bren-gun carriers couldn’t get through the mud.250  
 
Sprot agreed, and so did Lucas; although they had not had to fight on horseback, 
horse cavalry tactics were transferable to armoured warfare, and the previously 
mounted troopers had been indoctrinated in tactics of mutual support.251   
 
John Buckley cites examples of historians who have argued the weaknesses of 
the British armoured battle doctrine during the Second World War.252  Both 
                                                 
249 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
250 Operation Torch; the opening of the Anglo-American campaign in North Africa with the 
landing in French North Africa, November 1942, and the later advance and link up with British 
forces in Tunisia;  Holmes, The Oxford Companion to Military History, pp.655/656. 
251 Personal interviews with Sprot and Lucas (2007); by the author. 
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Buckley and David French were critical of British armoured cavalry tactics, 
charging their tanks against German and Italian anti-tank gun positions 
unsupported by artillery and infantry, but asserted that this was not due to old 
horsed cavalry tactics, but because ‘official doctrine’ had failed to demand ‘all 
arms’ cooperation.253  The interviewees remembered two instances of tanks 
charging ‘head-on’ against German anti-tank positions.  One incident failed and 
resulted in the death of the crew,254 the other succeeded and a Military Medal 
was awarded to the tank commander.255  
 
Buckley acknowledged that British armoured units did encounter tactical 
problems even in the Normandy campaign of 1944, but this was not the result of 
‘antediluvian thinking’.256  That which has attracted most attention, argued 
Buckley was the ‘dynamic aspect of armoured warfare… fast moving armour that 
would pass through a breach’. The armoured tactics  described, developed in 
Britain in training and still taught in 1943, were similar to those of an orthodox 
cavalry ‘mounted attack’, but with different equipment; ‘static firing at 
squadron level with massed 2-pounder [tank] guns, followed by a frantic charge 
by the other two squadrons’.257  Plate XLI in Cavalry Training (Horsed) 1937, 
diagrammatically illustrates a similar principle using machine-guns or horse 
artillery as supressing fire on one half-flank of an enemy position followed by a 
                                                                                                                                                    
252 Buckley, John [2010] ‘Tackling the Tiger: The development of British Armoured Doctrine for 
Normandy 1944’ in Vandervort, Bruce (ed.) The Journal of Military History Volume 74, No 4 
October 2012, pp.1162-1164. 
253 Ibid p.1167; French, D., Raising Churchill's Army, p.221. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author. 
256 Buckley ‘Tackling the Tiger’, p.1164. 
257 Ibid., p.1167. 
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mounted charge from the other.258  American tanks, after 1941, had enabled 
greater flexibility in tactics with more suitable armaments, notably the 75mm 
gun with high explosive ordnance;259  ffrench-Blake confirmed the 75mm gun 
‘totally altered the tactical aspects of the attack’.260   In 1943 Major General G P 
D ‘Pip’ Roberts, who, as a subaltern, had helped ‘mechanize’ the 12th Lancers in 
1929, trained the armoured troops in Great Britain in the fire and movement 
tactics that had been developed earlier in the North African desert campaign.  
These tactics, however, were later found inappropriate in the close confines of 
the battle for Normandy.261  Buckley asserts that it was in infantry-armour 
cooperation doctrine where the main challenges of battle were experienced.  It 
is interesting to note that none of the horsed cavalrymen interviewed for this 
thesis mentioned combined training with infantry during the inter-war period.  
 
Elizabeth Kier’s comments were, in the main, correct that ‘tactical training 
received little attention [in the 1930s]’,262 although it was certainly taught later 
in the war at Sandhurst, at the 11th Armoured Division in 1943 by Roberts, and 
by ffrench-Blake and others at the Royal Armoured Tactical School in Oxford. 263  
The Royal Tank Corps had supposedly been developing tactical doctrine between 
the wars, but views had diverged on how, in a future war, armour should be 
deployed.  Paddy Griffith was right when he pointed out that there was little or 
                                                 
258 Cavalry Training (Horsed)1937. 
259 Buckley, ‘Tackling the Tiger’, p.1166. 
260 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
261 Buckely, ‘Tackling the Tiger’, p.1168. 
262 Kier, Imagining War, p.126. 
263 Personal telephone interview with Hodgeson (2008); by the author.  Hodgeson spent part of 
his army career assisting RAC OCTU cadets training at Sandhurst: ‘We drove the cadets around so 
that they could concentrate on tactics’. Also Personal interview with ffrench Blake (2006); by 
the author - after convalescence in England from a wound sustained in the Western Desert, 
ffrench Blake was posted to the Armoured Corps Tactical School where battle experiences were 
passed on ‘particularly to the Americans who had not been to the war’. Buckley, ‘Tackling the 
Tiger’, p.1168. 
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no difference in tactics between The Royal Tank regiments and the armoured 
cavalry regiments.264    David French was also correct that a doctrine of 
mechanized ‘all arms’ operations did lack a common understanding and with it 
an effective training, and command and control system.265  Griffith and Buckley 
agreed in essence, that in terms of tactics, training manuals were found wanting 
of advice, and armour commanders were forced to improvise and formulate their 
own styles.266  
 
Sprot, from his experience in battle, confirmed that flexibility and learning from 
each situation was how a commander developed tactics. 267   Major William 
Davidson, whilst at an Officer Cadet Training Unit (OCTU) in 1940, did receive 
‘tactical training without tanks’ at Brookwood and Bovington, and later with 
tanks, at a Royal Armoured Corps Training Regiment near Salisbury. Tactical 
training continued when Davidson joined the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment.  
Davidson recalled, however:   
 
No matter how much training you have before going into battle, the real 
thing, for the first time, is an experience that you will never forget.  You 
learnt fast, paid attention to those who had done it before.268   
 
                                                 
264 Griffith, P. G. 'British Armoured Warfare in the Western Desert' in Harris, J. & Tose, F. N. 
(eds.) [1990] Armoured Warfare, (B.T. Batsford, London), p.73. 
265 French, D., Raising Churchill's Army, pp.173/174.  
266 Griffith, P. G. 'British Armoured Warfare in the Western Desert' in Harris, J. & Tose, F. N. 
(eds.) [1990] Armoured Warfare, (B.T. Batsford, London), p.72. Buckley, p.1162. 
267 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author.  
268 Personal interviews and correspondence with Davidson (2008 & 2009); by the author. 
 365 
Davidson commented on his time as Brigade Major of the 7th Armoured Brigade:  
 
As far as I am aware, all cavalry regiments were organised in the same 
way as the RTR; they certainly did everything the same way as we did in 
battle, and I cannot recall any problems with any cavalry regiment with 
which we might have made contact.  When I was Brigade Major of the 7th 
Armoured Brigade, I was in direct contact with the 7th Hussars, just as I 
was with the 2nd Royal Tanks and the 6th Royal Tanks, and I dealt with 
each regiment in exactly the same way.  We remained with the 7th 
Hussars for the remainder of the war.  We got on very well with each 
other, and the 7th Hussars were just as much a part of the Brigade as we 
were, with exactly the same organisation, and of course, on the same 
Brigade wavelength.  The only apparent difference between us was that 
when we wore our black berets with the RTR badge, the Hussars wore flat 
caps.269   
 
It is not within the scope of this thesis to examine critically or in detail the role 
or success of British armour in the Second World War.  It is relevant, however, to 
comment on the veterans’ reflections on the effectiveness or otherwise of their 
mechanization training.  In contrast to Liddell Hart’s assertion that the early 
tank battles of the Second World War were lost in the Cavalry Club in London, 
there were successes to celebrate.  Davidson recounted when the 11th Hussars 
                                                 
269 Ibid. 
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was the reconnaissance battalion in armoured cars and part of his 7th Armoured 
Division: 
 
They [the 11th Hussars) well deserved the tribute of being the finest 
reconnaissance group in the British Army.  They knew the Western Desert 
very well indeed, had been in Egypt for a long time, and we worked with 
them day in and day out, getting to know them well, greatly admiring 
them for the way they went about things.  They were known as the 
“Cherry Pickers” as their officers all wore pink trousers.270  
 
Liddell Hart acknowledged the ‘brilliant’ performance of the regiment in North 
Africa that ‘amply fulfilled expectations’.271 
 
Of the veterans interviewed who fought against the German Army in France and 
Belgium in 1940 in British tanks, the majority agreed that their training had been 
effective, but all asserted that the armour and armament deployed was woefully 
inadequate.272 John Bennett said: 
 
                                                 
270 Personal interviews and correspondence with Davidson (2008 & 2009); by the author.  The 7th 
Armoured Brigade was for a time, part of the 7th Armoured Division, known as ‘The Desert Rats’ 
that was made up of the 2nd and the 6th Royal Tank Regiments and the 7th Hussars.  In January 
1942 the 7th Armoured Brigade left the 7th Armoured Division to go to Burma, but without the 
6th RTR, and became an independent brigade.  The Brigade reformed with 6th RTR, and with the 
8th Army later in Italy. 
271 Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p.132. 
272 Personal interviews with Lucas (2007); Bennett (2007); and Jeffcut (2007); by the author.  
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The Vickers Mk VI tank had a .303 machine gun and a .5, what they called 
the “long rifle”, would fire a bullet through armour plate.  Well, the .5 
was ideal against German armoured cars; knock ‘em to bits, but no good 
against German tanks.  We had nothing to touch them, we just turned and 
scoot you know. 273   
 
John Bennett was correct; it was very difficult to wreck a German tank with a 
.55 inch Boys ‘Anti-tank’ rifle mainly because this weapon was not designed for 
that purpose.  It was none the less much criticised for its poor performance by 
the men returning from Dunkirk in May 1940.274  The Boys Anti-tank rifle was 
intended for use against lightly armoured AFVs, such as an armoured car and 
soft-skinned vehicles, and ‘was never intended to stop modern tanks’.275  At a 
range of 100 yards and with a direct hit, a .55 round from the Boys rifle could 
penetrate just 23.2 mm of armour: at an angle or at a greater range, its 
penetrating power was reduced.  The weapon was ‘extremely accurate’ up to 
300 yards, but at that range could penetrate only 20.9 mm of armour.276   This 
would have been inadequate in most cases as the depth of the armour of 
German tanks in 1940 ranged between 7mm to 15mm in the Panzer Mk I, but of a 
greater thickness in Mk IIs and Mk IIIs and up to 70mm in the Panzer Mk IVs.277 
 
                                                 
273 Personal interview with Bennett (2007); by the author; confirmed by Lucas in a further 
interview (2011); by the author. 
274 Boys Anti-Tank Rifle Mark I, p.7. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid., p.8. 
277 Burns, Tanks of World War II, Mk I, 7-15mm, p.103; Mk II, 14.4mm, p.112; Mk III, 10-70mm, 
p.113; Mk IV, 8-50mm, p.122. 
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The Royal Scots Greys’ veterans, who fought in the North African desert, Italy 
and Normandy in American tanks, agreed that their training must have been 
effective because they never suffered ‘a reverse’.278  Asked if his training in 
tanks had been adequate, former 16th/5th Lancer 94-year-old George ‘Yorkie’ 
Husband retorted: ‘well I’m still here’!  ffrench Blake of the 17th/21st Lancers, 
6th Armoured Division, said by Operation Torch, the Allied landings in Morocco 
and Algeria in 1942, they were the best trained armoured division  anywhere, 
but lacked experience: ‘Everything went like clockwork, except for the fact that 
our tanks were about as good as clocks for fighting in’. 279    
 
Historians and veterans agreed that the army was short of all mechanical 
vehicles in 1939.  Regarding AFVs, Vickers had been given little support and 
commercial encouragement to produce them, partly because Sir Hugh Ellis, the 
General responsible for procurement, had had doubts whether or not tanks were 
still useful and if so, what type of tank and at what price.  The government’s 
defence priority was air deterrent, air defence and keeping the sea-lanes open.  
Rearming the army was sacrificed partly to maintain a strong economy and 
partly because, until January 1939, there was no government intention to fight a 
ground war on Continental Europe. 
 
It has been argued that a reluctance to mechanize the cavalry in India had been 
a contributory factor to the delay in mechanizing the British Regular cavalry, but 
the cavalry in India was also short of vehicles suitable for the policing role and 
the terrain in which they had to operate.  When, in India, the 17th/21st Lancers 
                                                 
278 Personal interviews with Sprot (2007); and Randall (2006); by the author.  
279 Personal interview with ffrench Blake (2006); by the author. 
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were ordered to mechanize it was greeted with some relief; the commanding-
officer, supported by officers and NCOs from the RTC, organized and managed a 
swift conversion from horses to AFVs.  The AFVs issued for training the regiment 
were two obsolete, unreliable, Vickers Mk II tanks in which they had little 
confidence, and an assortment of a few other petrol driven vehicles.  The 
16th/5th Lancers were still horsed-mounted and patrolling the North West 
Frontier when ordered back to England to mechanize in 1939, but modern AFVs 
were not issued to them until 1941. 
 
In England in 1936/37, two officers of regiments each considered unique, 
successfully resisted mechanization until 1941/42.  This much publicised, but 
contextually insignificant event, was probably what influenced some later 
historians’ opinions on the cavalry’s resistance to change. The remainder of the 
regiments stationed in England got on with the job of mechanization as quickly 
as they could and coped with huge cultural and operational changes, but they 






The effectiveness and the efficacy of deploying horsed cavalry in a so-called 
‘modern war’ had been a contentious issue for military theorists, planners, and 
soldiers alike for some time prior to the Great War of 1914-1919. 1   But before, 
during, and for some time after the Great War, equines remained the only 
reliable cross-country conveyance on which to mount troops, tow guns and 
transport equipment.  The invention of the tank with its slow, all-terrain, 
caterpillar-like tracks and the development of the speedier armoured car during 
the Great War illuminated a way forward for the possibility of cross-country 
vehicles for  reconnaissance, wide troop movement protection, advance, rear 
and flank guarding and for transportation.  This was especially relevant to the 
cavalry, whose role in war was reconnaissance, fire and movement, to be in the 
vanguard and on the flanks to protect a moving troop column, and in retreat to 
act as its rear-guard. This role demanded a versatile cross-country vehicle.  It is 
quite clear from the War Office files that after the Great War the Army Council 
had every intention to mechanize horsed cavalry regiments as soon as suitable 
all-terrain armoured vehicles were available.  Successive Secretaries of State for 
War expected this too. They anticipated that the developments in engineering 
would soon enable the production of the necessary AFVs.   
 
Most serving professional soldiers viewed the end of the Great War as an 
opportunity to return to ‘the type of soldiering… which had been its wont before 
                                                 
1 Badsey, Doctrine and Reform, pp.101-103. 
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1914’.2  In the main that was policing the Empire and in that regard horsed 
cavalry troopers were most useful as mounted policemen.  For the every-day job 
of the British Army in peacetime, therefore, horse mounted cavalry was 
perfectly adequate.  Soldiers posted to operational duties had no urgent need 
for a change from horses to AFVs.  
 
The Secretary of State for War, Sir Lamming Worthington-Evans, in 1921 
acknowledged that the lessons of war had shown the cavalry vulnerable to 
machine-guns and air attack, but the mobility of the army had to be maintained.  
He planned to replace four cavalry regiments with tanks and armed motor-cars.3  
In 1921 the Army General Staff ‘hoped’ horsed cavalrymen would be transferred 
to an expanded Tank Corps by 1922.4  The General Staff envisaged that the 
cavalry regiments would transfer intact to the Tank Corps so that they could 
retain their regimental traditions and maintain the morale of their officers and 
men. 5  This was what, in effect, did happen, but not until 1939, with the 
formation of the Royal Armoured Corps from the Royal Tank Regiments and the 
mechanized cavalry regiments.   What actually took place by 1925 was a 
reduction in the Tank Corps and a move away from tank battalions to armoured 
car companies; there were seven tank battalions in 1920 and four in 1925 (plus a 
                                                 
2 Harris, Men, ideas and tanks, p.195. 
3 Emphasis added. The Times, 12.04.1921, p.15; see Phillips, Gervase ‘Who Shall Say That the 
Days of Cavalry Are Over? The Revival of the Mounted Arm in Europe’, 1853-1914 in War in 
History, URL: http://wih.sagepub.com/content/18/1/5  accessed 01.12.2011, for similar 
assertions made in the mid nineteenth century that ‘the days of cavalry were passed’ due to the 
development of new weapons. 
4 TNA WO 32/5959 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Scheme for reduction of Cavalry 
Regiments; hand written note, p.3, 24 February 1921. 
5 Ibid.1921. 
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Depot battalion).  In 1920 there were nine armoured car companies and in 1925 
this had risen to eleven including eight in India and three in Egypt.6 
 
On 23 November 1926 the committee for the Reconstruction of the Corps of 
Cavalry envisaged that a further two-year period was necessary to develop a 
‘reliable cross-country armoured car’.  The committee was, however, still keen 
to mechanize as much of the cavalry as possible.7  This was what Prime Minister 
Stanley Baldwin expected in 1927 and he took Worthington-Evans to task for not 
fulfilling the Cabinet’s expectations on this matter.  It was pointed out to 
Baldwin ‘that an efficient mechanical substitute for the horse does not at 
present exist’.8  Vehicles were currently on trial and Worthington-Evans thought 
these showed promise for future deployment as cavalry AFVs.  Baldwin was not 
concerned how the army managed mechanizing the cavalry; he just expected 
horsed cavalry to be abolished with concomitant savings in the Army Estimates. 9    
The CIGS, Field Marshal G F Milne, had told Worthington-Evans that the cavalry 
must be mechanized.  Milne’s dilemma was not if, but when could or would 
mechanization be affordable: it could be five to ten years away, he assessed.  
This estimate of November 1927 proved to be essentially correct.10 
 
                                                 
6 URL: www.army.mod.uk/documents/general/RAC_History_Royal_Tank_Regiment  accessed 
15.02.2013. 
7 TNA WO 32/3059 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Reconstruction of the Corps of 
Cavalry; Précis For Army Council No. 1279, Cavalry Establishments and Organization (Interim 
Report of the Cavalry Committee), marked 6A, February 1927, pp.5 & 7. The Interim Report is 
dated 23 November 1926. 
8 WO 32/2846 Reduction of Expenditure on Cavalry: Memorandum on the reorganization of The 
Cavalry, War Office Marked Secret, 30 June 1927.  
9 Ibid., Baldwin to Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, 20 July 1927. 
10 WO 32/2846 Register 16/General/5558, minute 14; Milne to Sir Lamming Worthington-Evans, 3 
November 1927. 
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The evidence from archived records, supported by oral testaments, confirmed 
without doubt that cavalry regiments, when eventually mechanized, did re-train 
and re-equip a substantial number of their horsemen to enable them to fight in 
AFVs.  The recorded experiences of the veteran cavalrymen who have 
contributed to this thesis bear witness to that.  The Royal Scots Greys’ 
statement that there was hardly a man who had not previously served as a 
mounted cavalryman added strong evidence too, and this was most likely the 
situation within the Household cavalry regiments and the 16th/5th Lancers, 
which were similarly late to mechanize. These regiments were still mounted on 
horses after the Second World War had begun in 1939.  A corresponding 
conclusion regarding the proportion of horsemen successfully trained in AFVs can 
be reached in respect of the regiments mechanized early on: the 11th Hussars 
and 12th Lancers in the late 1920s followed by the 3rd Hussars and the 9th 
Lancers in the mid-1930s.  Had their officers and men transferred or been posted 
to other Regular horsed regiments, they would, had their service commitment 
not expired, eventually have undergone the change process to mechanization.    
 
Research has been unable to confirm two interesting areas regarding personnel.  
Firstly, what proportion of the horsemen was unable to ‘fathom mechanics’ and 
what happened to them, particularly in the regiments that were mechanized in 
the mid to late 1930s?  Veterans confirmed that some existing soldiers were not 
able to cope with the complexities of mechanization and were transferred out of 




Secondly, what proportion of the other rank soldiers in previously horsed 
regiments had passed out of riding school before they underwent training as 
driver/mechanics, gunners and radio operators?  Some of the regiments were 
mechanized soon after they had returned from an overseas posting, such as the 
13th/18th Hussars and the 2nd Dragoon Guards.  Time-expired men, like Charles 
Need, an experienced horseman, left the regiment, probably with many others 
like him, and would have been replaced by whatever new recruits could be 
mustered.  It was discussed earlier in this thesis that during some of the inter-
war years recruitment was difficult, and the army was sometimes understrength.  
Cavalry regiments had no permanent depots in the way that infantry regiments 
did, and no central training establishment either, such as the RTC had at 
Bovington.  Cavalry recruits were trained by their own regiment and it follows, 
therefore, that if horses had never been taken over by the regiment returning 
from abroad, the recruits could not have been taught to ride them.  These 
recruits would straightaway have been trained in whatever motor vehicles 
became available.  Without the availability of the muster-rolls, so useful in 
researching military units of earlier periods, it has been impossible to determine 
the numbers of men who were never horsemen, or those who had been, but 
because they could not cope with mechanized training, were posted out to other 
units.  Officers’ careers can of course be traced through the Army Lists.  As has 
already been stated, most officers stayed with their regiments, horsed or 
mechanized, and when considering the veterans’ testimonies, an inference can 
be drawn that the same applied to the majority of the other rank soldiers too.  
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Almost all of the interviewees chose to join a cavalry regiment because they 
were interested in horses and wanted to ride them.  James Randall, Basil Jeffcut 
and Ronald Lucas are particular examples.  Jeffcut had followed his father and 
two brothers into the cavalry. Others, such as John Bennett, joined the cavalry 
because they were influenced by their pals who had enlisted earlier.  Lieutenant 
Colonels ffrench-Blake and Sprot, although they were horse-lovers, or became so 
later, followed a family tradition into their respective cavalry regiments and 
would have joined them regardless of horse or armour.  Some of the 
interviewees have testified that not all the cavalrymen with whom they had 
served loved horses and these soldiers preferred their new mechanized life and 
duties.  Randall and Jeffcut ‘hated’ mechanization; Randall tried to get a 
transfer to the Jordanian Frontier Force which was to remain mounted, but his 
sergeant-major forbade this.   Lucas saw mechanization as an opportunity and 
made the best of it.  All three later distinguished themselves in battle fighting in 
tanks.  The number of interviewees who have contributed to this thesis is 
acknowledged as too few in number to constitute a truly representative sample; 
it is most likely, however, that their stories varied little from those of their 
comrades, whose experiences have gone unrecorded, be they officers or other 
ranks.   These cavalrymen, in the main, were not keen to give up their horses, 
but neither were they keen to take their horses to war.   
 
Clearly there was a concern in Parliament about the cavalry’s attitude to part 
with horses.  The Secretary of State for War, Duff Cooper, perhaps was 
influenced by some ‘silly questions’, when on 10 March 1936 he thought that 
mechanization was an unwelcome imposition on the cavalry, and a great 
 376 
sacrifice for the cavalryman.11  Whilst this might have been so for some, it was 
not the case for the majority, and Duff Cooper should have known that because 
the men of the 12th Lancers in 1928, for example, had been ‘bent on 
mechanization’ and were ‘very, very keen’;12 this continued to be so.  Both 
Colonels ffrench Blake of the 17th/21st Lancers and Sprot of the Royal Scots 
Greys were keen to see their respective regiments mechanized. For some the 
change to armour should have happened ten years earlier.13  Both officers and 
other ranks knew there was no place for the horse in a modern war.  With horses 
the regiment would ‘just sit in a backwater, doing nothing… with no more battle 
honours or Military Crosses which was no good for the regiment of which one was 
proud’.14 Lieutenant Colonel Aiden Sprot acknowledged: ‘we must have realised 
that the horse could not cope in [a modern] war’.  In quiet retrospection, Sprot 
mused that he was pleased not to have had to look after a horse in war; it had 
been hard enough taking care of himself.  The thought of all that shrapnel that 
had hit his tank lacerating a horse horrified him.15  The 3rd Hussars’ regimental 
journal told of how those who had fought in the Great War no longer wished to 
see their ‘long-nosed pal’ suffer again in battle. David French was correct, as 
these veterans have testified, that ‘the significance of the oft-cited reluctance 
of cavalry officers to give up their horses in favour of tanks and armoured cars 
can be exaggerated’.16   David French also confirmed that many troopers 
                                                 
11 Ellis, Cavalry, pp.181/182; Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, p. 277; for the context see Minney, 
The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, pp. 92-98. 
12 IWM Sound Collection; Horsburgh-Porter, reel 1.  
13 ffrench Blake, The 17th/21st Lancers, p.82. 
14 Personal interviews with ffrench-Blake (2006); and Sprot (2007); by the author. 
15 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author.  
16 French, D., Raising Churchill's Army, p.61. 
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welcomed the change to tanks, as the mechanical skills taught them by the army 
would be useful later in civilian life; 17 
  
Caring for horses was hard work and riding to the cavalry standard took some 
time to learn; a skill like that once, and sometimes painfully, acquired would be 
unwillingly forsaken.  Charles Need of the 13th/18th Hussars, when he 
volunteered in 1933, remembered that for the first six months in the cavalry 
‘you never saw a horse’s back, but from day one you were grooming horses or 
mucking out… [later] riding training took twelve months’.  Ronald Lucas of the 
15th/19th Hussars agreed: ‘We went straight in, mixing with horses, which 
suited me, because that’s what I joined for’.18 Need had not ridden a horse 
before riding training began.  The lessons were hard; horses reared, cantered 
off, and men were strewn all over the ground. Need ‘did several summersaults’ 
that he never forgot.  Need thought that the cavalry was a ‘dead end… more or 
less finished… Talk of mechanization was always there… a couple of regiments 
were already mechanized’.19  Need also remembered the first time he saw anti-
tank guns: ‘That’s when it struck me, those sorts of things we are going to see; 
we [horsed cavalry] were out of date’.  Sergeant James Randall of the Royal 
Scots Greys had a contrary view: 
 
Mechanization broke my heart… I wasn’t a sort of ‘death or glory’ boy 
wanting to get into battle or anything like that, I wanted to ride 
                                                 
17 French, D., Military Identities, p.263. 
18 Personal interview with Lucas (2007); by the author.  
19 The 11th Hussars and the 12th Lancers, see Chapter One. 
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horses…The regiment made a glorious sight, three hundred horsemen in 
half-sections [riding in pairs] with bare brown hills on the right and the 
lush vegetation of the Jordan on the left.20   
 
Randall asserted he did everything he could in 1942 to get out of having to train 
in a tank. He tried unsuccessfully to transfer to the Trans Jordan Police Force 
that remained horsed; he did not want to be in a tank at all.  Asked if any of his 
comrades successfully transferred to the Trans Jordan Police Force he admitted: 
 
Not many of them wanted to.  Some had already served in ‘mechanized’ 
units already, they didn’t enjoy horses.  Most of them were probably 
pushed into the job in the first place and didn’t want it, but they were all 
keen to drive and to use vehicles rather than horses.  No, lots of them had 
no time for horses, bloody ‘goras’ they were called.21  
  
John Bennett explained that some of the older men, ‘old Indian soldiers [were] a 
bit peeved and cut–up’ at losing the horses, but the younger men, like him, 
accepted it and knew it was the end of horsed cavalry.  Many of the men wanted 
to learn to drive.22  Randall agreed this to be so 23 and it was so for Ronald Lucas 
                                                 
20 Personal correspondence with Randall (2009); by the author. 
21 Ibid., ‘Gora’ comes from an Indian expression, a mildly derogatory term referring to white 
people or those with a pale skin – the Greys were mounted on grey horses; URL: 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=gora  accessed 12.12. 2011. 
22 Personal interview with Bennett (2007); by the author. 
23 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author. 
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and John Bennett who, after 1945, had careers in motor vehicle engineering.24  
The horses had to be cared for twenty-four hours a day.  Tanks and armoured 
cars did not need round-the-clock attention.25  Some of the men had ‘not the 
slightest interest in riding’, and welcomed the opportunity to learn new skills.26  
Learning to drive a tank was fun and the men enjoyed it ‘up to a point’.27  
‘Quite a lot of the chaps were keen to be gunners. Macho wasn’t it’ mused 
Randall 28 who did not learn to drive a motor vehicle then or since.  Regarding 
mechanization he exclaimed: ‘Well what could you do about it?  There was 
nothing, you had to accept that was how things were’.29  Randall nonetheless 
became a gallant tank commander serving with Sprot in the Reconnaissance 
Troop of the Royal Scots Greys and was awarded a Mention in Despatches at the 
end of the Second World War.30   
 
In the Household Cavalry: 
 
When the horses finally went it tended to be only the sentimentalists who 
regretted their passing; the majority of troopers found armoured cars 
much less work and they did not miss the endless rounds of stables and kit 
cleaning.31  
 
                                                 
24 Personal interview with Lucas (2007); by the author.  
25 French, D., Military Identities,p.263; Personal interview with Lucas (2007); by the author.  
26 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author. 
27 Personal correspondence with Jeffcut (2007); by the author.  
28 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author. 
29 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author. 
30 A Mention in Despatches is a fourth level gallantry award and is denoted by a bronze oak leaf 
displayed diagonally across the  war or campaign medal for which it was awarded. 
31 White-Spunner, Horse Guards, p.496. 
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Many soldiers must have taken the same view as Ronald Lucas; the horses were 
gone and in a disciplined service life orders had to be obeyed.  Learning to drive 
was welcomed by many, and according to Lucas, ‘no one left because they 
didn’t like it’. 32  It was probably just men of the 16th/5th Lancers who had to 
endure the distress of actually seeing their horses destroyed, although the 
15th/19th Hussars at York were unhappy at not knowing the planned destination 
for their mounts when they took them to the railway yard in York.   
 
The change process from horses to vehicles had to be managed well and the key 
element was speed, keeping the momentum going.  No evidence has been found 
that morale within any cavalry regiment was affected by the loss of the horses.  
However, under circumstances when the men’s morale might have been 
questionable, pressure was put on them to achieve the task: this was 
appropriate leadership.  The Cavalry Corps was a combat arm and the men 
needed to feel competent and effective for battle again as soon as this could be 
achieved.  The commanding officers were right to set demanding time scales 
that at the time some officers and men thought quite a challenge, but achieving 
these targets would ensure morale was maintained and the objective achieved.  
This was leadership of the highest quality; the reputation of their regiment was 
at stake and the veterans have asserted that it mattered so much to them to 
have pride in their unit whatever the circumstances. 
 
The War Office had prescribed the method by which the cavalry regiments 
should manage their change from horses to AFVs.  So well-constructed and 
                                                 
32 Personal interview with Lucas (2007); by the author. 
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practical was this method that its principles were used by all the cavalry 
regiments, with varying degrees of pace, throughout the gradual process of 
mechanization.  As a comparison, the 11th Hussars took one year to convert 
from horses to AFVs from 1928, as did the 17th/21st Lancers from 1938; the 12th 
Lancers took three years from 1928 and the Royal Scots Greys took just eight 
months during 1942.  The pace of change was much dependent on having the 
vehicles on which to train.  The horses, with the exception of two for each 
officer (later reduced to one), were sent away very quickly after the order to 
mechanize was announced.  All the saddle equipment was withdrawn.  It was 
essential that the men understood there was no going back; the horses were 
gone for ever, in spite of the spurious promise made to the 3rd Hussars in 1934.  
33  A team of officers and NCO instructors and technicians was seconded from the 
Royal Tank Corps to the cavalry regiments to get their mechanical and driving 
training underway. The regiments began to train their own nucleus of driving, 
mechanical and gunnery instructors by sending a number of officers and NCOs 
away to the Royal Tank Corps Schools at or around Bovington in Dorset.  Second 
and subsequent tranches of officers and NCOs were sent later.  Almost all 
cavalrymen learnt to drive a motor vehicle, but not all of them went on to drive 
AFVs.  As the regimental instructors returned from their courses at Bovington, 
and became competent, they gradually replaced the RTC team.  Regimental 
fitters, as they too became more competent, supplemented or replaced the 
                                                 
33 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/Cav/831; 1C; War Office letter to various military commands, schools and overseas 
establishments, 8 December 1934. 
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fitters and mechanics provided by the Royal Army Ordnance Corps to maintain 
the AFVs.34 
 
Evidence has suggested a pragmatic approach was taken in deciding which 
element of the regiment to train first and which officers and NCOs to send for 
training.  As far as has been established, no intelligence or aptitude tests were 
applied until after 1939; research has been unable to explain, therefore, 
precisely why certain men were chosen over others to undertake the various 
tasks.   Each regiment had had a motor transport section for some time.  Some 
motor vehicle knowledge and experience was already contained within a small 
group of the regiment that had included the Signals Troop in Austin Seven cars, 
and these men could have become instructors.  Ronald Lucas realised how 
experienced these soldiers were ‘in the old motor-transport section’ who had 
been doing the job for a long time when he returned to the 15th/19th Hussars in 
1939  from nine months of intensive motor engineering training.35  Lucas had 
served part of an engineering apprenticeship before enlisting in 1935 and his 
regiment must have been aware of this as he was chosen to train as an 
instructor.36  Other NCOs were chosen because they could already instruct well 
in another subject.37 James Randall of the Royal Scots Greys, previously a school 
teacher, was trained as a signals instructor.38   
 
                                                 
34 IWM Sound Collection, Wiggin, reel 2. 
35 Personal interview with Lucas (2007); by the author. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author. 
38 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author. 
 383 
Training the men in driving and maintenance might not have been quite the 
challenging prospect that was envisaged.  The men were used to instruction and 
most had been trained to ride, a skill that ffrench-Blake assessed was far harder 
to learn than tank driving.39  But for the majority of men it was their first 
introduction to a motor vehicle and that must have been daunting for them.  
Sprot of the Royal Scots Greys estimated that in 1942 only about 50 men out of 
around 400 could drive a motor vehicle. 40  The 12th Lancers, in order to get the 
conversion off to a solid start, chose to train B Squadron first as B Squadron had 
included the more intelligent men of the machine-gun section.41 In the 
13th/18th Hussars, their former bandsmen, also intelligent men were 
‘motorized’ as despatch-riders on 500cc motor-cycles and left to get on with it 
with just an instruction book.42  Training the brighter men first will have formed 
a new skill-base as an example and inspiration to less able or less confident 
troopers. 
 
The officers drafted in from the RTC to train the cavalrymen found no resistance 
to the change to AFVs and were made welcome by their new cavalry colleagues.  
Inter-unit rivalry within the Army was encouraged by competitions, sports 
tournaments and military exercises; every unit wanted to be best, better than 
the rest.  This culture, when kept within sensible boundaries, was constructive 
and conducive to the development of a team spirit within the service.  Almost 
certainly there were arguments over scarce resources among senior level army 
officers, but any animosity that might have existed between the cavalry and the 
                                                 
39 Personal interview with ffrench Blake (2006); by the author. 
40 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author. 
41 IWM Sound Collection, Horsburgh-Porter, reel 1. 
42 Mallinson, Light Dragoons, pp.178/179. 
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Royal Tank Corps at regimental level seems to have been overstated, portrayed 
as destructive, and has itself become a myth.  No evidence has been found to 
support any antipathy between these two service arms.  Any bad feeling that 
might once have existed had long since disappeared by 1928, as 11th Hussar 
officer Peter Wiggin recounted from his own experience. 43  The officers, 
Uniacke, Roberts, Prendaghast and Dow, and the NCOs of the 3rd Armoured Car 
Company RTC were welcomed as ‘nice, helpful people’ into the 12th Lancers.44  
Harold Pyman and his RTC men ‘spent an immensely happy year’ mechanizing 
the 17th/21st Lancers, where the cavalrymen taught his family to ride horses.45  
‘Teacher’ Davidson and his men from the 42nd RTR were much appreciated by 
the Royal Scots Greys in 1942.46   
 
The RTR detachments found that the cavalrymen ‘were intelligent, keen to learn 
and easy to teach’. 47  The cavalry NCOs were of a better quality than their own, 
having developed through an organizational culture that encompassed a greater 
delegation of tasks by officers to NCOs compared to that of the RTR.48  The 
relatively small ratio of NCOs to men in the cavalry would have supported this 
ethos and would have helped to develop the NCOs into competent instructors 
and junior leaders. 49  Later, with Second World War battle experience, 2nd RTR 
officer and 7th Armoured Brigade-Major William Davidson could not ‘recall any 
problems’ between the cavalry and the tank regiments; they were organized and 
                                                 
43 IWM Sound Collection, Wiggin, reel 2. 
44 IWM Sound Collection, Savill, reel 1; Harding –Newman, reel 1; Kidston-Montgomerie, reel 1 & 
Horsburgh-Porter, reel 1. 
45 Pyman, Call to Arms, p.27. 
46 Personal interview with Sprot (2007); by the author. 
47 Brigadier Robert H Bright, IWM Sound Collection, access number 787, recorded 1977, reel IV.  
48 Ibid.  
49 French, D., Military Identities p.148. 
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operated in exactly the same way as each other.  Davidson was particularly 
impressed with the performance of both the 7th and 11th Hussars. 50 
 
The constant posting of men in and out of a regiment being converted to AFVs in 
order to maintain a full establishment of regiments serving overseas would have 
hindered building-up the required skills base. This must have been particularly 
so while existing horsed regiments still needed men who had ‘passed riding 
school’,51 especially when these men were being trained in vehicle driving and 
maintenance.  In 1936 thirty-two men went from the 3rd Hussars in England to 
the 10th Hussars in India, just as the 3rd Hussars was commencing the conversion 
process.  A further draft of thirty-four men went later to the 13th/18th Hussars, 
also in India.  The 4th Hussars lost many of their trained men under different 
circumstances; these men were required to make up the establishment for the 
mechanized cavalry regiments sent to France in 1939.  It is a credit to the 
consistency and continuity of the army’s training system that men could move 
usefully from regiment to regiment.  The out-going draft of trained men was 
then replaced by untrained new recruits and the training process was repeated 
again and again.    
 
As far as it was possible with the equipment and vehicles provided, speed was of 
the essence for each of the regiments to change; to ‘get on with it 
                                                 
50 Personal interviews and correspondence with Davidson (2008 & 2009); by the author. 
51 See, for an example:  The 3rd The King’s Own Hussars Historical Records 01.04.1934 – 
31.03.1935, p.2 File 1716; ‘From Cairo to Berlin With The Desert Rats’; the memoirs of 555950 
S.Q.M.S. C F A Newman in The Chronicle - The Journal of The Queen’s Royal Hussars Historical 
Society p.26 Volume 1 Number 3, November 2002. 
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[mechanization] quickly’52  with an ‘utter determination to make a success of 
it’.53   Morale had to be maintained because mechanization was a big change for 
cavalry regiments and any change from the familiar can be stressful and cause a 
loss of confidence.  These changes were considerable, in equipment, modus 
operandi and dispersion (five horsemen could ‘occupy’ more ground than a crew 
of five in a Rolls Royce armoured car or three in a Light tank).  Perhaps even 
more significant were the changes in the culture, relationships and leadership 
style within the regiment when the officers and men, as AFV crews, formed 
close-knit teams or ‘social groups’.  Both officers and men of other ranks might 
have found this difficult to cope with at first, although none of the interviewees 
said so.  A regiment undergoing mechanization could be considered ‘non-
operational’ and out of the action, something quite unacceptable within the 
‘can-do’ ethos of the British Army.  The quicker a regiment was re-equipped and 
properly trained the sooner it could return to the order of battle and ‘feel’ 
useful.  
  
The process, well planned and organized as it was, was frustrated, not from 
resistance to change or any lack of determination, but from a lack of suitable 
and sufficient equipment. Such was the chronically slow development and 
production of AFVs between the two world wars, that some of the well-used 
armoured cars transferred to the 12th Lancers in 1928 were driven by them in 
battle during the Second World War.  Trying to get enough of the right 
                                                 
52 IWM Sound Collection, Horsburgh-Porter, reel 1; Lieutenant Colonel H V S Charrington MC had 
taken command of the 12th Lancers in September 1927. Lieutenant Colonel J W Hornby MC took 
over command 6 September 1931; Army Lists 1928 – 1931. 
53 IWM Sound Collection, Allenby, reel 1. 
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equipment was quite a battle in itself, as White-Spunner had assessed. 54  Beset 
with the constant need to use ‘token’ equipment (15cwt box vans were used 
instead of AFVs), the frustration of the officers and other ranks  of the 3rd 
Hussars was expressed in their Regimental Journal in 1938 by wanting to ban 
‘token’ from the English language. 
 
What research has made clear and irrefutable is that, with the exceptions of the 
Royals and the Royal Scots Greys, the delay in the mechanization of British 
Regular and Household cavalry regiments was not due to an insular regimental 
culture, a reluctance to change or to give up its horses.  Cavalry mechanization 
was, nevertheless, retarded, especially when reflected against such an early 
intention for this happen following the experiences of the Great War.  What 
retarded this process was a reason or reasons other than those commonly 
attributed in popular military history.  Winton encapsulates the reasons: the 
‘modernization [of the army] was impeded by an indifferent Cabinet, a 
parsimonious Treasury, and a pacifist electorate’.55 
 
Historians have often described the British Army of this inter-war period as the 
‘Cinderella service’,56 denuded of investment, sufficient modern equipment and 
often of men too.  Recruitment into the army was difficult for much of the inter-
war period.  Some units were so under-strength that to attract more men to join 
up the standard of physique was lowered, but not for the cavalry. 57  The future 
                                                 
54 White-Spunner, Horse Guards, p.497-502. 
55 Winton, To Change An Army, p.1. 
56 For example, Anglesey, A History of the British Cavalry Volume 8, p.313; Feiling, Keith [1946], 
Life of Neville Chamberlain, (Macmillan, London) quoted in Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-
Belisha, p. 36.  
57 Evans, Gary, ‘The British Cavalry 1920-1940’, PhD, University of Kent Canterbury, 2011, p.165. 
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role of the army in war was seen at times at best confused, at worst redundant, 
having been superseded by the bombers of the RAF.  Relatively few British 
people foresaw the Second World War; of those that did, most, including the 
Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in 1938, hoped for the best that it could be 
averted.58  Many people knew from their personal experience of the 
consequences of war - the Great War, a war to end wars.  Much of the 
population had been involved in bereavement or the disablement of mind and 
body of themselves, a relative or someone in the neighbourhood. 59  They were 
not prepared to countenance another war. 60    
 
If Prime Minister Baldwin, reassessing the security risks in 1932, was keen to re-
arm,61 Chamberlain certainly was not; he considered this a provocative act 
certainly in regard to rearming the British Army. 62    Whether elected politicians 
should lead or follow public opinion has been often debated, but is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  What is pertinent was the significant role played by public 
opinion, or the politician’s perception of it, during the inter-war period.  This all 
turned on the extension of the franchise in 1918 and then again in 1928, after 
which everyone over age 21 was given the vote.63  The electorate grew 
significantly and included all adult men and women; the political class could no 
longer appeal only to the patronage of a privileged few as it had done 
previously.  Prime Minister David Lloyd George had promised in 1918 to build for 
                                                 
58 Britain by Mass Observation papers; 1937 – Ilford - 1/A; Britain by Mass Observation papers; 
1939, The Oxford By-Election; Harrison, & Madge, Britain by Mass Observation, p.101. 
59 Personal interview with Chapman (2008); by the author. 
60 Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, p.26. 
61 Barnett, Corelli 'The Illogical Promise' in Panichas, George A. (ed.) [1968] The Promise of 
Greatness: The War of 1914-1918, (Cassell, London) p.571.   
62 Self, Neville Chamberlain, pp.237/8 & pp.332/333; Liddell Hart, Memoirs Volume I, 
pp.385/386. 
63 There were and still are exceptions, such as convicted people in prison. 
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the people ‘homes fit for heroes to live in’ and voters’ expectations were raised 
by his political rhetoric.  There were concerns then regarding public disorder, 
perhaps even revolution, and under such circumstances the government could 
take some risks with defence but none with social and economic affairs’.64   In 
1919 the military was told to assume that another war would not occur for the 
next ten years; this became a policy and was not revoked until 1932. It proved to 
be the appropriate decision, there was no major war for Great Britain until 
1939, and there was no revolution either.   The dogma of the ‘ten year rule’, 
however, dominated the allocation of government defence expenditure and the 
Defence Estimates fell continuously from 1919 until 1932 and the Army Estimates 
until 1933.65  Social expenditure increased considerably; health care from £25m 
in 1920 to £46m in 1930, education form £110m to £154m and welfare from 
£156m to £251m over the same period.  Defence spending fell steadily from £694 
to £119m in the period 1920 to 1930, and then fell further to £103m before 
rising again in 1933; deflation affected the purchasing power of this money, but 
not that much.  Within the falling budget the armed services had to defend and 
police an Empire that had grown following the Great War. The responsibility for 
mandated and former enemy territories and the occupation of Germany soaked-
up resources. Later in the decade these responsibilities lessened, but so too did 
the Army Estimates. 
 
There were logical reasons why the British Government had not invested more 
and sooner in AFV development.  It was the advent of the Second World War, 
                                                 
64 Middlemass, Thomas Jones – Whitehall Dairies Volume I, Thomas Jones to the Prime Minister, 8 
February 1919,  pp.73-74; Gibbs, History of the Second World War Volume 1, p. 5. 
65 Bond, British Military Policy, p.39; see also, Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury; see 
Appendix G. 
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unforeseen for much of the inter-war period, which has raised questions.  
Between 1929 and 1933 there was an expectation that national armies might not 
even exist in the future, replaced by a ‘police-force’ under the auspices of the 
League of Nations.  Certainly tanks, heavy-guns and bombers would be banned; 
this had been head-lined in The Times.66  The League of Nations meeting 
regularly in Geneva had, by 1930, successfully undertaken much work in ‘conflict 
reduction’.  Significant inter and intra-national treaties had been agreed and 
member nations were committed to settle disputes without recourse to military 
action. 67  An agreed restriction on the number and size of battleships had taken 
place from 1922 that included, principally, the United States, Great Britain, 
France, Italy and Japan.68  A similar agreement was renegotiated by Japan, the 
United States and Great Britain in 1927,69  and again in London in 1935/1936 that 
also included an agreement with Germany.70  When the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference opened in 1932, therefore, it was a reasonable expectation that an 
agreement on general disarmament would be reached.  The wider public’s 
opinion on disarmament, and other political matters of the period, is impossible 
to know for certain as no surveys existed at that time.71  Given the time and 
events that have passed, the historian can only deduce what was public opinion 
from a number of sources.  These sources include: how an indicative number of 
the population behaved, what they wrote, read, and took as entertainment, and 
the agenda of newspapers that were found by later surveys to have shaped 
                                                 
66 The Times, 12.04.1932 ; The Daily Mail, 21.04. 1932, p.3. 
67 Gibbs, History of the Second World War Volume 1, pp.39/42. 
68 The Washington Naval Conference. 
69 The Geneva Naval Conference. 
70 The London Naval Conference and the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. 
71 Winton, To Change An Army, p.228 agreed the public mood was difficult to gauge. 
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opinions.72  Interviews of veterans have helped to illuminate some of these 
socio-political issues and have been reported in this thesis.   
 
There was considerable support for the popular peace movement as a whole, 
whether active or passive, whether by religious faith or pragmatism, whether 
absolute pacifists or pacificists (those that would only countenance war as 
sometimes necessary although an irrational and inhumane way to solve 
disputes).73  The Peace Ballot result on its own, supported as it was by 
11,000,000 participants, was sufficiently large to have considerably influenced 
government thinking.74  Newspapers, cinema news-reels and ‘next-war’ 
literature stoked up fears of bombing and poison gas within public and 
politicians alike.  Sir David Banks, the Permanent Secretary at the Air Ministry, 
was ‘seriously concerned with the tonnage of bombs which could now be 
dropped on England’; there could be 1,000,000 casualties.75  The war in Spain 
catalysed these fears from a possibility to a probability.  The political left, 
whose growing popularity was manifest in the ballot box76, particularly in by-
election results, was pacifist in ethos until it coalesced more around anti-fascism 
than anti-war.  With this split in the peace movement’s thinking the absolute 
pacifists, Sheppard, Lansbury, Brittain et al, stood alone with a much reduced 
influence that lowered the barriers to an accelerated rearmament programme.   
 
                                                 
72 Harrison, & Madge, Britain by Mass Observation, p.30. 
73 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain. 
74 See Appendix F. 
75 LHCMA - LH 11/1937/34, ‘Lunch with Sir D Banks’, 6 May 1937. 
76 See Appendix D. 
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In terms of re-equipping the army, however, and the cavalry and the RTC in 
particular, the damage had been already been done.  There had been 
insufficient investment in the development and production of AFVs between 
1918 and 1939 for the engineering industry to catch up in time.  Re-armament 
for the army had concentrated on air-defence, the principal concern of the man 
and woman on the so-called Clapham omnibus. The government’s naϊvety 
regarding a military commitment to their French allies had further exacerbated 
the situation.  It was not until early 1939, under political pressure, that the 
government accepted their obligation to send again a British Expeditionary Force 
(BEF) to fight alongside the French Army.  A field force would need tanks, 
appropriately armed and armoured, to combat the German Panzers.   
 
Vickers Armstrong, the United Kingdom’s only commercial tank manufacturer for 
much of the inter-war period, had received little incentive to produce tanks for 
the British Army of a quality and quantity superior to that of the German Army, 
the likely enemy.  They were on the road to success when the Vickers ‘Sixteen-
Tonner’ medium tank was prototyped in 1929/1930, but economic worries 
superseded those of defence and the ‘Sixteen-Tonner’ development programme 
was axed.  Vickers, always under pressure from the War Office to minimise the 
price, concentrated on the production of a light tank, variants of which were 
attractive to foreign markets.  For a time there was in the War Office the strong 
influence of the Tank Corps pioneer Sir Hugh Ellis, who had considered that 
tanks had become useless.  His judgment had been influenced by the more rapid 
development of anti-tank guns and armour piecing ordnance than in armour 
plating engineering for tanks.  
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 Neither could Vickers have been encouraged by the ‘tank-banning’ proposals at 
Geneva in 1932, nor by the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and 
Trade in Arms of February 1935.  The Commission was required to consider, 
among other matters, ‘a prohibition of private manufacture of and trade in arms 
and the munitions of war’.77  The Commission was presented information on 
Vickers’ overseas investments and the form of any government subsidies.78  It 
was argued that Vickers had, by the nature of their overseas sales and 
investments, contributed to an increasing demand for armaments both abroad 
and in the United Kingdom.79 The Union for Democratic Control (UDC), 
presenting evidence to the Commission, argued that Vickers’ true profits were 
deliberately hard to determine.  This was because of inter-linking trusts and 
‘internal’ trading and transfers among subsidiary companies within the Vickers 
group that included the English Steel Corporation.80  It was, almost certainly, a 
legitimate accusation.  It is significant to this thesis that in presenting their 
case, the UDC hardly mentioned tanks; such was their insignificance in terms of 
Vickers’ overall arms manufacture.  The Commission’s investigations, however, 
came to nothing, but it was a hesitant time to be in the arms industry; heavy 
engineering required long-term decisions to commit investment in jigs, tools and 
machinery, and in manpower planning.81  The tank situation was dire.   
 
                                                 
77 URL: www.fredsakademiet.dk? Udc.pdf ‘Verbatim Summary of the Evidence presented by The 
Union of Democratic Control July 17 and 18 1935’, accessed 23 January 2013. 
78 Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, confirmed The Government ‘set aside [£4,000,000] for 
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Union of Democratic Control July 17 and 18 1935’, accessed 23 January 2013. 
80 Ibid. 
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In 1932 there were still no tanks available to mechanize the cavalry.   The CIGS, 
George Milne, in a minute to his Army Council colleagues, reported that five 
tank battalions would be needed for an Expeditionary Force, but only four 
battalions existed and with only enough medium tanks to equip two battalions.  
The Army Council was always more aware of a need for a continental 
expeditionary force than were the politicians at that time.  With irony Milne 
exclaimed: ‘This situation cannot be regarded as satisfactory’.82  The earlier 
tank pioneers were concerned too: George M Lindsay, a previous Inspector of the 
RTC (1925-1929) and in 1934, as commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade, had 
written the notes for the CIGS’ Research Committee suggesting a programme of 
development to bring up-to-date the obsolescent machines of the Tank Brigade 
battalions.83  Lindsay was, by 13 February 1935, the GOC Assam District in India, 
when he received a reply to his letter from the previous assistant Director of 
Mechanization (1928-1932), Fredrick ‘Tim’ Pile, who was, until 1936, 
commanding the Canal Brigade. Pile wrote that ‘[we] have a host of obsolete 
machines… this niggardliness must cease… or we will not have enough machines 
on which to train our crews, let alone fighting machines’.84  
 
On 17 June 1936, a secret report on the RTC at home recorded ‘At the present 
moment we have only training tanks, none of which are fit to go to war’ and for 
which there were no spare parts to keep them running.85  On 17 October 1936 
                                                 
82 TNA WO 32/2852 ‘General Situation of Tanks Units at Home and in Egypt’; Register 
20/Tanks/304, 15.08.1932. 
83 LHCMA - LH15/12/1-2, 30; paragraph 7. 
84 LHCMA - LH 15/12/1-2, A2b13; Pile to Lindsay 13.02.1935. 
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the Secretary of State for War Duff Cooper produced a report entitled ‘The Tank 
Situation’.86  He outlined the previous thinking regarding the role of the Light 
tank:  
 
reconnaissance, protection and inter-communication.  These tanks were 
required to be speedy, with a good cross-country performance and with 
sufficient armour to afford protection against the smaller type of anti-
tank weapons; and only the lighter types of armament were considered 
necessary’.87 
 
The Medium tank, of which there were 166, was considered the main battle 
tank.  164 of these had been built between 1923 and 1930; the other two were 
the prototype models of the ‘Sixteen-Tonner’ project axed earlier to save 
money. 
 
In 1936 209 Light tanks of different marks were in operation and Duff Cooper 
considered these ‘barely sufficient for the peace training requirements of 
existing units’.   There were no war reserves and none for the formation of any 
new units.  A final decision had yet to be taken to equip all the cavalry with 
these vehicles, but as around 140 of the 209 were the two-man model with 
armour that would barely keep out ‘modern armour-piercing rifle bullets’, they 
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were anyway effectively obsolete.88  The remainder of the light tanks had been 
manufactured that year, 1936. These tanks were reckoned to be ‘superior’ to 
those of other nations and a further 680 had been ordered for delivery by April 
1938.89  Fulfilling this order on time would have made available approximately 
750 light tanks by May 1938.   In theory, that was just enough light AFVs to equip 
the cavalry regiments, assuming 40 tanks per regiment with no spares or 
reserves.  The cavalry regiments were in fact equipped later, partly with Bren-
gun carriers too; Lucas remembered the 15th/19th Hussars in France in 1940 had 
one troop in each squadron operating in Bren-gun carriers, the rest in Mark VIB 
Light tanks.90  It is clear from these figures that it would have been 
arithmetically impossible to have fully equipped all cavalry regiments until the 
spring of 1938 at the earliest, regardless of the cavalry’s attitude to change.   
 
In that spring of 1938, however, General Edmund Ironside, then the GOC-in-C of 
Eastern Command recorded: 
 
Mechanized division; cavalry regiments are not yet equipped or trained 
with tanks… Tanks; obsolete medium tanks, no cruiser tanks, no infantry 
tanks, obsolete armoured cars, no light tanks (we have one unit now in 
Egypt).91   
                                                 
88 LHCMA - LH15/12/9, 9; concern had been expressed in the House of Commons that bullet 
development was progressing faster than bullet-resisting armour plate; 15 March 1934, Orders of 
The Day Supply: Army Estimates. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Personal interview with Lucas (2011); by the author.  
91 Ironside’s diary entry, 29 March 1938, cited in Beale, Death by Design, p.116. 
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This was so, but the light tanks in Egypt were unreliable according to Colonel 
(later Brigadier) J A L Caunter, the commanding officer of the 1st Battalion 
(Light) RTC in Egypt.92  In discussion with Liddell Hart at the Tank Corps dinner 
in November 1936 he detailed the difficulties.  It seems that 50 out of the 76 
light tanks were Mark II models with suspension systems insufficiently robust to 
cope with the rough ground.  Spindles, eight of which made up part of the 
suspension system, fractured about every six miles.  The main problem, 
however, if that one was not enough with which to cope, was that there were a 
total of only 12 spare spindles in Egypt.  Gradually Caunter’s tank force had 
been reduced as one by one his tanks were cannibalized of spindles in order to 
the keep the others mobile.93  Brigadier Giffard le Quesne Martel, the Deputy 
Director of Mechanization at the War Office, told Liddell Hart on 28 November 
1938 that tanks were ‘now coming through at 2 or 3 a day… by next August 
[1939] we should have about 1000 delivered… mostly light tanks’.94 
 
Beale, citing a government paper of July 1942, reported that on 3 September 
1939 ‘834 light tanks of the Mk VI series… [were] available for operations or 
training’.95  Therefore, sometime between the spring and autumn of 1939 
enough tanks were reported to have become available.  From the experiences of 
some regiments, however, recounted earlier in this thesis, an insufficiency of 
AFVs still existed when the cavalry regiments of the BEF were embarked for 
France in September 1939.  The Cavalry Brigade in Palestine remained horsed, 
therefore not requiring AFVs until later. 
                                                 
92 LHCMA - GB99 KCLMA, Caunter.  
93 LHCMA, LH 11/1936/109, 23 November 1936. 
94
 LHCMA, LH 11/1938/122, ‘Talk with Brigadier G le Q Martel’, 28 November 1938. 
95 Beale, Death by Design, pp.116/117. 
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It matters little how the figures are calculated, and whether or not the reports 
are absolutely accurate. There is an overwhelming weight of evidence from 
these statistics, the cavalry regimental records, and the recorded testimonies of 
veteran soldiers that conclusively demonstrates that an earlier mechanization of 
the British cavalry could not have been possible.  The reason for this was a lack 
of AFVs, whether suitable or not, with which to equip the cavalry.  The delay in 
mechanizing the cavalry was certainly not due to a misplaced love of horses and 
the reluctance of cavalrymen to part with them. 
 
Duff Cooper reported to parliament that the main reasons for the lack of 
operational AFVs prior to 1936 were: financial stringency from 1927 to 1936 in 
which the allotment of funds for tank experiments each year varied from 
£22,500 to £93,750; the limitation of armaments which Cooper said was 16 tons 
for tanks, but 20 tons was the proposed limit at the Geneva Disarmament 
Conference.  However, this was never ratified or implemented. It was probably 
true that the public’s concern over the arms trade had limited the work at 
Vickers creating a dearth of ideas; it certainly would not have encouraged 
Vickers to accelerate tank development.  Cooper also listed a lead time of two-
and-a-half years to develop a model, and that British tanks had to operate in 
many parts of the world (that complicated any specification).  These were 
somewhat spurious arguments considering the age of the existing tanks.  Given 
the political will and the money to do so, there had been plenty of time to 
develop a satisfactory model, even since the ‘Sixteen-Tonner’; the Soviets had 
done so.  The wide-spread development of anti-tank weapons, Cooper assessed, 
had had a great effect on tank designs.  This argument had some merit; anti-
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tank guns had developed more quickly than tanks and were cheaper to produce. 
This had caused some hesitation in the minds of Sir Hugh Ellis and the Army 
Council on the specifications of future AFVs and their value on the battlefield 
altogether.96   
 
What was quite amazing was that the morale and efficiency of regiments could 
be maintained under such poor circumstances.  The lack of support from the 
electorate, manifested in the low numbers of recruits, the lack of interest in 
public school and university cadet forces that would have supplied officers; a 
confused role in war, or perhaps for a time, no role at all, could have affected 
morale.  The equipment, with which to train and modernize, was minimal and 
often obsolete, and could have affected efficiency.  The feeling the officers and 
men had had towards their animals mattered not at all when it was time for the 
horses to go, as Randall with resignation remembered, ‘Well – what could you do 
about it, there was nothing, you had to accept that was how things were’,97 and 
Lucas explained that because soldiering was a disciplined life ‘you just got on 
with it’.98  Given these circumstances, it is a testament to the efficacy of the 
management of change process, the consistency of a rigorous and appropriate 
training programme, the organization and quality of the instruction, and the 
clear and determined leadership to get the job done quickly that British Regular 
and Household Cavalry regiments were all mechanized by 1942. 
 
 
                                                 
96
 LHCMA - LH 15/11/6, ‘The tank Situation October 1936’, p.11. 
97 Personal interview with Randall (2006); by the author. 
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Ash, Mrs Kay Emily, Woman’s Royal Army Corps.  Personal Interview by the 
author, 2008.   
Kay Ash was born in Southend-on-Sea, Essex, on 2 April 1920, where she was 
educated, and later worked on the secretarial staff of the agent for the local 
Member of Parliament, ‘Chips’ Channon.  She served in the Women’s Royal Army 
Corps during the Second World War at the Ministry of Defence in Whitehall, and 
later married Corporal Kenneth Ash of the Sherwood Foresters, 14th Army, a 
‘Chindit’; he later served during the ‘Cold War’ as Civil Defence Officer for a 
large area of Essex. Kay Ash died in 2013. 
 
Bate, William, the Home Guard and the Royal Air Force. Personal discussions 
and correspondence by the author, 2008 – 2011.   
William Bate was born in 1925 in a mining village in the South Staffordshire 
coalfield.  In 1939 he began an apprenticeship as a toolmaker in Birmingham, 
and during the Second World War served in the Home Guard until his 
conscription into the Royal Air Force Medical Service in 1945, where he served as 
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a radiographer.  After demobilization William Bate retrained as a teacher and 
taught in army schools in many parts of the world.  He died in 2011. 
 
Bennett, John, Trooper, the 15th/19th Hussars. Personal interview by the 
author, 2007.   
John Bennett was born in Kent on 5 June 1921, the son of a Royal Engineer.  
Giving a false age, Bennett enlisted in the 15th/19th Hussars at Woolwich in 
1937 and joined the regiment at Fulford Barracks, York.  After training he passed 
out to 1st Troop, A Squadron, in March 1938. Very soon after this the horses 
went and driving training began with 15 cwt trucks. Carden-Lloyd carriers 
arrived in early 1939.  When war was declared the regiment sailed from Clifton 
docks to Saint Nazaire, and fought under the command of Major General Bernard 
Montgomery in the 3rd British Division. The regiment returned from Dunkirk 
having lost two-thirds of its strength as casualties.  John Bennett, with Ronald 
Lucas (see below), was evacuated from Dunkirk on HMS Malcolm.  He died in 
February 2008. 
 
Bishop, Thomas, the 3rd, 8th and 11th Battalions, The Royal Tank Regiment. 
Personal telephone interview by the author, 2008.   
Thomas Bishop was born in Tadley in 1919, and followed his elder brother into 
the Tank Corps in 1936.  He was trained at Bovington and later served in India 
and Egypt. 
 
Bullock, Raymond, Sergeant, the Brigade of Guards (Armour), email 
correspondence with the author, 2009.   
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‘Ray’ Bullock, from Stoke-on-Trent, Staffordshire, was born in Norwich, Norfolk 
on 12 June 1924.  He volunteered for air crew in November 1942, but colour-
blindness prevented his selection. He trained as an infantryman at Caterham. 
After taking a test it was established that he ‘apparently had an aptitude for 
mechanics’.  He was transferred to Pirbright for fifteen months tank training, 
then on to join the 4th Battalion Grenadier Guards in France; he finished the war 
at Kiel on the Baltic.  During the fighting Ray Bullock, by then a NCO, was 
wounded and lost two turret crews and two tank commanders. 
 
Chapman, Stanley, the Royal Navy.  Personal interview by the author, 2008. 
‘Stan’ Chapman was born in 1922 and grew up in north-west rural Essex; his 
working career was in retail grocery management.  He served in the Royal Navy 
on minesweepers and fast anti-submarine sloops during the Second World War 
and was awarded the ‘Atlantic Star’ medal.  Chapman is a committed Anglican 
and has been much involved in his church continuously from boyhood.  He is 
widely read and much travelled in pursuit of his interests in politics and current 
affairs. 
 
Cross, William, Sergeant, the 2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys). Personal 
interview by the author at the Royal Hospital Chelsea, 2010.   
‘Bill’ Cross was born in Scunthorpe on 21 November 1917, the son a Sergeant 
Major of the Coldstream Guards of Scottish descent. He attended Gordon School 
as an army band-boy and was posted to the Royal Scots Greys.  Eventually he 
became fond of horses.  He played trombone in the mounted band and later 
joined the Signal Troop in Austin Cars.  Sergeant Cross served with the horsed 
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regiment in Palestine with James Randall (see below) and trained as a mechanics 
instructor in Cairo during the mechanization period.  He saw action in the desert 
where he lost the sight in one eye.  He later fought again at Salerno and Monte 
Casino.  On D-Day Cross landed on Sword Beach at Ouistreham.  After the war, 
Cross became a State Trumpeter with The Life Guards. 
 
Cruddace, Robert, Trooper, 13th/18th Hussars. Personal Correspondence with 
the author, 2007. 
Mr Robert ‘Bob’ Cruddace was born in 1914 and joined the 13th/18th Hussars 
regimental band at Shorncliffe Barracks August 1929.  The following month the 
regiment sailed for Egypt, and after two years in Egypt went to India for seven 
years, serving two years of that time on the North West Frontier.  On return to 
England, driving training began.  The regimental band became despatch riders 
on 500cc Norton motorcycles.  On the outbreak of war the regiment formed part 
of the British Expeditionary Force and fought on ‘Dyle line’ in Belgium in May 
1940 covering the British 1st Division under the command of Major General 
Harold Alexander. Eventually the regiment was pushed back to Dunkirk and 
evacuated on 30 May. On D-Day, 6 June 1944, Cruddace landed with the 
regiment on the Normandy beaches in amphibious ‘Duplex-drive’ Sherman tanks 
known as ‘Hobart’s Funnies’.  He was demobilised in Hanover, Germany, in 1945 
and returned to Folkstone where he still resides.  Robert Cruddace and Charles 
Need (see below) had served together as horsed cavalrymen. 
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Davidson, William, Major, the Royal Armoured Corps / 2nd Royal Tank 
Regiment.  Several discussions and personal correspondence with the author, 
2009.  
‘Bill’ Davidson was born in Liverpool 15 July 1921.  His father was an active TA 
Officer in the 6th Rifle Battalion The Kings (Liverpool) Regiment and was 
wounded in France in 1918.  His father died in 1928, and Davidson joined the 
same regiment in memory of him as soon as he was 17 years old.  In December 
1939 he was selected for officer training in the Royal Armoured Corps at 
Brookwood and then at Bovington.  Davidson joined the 2nd Royal Tank 
Regiment in Egypt in January 1941, the regiment he remained with apart from a 
time as Brigade Major of the 7th Armoured Brigade.  Major Davidson served in 
the Western Desert, Burma and Italy, and was awarded the MBE (Military 
Division). He died in 2011. 
 
ffrench-Blake, R.L.Valentine, Lieutenant Colonel, the 17th/21st Lancers. 
Personal interview and subsequent correspondence with by the author, 2006 to 
2009.  
‘Val’ ffrench-Blake, was born 3 March 1913 in Rawalpindi.  He was educated at 
Eton and the Royal Military Collage, Sandhurst, and joined the 17th/21st Lancers 
in India in 1933. Later he fought in North Africa, and was wounded.  On 
recovering, he returned to command the regiment in Italy.  He was awarded the 
DSO.  He was part of the team to re-start the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 
after the Second World War had ended. Colonel ffrench-Blake died in 2011.  His 
memorial service was held in September in the chapel at Sandhurst. 
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Hodgson, Joseph Edward Gillet, Lance Corporal, the Royal Armoured Corps.    
Personal correspondence with the author, 2008.   
‘Joe’Hodgson was born on 4 August 1921 in Preston, Lancashire.  He enlisted 
under the ‘Young soldier Scheme’ on 4 June 1940, and was posted to the 6th 
(Home Defence) Battalion, The East Lancashire Regiment, and later to the 70th 
(Young Soldiers) Battalion, The Border Regiment. He later volunteered for The 
Royal Armoured Corps hoping to see action in the Desert.  Hodgson spent the 
Second World War in various training establishments, including Sandhurst, and 
he later worked on different fuel systems at the Petroleum Warfare Research 
Station near Horsham, Surrey. He was demobilised 25 March 1946. Joseph 
Hodgeson died on Sunday 21 August 2011, aged 90.  His funeral cortege was 
flanked by eight military standards. 
 
Husband, George, Corporal, the 16th/5th The Queen’s Royal Lancers. 
Personal interview and subsequent correspondence by the author, 2010.   
George ‘Yorkie’ Husband was born in the farming village of Howden, Yorkshire, 
in 1916 and grew up with horses.  He enlisted aged 18 into the 16th/5th the 
Queen’s Royal Lancers in York and served on the North West Frontier of India.  
The 16th/5th Lancers were mechanized in Colchester with Matilda and Churchill 
tanks in late 1941 and saw action in North Africa and Italy, where the regiment 
was equipped with Sherman tanks. 
 
Jeffcut, Basil, Corporal, the 15th/19th Hussars.  Personal correspondence with 
the author, 2007. 
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‘Jeff’ Jeffcut was born 21 February 1921 into a ‘cavalry family’; his father a 
Squadron Sergeant Major with the 3rd Dragoon Guards and two brothers in other 
cavalry regiments. Jeffcut enlisted April 1921 aged 15 using his brother’s birth 
certificate.  Jeffcut was a colleague of John Bennett (see above) and Ronald 
Lucas (see below).  Jeffcut survived Dunkirk and returned to fight in France in 
August 1944 mounted, first in a Cromwell tank, and later the 17-pounder variant 
Challenger tank as part of the 11th Armoured Division.  At some stage during the 
battles for north-west Europe Jeffcut’s tank was knocked out and he and his 
crew were wounded.  He was invalided out of the army.  Later he returned to 
riding and became a British Horse Society riding instructor and continued 
teaching until 2004, aged 83. 
 
Lucas, Ronald, Sergeant, the 15th/19th Hussars.  Personal interviews with by 
the author, 2007 - 2012.   
‘Ron’ Lucas was born in 1917 in Sheperton, Middlesex. He served part of an 
engineering apprenticeship and joined the 15th/19th Hussars in November 1935. 
He qualified as an instructor during the mechanization of the regiment in 1938 
and in 1940 commanded a tank in France.  He is a Dunkirk veteran, and later 
served as an instructor to Canadian troops in London. 
 
Need, Charles W, Lance Corporal, the 13th/18th Hussars.  Personal interview 
and subsequent correspondence by the author, 2007. 
Charles Need was born in Birmingham on 4 August 1914.  He left school at age 14 
and worked for a company making motor bodies.  On 28 June 1933 he joined the 
Cavalry of The Line and was sent to the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards for initial 
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training.  He was posted to the 13th/18th Hussars in India in February 1935, and 
served for a period on the North West Frontier. Need became a signaller.  On 
returning to England in 1938 Need attended a vocational course in woodwork and 
was placed on the Army Reserve.  Need was re-called to The Colours on the out-
break of war, to his now mechanized regiment.  Being untrained in driving and 
mechanics, Need was posted to the prisoner of war staff with no prisoners to 
guard.  Posted then to France, Need fought a rear-guard action with a mixed 
force of former cavalry soldiers at Berues on the outskirts of Dunkirk.  Eventually 
he was evacuated on the coaster SS Hythe.  Later, Need escorted prisoners of 
war to Canada and on return was posted to the Royal Corps of Signals.  Need 
served with the Head-Quarters, 14th Army Signals, in India and Burma under 
General William Slim.  Following the defeat of the Japanese and suffering from 
malnutrition and worms, Need left Rangoon via India for recuperation, and 
arrived for demobilisation in Hereford in December 1945. He died in 2010. 
 
Randall, James, Sergeant, the 2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys).  Personal 
interviews and subsequent correspondence by the author, 2006.  
‘Jim’ Randall was born in 1916 and, answering an advert, volunteered for the 
Cavalry of The Line in 1939.  After riding school and basic army training in 
Colchester he embarked for Palestine, where British horsed cavalry, the 1st 
Cavalry Division, was engaged on peacekeeping operations under the British 
Mandate.  Randall was posted to the Royal Scots Greys and spent a year as a 
horsed cavalry trooper until the regiment was mechanized with Sherman and 
Stuart tanks in 1941.  Randall served in the Western Desert, Italy, Normandy, 
France, Holland, Germany and the Baltic coast.  As a sergeant of the 
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reconnaissance troop he led his regiment across hundreds of miles of enemy held 
territory and was ‘Mentioned in Despatches’ at the end of hostilities. 
 
Sprot, Aiden M., Lieutenant Colonel, the 2nd Dragoons (Royal Scots Greys).    
Personal interview and subsequent correspondence by the author, 2007.  
Aidan M Sprot was born in 1919 and brought up in the Borders and educated at 
Stowe.  In 1940 he left The City and after basic training and riding school joined 
his father’s old Regiment, the Royal Scots Greys, still a horsed-mounted 
regiment.   He commanded the reconnaissance troop, James Randall was his 
sergeant (see above), and fought in the Western Desert, Italy and the battles of 
North West Europe.  He was awarded the MC.  Lieutenant Colonel Sprot 
commanded the regiment from 1959-1962.  After retirement he became Lord-
Lieutenant of Tweedale.  
 
Stead, Miss Margorie, the Civil Defence Corps.  Personal interview by the 
author, 2008.  Margorie ‘Nan’ Stead was born in 1914 in Hackney, east London 
where she was educated, lived and worked.  She was, and still is, a practicing 
Christian and was keen member of the Methodist Church.  She served in the Civil 
Defence Corps during the Second World War and in particular the London ‘blitz’ 
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Allenby, Viscount Dudley Jaffray Hynman, Captain, the 11th Hussars. IWM 
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Viscount Allenby was born 1903 and served in the 11th Hussars from 1923 until 
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Bright, Robert, Brigadier, the Royal Tank Corps. IWM Sound Collection, access 
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Robert Bright was born 1912, educated at Wellington and The Royal Military 
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Northamptonshire Yeomanry.  IWM Sound Collection, access number 919, 
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Rupert Harding-Newman was educated at St. Edward’s School, Oxford, and at 
the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He served with the Royal Tank Corps, later 
the Royal Armoured Corps 1928-1958.  He was awarded the MC. 
 
Horsburgh-Porter, Sir Andrew Marshall, Colonel, the 12th Lancers. IWM Sound 
Collection, access number 905, recorded 1977.   
Sir Andrew Horsburgh-Porter was born 1907 and served with the 12th Lancers 
from 1927 in Egypt, Germany and England.  During the Second World War he 
commanded D Squadron in France in 1940 and later served in Italy.  He was 
wounded in battle, and was twice awarded the DSO, and Mentioned in 
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Kidston-Montgomerie, George, Colonel, the 12th Lancers and the 3rd County 
of London Yeomanry.  IWM Sound Collection, access number 892, recorded 
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Wiggin, Peter Milner, Colonel, the 11th Hussars and the Northampton 
Yeomanry.  IWM Sound Collection, access number 918, recorded 1977.  
Peter Wiggin was born in 1907; he served with the 11th Hussars from 1927 until 
1936 when he succeeded Douglas Forster (see above) as Adjutant of the 
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British Household and Regular Cavalry – Order of Battle. 
1918 – 1922 
1st Life Guards 
2nd Life Guards 
Royal Horse Guards [The Blues] 
The 1st (Kings) Dragoon Guards 
The 2nd (Queen’s Bays) Dragoon Guards 
The 3rd (Prince of Wales’s) Dragoon Guards 
The 4th (Royal Irish) Dragoon Guards 
The 5th (Princess Charlotte of Wales’s) Dragoon Guards 
The 6th (Carabiniers) Dragoon Guards 
The 7th (Princess Royal’s) Dragoon Guards 
The 1st (Royal) Dragoons [The Royals] 
The 2nd (Royal Scots Greys) Dragoons 
The 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons 
The 3rd (King’s Own) Hussars 
The 4th (Queen’s Own) Hussars 
The 7th Queen’s Own Hussars 
The 8th (King’s Royal Irish) Hussars 
The 9th (Queen’s Royal) Lancers 
The 10th (Prince of Wales’s Own) Hussars 
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The 11th (Prince Albert’s Own) Hussars 
The 12th (Prince of Wales’s Royal) Lancers 
The 13th Hussars 
The 14th (Kings) Hussars 
The 15th (The King’s) Hussars 
The 16th (The Queen’s) Lancers 
The 17th (Duke of Cambridge’s Own) Lancers 
The 18th (Queen Mary’s Own) Royal Hussars 
The 19th (Queen Alexandra’s Own Royal) Hussars 
20th Hussars 
21st (Empress of India’s) Lancers 
 
The 1922 Amalgamations:- 
Army Order 133 1922  
By taking two squadrons from the senior regiment and one from the junior 
regiment, amalgamations of regiments of the Cavalry of the Line became:-  
 
The 3rd/6th Dragoon Guards 
The 4th/7th Dragoon Guards 
The 5th/6th Dragoons 
The 13th/18th Hussars 
The 14th/20th Hussars 
The 15th/19th Hussars 
The 16th/5th Lancers 
The 17th/20th Lancers 
 443 
And in 1927 - 1st and 2nd Life Guards formed The Life Guards (1st and 2nd)1  
There were changes to some regimental titles: the 3rd/6th Dragoon Guards 
became The 3rd Carabiniers Dragoon Guards, and the 5th/6th Dragoon Guards 
became the 5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards;2 and there was consolidation of 
regimental badges during the inter-war period in order to maintain traditions 
and other historical links,3 but no changes as such occurred to the entity of each 
regiment until motorization and mechanization.  The following regiments, 
therefore, underwent the process of mechanization. Eventually the regiments 
were equipped with tanks or armoured cars, carriers and scout-cars either 
before or during the course of the Second World War:- 
 
1st and 2nd Household Cavalry Regiments 
The 1st (Kings) Dragoon Guards 
The 2nd (Queen’s Bays) Dragoon Guards 
The 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales’s Dragoon Guards) 
The 4th/7th Dragoon Guards 
The 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards 
The Royal Dragoons (1st Dragoons) 
                                                 
1 White-Spunner, Barney [2006], Horse Guards  pp.489/490. 
TNA WO 32/2843 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Regiment of Household Cavalry:  
Reorganisation 1927, 20/Cav/599 minutes 1 – 31  March - July 1927and 13B; In the interests  
of economy there was a further consolidation of the Household Cavalry Regiments in 1927- 
1928. 
2 TNA WO 32/3271 Regimental Dress and Badges: Cavalry (Code 43(D)): Dress of the amalgamated 
Cavalry Regiments 1927. 
TNA WO 32/3272 Regimental Dress and Badges: Cavalry (Code 43(D)): Change of titles of 
amalgamated Cavalry Regiments 1927-1929; minute 64. 




The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons) 
The 3rd (King’s Own) Hussars 
The 4th (Queen’s Own) Hussars 
The 7th Queen’s Own Hussars 
The 8th (King’s Royal Irish) Hussars 
The 9th (Queen’s Royal) Lancers 
The 10th (Prince of Wales’s Own) Hussars 
The 11th (Prince Albert’s Own) Hussars 
The 12th (Prince of Wales’s Royal) Lancers 
The 13th/18th Royal Hussars (Queen Mary’s Own) 
14th/20th King’s Hussars 
15th/19th The King’s Royal Hussars 





Badges of the Regiments that formed the Royal Armoured Corps in 1939
4 
 
                                                 




British Household and Regular Cavalry – Role, function and organization between the 
two World Wars 
 
The dispositions of units of the British Army, and many of its officers, during the 
inter-war period reflected the Government’s responsibilities to its allies, and 
when and where the authorities ‘required the use of troops for the maintenance 
of law and order’.5  Examples were: the occupation of Turkey and Germany, the 
security of Great Britain and the British Empire, Dominions and Colonies, and the 
administration and protection of the mandated states, such as Palestine.  In 
1919 the Master General of the Ordnance, Lieutenant General Sir W T Furse, 
wrote that it was already difficult for the army to ‘keep abreast [of the needs 
in] almost every corner of the globe’.6  Across the two decades, January 1921, 
April 1929 and September 1939 are detailed below as significant examples of the 
size and deployment of army units.  January 1921 was the first post-Great War 
Army List detailing the deployment of individual units.  The total strength of all 
British armed services was 438,500 7, and the army was recorded as 370,000 in 
late 1920,8 reduced to 231,062 in 1922.9  In April 1929, the total strength of all 
British armed services was 325,600, but the Army was reduced still further to 
                                                 
5 Oatts, I Serve - Regimental History of 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards) 
p.244. 
6 TNA WO 32/5685 Army Organisation: Tanks (Code 14 (G)): Proposals concerning formation of 
tank expeditionary force and use of tanks in Russia – 1919; minute 14. 
7 URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/sep/01/military-service-personnel-total 
8 Bond, Brian in Chandler, David (Ed) [1994], The Oxford Illustrated History Of The British Army 
p.263. 
9 Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars p.91. 
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207,537 in 1931,10 in response to some reduction in the Army’s overseas 
commitments such as Turkey and Ireland.  The occupation of Germany ceased in 
1929, and except for the growth of self-determination, principally in India, 
reflected the more peaceful and stable world political environment.  September 
1939 was the last Army List detailing the deployment of most units before the 
Second World War.  By then the total strength of all British armed services had 































                                                 
13
 Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars pp.118/119. 
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United Kingdom Commands 
Aldershot Command 
January 1921 – 
General Officer Commanding (GOC) Lieutenant General F R Earl of Cavan with a 
full complement of staff. 
1st Cavalry Brigade – The 3rd, 4th and the 13th Hussars with details of the 17th 
Lancers and one signal troop of the Royal Engineers. Attached; a brigade of the 
Royal Horse Artillery (RHA), a Field Squadron of Royal Engineers and an Air 
Defence brigade of three batteries.  
1st Division – three brigades of infantry of between two and four battalions each,  
Divisional troops included eight batteries of field artillery and a signals company 
of Royal Engineers. 
2nd Division – two infantry brigades of between two and five battalions each 
together with three brigades of field artillery, a signals company of Royal 
Engineers, two brigades of garrison artillery and three field companies of Royal 
Engineers. 
April 1929 –  
GOC - Lieutenant General Sir David Campbell. 
The make-up of the Command was similar; 1st Cavalry Brigade consisted of The 
King’s Dragoon Guards, the 11th and the 14th/20th Hussars and a brigade of the 
RHA of three batteries (A, B and O batteries). 
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2nd Division had an extra brigade of infantry. 
Other Regular troops in the command included the 2nd Battalion Royal Tank 
Corps, field artillery, the Mechanical Warfare Establishment, Farnborough and 
‘detached War Office’ corps troops from the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC), 
Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC), Royal Army Ordnance Corps (RAOC), Royal 
Army Veterinary Corps (RAVC) and the Royal Army Pay Corps (RAPC). 
September 1939 –  
GOC Lieutenant General Sir John Dill. 
The changes in establishment reflected the preparation for a possible European 
war with the inclusion of the Army Tank Brigade of three battalions (4th, 7th and 
8th) Royal Tank Corps.  Divisional troops included a company of Royal Military 
Police (RMP), eight batteries of anti-tank guns, and a Royal Armoured Corps 
(RAC) brigade consisting of the Kings Dragoon Guards, the 12th Lancers and the 
3rd battalion RTR. Also as 1st Division troops, the 13th/18th Hussars and as 2nd 
Division troops, the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards. 
There was in 1939 a vast recruiting organization that came under various 
commands throughout the United Kingdom. 
Eastern Command 
January 1921 –  
GOC General H S Lord Horne. 
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As well as a full staff, the command included eleven companies RASC, mostly 
horse transport companies, four companies each of the RAMC and RAOC, three 
sections of the RAVC and a veterinary hospital at Luton. 
Field Troops –  
4th Cavalry Brigade – The Royals at Hounslow and the 10th Hussars at 
Canterbury. 
4th Division of two infantry brigades (the 11th and 12th) each of three 
battalions. 
Other troops included four batteries of the Royal Garrison Artillery (RGA), a field 
company of Royal Engineers and a number of Territorial Divisions and Brigades 
that included regular officers and men. 
London District included three companies each from the RASC (motor transport) 
and the RAMC.  Field troops included the Life Guards, the Royal Horse Guards 
and N battery RHA, also Territorial Divisions and Brigades. 
April 1929 –  
GOC – General Sir Robert Wigham. 
The command included the counties of Essex, Norfolk and Sussex with coastal 
defences, also London District.  London District included depots at Caterham, 
Warley, Pirbright, Windsor and Woolwich and the Rainham rifle range, the 4th 
(Guards) Infantry Brigade, the Life Guards and the Royal Horse Guards, M Battery 
RHA at St. John’s Wood, also various Territorial Divisions and Brigades including 
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the 26th and 27th (London) Air Defence Brigades.  Divisional troops included 
those from the RAOC, the Royal Signals and the Royal Engineers. 
The 4th Division had an additional infantry brigade (the 10th) and other regular 
troops included the 7th Hussars at Colchester, 13th/18th Hussars at Shorncliffe 
and the 17th/21st Lancers at Hounslow. 
September 1939 –  
GOC Lieutenant General Sir Guy Williams. 
The make-up of the command looks generally similar.  Divisional troops included 
the 5th Inniskilling dragoon Guards at Colchester, six batteries of Royal Artillery, 
three companies Royal Engineers and two companies RASC, also the officer 
commanding signals. 
Other Regular troops in the command were; the 13th/18th Hussars (under 
Aldershot) but based in Shorncliffe and the 17th/21st Lancers at Colchester and 
two battalions of infantry. 
The Royal Artillery ‘Fixed Defences’ on the south east coast such as 
Shoeburyness and Brighton came under Eastern Command, also the RASC units 
including the driving school at Feltham, eleven companies, workshops and 
depots, a unit of RMP and numbers 44 and 54 Territorial Divisions. 
London District was made up of an infantry brigade of three Guards’ battalions 
and other Regular troops; the Household Cavalry, a Guards’ battalion, K Battery 




January 1921 –  
GOC General Right Honourable Sir C F N Macready. 
The command had headquarters in Dublin, The Curragh, Cork, Belfast, 
Ballincollig and Carrickfergus. 
Field troops –  
3rd Cavalry Brigade – The Royals at Ballinasloe, the 10th Hussars at Ennis and the 
17th Lancers at Galway; the brigade included IV Brigade RHA with two batteries. 
1st Division – the 15th Brigade of four battalions and the Londonderry Infantry 
Brigade on four battalions. 
5th Division – three brigades each of two infantry battalions – the Galway, 13th 
Infantry Brigade at Athlone and 14th Infantry brigade at The Curragh, three 
brigades of field artillery each of four batteries. 
6th Division – of three Infantry Brigades; the 16th (four battalions) at Fermoy, 
Buttevant, Tipperary and Waterford; the 17th (five battalions) at Cork, Kinsole, 
Ballincollig and Queenstown, and the 18th (five battalions) at Ennis, Rathkeal, 
Limmerick and Templemare. 
Dublin District –  
Two Provisional brigades of infantry each of five battalions, a mobile searchlight 
group, one battalion of field artillery and the 5th Armoured Car Company. 
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Numbers 11 and 12 Districts included cavalry and infantry regimental depots and 
such staff as was needed. 
April 1929 –  
Northern Ireland District of eight infantry battalions was under Northern 
Command. 
September 1939 –  
Northern Ireland, under Northern Command, included four battalions of infantry, 
coastal defences and companies and detachments from the following Corps – 
RASC, RAMC, RAOC and RAPC. 
Northern Command 
January 1921 -  
GOC Lieutenant General Sir F I Maxe. 
Field troops –  
Part of the 4th Division – the 10th Infantry brigade of three battalions. 
Other troops included the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons, a Fortress company of the 
Royal Engineers  and number of infantry and cavalry depots and their staff and 
Territorial Divisions and Brigades.  
April 1929 -  
GOC Sir Cameron D Shute. 
Field troops –  
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The 13th Infantry Brigade, 5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards (York), a coastal 
defence division and Territorial Divisions and Brigades. 
September 1939 –  
GOC General Sir William Bartholomew. 
Companies, sections and detachments from the following corps; RAMC, RAOC, 
RAPC AND RAVC. 
Field troops –  
5th Division of two brigades of infantry and divisional troops from the Royal 
Engineers, Royal Signals and RASC. 
Other troops included the 15th/19th Hussars at York, 7th battalion Royal Tank 
Corps, four anti-aircraft battalions, two field artillery batteries and the Royal 
Artillery’s fixed defences at northern ports.  Also included in the command were 
49th (West Riding) and 50th (Northumbria) Territorial Divisions.  
Scottish Command 
January 1921 – 
GOC Lieutenant General Sir F J Davies. 
A motor transport troop of the RASC, one company from the RAMC and one 
section from the RAOC. 
Field Troops –  
The Kings Dragoon Guards, three battalions of infantry and two companies of 
Royal Engineers.  In the Highland Area were Royal Artillery depots and in 
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Lowland Area were depots for six cavalry and five infantry regiments. Also in the 
command were Territorial Divisions and Brigades. 
April 1929 –  
GOC General sir William E Peyton 
Field troops – The Royal Scots Greys. 
In both the Highland and Lowland Areas were five infantry battalion depots, 
Territorial Divisions and Brigades. 
September 1939 –  
GOC General Sir Charles Grant. 
The command was made up from; a company from the RAMC, a section from the 
RAOC, three detachments from the RAPC and one from the RAVC; one battery of 
field artillery, Royal Artillery fixed defences in Scottish ports, three battalions of 
infantry together with Territorial Divisions and Brigades including the 51st 
(Highland) and 52nd (Lowland) Divisions. 
Southern Command – this included the vast army training area of Salisbury Plain.  
January 1921 –  
GOC Lieutenant General Sir G M Harper. 
Troops from Corps included nine companies, both motor and horse from the 
RASC, six companies from the RAMC and four section of the RAOC. 
Field troops –  
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2nd Cavalry Brigade – made up of the 4th Dragoon Guards, the 9th Lancers 
(temporarily serving in Ireland), the Kings Dragoon Guards and a signal troop of 
Royal Engineers. 
3rd Division made up of the 7th Infantry Brigade, just details of one battalion 
and 8th Infantry Brigade, two infantry battalions and details from another. 
Divisional troops were three brigades of field artillery of four batteries each and 
three field companies of Royal Engineers.  Other troops were three brigades of 
various units of the Royal Artillery. 
Southern Command also included the Tank Corps Centre; numbers 7,8,9 and 10 
Armoured Car Companies at Wareham, but bound for India; Number 1 Depot 
Battalion and a cadre of the 4th Battalion  were also at Wareham; 2nd Battalion, 
a cadre of the 3rd Battalion and the 5th Battalion, less one company  were 
stationed at Wool.  Also at Wool were the Head Quarters of the Tank Corps, the 
workshop and the training battalion. 
The command also included Territorial Divisions and Brigades. 
April 1929 –  
GOC Lieutenant General Sir Montgomery Massingberd. 
Field troops – 
2nd Cavalry Brigade made up of The Bays, the 3rd Dragoon Guards and the 
16th/5th Lancers. 3rd Division contained the 7th, 8th and 9th Infantry brigades 
and divisional troops. 
The command included Territorial Divisions and Brigades. 
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September 1939 –  
GOC Lieutenant General A F Brooke. 
This very much reflected the change in the security situation in Europe. 
Field troops –  
The Armoured Division:- 
1st Light Armoured Brigade (Tidworth) – the Kings Dragoon Guards and the 3rd 
and 4th Hussars. 
2nd Light Armoured Brigade (Tidworth) – The Bays, the 9th Lancers and the 10th 
Hussars. 
1st Heavy Armoured Brigade – the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Royal Tank Regiments. 
The divisional troops included men from the Royal Signals, six companies from 
the RASC and one company of RMP. 
3rd Division made up of the 8th and 9th Infantry Brigades with divisional troops 
that included six batteries of Royal Artillery, divisional signals and three 
companies each from the RASC and the Royal Engineers. 
The command also included the Territorial Divisions - 43 (Wessex) and 48 (South 
Midland) together with their divisional troops. 
Western Command 
January 1921- 
GOC Lieutenant General Sir H de B De Lisle. 
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Field troops – one battalion of infantry. 
Welsh Area – four cavalry and four infantry regiment depots and a company of 
Royal Engineers. 
West Lancashire Area – three infantry battalion depots 
East Lancashire Area – Reserve Brigade Royal Field Artillery and six infantry 
depots. 
The command included Territorial Divisions and Brigades. 
The Channel Islands:-  
Guernsey – a company of Royal Engineers, a detail from an infantry battalion and 
a section of RAOC. 
Jersey – one infantry battalion and one section of RAOC 
April 1929 –  
RHA F and J Batteries and one battalion of infantry. 
Welsh Area – four infantry regiment depots. 
West Lancashire Area – three infantry regiment depots. 
East Lancashire Area – six infantry regiment depots. 
Also Territorial Divisions and Brigades. 
The Channel Islands:- an officer commanding – no troops listed 
September 1939 –  
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GOC Lieutenant General Sir R H Haining. 
Two companies of the RASC 
One company of the RAMC 
One section of the RAOC 
Three detachments of the RAPC 
2nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade 
One battery of field artillery and the coastal defences of northwest and Welsh 
ports. 
Territorial Divisons:- 
38rd (South Welsh) Division 
42nd (East Lancs) Division 
53rd (Welsh) Division 
55th (Welsh) Division 
The Channel Islands:-  
A small staff, no troops. 
Anti-Aircraft Command 
September 1939 
GOC Lieutenant General Sir Fredrick Pile 







The Army of The Black Sea (Constantinople and Turkish Police Control) 
January 1921- 
GOC Lieutenant General Sir C H Harington. 
The 28th Division of three infantry brigades. 
Divisional troops included the 20th Hussars (bound for Egypt), 
A brigade of field artillery of four batteries 
Two companies of the Royal Engineers 
Two battalions of infantry and a company of the Machine-Gun Corps 
Two companies of the RAOC and a detachment of the RAPC. 
 
France and Flanders 
January 1921- 
Administrative and technical staff dealing with matter such as railways, police 
and labour. 
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The Army of The Rhine 
January 1921- 
GOC Lieutenant General Sir T L N Morland (with a full staff). 
British troops in Command –  
The 14th Hussars 
One brigade of field artillery of four batteries and one brigade of garrison 
artillery of one battery 
A field company of the Royal Engineers 
Seven battalions of infantry and a machine-gun company 
B Company of the Tank Corps 
Three motor transport companies of the RASC 
Four companies of the RAOC and a detachment of the RAPC; there was also 
staffing for the Military Inter-Allied Commissions of Control in Berlin and Austria. 
April 1929 –  
GOC Lieutenant General Sir William Thwaites; also the Office of the Judge 
Advocate-General. 
The 8th Hussars 
One section of the 12th Armoured Car Company 
1st and 2nd Rhine Brigades each of three infantry battalions 
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East Indies Command 
 
The Army in India 
January 1921- 
GOC General H S Lord Rawlinson (with a full staff including branches of the 
Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, medical, ordnance and military 
works). 
British troops in Command –  
Northern Command – no British troops, but British officers are listed. 
Lahore District - a battery each of the RHA and the Royal Field Artillery. 
Western Command 
Sid-Rajputana District – one infantry battalion, a brigade of three batteries of 
field artillery and one company of garrison artillery. 
Southern Command 
Bombay District - one infantry battalion and two companies of garrison artillery. 
Madras District – two battalions of infantry and a company of garrison artillery. 
April 1929 –  




The 15th/19th Hussars 
Number 1 Armoured Car Company, Royal Tank Corps (RTC) 
Units of the Royal Artillery and three infantry battalions. 
Kohat District 
Kohat Brigade – 12th Light Battalion, Royal Artillery. 
Rawalpindi District 
XXII field Brigade, Royal Artillery, and three infantry battalions. 
Lahore District 
The 4th/7th Dragoon Guards 
N Battery, the RHA 
XII Battery, the Royal Field Artillery 
Number 7 Armoured Car Company, RTC, and six infantry battalions. 
Waziristan District  
Two light batteries of artillery and an infantry battalion. 
Western Command  
Baluchistan District – in two Independent Brigade areas; 
Zhob Area in Loralai 
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Number 10 Armoured Car Company, RTC, I Royal Artillery Brigade of four light 
batteries, and two infantry battalions. 
Sind Area in Karachi 
A detachment I Brigade, Royal Artillery, a battery of heavy artillery and a 
battalion of infantry. 
Eastern Command 
Meerut District 
The 4th Hussars 
I Field Brigade, Royal Artillery of three batteries, 
XXVII Field Brigade, Royal Artillery of three batteries, and four battalions of 
infantry. 
Lucknow District 
The 3rd Hussars 
Number 9 Armoured Car Company, RTC 
Four batteries of artillery and five infantry battalions. 
Delhi Independent Brigade Area 
Number 11 Armoured Car Company, RTC 
Three batteries of medium artillery and two infantry battalions. 
Presidency and Assam District 
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Three infantry battalions. 
Southern Command 
Mhow District 
Four batteries of artillery and two infantry battalions. 
Deccan District 
The 9th Lancers 
Four batteries of artillery, five infantry battalions and a company of the Royal 
Corps of Signals. 
Poona Independent Brigade Area 
Number 8 Armoured Car Company, RTC 
One battery of artillery and two infantry battalions. 
Bombay District 
Two batteries of artillery an infantry battalion, and Number 31 Company, RAMC. 
Madras District 
Southern Brigade Area 
Number 6 Armoured Car Company, RTC 




Burma - Independent District 
Rangoon Area 
A Royal artillery headquarters and two infantry battalions. 
September 1939 
GOC General Sir Robert Cassels 
Northern Command 
Peshawar District 
The 16th/5th Lancers, 
Numbers 1, 7 and 11 Light Tank Companies of the RTC, 
Three artillery and one anti-aircraft batteries, and two infantry battalions. 
Rawalpindi District 
Three artillery batteries and two infantry battalions. 
Lahore District 
The 3rd Dragoon Guards, 
Three artillery batteries, six infantry battalions and a company of the Royal 
Engineers. 
Waziristan 




Six artillery batteries and two infantry battalions. 
Lucknow District 
Four artillery batteries and five infantry battalions 
Delhi District 
Two artillery batteries and two infantry battalions. 
The Presidency and Assam District 
Three infantry battalions. 
Southern Command 
Deccan District 
The 14th/ 20th Hussars, 
One signals company, two artillery batteries and two infantry battalions. 
Poona District 
One artillery battery and two infantry battalions. 
Bombay 
Seven artillery batteries, eight battalions of infantry and one company of the 
RAMC. 
Madras (Bangalore) 
Three infantry battalions 
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Western District (Quetta) 
One artillery battery and two infantry battalions. 
 
Burma 
One artillery battery and two infantry battalions. 
Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates 
January 1921 
West Africa – British troops in Sierra Leone. 
One company of garrison artillery, a company of the Royal Engineers. 
April 1929 
One company of garrison artillery, a company of the Royal Engineers. And 
detachments from the RAOC and RAPC. 
September 1939 
One artillery battery, a company of the Royal engineers and detachment from 
the RAMC,  the RASC and the RAPC. 
Bermuda –  
January 1921 




Detacments from the Royal Engineers, infantry, RAPC a signals section and 
Number 25 Company RAMC. 
 
September 1939 
A battalion of infantry, a company of the RAMC and detachments from the Royal 
Engineers, the RASC, the RAOC and the RAPC. 
Ceylon –  
January 1921 
A company of the Royal Engineers. 
April 1929 
Two batteries of artillery, a company of Royal engineers, a signals section and 
detachments from the RASC, the RAMC, the RAPC and the RAOC. 
 
China – Hong Kong –  
January 1921 
A company of the Royal Engineers, two companies of the RAMC and an infantry 
battalion. 
April 1929 
South China – Hong Kong – 
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Seven artillery batteries, a company of Royal engineers, three battalions of 
infantry, a signals section Number 27 Company RAMC and detachments from the 
RASC, the RAPC and the RAOC. 
 
September 1939 
Six artillery batteries for coastal defence and anti-aircraft and four artillery 
mountain and field batteries. Two companies of Royal Engineers and one 
company from each of the Royal Corps of Signals, the RASC, RMP and the RAMC; 
one section from the RAPC and a detachment of the RAVC.  
North China – Shanghai –  
January 1921 
Two battalions of infantry, Number 12 (Motor Company) and supply depot RASC. 
Number 7 General Hospital and Number 12 Field Ambulance (less one company) 
RAMC. 
RAOC Advance Depot and Mobile Workshop, a signals section and detachments 
from the Royal Engineers, the Army Postal Service, the RAPC and the RMP. 
Tientsin Area –  
Two infantry battalions, a signals section and detachments of the Royal 




Two infantry battalions, sections of the RMP and the Royal Corps of Signals and 
detachments for each of the RASC, the RAMC, the RAOC and the RAPC. 
Tientsin Area 
A battalion of infantry, a signal section and detachments form each of the Royal 




One infantry Company. 
September 1939 




Two batteries of artillery and units of the Royal Engineers and Royal Corps of 
Signals. 
 
Egypt and Palestine 
January 1921 
 473 
GOC Lieutenant General Sir W N Congreve VC with a full staff. 
British troops in Command –  
The 4th Cavalry Division – the 5th Dragoon Guards and the Royal Scots Greys. 
The 3rd (Lahore) Division – three battalions of infantry and a brigade of four 
batteries of field artillery. 
The 10th (Irish) Division) – the 11th Hussars, a brigade of the RHA and two 
battalions of infantry. 
Cairo Brigade – three battalions of infantry. 
Khartoum – one battalion of infantry. 
April 1929 
GOC Lieutenant General Sir E Peter Strickland 
The Cavalry Brigade – The Royals, the 10th Hussars and the 12th Lancers. 
The Canal Brigade – three infantry battalions 
The Cairo Brigade – three infantry battalions 
Other British troops –  
Three batteries of the RHA and three batteries of the Light Royal Artillery, 
Two field companies each of the Royal Engineers and Royal Corps of Signals, four 
Motor Transport Companies and one Supply Company of the RASC. A company 
each from the RAMC and the RAOC, Number 20 Veterinary Hospital RAVC and 
detachment of the RAPC. 
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GOC Lieutenant General H M Wilson 
The Armoured Division 
The Light Armoured Brigade 
The 7th, 8th and the 11th Hussars. 
The Canal Brigade – three infantry battalions 
The Cairo Brigade – three infantry battalions 
The (Armednagar) Infantry Brigade 
one British infantry battalion and two Indian infantry battalions. 
18th Infantry Brigade of three infantry battalions. 
Other British troops in the Command:- 
Numbers 1 and 6 Battalions the RTC, six artillery batteries, five companies of 
the Royal Engineers, ‘Egypt’ signals, ten companies RASC, Number 11 General 
Hospital, three field ambulances and two hygiene sections of the RAMC, a 
section and a workshop of the RAOC, three companies of RMP and a detachment 
from each of the RAPC and the RAVC. 
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Palestine and Trans Jordan 
September 1939 
GOC Lieutenant General M G H Barker - with a full staff of British and Indian 
Army officers. 
The 7th Division 
British troops included the 19th Infantry Brigade of two battalions. 
Divisional troops included – The Greys 
One company of the Royal Engineers and two companies of the RASC. 
The 8th Division 
British troops included the 14th Infantry Brigade of three battalions and the 16th 
Infantry Brigade of four battalions. 
Divisional troops included – The Royals 
One company of the Royal Engineers, two companies of the RASC and an artillery 
detachment. 
Other British troops in the Command –  
An artillery battery, a company from each of the Royal Engineers and the Royal 
Corps of Signals and the RMP, three infantry battalions, a RAMC Base General 






Two infantry battalions. 
September 1939 
Two infantry battalions and detachments of the RAPC, the RAMC and the RASC. 
Two infantry battalions 
The Falkland Islands 
January 1921 




A battalion of infantry, one company each of the Royal Engineers and RAMC. 
April 1921 
A cadre of  heavy artillery, a company from each of the Royal Engineers and the 
RAMC, an infantry battalion, a signals section and a detachment from the RAPC. 
Malta 
January 1921 
Two battalions of infantry, two companies of the Royal Engineers and a company 
of the RAMC. 
 477 
April 1921 
Two batteries of artillery, a company each of the Royal Engineers, the RASC and 
the RAMC, a signals section and a detachment of the RAPC. 
September 1939 
The Malta Infantry Brigade of four battalions. 
Other troops –  
An anti-aircraft regiment, three companies of the Royal Engineers, the RASC, 
and the RAMC and detachments from each of the RMP and the RAOC.  
Mauritius 
January 1921 
One company of the Royal Engineers. 
April 1921 
One company of the Royal Engineers, an artillery battery, a signals section and a 
detachment of the RAPC. 
September 1939 
An artillery battery, one company of the Royal Engineers, a signals section and 







Three artillery batteries, a battalion of infantry, a company from each of the 
Royal Engineers, the RASC, and the RAMC, a signal company and a detachment of 
the RAPC. 
September 1939 
Coastal and anti-aircraft batteries, three infantry battalions, three companies of 
the Royal Engineers, a company form each of the RASC, the RAMC and the RAOC, 
sections from each of the Royal Corps of Signals and RMP and detachments from 
the RAPC and the RAVC. . 
Iraq 
April 1921 
A signals section. 
Jamaica 
September 1939 
An artillery battery, infantry battalion, A company of each of the Royal 
Engineers and the RAMC, a signals section and detachments of the RASC, the 






GOC Major General L V Bond 
Changi - Five artillery batteries. 
Singapore – Eight batteries of anti-aircraft and coastal defence, six companies of 
the Royal Engineers and one company from each of the Royal Corps of Signals 
and the RAMC together with one section from each of the RAOC, the RMP and 
the RAPC.  
The Malay Infantry Brigade of three British battalions plus another in Taiping, 
and 
The 12th (Secunderabad) Infantry Brigade of one British battalion and three 
Indian Army Battalions. 
January 1921 
British officers were listed as serving in:- New Zealand, Saint Helena, The 
Seychelles and with the Egyptian Army. 
April 1921  
British officers were listed as serving in:- The Leeward Island, Iraq, Canada, 





The locations, or stations, of cavalry regiments from 1920 – 1939 Location and  
Location and Station of British Household and Regular cavalry regiments 1920 – 1922 
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Location and Station of British Household and Regular cavalry regiments  
1923 – 1928 
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Location and Station of British Household and Regular cavalry regiments  
1929 – 1935 
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Location and Station of British Household and Regular cavalry regiments 
 1936 - 1939 
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Source - The Army Lists  - As a state of war existed before 1920 and after 1939 detailed locations 






A cavalry regiment, as a matter of routine, spent three years in rotation, in a 
number of the stations in England and Scotland, the ‘Home’ stations.  Home 
stations included: Aldershot, Colchester, Edinburgh, Shorncliffe, Tidworth and 
York.  Hounslow was usually the station of embarkation and Shorncliffe the 
station for regiments returning from overseas. Nine years were spent away when 
a regiment was posted abroad, usually to Egypt and India, but there were 
exceptions, such as the 1st (Kings) Dragoon Guards and the 1st (Royal) Dragoons 
(The Royals) that were overseas for just six years.  The 12th Lancers, 
mechanized with armoured cars in 1927, served in Egypt until 1934 when they 
were replaced by the other cavalry armoured car regiment, the 11th Hussars, 
whose tour of duty was extended by the outbreak of war.  The 3rd Hussars 
served in Constantinople in 1922, followed by three years in Egypt and six in 
India.  The 15th/19th Hussars served in Egypt and Palestine between 1924 and 
1928, moved then to India until 1933, when the regiment returned home to 
Shorncliffe in early 1934.  The Army List for any given period gave the main 
location for the regiment, but detachments from the regiment were posted 
around the region of their main station to carry out police and security duties.  
The 15th/19th Hussars postings were an example.14  The regiment left Tidworth 
on 11 January 1924 and disembarked at Port Said on 25 January.  Between 1924 
and 1928 the regiment’s main locations were in Palestine and Egypt, at Helmieh 
(now in the Yemen), and Abbassia, near Cairo.  Regimental detachments were 
stationed at Sidi Bishr near Alexandria, Mena Camp, outside Cairo and within site 
of the Pyramids [‘mena’ – a military acronym for Middle East and North Africa], 
Helwan, south of Cairo, and Wadi El Natrum 100 km northwest of Cairo. 
                                                 
14 Thompson, The 15th/19th The King’s Hussars – A Pictorial History - appendix. 
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The 15th/ 19th Hussars embarked on 28 October 1928 for India and travelled 
1,400 miles to Risalpur via Bombay (now Mumbai), Surat, Baroda, Agra, Delhi, 
Ambala, Lahore and Rawalpindi; they arrived at Risalpur 14 November 1928 
where they took over the station from the 5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.  
Detachments of the regiment were then stationed at Kanpur, Arbi-Ksli, 
Peshawar, where in 1930 the unit was called out to assist the civil power during 
‘disturbances’ in the district.  In 1931 a detachment in Tulandi was called out 
‘to quell the Red Shirt troubles’.  Detachments were variously at Hoti Mardan, 
Charsadda, Kanpur, Swabbi, Rashkai, Lahore, Kohat, Kaganath and Jalbai.15  The 
regiment embarked for Shorncliffe, England, 15 January 1934, handing over the 
station to the 14th/20th (King’s) Hussars.  George ‘Yorkie’ Husband, who served 
with the 16th/5th Lancers in Secunderabad in 1937, confirmed in 2010 that he 
sometimes ‘never saw [a] barracks for two to three weeks at a time, whole 








                                                 
15 Thompson, The 15th/19th The King’s Hussars – A Pictorial History - appendix. 
















                                                 





Military stations around Cairo.18  
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British horsed cavalry regiments of the period were similar, but not identical, in 
structure and organisation.  There was a ‘recommended’ establishment for both 
‘peace’ and ‘war’,19 but this varied with circumstance, such as home or overseas 
postings, recruitment levels, whether a regiment had just retuned ‘home’ when 
large numbers of time-expired men might be demobilised,20 or when the 
regiment was about to be posted abroad and was most likely to be up to full 
establishment. Every effort was to be made to ensure regiments serving overseas 
were fully manned. Regiments serving abroad were ‘linked’ with regiments at 
home to train new recruits and provide drafts to serve abroad.21 
 
A Lieutenant Colonel commanded the regiment. At ‘home’ the regiment’s peace 
time establishment was 560, and 574 war time establishment - men of all ranks; 
regiments serving in the colonies had an establishment of 575 men of all ranks 
and in India 596 men of all ranks.22  The Army Lists indicated, in most cases but 
not all, officers, up to and including Lieutenant Colonel, were promoted from 
within their own regiment.  It was likely, therefore, that the Lieutenant Colonel 
commenced his career as a subaltern in the regiment.23  The second in command 
of the regiment was a Major; he was likely to succeed the Lieutenant Colonel in 
due course, perhaps after three to four years in post.24 The executive was 
supported by a Head Quarters Squadron that included: the Adjutant (usually a 
                                                 
19 TNA WO 32/11369 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Reports of committee on war and 
peace time establishment – Appendices. 
20 Personal interviews with Lucas (2007); and Bennett (2007); by the author. 
21 TNA WO 32/5959 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Scheme for reduction of Cavalry 
Regiments. 
22 TNA WO 32/11369 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Reports of committee on war and 
peace time establishment – Appendices; Evans, The Story of The Fifth Royal Inniskilling Dragoon 
Guards, p.172 – 598; men of all ranks. 
23 The Army Lists. 
24 The Army Lists. 
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Captain, who was responsible for the day to day administration of the regiment), 
signals officer (usually a subaltern), a Quartermaster, responsible for clothing 
and equipment, the Regimental Sergeant Major and the Band Master (both 
Warrant Officers Class I), and the Farrier Quartermaster-Sergeant (Warrant 
Officer Class II).  Other roles and ranks included: Warrant Officers responsible 
for instruction such as rough-riders and musketry:  Sergeants, Corporals and 
Privates (known as Troopers after 1924) were responsible for policing the 
regiment (provost), tailoring, cooking, saddler, transport, and the officers mess.  
The Headquarters Squadron establishment totalled around 160 of all ranks.25 
 
The operational or fighting soldiers, totalled around four hundred men of all 
ranks, and were divided between three Squadrons, known as ‘Sabre’ or ‘Lance’ 
Squadrons.  Each squadron was commanded by a Major with a Captain as his 
second in command, and these officers were supported by a small squadron 
headquarters of perhaps twenty men of all ranks.26  The squadron was divided 
into four troops, each troop commanded by a subaltern with a sergeant as 
second in command.  One troop in each regiment had a sergeant in command of 
a troop.  In three of the troops the soldiers were armed with a sword (1908 
pattern) or lance (final pattern), or both, and a rifle, the Short Magazine Lee 
Enfield Mark III (S.M.L.E.).  Officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) 
carried revolvers (the Webley Mk VI).27  On active service the officers would 
probably carry the same 1908 pattern sword as the troopers, rather than the 
                                                 
25 TNA WO 32/11369 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Reports of committee on war and 
peace time establishment – Appendices. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
Chappell, British Cavalry Equipment 1800-1941, pp. 37-39. 
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more elaborate officer’s 1912 pattern, in a brown leather covered wooden 
scabbard.28 Each of the three troops was divided into three sections of eight men 
each led by a corporal; 29 one man in four was designated as the ‘horse-holder’, 
enabling the other three to fight dismounted when such action was required.  
When fighting dismounted the Troop Sergeant was responsible for the horse-
holders and the led horses.30  It was found to be a very difficult task for one man 
to hold on to four horses whilst under fire, especially artillery fire, and the 
timing was critical to bring up the horses for remounting the rest of the troop 
after dismounted action had taken place.31  The fourth troop was the ‘machine-
gun’ or ‘Hotchkiss’ Troop and was divided into four sections.32  This troop was 
armed with Vickers or Hotchkiss machine-guns, sometimes both.  Machine-guns 
were carried on led pack-horses.33  At ‘home’ the regiments had around 360 
horses, 515 in the colonies and a little over 600 in India.34 
 
The British Army, post 1918, was designed in the main for home security, and to 
defend and protect the British Empire, including new responsibilities in Africa, 
the Pacific and those Middle-Eastern lands mandated to Great Britain following 
the San Remo Conference in April 1920.  There was also a commitment to the 
Anglo-French army of occupation in the Rhineland as well as home-service in 
                                                 
28 Robinson, Swords of the British Army, p.100. 
29 Kenyon, Horseman in No Man’s Land, p.21. 
30 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
31 TNA WO 95/1466 4th Division War Diaries; 19th Hussars; B Squadron, 26 August 1914. 
32 Evans, The Story of The Fifth Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, p.162. 
33 TNA WO 32/11366 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Abolition of certain weapons to 
improve efficiency; Oatts, I Serve - Regimental History of 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's 
Dragoon Guards), p.247. 
34 TNA WO 32/11369 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Reports of committee on war and 
peace time establishment – Appendices. 
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Ireland.35  By 1922 the British Empire spanned one quarter of the globe and one 
quarter of the world’s population.36 In some countries within the Empire a 
growth of self-determination and anti-Imperialism caused a huge strain on 
British military resources.37  War, certainly another European war, was not 
contemplated during the 1920s.  Had a war happened, horsed cavalry would 
have performed as it had done so during the previous wars of the twentieth 
century, and would do again in future conflicts as an armoured corps.  This was 
succinctly summarized in 1935 38 as:- 
Long distance reconnaissance 
To seize and hold ground 
Flank and rear guards 
To follow-up a break into an enemy position 
To raid back areas 
The pursuit of a broken enemy 
 
Imperial policing (this term was coined in the 1930s to reflect the changing 
methods used to control the Empire), employed some mechanized forces in the 
form of armoured cars and aircraft.39  In some areas however, horses were 
invaluable.  In Ireland, after the Easter uprising of 1916, military action by the 
self-styled Irish Republican Army (IRA) increased.  British Army numbers in 
Ireland rose to almost 40,000 troops by 1921.  As well as lorries, the British 
                                                 
35 Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, pp.15,17,32. 
36 Anglesey, A History of the British cavalry 1816-1919, Volume 8, The Western Front 1915-1918  
Epilogue, 1919-1939, p.310. 
37 Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, pp.10/11. 
38 ‘3rd Hussars Experiment in Mechanization April-September 1935’ in TNA WO32/2847 Army 
Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 1934-1936 20/Cav/831. 
39 Holmes, The Oxford Companion to Military History, p.433. 
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troops were equipped with aircraft and 100 armoured cars.40  Armoured cars, not 
being cross-country vehicles, were vulnerable to road obstructions, such as tree 
felling and bridge blowing that were frequent tactics of the IRA, but tactics that 
failed to halt the progress of horse cavalry.  The cavalry squadrons were 
dispersed over a wide area of Ireland and were engaged in wide sweeps of the 
countryside looking for arms and armed men.  Five cavalry regiments were 
engaged on this work, sometimes working dismounted when ‘on steep hills and 
rocky ground’ and sometimes at night; the cavalry was supported by infantrymen 
and armoured cars.41  Oatts, the historian of the 3rd Hussars, argued that this 
demonstrated that horsed cavalry had ‘not yet become obsolete, but was still 
indispensable in mobile operations however useless it might be considered in 
trench warfare’, a view supported by Lord Carnock, the historian of the 15th 
Hussars.42  After ‘The Treaty’ between Great Britain and Ireland in December 
1921, British troops withdrew to Ulster on border protection duties.43 
 
The horse cavalry arm of the British Army was particularly efficient in dealing 
with public disturbances, using methods now adopted by mounted police.44 In 
this regard, cavalry horsemanship changed its emphasis after the Great War, by 
keeping the horse ‘on-contact’ all the time.  This style of riding, a ‘collected’ 
dressage movement, was highly suitable for close contact pressure on a crowd: it 
was argued that the horse, ‘still the best cross country conveyance available at 
                                                 
40 James, Warrior Race – A History of The British at War, p.577. 
41 Oatts, I Serve - Regimental History of 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards), 
p.244; Carnock, The History of the 15th The King’s Hussars 1914-1922 pp.212-220. 
42 Ibid. 
43 James, Warrior Race – A History of The British at War, p.577; Bond, British Military Policy 
Between the Two World Wars, p.20. 
44 Oatts, I Serve - Regimental History of 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards), 
p.244. 
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the time… did not properly demonstrate its capability’ in later experiments 
comparing the horse to other forms of transport,45 where speed and stamina 
were required.  ffrench Blake confirmed the horses were no longer trained for 
endurance, nor tested in that respect, but to look impressive.46 
 
Ronald Lucas remembered ‘shop window riding’ through York, where the 
troopers checked their own riding positions by observing their reflections in the 
shop windows; mirrors are used in riding schools for the same purpose.  Lucas’s 
comment demonstrated that the men had been trained to get their mounts ‘on 
contact’ or ‘collected’.47 This technique enabled better control of the animal in 
walk, trot and canter, and was essential for crowd control.  A somewhat 
different technique is employed for the gallop, a ‘pace’ essential for the latter 
stages of a mounted charge of an earlier era.48 The catalyst for the change in 
riding technique might have occurred in the early 1920s when Colonel Sykes, the 
Riding Master at Sandhurst, retired.  Oatts commented that the riding style 
seemed to change, to keep the horse ‘collected’ at all times and ‘never bring a 
horse home in a lather’.49  
 
Imperial policing went on in many areas of the British Empire; India, Egypt, 
Kurdistan, Iraq, and the North West Frontier in circumstances quite different 
from Ireland.50  Such an example was in May 1919, in what was more a warlike 
                                                 
45 Oatts, I Serve - Regimental History of 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards) 
pp.245/246. 
46 Personal interview with ffrench-Blake (2006); by the author. 
47 Personal interview with Lucas (2007); by the author. 
48 Richardson, Riding, pp. 46-51. 
49Oatts, I Serve - Regimental History of 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards), 
p.245. 
50 James, Warrior Race – A History of The British at War, p.576. 
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situation than policing.  The Kings Dragoon Guards marched overnight at short 
notice to seize and hold wells on the Indian side of the Afghan border, illegally 
occupied by the Afghan Army.  The Dragoons achieved their objective by setting 
up machine-gun positions, and mounted patrols.  Combining with infantry and 
the RAF, and somewhat reminiscent of Allenby’s tactics in Palestine, they drove 
the Afghan forces back down the pass.  The force was counter-attacked; two 
squadrons of the regiment charged in order to give the infantry time to withdraw 
safely.51  The ‘Third Afghan War’ ended in August 1919, but agitation for Indian 
independence and troublesome tribesmen necessitated the continued 
deployment of large numbers of troops on the frontier.52 
 
In Mesopotamia, between December 1919 and May 1921, the 7th Dragoon 
Guards, with elements of the 8th Hussars, were ‘chasing rebel bands in the 
desert between the Tigris and the Euphrates’ as part of 5,000 British troops 
deployed to put down ‘this forgotten Arab rebellion’.53 The 8th Hussars had been 
engaged ‘to help in quelling grave disturbances in that country’; later they 
moved their horses, first by river barge, and then overland to march ‘one 
hundred miles to Medali, near the Persin (Iran) border [to deal] with various 
native insurrections’.54 
 
Queen’s Bays were in action in Malabar in 1921-1922, and 15th/19th Hussars on 
the North West Frontier in 1930-1931.  In Risalpur, India, the 5th/6th Dragoon 
                                                 
51 URL: http://www.qdg.org.uk/pages/Afghanistan-1919-121.php 
52 Anglesey, A History of the British cavalry 1816-1919, Volume 8, p.307. 
53 Brereton, A History of the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards and their predecessors 1685-1980, 
p.346; Joslin Litherland, Simpkin, British Battles and Medals, pp.220, 238-240. 
54 Strawson, Pierson, and Rhoderick-Jones, Irish Hussar p.95. 
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Guards had to train for a mobile column to be prepared, ‘at a moment’s notice 
to deal with a tribal raid’; this had to be practised.55  In Palestine, 1936-1939, 
Royal Scots Greys, the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards and the 11th Hussars were 
engaged; by this time the 11th Hussars were ‘mounted’ in armoured cars.56  
Mounted troops on horses were last deployed in England during the Liverpool 
Race Riots of August 1919; mounted police later took over this type of work.57  
For the 4th Hussars in India for nine years (1921-1930): 
 
Life was very pleasant… untroubled by anything more strenuous in the 
way of duty than the occasional quelling of Hindoo-Moslem riots… There 
were two long marches on change of station: two hundred and fifty miles 
from Muttra to Lucknow in February, 1924, made in twenty-six days, and 
three hundred miles from Lucknow to Meerut in twenty days in October, 
1927.58  
 
In 1927, in a memorandum to the Secretary of State for War, the Military 
members of the Army Council reminded him that since the end of the Great War, 
the British Army had already been involved with seven emergencies: ‘the Third 
Afghan War, the Rebellion in Mesopotamia, Chanak, Ireland, Egypt, China, and 
not least the General Strike’.59   
                                                 
55 Evans, The Story of The Fifth Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, p.173. 
56 Joslin Litherland, Simpkin, British Battles and Medals, pp.220, 238-240. 
57 Anglesey, A History of the British cavalry 1816-1919, Volume 8, p.311-322. 
58 Scott Daniell, 4th Hussar, p.28. 
59 TNA WO 32/2846 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Reduction of expenditure on 
Cavalry 1927; Memorandum on the Reorganization of The Cavalry (Secret), 30 June 1927. 
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In June 1936, now as a mechanized unit, the 8th Hussars were involved ‘in 
suppressing disturbances between Arabs and Jews… patrolling, guarding the 
railway and aerodrome at Gaza, escorting post office parties restoring telephone 
lines and searching villages’.60 
 
Part of the British Army’s role during the early period between the wars was 
reminiscent in many ways to the role of the late Victorian British Army.  It was 
not surprising, therefore, that the British Army reverted to the tried and tested 
so-called ‘Cardwell system’ to garrison and police the Empire with a non-
conscript army.61  The Cardwell System was re-introduced to infantry battalions 
at the end of the Great War, but it did not apply directly to regular cavalry 
regiments (the Household Cavalry only served abroad during war-time), but in 
essence, it appeared to have operated as cavalry regiments were unofficially 
linked, such as the 15th Hussars and the 19th Hussars described below.  Prior to 
1932, the British cavalry was formed as a Corps of Dragoons, Corps of Lancers 
and Corps of Hussars. On enlistment, men agreed, and were obliged, to serve 
within their own corps.  A Hussar enlisted as a ‘Hussar of The Line’; although he 
joined a particular Hussar regiment, he might be required to serve in any other 
of the Hussar regiments.  The 15th Hussars were an example, engaged in Ireland 
in 1919, where ‘the Irish Republican Army was very active at the time’. The 15th 
Hussars had to: 
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‘find armed guards, and pickets, escorts and patrols, and there was hardly 
a man in the Regiment at the time who knew how to ride, or use his 
arms… As soon as men became slightly trained they had to be despatched 
to the 19th Hussars in India, where men were wanted as badly as in 
Ireland’.62   
 
The author’s father was one of these men who served in five different Hussar 
regiments between 1919 and 1922 (the 13th - enlistment and training, the 15th – 
The Rhine and Ireland, the 19th and the 4th – India, and the 8th - home and 
demobilization), although most of his service was in only two of these regiments 
and the majority in just one, the 4th (Queen’s Own) Hussars.63  In 1924, the rank 
of ‘Private’ was changed to the rank of ‘Trooper’ 64 and from 1932, the separate 
Corps were abolished and a single Corps formed, known as ‘Cavalry of the 
Line’.65 From then on a cavalryman of any rank was required to serve in any 
cavalry regiment anywhere in the world.   
 
Policing the Empire and the Cardwell system had been given as an excuse for the 
delay in modernizing and mechanizing the British Army and horsed regiments in 
                                                 
62 Carnock, The History of the 15th The King’s Hussars 1914-1922, p.217. 
63 Army form B.200 (Trial) Statement of the Services of No. 537071 Salmon. W; (Army Personnel 
Centre, Glasgow). 
64 Army Order 222/1923; Army form B.200 (Trial) Statement of the Services of No. 537071 
Salmon. W; (Army Personnel Centre, Glasgow); Oats, I Serve - Regimental History of 3rd 
Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards), p.244. 
65 TNA WO/32 3059 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Reconstruction of the Corps of 
Cavalry 
Brereton ,A History of the 4th/7th Royal Dragoon Guards and their predecessors 1685-1980, 
p.354.  
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particular. The Achilles heel was India. 66   In the late 1930s, the 10th Hussars, 
for example, were not planned to mechanize to a motor cavalry regiment until 
after their return from India; the Queen’s Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards) were 
brought home early from India in order to mechanize to a light tank cavalry 
regiment.67  The feature of the Cardwell system relevant to this thesis was 
training and maintaining a reserve pool of troops at home to feed the overseas 
garrisons.  In order for this pool of troops to integrate into units abroad and 
perform as a team, they all had to be trained in the same way and with similar 
equipment. 68  It can be inferred, therefore, that as the Indian Army units, 
funded by the Indian Government, were not mechanized, neither could be the 
British Army units required to integrate with them.  Policing India and protecting 
the North West Frontier both against Afghan insurgents, and a possible Soviet 
Russian invasion, took a quarter of a million troops, sixty-thousand of whom 
were British troops.  Units were drawn from both the Indian and British armies 
including five British cavalry regiments. Although kept separate as units, the 
British battalions were brigaded with Indian regiments, two Indian to one 
British.69 In order that these brigades should remain operationally effective, the 
implication was that both Indian and British units had to have the same 
equipment and training; in the cavalry’s case, it was either to remain horsed or 
be mechanized.  Even if the British Government chose to afford to mechanize 
                                                 
66 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/Cav/831 Minute 4; TNA WO32/4633 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): 
Appeal against the proposed mechanisation resulting in the retention of the Royal Scots Greys 
and the Royal Dragoons as horsed regiments 1936-1937; Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, p.258; 
Bond, British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars, pp.101&112. 
67 TNA WO 32/2847 Army Organisation: Cavalry (Code 14(D)): Introduction of a Mobile Division 
1934-1936 20/General/5512 (S.D.2.) 18 December 1935. 
68 Bond, Brian [1980], British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars p.101; quoting ‘one of 
the Army’s indefatigable advocates of reform, Major B C Denning’ in 1928. 
69 Ibid., p.99. 
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the British cavalry, which it chose not to do, the Indian Government could not 
afford to do so, and did not think this expenditure necessary for the role that 
was expected from their army. The Indian Government had to fund the cost of 
British troops in India. This was costing a third of their total revenue; in 
addition, the Indian Government was later expected to fund the training of 
these British troops in the United Kingdom prior to their embarkation.  This cost 
became something of a vicious spiral: the growth of Indian Nationalism meant 
that troop numbers had to be maintained, and the increasing burden of taxation 
on the Indian people to pay for these troops encouraged further the drive for 
self-determination.70 As in Britain, economic pressures in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s caused a steady reduction in Indian Government defence 
expenditure.71 This situation continued until 1933 when, in return for an Indian 
Division being available for Imperial Service, the UK Government contributed 
£1.5m to the Indian defence budget.  This established the precedent that Indian 







                                                 
70 Ibid., pp.109/110 and pp.111/112. 
71 Ibid., p.111. 
72 Ibid., p.112. 
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Appendix C - Biographies73 
 
Atlee, Clement Richard, first Earl Atlee (1883-1967) was educated at Haileybury 
College and University College Oxford.  Lawyer, lecturer and politician.  He was 
Manager of Haileybury House Boys’ Club in Stepney for 14 years, where his east 
London experience converted him to socialism and he became secretary for the 
Stepney Independent Labour Party.  He served in the Great War in Gallipoli and 
Mesopotamia where he was wounded.  By 1917 he was a Major in the Tank Corps.  
Atlee became Mayor of Stepney in 1919, Member of Parliament in 1922, and 
became Principal Parliamentary Secretary for Ramsay MacDonald and 
Undersecretary for War in the first Labour Government. In 1930 he was 
Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster and in 1931 Postmaster General; he did not 
serve in the National Government.  Atlee became deputy leader of the Labour 
Party under Lansbury, and the leader in 1935. He served in the War Cabinet from 
1940 and as Churchill’s deputy from 1942.  He was Prime Minister from 1945-
1951. 
 
Baldwin, Stanley, First Earl of Bewdley (1867-1947) was educated at Harrow and 
Trinity College Cambridge. He joined the family iron and steel business, 
becoming Managing Director in 1902, and remained in post until resigning to take 
up ministerial office in 1917.  He was elected to the Commons unopposed in his 
late father’s seat in 1908.  He was Financial Secretary in 1919, Board of Trade 
1921, Chancellor of The Exchequer 1922, Prime Minister 1923-1924 and 1924-
                                                 
73 Summarized from various sources, but principally from the Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography; URL: http:// www. Oxforddnb.com 
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1929; Leader of The Opposition 1929-1931, Lord President of The Council 1931-
1935, Prime Minister again 1935-1937, when he resigned and accepted a 
peerage. 
 
Belisha, Isaac Leslie Hore (1893-1957) was educated at Clifton College, 
Heidelberg, the Sorbonne, and St John’s College Oxford.  He was commissioned 
into the Army Service Corps and saw action during the Great War in France, 
Salonika, Cyprus and Egypt. He attained the rank of Major, but was invalided 
home in 1918.  Admitted to the Inner Temple in 1922, he was elected Member of 
Parliament in 1923 and served at the Board of Trade, Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury, 1932, Minister of Transport, 1934, Cabinet, 1936 and Secretary of 
State for War in 1937. 
 
Birch, General Sir James Fredrick Noel (Curly) 1865-1939, was educated at 
Giggleswick School, Marlborough College and the Royal Military Academy, 
Woolwich.  He was commissioned into the Royal Horse Artillery in 1885.  He 
served with the Ashanti Expedition, and later in the Boer War.  From 1905-1907 
he commanded the Riding Establishment at Woolwich, and published two books 
on horse riding.  Birch served in France throughout the Great War and became 
Haig’s artillery advisor.  He was promoted Lieutenant General in 1919 and later 
served as Director of Remounts at the War Office, and Director General of the 
Territorial Army.  He was promoted General in 1926 and was Master General of 
the Ordnance until 1927 when he retired from the army to become a director of 
Vickers.  Birch was married to Florence Hyacynth Chetwode, sister of Philip 
Chetwode – later Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, 7th Baronet. 
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Broad, Charles Noel Frank, (1882-1976), was educated at Wellington College, 
Berkshire, and Pembroke College, Cambridge.  He served as a Private in the 
militia during the South African War, and was commissioned into the Royal 
Artillery in 1905.  After passing Staff College, Broad served as a Brigade Major in 
France from the summer of 1915, the year he married Lillian Mary Mackintosh.  
He was awarded the DSO in 1917.  After the war he became an artillery 
instructor at the Staff College and transferred to the Royal Tank Corps in 1923 
where he continued to instruct gunnery, becoming a chief instructor at the Tank 
Corps Central School in 1925.  Board was the author of the ‘purple primer’ – 
Mechanized and Armoured Formations – in 1929 and later, as a brigadier, 
commanded the experimental mechanized force (later the armoured force) in 
the Salisbury Plain exercises.  The disbandment of this ‘force’ is discussed within 
this thesis.  
 
In 1939, Broad first led the Aldershot Command and later, as a Lieutenant 
General, commanded the Eastern Army in India.  He was appointed CB in 1938 
and KCB in 1941; he retired in 1942, but continued as colonel-commandant of 
the RTC until 1948. 
 
Chetwode, Sir Philip Walhouse, 1st Baron Chetwode, 7th Baronet, GCB, 
OM,GCSI,KCMG,DSO (1869-1950) was educated at Eton and commissioned into 
the 3rd Battalion the Oxfordshire Light Infantry Militia. He entered the Regular 
Army November 1889 as a Second Lieutenant in the 19th Hussars.  Chetwode 
became a protégé of his commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel, later Field 
Marshal Sir J P D French; he served in India and saw action in South Africa where 
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he was twice Mentioned in Despatches and awarded a DSO.  Later he spent time 
on the Staff at Aldershot and then became Commanding Officer of the 19th 
Hussars from 1908 until 1911 when he was transferred, as Colonel, to a newly 
formed mounted Territorial Unit. He commanded the 5th Cavalry Brigade in 
August 1914, and saw action on the Western Front until November 1916 when he 
was given command of the Desert Mounted Corps in Palestine, and played a 
major role under Sir Edmund Allenby.  He was wounded, and eight times 
mentioned in Despatches.  Chetwode became a Lieutenant General 1919, served 
at the War Office, as GOC Aldershot, Commander-in-Chief India, and was 
appointed Field Marshal 1933.  He married in 1899 into the Stapleton-Cotton 
family - a famous cavalry family – later his daughter married the poet John (later 
Sir John) Betjeman.  
 
Churchill, Sir Winston Leonard Spencer (1874-1965) was educated at Harrow 
and Sandhurst, being commissioned 20.02.1894 into the 4th Queen’s Own 
Hussars.  He served in India, Sudan and South Africa and was also a journalist 
and author. Elected Member of Parliament October 1900, he served at the Board 
of Trade 1908 and as First Lord of the Admiralty 1911.  He left office and served 
with the British Army in France November 1915 to May 1916, leaving to return to 
government as Minister of Munitions in 1917, and Chancellor of Exchequer 1924.   
Out of office for a time, he returned to The Admiralty in the autumn of 1939 and 
was Prime Minister 1940 - 1945 and 1951 - 1955. 
 
Fisher, Sir Norman Fenwick Warren (1879-1948) was educated at Winchester 
College and Hertford College, Oxford.  He became a civil servant. Fisher served 
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on the Board of Inland Revenue in 1903 where he worked his way up to become 
Chairman in 1918. He became Permanent Secretary to the Treasury 1919, and 
the first ever Head of the Civil Service. 
 
Fuller, John Frederick Charles (1878-1966) was educated at Malvern College 
and the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.  He was commissioned in 1899 into 
the Oxfordshire Light Infantry and served in the South African War (1899-1902). 
He served as a Staff Officer in the Great War. After a regimental administrative 
post, he was Chief Instructor at the Camberley Staff College (1923-1926) and 
then Military Assistant to the CIGS. Fuller retired in 1933 and devoted his time to 
writing and speaking on military matters.  He is popularly considered a military 
theorist, historian and pioneer, certainly an advocate, of armoured warfare in 
which he collaborated with Basil Liddell Hart. 
 
Haig, Douglas, first Earl Haig (1861-1928) was educated at Clifton College, 
Brasenose College, Oxford, and Sandhurst, and was Commissioned in 1885 into 
the 7th Hussars. He served in India, and was allowed to attend Staff College by 
nomination 1896. Haig served in Sudan and as a Staff Officer in South Africa.   
He was Corps Commander in 1914, Army Commander 1915, and Commander in 
Chief BEF from late 1915 until November 1918.  
 
Hankey, Maurice Pascal Alers, 1st Baron Hankey (1877–1963) was educated 
privately and then at Rugby School and Trinity College, Cambridge. He passed 
out ‘first’ from the Royal Naval College being awarded the Sword of Honour and 
was commissioned into the Royal Marine Artillery in 1897.  He served on HMS 
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Ramillies doing intelligence work and came to the notice of Admiral Sir John 
Fisher.  Hankey joined the Whitehall staff in 1902 where he remained for his 
entire career except for another brief spell at sea in 1907, again as an 
intelligence officer. He joined the Admiralty Committee of Imperial Defence 
and, in various roles and positions, remained part of the committee for over 
thirty years. Hankey was Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence from 
1912-1938 during which time his administrative duties expanded to include the 
War Cabinet and the Privy Council.  He was created a peer in 1939 and returned 
from retirement to serve in Chamberlain’s War Cabinet and chaired the 
Scientific Committee. He retired in 1952.  He was awarded many honours 
including KCB, GMCG and GCVO. 
 
Henderson, Arthur (1862-1935) was an Iron-moulder, trade unionist and 
politician. He was a committed Christian and had first been a Liberal supporter, 
moving to Labour with his trades union. He was elected Member of Parliament 
1903 and served as Labour Party Treasurer and Chairman.  He was a member of 
the Union of Democratic Control and became a Cabinet member and Chief Whip 
in 1915.  His son was killed on the Somme in 1916.  Henderson chaired many 
boards and advisory committees.  Henderson was vehemently opposed to 
communism, and, with Lord Robert Cecil, a great supporter of the League of 
Nations.  He became Home Secretary in the first Labour Government in 1924, 
and Foreign Secretary in 1929.  He was elected Labour Leader in 1931 after 
MacDonald’s departure; he lost his seat, but continued as Leader (with George 
Lansbury) for a short time.  Henderson was passionately interested in world 
peace and was nominated to open the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1932; 
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he presided over it until 1935 and died shortly afterwards.  He had been 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1934.  
 
Hobart, Percy Cleghorn Stanley (1885-1957) was educated at Clifton College 
and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich; he was commissioned into the Royal 
Engineers in 1907, and was posted to an Indian Army engineer regiment.  Hobart 
enjoyed equestrian sport and was a great lover of poetry.  He served in France 
from 1915 and was awarded the MC.  From 1916 he served as a staff officer in 
aerial reconnaissance in Mesopotamia, was wounded and was awarded the DSO.  
After recovering he served with the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.  He was 
appointed OBE in 1919, and the same year he passed through Staff College. 
Hobart joined the RTC in 1923.  He served in various appointments including as 
an instructor at the staff college at Quetta.  His ‘prickly’ personality and 
impropriety in his personal life did not endear him to some of his superiors, he 
was, however, supported by CIGS Montgomery-Massingberd.  He became deputy 
director of staff duties (AFVs) in 1937 and, later, as Major General, the director 
of military training. In 1938 Hobart was appointed to command the Mobile 
Division in Egypt, but after disagreements, both professional and personal, with 
his superiors he was sacked. 
 
Hobart served as a corporal in the Home Guard, but was then appointed to 
command the 11th and then 79th Armoured Divisions to develop special 
armoured equipment for D Day, which he did with great success.  He was 
appointed CB in 1939 and KBE in 1943, retiring in 1946, but continued as Colonel 
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Commandant of the RTR until 1951.  His sister, Elizabeth (Betty), married Field 
Marshal Lord Montgomery. 
 
Hogg, Douglas McGarel 1st Viscount Hailsham, (1872-1950) was educated at Eton 
College and vocationally in the West Indies.  He served in the Boer War and was 
called to the bar in 1902.  He became a Conservative politician and served in 
government as Attorney General, Minister of War (from 5 November 1931 until 7 
June 1935), when he became Leader of the House of Lords and Lord Chancellor. 
 
Jones, Dr Thomas, CH (1870-1955) was born in Rhymney, Monmouthshire, and 
until aged 13, when he started work, he attended the local grammar school.  
After saving money and with encouragement from family and management, he 
later reached the University of Wales in 1895, followed by the University of 
Glasgow.  Until 1917 Jones was the Secretary to the Welsh National Health 
Insurance Commission and was an influential academic.  He was said to have 
been one of the architects of Lloyd George’s ‘bid for supreme power’ in 1916.  
Jones joined the War Cabinet Secretariat and later, as secretary to Sir Maurice 
Hankey, became the secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence.  Jones was 
an assistant secretary and then Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet and for the next 
fourteen years served four Prime Ministers. 
 
Lansbury, George (1859-1940) Leader of the Labour Party, was born in Suffolk 
and brought up in east London.  He had an elementary education and originally 
worked as a labourer, but later took over his father-in-law’s timber business.  
Originally he was a liberal, but later he converted to socialism and became a 
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local councillor; he was elected Member of Parliament in 1910. He founded the 
Daily Herald in 1912 and was its editor until 1922.  Lansbury was appointed 
Commissioner of Works in the MacDonald Government of 1929 and was the only 
cabinet minister to survive the 1931 General Election, after which he became 
Labour Party leader.  Already in conflict with trades unionists over his pacifist 
views, he resigned in 1935, later he became President of the Peace Pledge 
Union.  
 
Liddell Hart, Sir Basil Henry (1895-1970) was educated at St Paul’s School and 
Corpus Christi, Cambridge, and became a military historian and strategist.  He 
was commissioned into the Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry; he became a 
casualty of The Somme in 1916. He left the army aged 28, after 10 years’ 
service.  Later, he became a Military Correspondent for the Daily Telegraph 
1925-1935 and The Times 1935-1939.  He published over 30 books and for a short 
time was an ‘unofficial advisor’ to the War Minister Leslie Hore-Belisha.  He was 
knighted in 1966. 
 
MacDonald, James Ramsay (1866-1937) Labour politician and Prime Minister 
1924 and 1929-1935; previously Leader of the Opposition 1922-1924. MacDonald 
served as Lord President of the Council until just before his death in 1937.  He 
was educated in the Parish School and became a teacher in Lossiemouth, later 
assistant to a clergyman in Bristol.  His interests in socialist ideas grew.  He later 
took classes at Birkbeck Institute and gained experience as a private secretary to 
a Liberal politician.  MacDonald joined Keir Hardy’s Independent Labour Party 
(ILP) in 1894 and was elected Member of Parliament in 1906 for the Labour 
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Party, which had absorbed the ILP.  He became party leader in 1911, but 
resigned in opposition to the war in 1914, being replaced by Arthur Henderson. 
Despite his opposition to the war, he visited the Western Front with an 
ambulance unit.  He lost his seat in 1918, was returned again in 1922 and was re-
elected as party leader.  
 
Makins, Major General Sir Ernest (1869-1959) was educated at Winchester and 
Christ Church College, Cambridge.  He served in South Africa 1899-1902, was 
Mentioned in Despatches, and in The Great War as Temporary Brigadier-General 
of a Cavalry Brigade, where he again was Mentioned in Despatches.  He was later 
appointed KBE, CB and DSO. Makins was elected Member of Parliament for 
Knutsford and served from 1922. 
 
Norrie, Lieutenant General Charles Willoughby Moke 1st Baron Norrie, a 
former 11th Hussar and distinguished Great War veteran, he commanded the 1st 
Armoured Division England in 1940 and later in the Middle East.  He commanded 
XXX Corps during ‘Operation Crusader’ and later became Commander, Royal 
Armoured Corps. 
 
Simon, John Allsebrook, first Viscount Simon (1873-1954) was educated at 
kindergarten in Manchester, King Edward’s School, Bath, Fettes College, 
Edinburgh and Wadham College, Oxford. He was called to the Bar in 1898 and his 
legal career ‘prospered’. Simon was elected Liberal MP for Walthamstow in 
1906.  At aged 37 he was the youngest ever solicitor-general and later became 
attorney-general and member of the Cabinet. Simon was Home Secretary in 
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1915, but resigned in 1916 over the introduction of conscription. He joined the 
Royal Flying Corps and served with distinction. He lost his seat in 1918, but was 
re-elected in 1922 and became deputy leader of the Liberal Party. In the hiatus 
of the late 1920s and early 1930s, Simon formed the Liberal national group and 
served as Foreign Secretary in the MacDonald Government. He moved to the 
Home Office 1935 – 1937, having been accused as being the worst Foreign 
Secretary since ‘Ethelred the Unready’. Simon became Chancellor of the 
Exchequer when Chamberlain became Prime Minister.  After Churchill took 
control, Simon served as Lord Chancellor.  He left political office in 1945, but 
remained active in the House of Lords. 
 
Snowden,, Philip (1864-1937) First Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer 1924, 
again in 1929, and in the National Government of 1931.  A Methodist and 
originally a Liberal, he became convinced of socialist ideology and joined the 
Independent Labour Party. Originally an insurance clerk in Burnley, he later 
joined the Inland Revenue in the North and West Country.  He was elected 
Member of Parliament 1906.  Snowden maintained his pacifist beliefs during the 
Great War and supported conscientious objectors.  He lost his seat in 1918, was 
re-elected 1922 and created Viscount Snowden; he served as Lord Privy Seal 
1931-1932.  He resigned over a trade protection issue. 
 
Thomas, George Holt (1869-1929) made his ‘name and fortune’ by founding the 
newspapers The Bystander – in which appeared the comic character ‘Old Bill’ 
and Empire Illustrated.  He formed the Aircraft Manufacturing Company Limited 
in 1912 and later, to Geoffrey de Havilland’s design, made a significant number 
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of fighters and bombers used by the British and Americans during the Great War.  
He later became an advocate for civil aviation. 
 
Weir, William Douglas, first Viscount Weir (1877-1959) was educated at Glasgow 
High School, an engineer, industrialist and public servant.  By 1913 two thirds of 
his companies’ work was on warships. He served on the central advisory 
committee on munitions during the Great War.  He was knighted in 1917.  He 
was involved with the formation of the RAF and was created Baron Weir in 1918.  
Baron Weir was a supporter of Basil Liddell Hart’s theories on the pre-eminence 
of tanks. 
 
Wyndham, Colonel The Hon. Everard Humphrey (1888-1970) commanded a 
machine-gun squadron in France during The Great War, and The Life Guards for 
four years.  He is the author of The Household Cavalry at War: The First 
Household Cavalry Regiment (Gale and Poldon, Aldershot, 1952) and War Diary 











Growth in the support for Labour, 1900-1929 
 
Election Number of 
votes for the 
Labour Party 
Share of votes Seats Outcome of the 
election 
1900 62,698 1.8% 2 Conservative 
victory 
1906 321,663 5.7% 29 Liberal victory 
1910 
January 




371,802 7.1% 42 Liberal minority 
government 
1918 2,245,777 21.5% 57 Coalition victory 
1922 4,076,665 29.7% 142 Conservative 
victory 
1923 4,267,831 30.7% 191 Labour minority 
government 
1924 5,281,626 33.3% 151 Conservative 
victory 







Growth in the support for Labour, 1931-1935 
 
Election Total votes for 
the Labour Party 
including 
Independent 








Total number of 
all Labour seats 
Outcome of 
the election 


















President Wilson’s Fourteen Points 
 
 
1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no 
private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall 
proceed always frankly and in the public view. 
 
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, 
alike in peace and war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in 
part by international action for the enforcement of international 
covenants. 
 
3. The removal, so far as is possible, of all economic barriers and the 
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations 
consenting to peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. 
 
4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be 
reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 
 
5. A free, open minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial 
claims, based on a strict observance of the principle that in determining 
all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations 
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concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of 
government whose title is to be determined. 
 
6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all 
questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation 
of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and 
unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own 
political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere 
welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own 
choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance of every kind that she 
may need and may herself desire.  The treatment accorded to Russia by 
her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good 
will, of her comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own 
interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. 
 
7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, 
without any attempt to limit the sovereignty she now enjoys in common 
with all other free nations.  No other single act will serve as will to 
restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have 
themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with 
one another.  Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of 
international law is forever impaired. 
 
8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, 
and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsase-
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Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty 
years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made 
secure in the interests of all. 
 
9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly 
recognised lines of nationality. 
 
10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish 
to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest 
opportunity of autonomous development. 
 
11. Roumania,[sic] Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated: occupied 
territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea: 
and the relations of several Balkan states to one another determined by 
friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and 
nationality; and international guarantees of political and economic 
independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should 
be entered into. 
 
12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a 
secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under 
Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an 
absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the 
Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships 
and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. 
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13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the 
territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be 
assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and 
economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by 
international covenant. 
 
14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants 
for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and 
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The analysis of the Peace Ballot announced by Viscount Cecil at the Royal Albert 
Hall, June 27 1935.75 
Question 1. Should Great Britain remain a member of the League of Nations? 
yes no doubtful abstentions 
11,090,387 355,888 10,470 102,425 
 
Question 2. Are you in favour of an all-round reduction in armaments by 
international agreement? 
yes no doubtful abstentions 
10,470,489 862,775 12,062 213,839 
 
Question 3.  Are you in favour of an all-round abolition of national military 
and naval aircraft by international agreement? 
yes no doubtful abstentions 
9,533,558 1,689,786 16,976 318,845 
 
Question 4.  Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for private profit 
be prohibited by international agreement? 
yes no doubtful abstentions 
10,417,329 775,415 15,076 351,834 
 
Question 5. Do you consider that, if a nation insists on attacking another, the 
other nation should combine to compel it to stop by 
(a) economic and non-military measures? 
yes no doubtful abstentions 
10,027,608 635,074 27,255 855,107 
 
(b) if necessary, military measures? 
yes no doubtful abstentions 
6,784,368 2,351,981 40,893 2,364,441 
 
Total votes - 11,599,165 i.e. 27.9% of the total number of voters in Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. 
 
                                                 
75 Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p.128. 
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Appendix G 
Provision of Army Estimates for the purchase and maintenance of animals and 


















% SPEND ON 
VEHICLES 
% SPEND ON 
ANIMALS 
1927 41,565 190.25 520 2.48 1.75 
1928 41,050 171 555 2.65 1.78 
1929 40,545 254 540 3.04 1.70 
1930 40,500 178 319 2.35 1.65 
1931 39,930 221 357 2.36 1.47 
1932 36,488 226 309 2.24 1.32 
1933 37,950 158 348 2.34 1.26 
1934 39,600 193 501 2.64 1.15 
1935 44,900 407 772 3.95 1.05 
1936 55,881 1,729 842 6.29 .7 
1937 82,174 2,747 3,625 9.24 .25 






                                                 





Part of the list of maintenance and repair tasks for AFVs needed to be learned 
and undertaken by cavalrymen as suggested by Lieutenant Harold ‘Pete’ Pyman 
for the 17th/21st Lancers, 20 June 1938.77 
 
                                                 
77 LHCMH, Pyman 1/1-28, 7, 1938. 
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Appendix I 
An example of the standard required for the classification for a Diver eligible for 




                                                 




MachaniZation and MechaniSation 
 
The spelling used in this thesis is the traditional form using the letter ‘z’ from 
the Greek mĕkhanikos (machine); the exceptions being  direct quotes from 
written sources where the original spelling with an ‘s’ has been used. 
 
In considering these issues surrounding the mechanization of British horsed 
cavalry regiments, it important to know that this study makes a distinction 
between three key terms, armour, mechanization and motorization.  Some 
contemporary sources do not make these terms clear. The following are the 
definitions used in each case with in this study: 
 
Armour – A term applied to two kinds of armouring on land, a wheeled vehicle 
(armoured car) or a tracked vehicle (tank).  The term ‘tank’ was ‘coined in 1915 
to conceal the true purpose of early “landships”, which has stuck’79 to describe 
a vehicle powered by an internal combustion engine and covered with protective 
armoured plate, armed with machine guns, cannon or both.  Later designs 
combined the feature of a revolving turret. 
 
Mechanization – A term usually associated with the debate between the wars on 
the development of armoured warfare that included the role of air power.  With 
                                                 
79 Fletcher, David ‘Tanks’ in Holmes. R. (ed.) [2001] 0xford Companion To Military History, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford) p.898.   
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both land and sea applications the inference is that the mechanically propelled 
vehicle is covered with protective armour plate.  
 
Motorization – This term is applied to the substitution of horses for wheeled 
vehicles powered by internal combustion engines for the transportation of 
personnel or equipment.  These vehicles are not usually covered with protective 
armoured plate.  
 
‘Charger’ - Officers alone were allowed to keep their horses, known as 
‘chargers’ or ‘officer’s mounts’.  The common term, and dictionary definition, 
for a cavalry horse is a ‘charger’, but most cavalry horses were (and still are) not 
‘chargers’ as such but troop-horses or ‘troopers’.  Cavalry horses are of mixed 
breed, ‘hunter-type’ usually with some ‘thoroughbred’ blood in them for 
stamina, well mannered, capable of carrying weight and currently stand no less 
than 16.3hh., although  some cavalry horses of the inter-war period may have 
been smaller.  Officers, and trumpeters on grey horses, who accompany officers, 
ride ‘chargers’.  ‘Charger Definitions’ – Animal Defence Centre; personal 
correspondence with the author 8 May 2012; also see Tylden, Major G., [1980], 
Horses and Saddlery, (J A Allen & Company, London) pp.3,5/6,8 – passim - 
Tylden acknowledged the difficulty of definition p.17 and Scott Daniell, David 
[1959], 4th Hussar The Story of The 4th Queen's Own Hussars 1685-1958, (Gale 
and Polden, Aldershot) p.283 re Captain Scott-Cockburn’s horse ‘Carclew’ – 






A breakdown of the interviewees by Unit 
 
Service and Unit Number of Interviewees 
Royal Tank Corps  
First Light Battalion 2 
Second Battalion 4 
Fifth Battalion 2 
Sixth Battalion 3 
3rd Armoured Car Company 1 
4th Armoured Car Company 1 
Regular Cavalry/Royal Armoured Corps  
1st Dragoon Guards 2 
2nd Dragoon Guards 1 
3rd Dragoon Guards 1 attached 
Royal Scots Greys 3 
7th Hussars 1 
9th Lancers 1 attached 
11th Hussars 3 
12th Lancers 3 
13th/18th Hussars 2 
15th/19th Hussars 3 
16th/5th Lancers 2 
17th/21st Lancers 1 
110 Regiment Royal Armoured Corps 1 
Armoured Infantry  
Guards Armoured Division 1 
Yeomanry Cavalry Regiments  
Westminster Dragoons 1 
Northamptonshire 1 
Fife and Forfar 1 
Cheshire 1 
British Empire  
15th Northern Rivers Lancers – Australian Light 
Horse 
1 
Others 6 
Total 49 
 
